• Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with impure altruism: Applications to charity and Ricardian equivalence.Journal of Political Economy,97(6), 1447–1458.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Becker, E., & Lindsay, C. M. (1994). Does the Government free ride?The Journal of Law and Economics,37(1), 277–296.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Becker, G. S. (1974). A theory of social interactions.Journal of Political Economy,82(6), 1063–1093.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Ben-Ner, A., & Van Hoomissen, T. (1991). Nonprofits in a mixed economy: A demand and supply analysis.Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics,62, 519–550.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., & Varian, H. (1986). On the private provision of public goods.Journal of Public Economics,29(1), 25–49.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An economic theory of clubs.Economica,32, 1–14.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Chang, C., & Tuckman, H. (1996). The goods produced by nonprofit organisations.Public Einance Quarterly,24(1), 25–43.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Coase, R. (1960). The problem of social cost.Journal of Law and Economics,3, 1–44.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Colombo, J. D., & Hall, M. A. (1995).The charitable tax exemption. Boulder: Westview Press.

  Google Scholar 

• Comes, R., & Sandler, T. (1984). Easy riders, joint production, and public goods.Economic Journal,94, 580–598.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• DiMaggio, P. J., & Anheier, H. K. (1990). The sociology of nonprofit organizations and sectors.Annual Review of Sociology,16, 137–159.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Eckel, C. C., & Steinberg, R. (1993). Competition, performance, and public policy toward nonprofits. In D. C. Hammack & D. R. Young (Eds.),Nonprofit organizations in a market economy: Understanding new roles, issues, and trends. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

  Google Scholar 

• Feigenbaum, S. (1980). The case of income redistribution: A Theory of Government and Private Provision of Collective Goods.Public Finance Quarterly,8(1), 3–22.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Gross, J. (1995). Heterogeneity of preferences for local public goods: The case of private expenditure on public education.Journal of Public Economics,51(1), 103–127.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Hansmann, H. (1980). The role of nonprofit enterprise.Yale Law Journal,89(5), 835–901. [Reprinted in S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.). (1986).The economics of nonprofit organizations: Studies in structure and policy. New York: Oxford University Press.]

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Hansmann, H. (1981). Nonprofit enterprise in the performing arts.Bell Journal of Economics,12(2), 341–361.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Hansmann, H. (1987). Economic theories of nonprofit organisations. In W. W. Powell (Ed.),The nonprofit sector: A research handbook. New Haven: Yale University Press.

  Google Scholar 

• James, E. (1983). How nonprofits grow: A model.Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,2(3),350–365. [Reprinted in S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.). (1986).The economics of nonprofit organizations: Studies in structure and policy. New York: Oxford University Press.]

  Article  Google Scholar 

• James, E. (1993). Why do different countries choose a different public-private mix of educational services?Journal of Human Resources,28(3), 571–592.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Khanna, J., Posnett, J., & Sandler, T. (1995). Charity donations in the UK: New evidence based on panel data.Journal of Public Economics,56(2), 257–272.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Kingma, B. R. (1989). An accurate measurement of the crowd-out effect, income effect, and price effect for charitable contributions.Journal of Political Economy,97(5), 1197–1207.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Kingma, B. R., & McClelland, R. (1995). Public radio stations are really, really not public goods.Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics,66(1), 65–76.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Ledyard, J. O. (1995). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth (Eds.),Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  Google Scholar 

• McClelland, R. (1989). Voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federalist system: A comment.American Economic Review,79(5), 1291–1296.

  Google Scholar 

• Olson, M. (1965).The logic of collective action: Public goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

  Google Scholar 

• Posnett, J., & Sandler, T. (1989). Demand for charity donations in private non-profit markets: The case of the UK.Journal of Public Economics,40(2), 187–200.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Preston, A. E. (1989a). The nonprofit firm: A potential solution to inherent market failures.Economic Inquiry,26(3), 493-506.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Preston, A. E. (1989b). The nonprofit worker in a for-profit world.Journal of Labor Economics,7(4), 438–463.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Ribar, D. C, & Wilhelm, M. O. (1995). Charitable contributions to international relief and development.National Tax Journal,48(2), 229–244.

  Google Scholar 

• Roberts, R. D. (1984). A positive model of private charity and public transfers.Journal of Political Economy,92(1), 136–148.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Rose-Ackerman, S. (1982). Charitable giving and “Excessive” fundraising.Quarterly Journal of Economics,97, 195–212. [Reprinted in S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.). (1986).The economics of nonprofit institutions: Studies in structure and policy. New York: Oxford University Press.]

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Rose-Ackerman, S. (1987). Ideals versus dollars: Donors, charity managers, and Government Grants.Journal of Political Economy,95(4), 810–823.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Rose-Ackerman, S. (1996). Altruism, nonprofits, and economic theory.Journal of Economic Literature,34(2), 701–728.

  Google Scholar 

• Schiff, J., & Weisbrod, B. (1986). Government social welfare spending and the private nonprofit sector: Crowding out and more. Unpublished manuscript.

  Google Scholar 

• Schiff, J., & Weisbrod, B. (1991). Competition between for-profit and nonprofit organizations in commercial activities.Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics,62(4), 619–640. [Reprinted in A. Ben-Ner & B. Gui (Eds.). (1993).The nonprofit sector in the mixed economy (pp. 127–148). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.]

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Sloan, E A., Hoerger, T. J., Morrisey, M. A., & Hassan, M. (1990). The demise of hospital philanthropy.Economic Inquiry,28(4), 725–743.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Steinberg, R. (1986). Should donors care about fundraising? In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.),The economics of nonprofit institutions: Studies in structure and policy. New York: Oxford University Press.

  Google Scholar 

• Steinberg, R. (1987). Voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federalist system.American Economic Review,77(1), 24–36.

  Google Scholar 

• Steinberg, R. (1991). Does Government spending crowd out donations? Interpreting the Evidence.Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics,62(4), 591–617. [Reprinted in A. Ben-Ner & B. Gui (Eds.),The nonprofit sector in the mixed economy (pp. 99–126). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.]

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Steinberg, R. (1993). Public policy and the performance of nonprofit organizations: A general framework.Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,22(1), 13–32.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Thorpe, K. E., & Phelps, C. E. (1991). The social role of not-for-profit organizations: Hospital provision of charity care.Economic Inquiry,29(3), 472–484.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Warr, P. (1982). Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity.Journal of Public Economics,19(1), 131–138.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Weisbrod, B. A. (1977).The voluntary nonprofit sector. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books.

  Google Scholar 

• Weisbrod, B. A. (1975). Toward a theory of the voluntary nonprofit sector in a three-sector economy. In Phelps, E. S. (Ed.),Altruism, morality, and economic theory. New York: Rusell Sage Foundation. [Reprinted in S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.). (1986).The economics of nonprofit organizations: Studies in structure and policy. New York: Oxford University Press. Also reprinted in D. L. Gies, J. S. Ott, & J. M. Shafritz (Eds.). (1990).The nonprofit organization: Essential readings. Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole.

  Google Scholar 

• Weisbrod, B. A. (1983). Nonprofit and proprietary sector behavior: Wage differentials among lawyers.Journal of Labor Economics,1(3), 246–263.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Weisbrod, B. A. (1988).The nonprofit economy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

  Google Scholar 

• Weisbrod, B. A., & Dominguez, N. D. (1986). Demand for collective goods in private nonprofit markets: Can fundraising expenditures help overcome free-rider behavior?Journal of Public Economics,30(1), 83–95.

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Young, D. (1983).If not for profit, for what? Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Health.

  Google Scholar 

Download references