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Abstract
The argument from relevance expresses an intuition that, although shared by many applied ethicists, has not been analyzed and systematized in the form of a clear argument thus far. This paper does this by introducing the concept of value relevance, which has been used before in economy but not in the philosophical literature. The paper explains how value relevance is different from moral relevance, and distinguishes between direct and indirect ways in which the latter can depend on the former. These clarifications allow the argument to explain in detail how we can make two claims. The first one is that being a recipient of value should be the only criterion for full moral considerability. This follows if we accept that value relevance should determine, directly or indirectly, moral relevance. The second claim is that, given what the main theories of wellbeing imply regarding what entities can be recipients of value, sentience is both a sufficient and a necessary criterion for full moral considerability. The paper argues that this conclusion stands even if we hold views that consider other values different from sentience.
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The term “equally significant interests” has an axiological meaning, not a normative one. It refers to interests whose satisfaction or frustration is equally good or bad for the interest bearers.
Several theorists, without developing an argument from relevance, propose different explanations of why sentience is relevant. See Pluhar (1995), DeGrazia (1996), Rowlands (1998). For his part, Bernstein does develop an argument claiming that if an individual can be morally considerable, then she ought to be morally considerable (1998, especially p. 10). But he leaves open the task of formulating it and detailing an argument such as the one that will be presented in this paper. An account of discrimination in terms of lack of relevance but which is not applied by its author to the question of speciesism can be found in Frankfurt (2000).
While for the sake of simplicity this formulation of (MR) just mentions actions it would apply equally in the case of omissions and of thoughts as well, such as the forming of certain intentions and moral evaluations.
This term has been used in economics, but with another meaning only remotely related to this one, which considers instrumental value.
Being a recipient of value means being an entity that can either have value or enjoy valuable things and/or suffer disvaluable things, whatever they are. It is therefore not what Regan (1983, p. 205) has called being a mere receptacle of value. It is not being a location of value either if such a location is not as such benefitted or harmed by the presence of value.
Even less orthodox views such as the one defended by Woodard (2013), that present different classifications coincide eventually with their account of the things that different theories consider valuable.
Ethical theories take also into account how value is distributed between individuals, and these distributions can also be considered better or worse. But this question need not be assessed here as we are not concerned with which particular ethical theory we will accept, but with which entities they should regard as morally considerable.
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Fac. Filosofia, University of Santiago de Compostela, Pza. Mazarelos s/n, 15782, Santiago de Compostela, Spain
Oscar Horta
- Oscar Horta
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Correspondence toOscar Horta.
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Horta, O. Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance.J Agric Environ Ethics31, 369–388 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-018-9730-y
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