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Abstract
Algorithmic progress and future technology threaten today’s cryptographic protocols. Long-term secure protocols should not even in future reveal more information to a—then possibly unlimited—adversary.
In this work we initiate the study of protocols which are long-term secureand universally composable. We show that the usual set-up assumptions used for UC protocols (e.g., a common reference string) are not sufficient to achieve long-term secureand composable protocols for commitments or general zero knowledge arguments. Surprisingly, nontrivial zero knowledge protocols are possible based on a coin tossing functionality: We give a long-term secure composable zero knowledge protocol proving the knowledge of the factorisation of a Blum integer.
Furthermore we give practical alternatives (e.g., signature cards) to the usual setup-assumptions and show that these allow to implement the important primitives commitment and zero-knowledge argument.
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IAKS, Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Germany
Jörn Müller-Quade
Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
Dominique Unruh
- Jörn Müller-Quade
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- Dominique Unruh
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Müller-Quade, J., Unruh, D. (2007). Long-Term Security and Universal Composability. In: Vadhan, S.P. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4392. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70936-7_3
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