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Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA

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Part of the book series:Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3531))

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Abstract

Let us consider the following situation: (1) a client, who communicates with a variety of servers, remembers only one password and hasinsecure devices with very-restricted computing power and built-in memory capacity; (2) the counterpart servers have enormous computing power, but they are not perfectly secure; (3) neither PKI (Public Key Infrastructures) nor TRM (Tamper-Resistant Modules) is available.

Our main goal of this paper is to provide its security against the leakage of stored secrets as well as to attain high efficiency on client’s side. For those, we propose an efficient and leakage-resilient RSA-based Authenticated Key Establishment (RSA-AKE) protocol suitable for the above situation whose authenticity is based on passwordand an additional stored secret. TheRSA-AKE protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model where an adversary is given the stored secret of client and the RSA private key of server. In terms of computation costs, the client is required to compute only one modular exponentiation with an exponente (e ≥ 3) in the protocol execution. We also show that theRSA-AKE protocol has several security properties and efficiency over the previous ones of their kinds.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo, 4-6-1 Komaba, Meguro-ku, Tokyo, 153-8505, Japan

    SeongHan Shin, Kazukuni Kobara & Hideki Imai

Authors
  1. SeongHan Shin

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  2. Kazukuni Kobara

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  3. Hideki Imai

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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. AT&T Labs – Research,  

    John Ioannidis

  2. Computer Science Department, Columbia University,  

    Angelos Keromytis

  3. Computer Science Department, Google Inc. and Columbia University, 1214 Amsterdam Avenue, 10027, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

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© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Shin, S., Kobara, K., Imai, H. (2005). Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA. In: Ioannidis, J., Keromytis, A., Yung, M. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3531. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11496137_19

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