- Praveen Paruchuri1,
- Jonathan P. Pearce2,
- Janusz Marecki3,
- Milind Tambe4,
- Fernando Ordóñez4 &
- …
- Sarit Kraus5,6
236Accesses
13Citations
Abstract
We consider the problem of providing decision support to a patrolling or security service in an adversarial domain. The idea is to create patrols that can achieve a high level of coverage or reward while taking into account the presence of an adversary. We assume that the adversary can learn or observe the patrolling strategy and use this to its advantage. We follow two different approaches depending on what is known about the adversary. If there is no information about the adversary we use a Markov Decision Process (MDP) to represent patrols and identify randomized solutions that minimize the information available to the adversary. This lead to the development of algorithms CRLP and BRLP, for policy randomization of MDPs. Second, when there is partial information about the adversary we decide on efficient patrols by solving a Bayesian–Stackelberg games. Here, the leader decides first on a patrolling strategy and then an adversary, of possibly many adversary types, selects its best response for the given patrol. We provide two efficient MIP formulations named DOBSS and ASAP to solve this NP-hard problem. Our experimental results show the efficiency of these algorithms and illustrate how these techniques provide optimal and secure patrolling policies. We note that these models have been applied in practice, with DOBSS being at the heart of the ARMOR system that is currently deployed at the Los Angeles International airport (LAX) for randomizing checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals.
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Notes
The ARMOR software has been developed in close interaction with the LAWA (Los Angeles World Airports) police, and has been in use at LAX since Aug’07.
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Acknowledgments
This research is supported by the United States Department of Homeland Security through Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE). This work was supported in part by NSF grant no. IIS0705587 and ISF.
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Authors and Affiliations
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 15232, USA
Praveen Paruchuri
Knight Capital Group, Jersey city, NJ, USA
Jonathan P. Pearce
IBM Research, York Town, NY, USA
Janusz Marecki
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, 90089, USA
Milind Tambe & Fernando Ordóñez
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 52900, Israel
Sarit Kraus
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742, USA
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Correspondence toFernando Ordóñez.
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Paruchuri, P., Pearce, J.P., Marecki, J.et al. Coordinating randomized policies for increasing security of agent systems.Inf Technol Manag10, 67–79 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10799-008-0047-9
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