Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:



Internet Engineering Task Force                              A. MalhotraInternet-Draft                                               S. GoldbergUpdates:5905 (if approved)                            Boston UniversityIntended status: Standards Track                         October 3, 2018Expires: April 6, 2019Message Authentication Code for the Network Time Protocoldraft-ietf-ntp-mac-05AbstractRFC 5905 [RFC5905] states that Network Time Protocol (NTP) packets   should be authenticated by appending a 128-bit key to the NTP data,   and hashing the result with MD5 to obtain a 128-bit tag.  This   document deprecates MD5-based authentication, which is considered to   be too weak, and recommends the use of AES-CMAC [RFC4493] as a   replacement.Status of This Memo   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the   provisions ofBCP 78 andBCP 79.   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-   Drafts is athttps://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 6, 2019.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described inSection 4.e ofMalhotra & Goldberg       Expires April 6, 2019                 [Page 1]

Internet-Draft                 MAC for NTP                  October 2018   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22.  Deprecating the use of MD5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23.  Replacement Recommendation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35.  Test Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51.  IntroductionRFC 5905 [RFC5905] states that Network Time Protocol (NTP) packets   should be authenticated by appending a 128-bit key to the NTP data,   and hashing the result with MD5 to obtain a 128-bit tag.  This   document deprecates MD5-based authentication, which is considered to   be too weak, and recommends the use of AES-CMAC [RFC4493] as a   replacement.1.1.  Requirements Language   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described inRFC 2119 [RFC2119].2.  Deprecating the use of MD5RFC 5905 [RFC5905] defines how the MD5 digest algorithm inRFC 1321   [RFC1321] can be used as a message authentication code (MAC) for   authenticating NTP packets.  However, as discussed in [BCK] andRFC6151 [RFC6151], this is not a secure MAC and therefore MUST be   deprecated.3.  Replacement Recommendation   If authentication is implemented, then AES-CMAC as specified inRFC4493 [RFC4493] SHOULD be computed over all fields in the NTP header,   and any extension fields that are present in the NTP packet as   described inRFC 5905 [RFC5905].  The MAC key for NTP MUST be atMalhotra & Goldberg       Expires April 6, 2019                 [Page 2]

Internet-Draft                 MAC for NTP                  October 2018   least 128 bits long AES-128 key and the resulting MAC tag MUST be at   least 128 bits long as stated insection 2.4 of RFC 4493 [RFC4493].   NTP makes this transition possible as it supports algorithm agility   as described inSection 2.1 of RFC 7696 [RFC7696].   The hosts who wish to use NTP authentication share a symmetric key   out-of-band.  So they MUST implement AES-CMAC and share the   corresponding symmetric key.  A symmetric key is a triplet of ID,   type (e.g.  MD5, AES-CMAC) and the key itself.  All three have to   match in order to succesfully authenticate packets between two hosts.   Old implementations that don't support AES-CMAC will not accept and   will not send packets authenticated with such a key.4.  Motivation   AES-CMAC is recommended for the following reasons:   1.  It is an IETF standard that is available in many open source       implementations.   2.  It is immune to nonce-reuse vulnerabilities (e.g.  [Joux])       because it does not use a nonce.   3.  It has fine performance in terms of latency and throughput.   4.  It benefits from native hardware support, for instance, Intel's       New Instruction set.5.  Test Vectors   For test vectors and their outputs refer toSection 4 of RFC 4493   [RFC4493]6.  Security Considerations   Refer to the Appendices A, B and C of NIST document [NIST] and   Security Considerations Section ofRFC 4493 [RFC4493] for discussion   on security guarantees of AES-CMAC.7.  Acknowledgements   The authors wish to acknowledge useful discussions with Leen   Alshenibr, Daniel Franke, Ethan Heilman, Kenny Paterson, Leonid   Reyzin, Harlan Stenn, and Mayank Varia.Malhotra & Goldberg       Expires April 6, 2019                 [Page 3]

Internet-Draft                 MAC for NTP                  October 20188.  IANA Considerations   This memo includes no request to IANA.9.  References9.1.  Normative References   [NIST]     Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of              Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication",              <https://www.nist.gov/publications recommendation-block-              cipher-modes-operation-cmac-mode-authentication-0>.   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.   [RFC4493]  Song, JH., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The              AES-CMAC Algorithm",RFC 4493, DOI 10.17487/RFC4493, June              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4493>.   [RFC5905]  Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,              "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms              Specification",RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.9.2.  Informative References   [BCK]      Bellare, M., Canetti, R., and H. Krawczyk, "Keyed Hash              Functions and Message Authentication", in Proceedings of              Crypto'96, 1996.   [Joux]     Joux, A., "Authentication Failures in NIST version of              GCM",              <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/comments/800-38_Series-Drafts/GCM/Joux_comments.pdf>.   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",RFC 1321,              DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.   [RFC6151]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations              for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.Malhotra & Goldberg       Expires April 6, 2019                 [Page 4]

Internet-Draft                 MAC for NTP                  October 2018   [RFC7696]  Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm              Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms",BCP 201,RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696>.Authors' Addresses   Aanchal Malhotra   Boston University   111 Cummington St   Boston, MA  02215   US   Email: aanchal4@bu.edu   Sharon Goldberg   Boston University   111 Cummington St   Boston, MA  02215   US   Email: goldbe@cs.bu.eduMalhotra & Goldberg       Expires April 6, 2019                 [Page 5]
Datatracker

draft-ietf-ntp-mac-05

This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published asRFC 8573.

DocumentDocument type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published asRFC 8573.
Select version
Compare versions
AuthorsAanchal Malhotra,Sharon Goldberg
Replacesdraft-aanchal4-ntp-mac
RFC streamIETF LogoIETF Logo
Other formats
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Report a datatracker bug

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2025 Movatter.jp