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Abstract
Anti-representationalism is in the air. In the last few years, many philosophers and cognitive scientists have considered or even embraced the claim that cognition is not representational, often without giving explicit consideration to whatexactly this means. The point of this essay is to try to make some sense of claims that cognitive science can do without representations by proposing a taxonomy for them. In what follows, I will make a distinction between two different varieties of anti-representationalism. And, with this distinction in hand, I will consider some actual scientific work that has led to claims that cognitive science can do, at least in part, without representations.
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Authors and Affiliations
Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 47405, USA
Anthony Chemero
- Anthony Chemero
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Free University of Brussels, Brussels, Belgium
Alexander Riegler
University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Markus Peschl
University/ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Astrid von Stein
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© 1999 Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers
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Chemero, A. (1999). Empirical and Metaphysical Anti-Representationalism. In: Riegler, A., Peschl, M., von Stein, A. (eds) Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-585-29605-0_5
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