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A bankruptcy approach to the core cover

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Abstract

In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.

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ArticleOpen access26 August 2019

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tinbergen Institute and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    A. Estévez-Fernández

  2. Department of Statistics and Operations Research, Vigo University, Vigo, Spain

    M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, M. A. Mosquera & E. Sánchez-Rodríguez

Authors
  1. A. Estévez-Fernández

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  2. M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro

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  3. M. A. Mosquera

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  4. E. Sánchez-Rodríguez

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Corresponding author

Correspondence toM. G. Fiestras-Janeiro.

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Estévez-Fernández, A., Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G., Mosquera, M.A.et al. A bankruptcy approach to the core cover.Math Meth Oper Res76, 343–359 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2

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