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On achieving secure collaboration in supply chains

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Abstract

Security of private information is a critical requirement for information sharing in supply chains. Security is measured on a variety of metrics: participating suppliers in a supply chain process need guarantees on confidentiality, anonymity, and privacy; the purchaser needs assurance on verifiability and non-repudiation. Given the mutually exclusive nature of security metrics such as anonymity vs. non-repudiation, and confidentiality vs. verifiability, the challenge is to design a process that satisfies all these metrics. In this paper, we propose three major processes that enable secure information sharing and secure computation of arbitrary supply chain functions. We evaluate and compare the secure processes using a ranking method and score function, which we propose for that purpose. We find that certain processes will be preferred over other processes, depending on the environmental characteristics and user preferences. Thus, our secure processes aim to solve major collaboration issues in supply chains.

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Notes

  1. Forrester Research

  2. This list includes companies such as SAP, Logility, and Infosys.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. American University in Dubai, PO Box 28282, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

    Sharad Barkataki & Hassan Zeineddine

Authors
  1. Sharad Barkataki

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  2. Hassan Zeineddine

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Corresponding author

Correspondence toSharad Barkataki.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1Appendix A: Figures

Fig. 1
figure 1

Supply chain context

Fig. 2
figure 2

Message sequence for the STTP process

Fig. 3
figure 3

Message sequence for the WTTP process

Fig. 4
figure 4

Message sequence for the NTTP process

1.2Appendix B: Tables

Table 1 Robustness to cracking
Table 2 Robustness to collusion
Table 3 Ease of implementation

1.3Appendix C: Glossary of terms

  1. 1.)

    TTP: Trusted Third Party

  2. 2.)

    STTP: Secure process with a strongly trusted third party

  3. 3.)

    WTTP: Secure process with a weakly trusted third party

  4. 4.)

    NTTP: Secure process with no third party.

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