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Round-Reduced Modular Construction of Asymmetric Password-Authenticated Key Exchange

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Abstract

Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) establishes a shared key between two parties who hold the same password, assuring security against offline password-guessing attacks. Theasymmetric PAKE (a.k.a.augmented orverifier-based PAKE) strengthens this notion by allowing one party, typically a server, to hold a one-way hash of the password, with the property that a compromise of the server allows the adversary to recover the password only via theoffline dictionary attack against this hashed password. Today’s client-to-server Internet authentication is asymmetric, with the server holding only a (salted) password hash, but it relies on client’s trust in the server’s public key certificate. By contrast, cryptographic PAKE literature addresses the password-only setting, without assuming certified public keys, but it commonly does not address the asymmetric PAKE setting which is required for client-to-server authentication.

The asymmetric PAKE (aPAKE) was defined in the Universally Composable (UC) framework by the work of Gentry et al. [15], who also provided a generic method of converting a UC PAKE to UC aPAKE, at the cost of two additional communication rounds. Motivated by practical applications of aPAKEs, in this paper we propose alternative methods for converting a UC PAKE to UC aPAKE, which use only one additional round. Moreover, since this extra message is sent from client to server, it does not add any round overhead in applications which require explicit client-to-server authentication. Importantly, this round-complexity reduction in the compiler comes at virtually no cost, since with respect to local computation and security assumptions our constructions are comparable to that of Gentry et al. [15].

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The compiler of [16] also adds up to 2 extra rounds to the aPAKE protocol, but for example in the case of any of our aPAKE constructions instantiated with the PAKE of Abdallaet al. [1] (see Fig. 4), the OPRF instance in the compiler of [16] would be piggybacked with the first two protocol flows, so the resultingprivately salted UC aPAKE would have the same 3 rounds.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government, Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) (No. 2016-0-00097, Development of Biometrics-Based Key Infrastructure Technology for Online Identification, and No. 2018-0-01369, Developing blockchain identity management system with implicit augmented authentication and privacy protection for O2O services), and supported by the MSIT, Korea, under the ITRC (Information Technology Research Center) support programs (IITP-2018-0-01423, and IITP-2018-2016-0-00304) supervised by the IITP. This work was also supported by Samsung Research Funding Center of Samsung Electronics under Project (No. SRFC-TB1403-52). We would like to thank anonymous SCN 2018 reviewers for their valuable comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, Daejeon, Republic of Korea

    Jung Yeon Hwang

  2. University of California, Irvine, USA

    Stanislaw Jarecki & Jiayu Xu

  3. Yonsei University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

    Taekyoung Kwon

  4. Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

    Joohee Lee

  5. Sejong University, Seoul, Republic of Korea

    Ji Sun Shin

Authors
  1. Jung Yeon Hwang

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  2. Stanislaw Jarecki

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  3. Taekyoung Kwon

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  4. Joohee Lee

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  5. Ji Sun Shin

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  6. Jiayu Xu

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Corresponding author

Correspondence toJoohee Lee.

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Catania, Catania, Italy

    Dario Catalano

  2. University of Salerno, Fisciano, Italy

    Roberto De Prisco

 A UC Password Authentication Functionalities

 A UC Password Authentication Functionalities

For reference we include the specification of functionalities\(\mathsf {F}_{\mathsf {rpwKE}}\) and\(\mathsf {F}_{\mathsf {apwKE}}\) introduced by [15] for modeling resp. symmetric PAKE and asymmetric PAKE protocols. We refer to Sect. 2 for an overview of these functionalities, and to [15] for their full discussion.

Fig. 5.
figure 5

The revised symmetric PAKE functionality\(\mathsf {F}_{\mathsf {rpwKE}}\) [15]

Fig. 6.
figure 6

The asymmetric PAKE functionality\(\mathsf {F}_{\mathsf {apwKE}}\) [15]

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Hwang, J.Y., Jarecki, S., Kwon, T., Lee, J., Shin, J.S., Xu, J. (2018). Round-Reduced Modular Construction of Asymmetric Password-Authenticated Key Exchange. In: Catalano, D., De Prisco, R. (eds) Security and Cryptography for Networks. SCN 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11035. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98113-0_26

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