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A Game Theoretical Analysis of Distributed Denial-of-Service Defense Incentive

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Abstract

Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are becoming more frequent and powerful. Traditionaledge defense solutions can no longer keep up, andin-network defense solutions are needed that involve multiple Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to collaboratively defend against the attacks. While collaborative defense solutions are technically more effective at stopping large-scale attacks, the incentives for ISPs to deploy these solutions remain unexplored. In this study, we develop a game theoretic model to capture the economic benefits and costs of deployment for ISPs competing for customers. Through large-scale simulations at the Internet level, we find that the majority of ISPs on the Internet have an economic incentive to participate in DDoS defense, driven by competition; and that the severity of DDoS attacks and the level of competition affect an ISP’s charge for filtering DDoS traffic for its customers.

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Acknowledgment

This project is in part the result of funding provided by the Science and Technology Directorate of the United States Department of Homeland Security under contract number D15PC00204. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Department of Homeland Security or the US Government.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Oregon, Eugene, USA

    Mingwei Zhang, Jun Li & Jiabin Wu

  2. University California, Los Angeles, USA

    Peter Reiher

Authors
  1. Mingwei Zhang

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  2. Jun Li

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  3. Jiabin Wu

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  4. Peter Reiher

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Corresponding author

Correspondence toJun Li.

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

    Haixin Duan

  2. Concordia University, Montreal, QC, Canada

    Mourad Debbabi

  3. Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong

    Xavier de Carné de Carnavalet

  4. Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong

    Xiapu Luo

  5. Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, USA

    Xiaojiang Du

  6. Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong

    Man Ho Allen Au

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© 2025 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Zhang, M., Li, J., Wu, J., Reiher, P. (2025). A Game Theoretical Analysis of Distributed Denial-of-Service Defense Incentive. In: Duan, H., Debbabi, M., de Carné de Carnavalet, X., Luo, X., Du, X., Au, M.H.A. (eds) Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2023. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 568. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-64954-7_1

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