Part of the book series:Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science ((AUST,volume 6))
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Abstract
Why should we believe the findings of science? The traditional answer is that there are goodarguments for those findings. Scientists start from the evidence of their senses, and then proceed by valid inferences to their conclusions. The scientific community is the rational communitypar excellence, and the findings of science are simply the conclusions forced on scientists by the dictates of reason.
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University of Cambridge, UK
David Papineau
- David Papineau
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Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Robert Nola
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© 1988 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Papineau, D. (1988). Does the Sociology of Science Discredit Science?. In: Nola, R. (eds) Relativism and Realism in Science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2877-0_2
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