Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Skip to main content

Advertisement

Springer Nature Link
Log in

Format Oracles on OpenPGP

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:

Part of the book series:Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9048))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

The principle of padding oracle attacks has been known in the cryptography research community since 1998. It has been generalized to exploit any property of decrypted ciphertexts, either stemming from the encryption scheme, or the application data format. However, this attack principle is being leveraged time and again against proposed standards and real-world applications. This may be attributed to several factors, e.g., the backward compatibility with standards selecting oracle-prone mechanisms, the difficulty of safely implementing decryption operations, and the misuse of libraries by non cryptography-savvy developers. In this article, we present several format oracles discovered in applications and libraries implementing the OpenPGP message format, among which the popular GnuPG application. We show that, if the oracles they implement are made available to an adversary, e.g., by a front-end application, he can, by querying repeatedly these oracles, decrypt all OpenPGP symmetrically encrypted packets. The corresponding asymptotic query complexities range from 2 to\(2^8\) oracle requests per plaintext byte to recover.

This work was partially supported by the French National Research Agency through the BLOC project (contract ANR-11-INS-011).

This is a preview of subscription content,log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
¥17,985 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
JPY 3498
Price includes VAT (Japan)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
JPY 5719
Price includes VAT (Japan)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
JPY 7149
Price includes VAT (Japan)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide -see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Albrecht, M.R., Paterson, K.G., Watson, G.J.: Plaintext Recovery Attacks against SSH. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 16–26. IEEE Computer Society (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  2. AlFardan, N.J., Paterson, K.G.: Lucky Thirteen: Breaking the TLS and DTLS Record Protocols. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 526–540. IEEE Computer Society (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Andreeva, E., Bogdanov, A., Luykx, A., Mennink, B., Mouha, N., Yasuda, K.: How to Securely Release Unverified Plaintext in Authenticated Encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/144 (2014).http://eprint.iacr.org/

  4. Bardou, R., Focardi, R., Kawamoto, Y., Simionato, L., Steel, G., Tsay, J.-K.: Efficient Padding Oracle Attacks on Cryptographic Hardware. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Canetti, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2012. LNCS, vol. 7417, pp. 608–625. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Bleichenbacher, D.: Chosen Ciphertext Attacks against Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, pp. 1–12. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Boldyreva, A., Degabriele, J.P., Paterson, K.G., Stam, M.: On Symmetric Encryption with Distinguishable Decryption Failures. In: Moriai, S. (ed.) FSE 2013. LNCS, vol. 8424, pp. 367–390. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Jager, T., Somorovsky, J.: How to break XML encryption. In: Chen, Y., Danezis, G., Shmatikov, V. (eds.) ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 413–422. ACM (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Jallad, K., Katz, J., Schneier, B.: Implementation of Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks against PGP and GnuPG. In: Chan, A.H., Gligor, V.D. (eds.) ISC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2433, pp. 90–101. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., Thayer, R.: OpenPGP Message Format. RFC 4880 (Proposed Standard) (November 2007)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Klíma, V., Rosa, T.: Side Channel Attacks on CBC Encrypted Messages in the PKCS#7 Format. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/098 (2003).http://eprint.iacr.org/

  11. Mister, S., Zuccherato, R.J.: An Attack on CFB Mode Encryption as Used by OpenPGP. In: Preneel, B., Tavares, S. (eds.) SAC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3897, pp. 82–94. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Mitchell, C.J.: Error Oracle Attacks on CBC Mode: Is There a Future for CBC Mode Encryption? In: Zhou, J., López, J., Deng, R.H., Bao, F. (eds.) ISC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3650, pp. 244–258. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Möller, B., Duong, T., Kotowicz, K.: Google Security Advisory: This POODLE Bites: Exploiting The SSL 3.0 Fallback (2014).https://www.openssl.org/bodo/ssl-poodle.pdf

  14. Paterson, K.G., AlFardan, N.J.: Plaintext-Recovery Attacks Against Datagram TLS. In: NDSS. The Internet Society (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Vaudenay, S.: Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding - Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 534–546. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. ANSSI, Paris, France

    Florian Maury, Jean-René Reinhard, Olivier Levillain & Henri Gilbert

Authors
  1. Florian Maury

    You can also search for this author inPubMed Google Scholar

  2. Jean-René Reinhard

    You can also search for this author inPubMed Google Scholar

  3. Olivier Levillain

    You can also search for this author inPubMed Google Scholar

  4. Henri Gilbert

    You can also search for this author inPubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence toJean-René Reinhard.

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Aalto University School of Science, Espoo, Finland

    Kaisa Nyberg

Rights and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Maury, F., Reinhard, JR., Levillain, O., Gilbert, H. (2015). Format Oracles on OpenPGP. In: Nyberg, K. (eds) Topics in Cryptology –- CT-RSA 2015. CT-RSA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9048. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16715-2_12

Download citation

Publish with us

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
¥17,985 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
JPY 3498
Price includes VAT (Japan)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
JPY 5719
Price includes VAT (Japan)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
JPY 7149
Price includes VAT (Japan)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide -see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only


[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2025 Movatter.jp