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Cache-Timing Attacks Still Threaten IoT Devices

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Abstract

Deployed widely and embedding sensitive data, The security of IoT devices depend on the reliability of cryptographic libraries to protect user information. However when implemented on real systems, cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel attacks based on their execution behavior, which can be revealed by measurements of physical quantities such as timing or power consumption. Some countermeasures can be implemented in order to prevent those attacks. However those countermeasures are generally designed at high level description, and when implemented, some residual leakage may persist. In this article we propose a methodology to assess the robustness of the MbedTLS library against timing and cache-timing attacks. This comprehensive study of side-channel security allows us to identify the most frequent weaknesses in software cryptographic code and how those might be fixed. This methodology checks the whole source code, from the top level routines to low level primitives, that are used for the final application. We retrieve hundreds of lines of code that leak sensitive information.

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Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Matthieu Lec’hvien for having initiated this work (under the guidance of Alexander Schaub). This work has benefited from a funding viaTeamPlay (https://teamplay-h2020.eu/), a project from European Union’s Horizon2020 research and innovation programme, under grand agreement No. 779882. Besides, this work has been partly financed by NSFC grant No. 61632020, and French PIA (Projet d’Investissment d’Avenir) grant P141580, of acronym RISQ (Regroupement de l’Industrie pour la Sécurité post-Quantique).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Secure-IC S.A.S., 15 Rue Claude Chappe, Bât. B, 35 510, Cesson-Sévigné, France

    Sofiane Takarabt, Adrien Facon, Sylvain Guilley, Laurent Sauvage & Youssef Souissi

  2. LTCI, Télécom ParisTech, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, 75 013, Paris, France

    Sofiane Takarabt, Alexander Schaub, Sylvain Guilley, Laurent Sauvage & Yves Mathieu

  3. École Normale Supérieure, Département d’informatique, 75 005, Paris, France

    Adrien Facon & Sylvain Guilley

Authors
  1. Sofiane Takarabt

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  2. Alexander Schaub

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  3. Adrien Facon

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  4. Sylvain Guilley

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  5. Laurent Sauvage

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  6. Youssef Souissi

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  7. Yves Mathieu

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Corresponding author

Correspondence toSylvain Guilley.

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Université Paris 8, Saint-Denis, France

    Claude Carlet

  2. Institut MINES-TELECOM, Paris, France

    Sylvain Guilley

  3. Université de Caen, Caen, France

    Abderrahmane Nitaj

  4. Mohammed V University, Rabat, Morocco

    El Mamoun Souidi

A Appendix

A Appendix

Here we give all the inter-procedural graphs that show the dependency and the leakage location for each algorithm (Figs. 13,14,15,16,17, and18).

Fig. 13.
figure 13

Full RSA graph with leakage dependency for\(mbedtls\_rsa\_private\) function

Fig. 14.
figure 14

Part of ECDSA graph with leakage dependency for\(mbedtls\_ecdsa\_sign\) function

Fig. 15.
figure 15

Full AES graph with leakage dependency:\(mbedtls\_aes\_self\_test\)

Fig. 16.
figure 16

Full DES graph with leakage dependency:\(mbedtls\_des\_self\_test\) function

Fig. 17.
figure 17

Full Blowfish graph with leakage dependency:\(blowfish\_enc\) function

Fig. 18.
figure 18

Full Camellia graph with leakage dependency:\(mbedtls\_camellia\_self\_test\) function

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Takarabt, S.et al. (2019). Cache-Timing Attacks Still Threaten IoT Devices. In: Carlet, C., Guilley, S., Nitaj, A., Souidi, E. (eds) Codes, Cryptology and Information Security. C2SI 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11445. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16458-4_2

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