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Initiator-Resilient Universally Composable Key Exchange

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Part of the book series:Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2808))

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Abstract

Key exchange protocols in the setting ofuniversal composability are investigated. First we show that the ideal functionality\(\mathcal{F}_{\rm KE}\) of [9] cannot be realized in the presence of adaptive adversaries, thereby disproving a claim in [9]. We proceed to propose a modification\(\mathcal{F}_{\rm KE}^{(i,j)}\), which is proven to be realizable by two natural protocols for key exchange. Furthermore, sufficient conditions for securely realizing this modified functionality are given. Two notions of key exchange are introduced that allow for security statements even when one party is corrupted. Two natural key exchange protocols are proven to fulfill the ”weaker” of these notions, and a construction for deriving protocols that satisfy the ”stronger” notion is given.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. IAKS, Arbeitsgruppe Systemsicherheit, Prof. Dr. Th. Beth, Fakultät für Informatik, Universität Karlsruhe, 76131, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Dennis Hofheinz, Jörn Müller-Quade & Rainer Steinwandt

Authors
  1. Dennis Hofheinz

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  2. Jörn Müller-Quade

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  3. Rainer Steinwandt

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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Norwegian Information Security Lab, Department of Computer Science and Media Technology, Gjovik University College, P.O. Box 191, 2802, Gjovik, Norway

    Einar Snekkenes

  2. Institute for Security in Distributed Applications, Hamburg University of Technology, 21071, Hamburg, Germany

    Dieter Gollmann

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hofheinz, D., Müller-Quade, J., Steinwandt, R. (2003). Initiator-Resilient Universally Composable Key Exchange. In: Snekkenes, E., Gollmann, D. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2003. ESORICS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2808. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39650-5_4

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