Movatterモバイル変換

[0]ホーム
URL:

Skip to main content

Advertisement

Springer Nature Link
Log in

Universally Composable Commitments

Extended Abstract

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:

Part of the book series:Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2139))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

We propose a new security measure for commitment protocols, calledUniversally Composable (UC) Commitment. The measure guarantees that commitment protocols behave like an “ideal commitment service,” even when concurrently composed with an arbitrary set of protocols. This is a strong guarantee: it implies that security is maintained even when an unbounded number of copies of the scheme are running concurrently, it implies non-malleability (not only with respect to other copies of the same protocol but even with respect to other protocols), it provides resilience to selective decommitment, and more.

Unfortunately, two-party uc commitment protocols do not exist in the plain model. However, we construct two-party uc commitment protocols, based on general complexity assumptions, in thecommon reference string model where all parties have access to a common string taken from a predetermined distribution. The protocols are non-interactive, in the sense that both the commitment and the opening phases consist of a single message from the committer to the receiver.

Part of this work done while visiting IBM T.J. Watson Research Center.

Similar content being viewed by others

Keywords

References

  1. D. Beaver, “Secure Multi-party Protocols and Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems Tolerating a Faulty Minority”, J. Cryptology, Springer-Verlag, (1991) 4: 75–122.

    Article MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. D. Beaver, “Adaptive Zero-Knowledge and Computational Equivocation”,28th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), ACM, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  3. M. Bellare, A. Boldyreva and S. Micali, “Public-Key Encryption in a Multiuser Setting: Security Proofs and Improvements,”Eurocrypt 2000,pp. 259–274,Springer LNCS1807, 2000.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. M Bellare, A. Desai, E. Jokipii and P. Rogaway, “A concrete security treatment of symmetric encryption: Analysis of the DES modes of operations,”38th Annual Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), IEEE, 1997.

    Google Scholar 

  5. M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval and P. Rogaway, “Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes”,CRYPTO’ 98, 1998, pp. 26–40.

    Google Scholar 

  6. M. Blum, S. Micali: How to Generate Cryptographically Strong Sequences of Pseudorandom Bits,SIAM Journal on Computation,Vol. 13,pp. 850–864, 1984.

    Article MATH MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  7. G. Brassard, D. Chaum and C. Crépeau. Minimum Disclosure Proofs of Knowledge.JCSS, Vol. 37, No. 2, pages 156–189, 1988.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. R. Canetti, “Security and composition of multi-party cryptographic protocols”,Journal of Cryptology, Vol. 13, No. 1, winter 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  9. R. Canetti, “A unified framework for analyzing security of Protocols”, manuscript, 2000. Available athttp://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067.

  10. R. Canetti and M. Fischlin, “Universally Composable Commitments”. Available athttp://eprint.iacr.org/2001.

  11. R. Cramer and V. Shoup, “A paractical public-key cryptosystem provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack”,CRYPTO’ 98, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  12. I. Damgard, On the existence of bit commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs, Advances in Cryptology-Crypto’ 89, pp. 17–29, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  13. I. Damgard. Efficient Concurrent Zero-Knowledge in the Auxiliary String Model.Eurocrypt 00, LNCS, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  14. G. Di Crescenzo, Y. Ishai and R. Ostrovsky, Non-interactive and non-malleable commitment,30th STOC, 1998, pp. 141–150.

    Google Scholar 

  15. G. Di Crecenzo, J. Katz, R. Ostrovsky and A. Smith. Efficient and Perfectly-Hiding Non-Interactive, Non-Malleable Commitment.Eurocrypt’ 01, 2001.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Y. Dodis and S. Micali, “Secure Computation”,CRYPTO’ 00, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  17. D. Dolev, C. Dwork and M. Naor, Non-malleable cryptography,SIAM.. J. Computing, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2000, pp. 391–437. Preliminary version in23rd Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), ACM, 1991.

    Article MATH MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  18. C. Dwork, M. Naor, O. Reingold, and L. Stockmeyer. Magic functions. In40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 523–534. IEEE, 1999.

    Google Scholar 

  19. U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness Indistinguishability and Witness Hiding Protocols. In22nd STOC, pages 416–426, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  20. M. Fischlin and R. Fischlin, “Efficient non-malleable commitment schemes”,CRYPTO’ 00,LNCS 1880, 2000, pp. 413–428.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Z. Galil, S. Haber and M. Yung, Cryptographic computation: Secure fauttolerant protocols and the public-key model,CRYPTO’ 87,LNCS 293, Springer-Verlag, 1988, pp. 135–155.

    Google Scholar 

  22. O. Goldreich, “Foundations of Cryptography (Fragments of a book)”, Weizmann Inst. of Science, 1995. (Avaliable athttp://philby.ucsd.edu)

  23. O. Goldreich. “Secure Multi-Party Computation”, 1998. (Avaliable athttp://philby.ucsd.edu)

  24. O. Goldreich, S. Micali and A. Wigderson, “Proofs that yield nothing but their validity or All Languages in NP Have Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems”,Journal of the ACM, Vol 38, No. 1, ACM, 1991, pp. 691–729. Preliminary version in27th Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), IEEE, 1986, pp. 174–187.

    MATH MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  25. O. Goldreich, S. Micali and A. Wigderson, “How to Play any Mental Game”,19th Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), ACM, 1987, pp. 218–229.

    Google Scholar 

  26. S. Goldwasser, and L. Levin, “Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority”,CRYPTO’ 90,LNCS 537, Springer-Verlag, 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  27. S. Goldwasser, S. Micali and C. Rackoff, “The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof Systems”,SIAM Journal on Comput., Vol. 18, No. 1, 1989, pp. 186–208.

    Article MATH MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  28. S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, R. Rivest: A Digital Signature Scheme Secure Against Adaptive Chosen-Message Attacks,SIAM Journal on Computing,Vol. 17,No. 2,pp. 281–308, 1988.

    Article MATH MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  29. Y. Lindell, private communication, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  30. S. Micali and P. Rogaway, “Secure Computation”, unpublished manuscript, 1992. Preliminary version inCRYPTO’ 91,LNCS 576, Springer-Verlag, 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  31. M. Naor: Bit Commitment Using Pseudo-Randomness,Journal of Cryptology,vol. 4,pp. 151–158, 1991.

    Article MATH MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  32. M. Naor, R. Ostrovsky, R. Venkatesan, and M. Yung, Perfect zero-knowledge arguments for NP can be based on general complexity assumptions, Advances in Cryptology-Crypto’ 92, pp. 196–214, 1992.

    Google Scholar 

  33. B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner, “A general framework for formal notions of secure systems”, Hildesheimer Informatik-Berichte 11/94, Universität Hildesheim, 1994. Available athttp://www.semper.org/sirene/lit.

  34. B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner, “A model for asynchronous reactive systems and its application to secure message transmission”, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2001. See also IBM Research Report RZ 3304 (#93350), IBM Research, Zurich, December 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  35. C. Rackoff and D. Simon, “Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and chosen ciphertext attack”,CRYPTO’ 91, 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  36. A. Yao, Theory and applications of trapdoor functions, InProc. 23rd Annual Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 80–91. IEEE, 1982.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, USA

    Ran Canetti

  2. Goethe-University of Frankfurt, Germany

    Marc Fischlin

Authors
  1. Ran Canetti

    You can also search for this author inPubMed Google Scholar

  2. Marc Fischlin

    You can also search for this author inPubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Yianilos Labs., 707 State Rd., Rt. 206, Suite 212, Princeton, NJ, 08540, USA

    Joe Kilian

Rights and permissions

Copyright information

© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Canetti, R., Fischlin, M. (2001). Universally Composable Commitments. In: Kilian, J. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2001. CRYPTO 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2139. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44647-8_2

Download citation

Publish with us

[8]ページ先頭
©2009-2025 Movatter.jp