| Internet-Draft | C509 Certificates | March 2024 |
| Preuß Mattsson, et al. | Expires 5 September 2024 | [Page] |
- Workgroup:
- Network Working Group
- Internet-Draft:
- draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-09
- Published:
- Intended Status:
- Standards Track
- Expires:
- Authors:
- J. Preuß MattssonEricsson ABG. SelanderEricsson ABS. RazaRISE ABJ. HöglundRISE ABM. FuruhedNexus Group
CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509 Certificates)
Abstract
This document specifies a CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates. The resulting certificates are called C509 Certificates. The CBOR encoding supports a large subset of RFC 5280 and all certificates compatible with the RFC 7925, IEEE 802.1AR (DevID), CNSA, RPKI, GSMA eUICC, and CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements profiles. When used to re-encode DER encoded X.509 certificates, the CBOR encoding can in many cases reduce the size of RFC 7925 profiled certificates with over 50% while also significantly reducing memory and code size compared to ASN.1. The CBOR encoded structure can alternatively be signed directly ("natively signed"), which does not require re-encoding for the signature to be verified. The document also specifies C509 Certificate Signing Requests, C509 COSE headers, a C509 TLS certificate type, and a C509 file format.¶
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
Status information for this document may be found athttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert/.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption Working Group mailing list (mailto:cose@ietf.org), which is archived athttps://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cose/. Subscribe athttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cose/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found athttps://github.com/cose-wg/CBOR-certificates.¶
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is athttps://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 September 2024.¶
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
1.Introduction
One of the challenges with deploying a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet of Things (IoT) is the size and parsing of X.509 public key certificates[RFC5280], since those are not optimized for constrained environments[RFC7228]. Large certificate chains are also problematic in non-constrained protocols such as EAP-TLS[RFC9190][RFC9191] where authenticators typically drop an EAP session after only 40 - 50 round-trips, QUIC[RFC9000] where the latency increases significantly unless the server sends less than three times as many bytes as received prior to validating the client address, and RPKI[RFC6487] where a single certificate can be very large. More compact certificate representations are therefore desirable in many use cases. Due to the current PKI usage of DER encoded X.509 certificates, keeping compatibility with DER encoded X.509 is necessary at least for a transition period. However, the use of a more compact encoding with the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)[RFC8949] reduces the certificate size significantly which has known performance benefits in terms of decreased communication overhead, power consumption, latency, storage, etc. The use of CBOR also reduces code complexity, code size, memory usage, and CPU usage.¶
CBOR is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. CBOR builds on the JSON data model but extends it by e.g. encoding binary data directly without base64 conversion. In addition to the binary CBOR encoding, CBOR also has a diagnostic notation that is readable and editable by humans. The Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL)[RFC8610] provides a way to express structures for protocol messages and APIs that use CBOR. RFC 8610 also extends the diagnostic notation.¶
CBOR data items are encoded to or decoded from byte strings using a type-length-value encoding scheme, where the three highest order bits of the initial byte contain information about the major type. CBOR supports several different types of data items, in addition to integers (int, uint), simple values (e.g. null), byte strings (bstr), and text strings (tstr), CBOR also supports arrays [] of data items, maps {} of pairs of data items, and sequences of data items. For a complete specification and examples, see[RFC8949],[RFC8610], and[RFC8742]. We recommend implementors to get used to CBOR by using the CBOR playground[CborMe].¶
CAB Baseline Requirements[CAB-TLS], RFC 7925[RFC7925], IEEE 802.1AR[IEEE-802.1AR], and CNSA[RFC8603] specify certificate profiles which can be applied to certificate based authentication with, e.g., TLS[RFC8446], QUIC[RFC9000], DTLS[RFC9147], COSE[RFC9052], EDHOC[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc], or Compact TLS 1.3[I-D.ietf-tls-ctls]. RFC 7925[RFC7925], RFC7925bis[I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile], and IEEE 802.1AR[IEEE-802.1AR] specifically target Internet of Things deployments. This document specifies a CBOR encoding based on[X.509-IoT], which can support large parts of RFC 5280. The encoding supports all RFC 7925, IEEE 802.1AR, CAB Baseline[CAB-TLS],[CAB-Code], RPKI[RFC6487], eUICC[GSMA-eUICC] profiled X.509 certificates, and is designed to render a compact encoding of certificates used in constrained environments.¶
The resulting certificates are called C509 Certificates. This document does not specify a certificate profile. Two variants are defined using the same CBOR encoding and differing only in what is being signed:¶
An invertible CBOR re-encoding of DER encoded X.509 certificates[RFC5280], which can be reversed to obtain the original DER encoded X.509 certificate.¶
Natively signed C509 certificates, where the signature is calculated over the CBOR encoding instead of over the DER encoding as in 1. This removes the need for ASN.1 and DER parsing and the associated complexity but they are not backwards compatible with implementations requiring DER encoded X.509.¶
Natively signed C509 certificates can be applied in devices that are only required to authenticate to natively signed C509 certificate compatible servers, which is not a major restriction for many IoT deployments where the parties issuing and verifying certificates can be a restricted ecosystem.¶
This document also specifies C509 Certificate Signing Requests, seeSection 4; COSE headers for use of the C509 certificates with COSE, seeSection 9.12; and a TLS certificate type for use of the C509 certificates with TLS and QUIC (with or without additional TLS certificate compression), seeSection 9.18.¶
2.Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14[RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This specification makes use of the terminology in[RFC2986],[RFC5280],[RFC7228],[RFC8610], and[RFC8949]. When referring to CBOR, this specification always refers to Deterministically Encoded CBOR as specified in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of[RFC8949].¶
3.C509 Certificate
This section specifies the content and encoding for C509 certificates, with the overall objective to produce a very compact representation supporting large parts of[RFC5280], and everything in[RFC7925],[IEEE-802.1AR], RPKI[RFC6487], GSMA eUICC[GSMA-eUICC], and CAB Baseline[CAB-TLS][CAB-Code]. In the CBOR encoding, static fields are elided, elliptic curve points and time values are compressed, OID are replaced with short integers or complemented with CBOR OID and PEN encodings[RFC9090], and redundant encoding is removed. Combining these different components reduces the certificate size significantly, which is not possible with general purpose compression algorithms, seeFigure 4.¶
The C509 certificate can be either a CBOR re-encoding of a DER encoded X.509 certificate, in which case the signature is calculated on the DER encoded ASN.1 data in the X.509 certificate, or a natively signed C509 certificate, in which case the signature is calculated directly on the CBOR encoded data. In both cases the certificate content is adhering to the restrictions given by[RFC5280]. The re-encoding is known to work with DER encoded certificates but might work with other canonical encodings. The re-encoding does not work for BER encoded certificates.¶
In the encoding described below, the order of elements in arrays are always encoded in the same order as the elements or the corresponding SEQUENCE or SET in the DER encoding.¶
3.1.Message Fields
The X.509 fields and their CBOR encodings are listed below, and used in the definition of C509 certificates, seeFigure 1.¶
C509 certificates are defined in terms of DER encoded[RFC5280] X.509 certificates:¶
version. The 'version' field is encoded in the 'c509CertificateType' CBOR int. The field 'c509CertificateType' also indicates the type of the C509 certificate. Currently, the type can be a natively signed C509 certificate following X.509 v3 (c509CertificateType = 0) or a CBOR re-encoded X.509 v3 DER certificate (c509CertificateType = 1), seeSection 9.1.¶
serialNumber. The 'serialNumber' INTEGER value field is encoded as the unwrapped CBOR unsigned bignum (~biguint) 'certificateSerialNumber'. Any leading 0x00 byte (to indicate that the number is not negative) is therefore omitted.¶
signature. The 'signature' field is always the same as the 'signatureAlgorithm' field and therefore omitted from the CBOR encoding.¶
issuer. In the general case, the sequence of 'RelativeDistinguishedName' is encoded as a CBOR array of CBOR arrays of Attributes. Typically, each RelativeDistinguishedName only contains a single attribute and the sequence is then encoded as a CBOR array of Attributes. Each Attribute is encoded as either¶
a (CBOR int, CBOR text string) pair, or¶
a (unwrapped CBOR OID, CBOR bytes) pair, or¶
a (CBOR PEN, CBOR bytes) pair.¶
The absolute value of the CBOR int (seeFigure 7) encodes the attribute type and the sign is used to represent the character string type; positive for Utf8String, negative for PrintableString. The Attribute Email Address is always an IA5String. In natively signed C509 certificates all text strings are UTF-8 encoded and all attributeType SHALL be non-negative. Text strings SHALL still adhere to any X.509 restrictions, i.e., serialNumber SHALL only contain the 74 character subset of ASCII allowed by PrintableString and countryName SHALL have length 2. The string types teletexString, universalString, and bmpString are not supported. If Name contains a single Attribute containing an utf8String encoded 'common name' it is encoded as follows:¶
If the text string has an even length≥ 2 and contains only the symbols '0'–'9' or 'a'–'f', it is encoded as a CBOR byte string, prefixed with an initial byte set to '00'.¶
If the text string contains an EUI-64 of the form "HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH" where 'H' is one of the symbols '0'–'9' or 'A'–'F' it is encoded as a CBOR byte string prefixed with an initial byte set to '01', for a total length of 9. An EUI-64 mapped from a 48-bit MAC address (i.e., of the form "HH-HH-HH-FF-FE-HH-HH-HH) is encoded as a CBOR byte string prefixed with an initial byte set to '01', for a total length of 7.¶
Otherwise it is encoded as a CBOR text string.¶
validity. The 'notBefore' and 'notAfter' fields are encoded as unwrapped CBOR epoch-based date/time (~time) where the tag content is an unsigned integer. In POSIX time, leap seconds are ignored, with a leap second having the same POSIX time as the second before it. Compression of X.509 certificates with the time 23:59:60 UTC is therefore not supported. Note that RFC 5280 mandates encoding of dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and later dates as GeneralizedTime. The value "99991231235959Z" (no expiration date) is encoded as CBOR null.¶
subject. The 'subject' is encoded exactly like issuer.¶
subjectPublicKeyInfo. The 'AlgorithmIdentifier' field including parameters is encoded as the CBOR int 'subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm' (seeSection 9.11) or as an array with an unwrapped CBOR OID tag[RFC9090] optionally followed by the parameters encoded as a CBOR byte string. In general, the 'subjectPublicKey' BIT STRING value field is encoded as a CBOR byte string. This specification assumes the BIT STRING has zero unused bits and the unused bits byte is omitted. For rsaEncryption and id-ecPublicKey, the encoding of subjectPublicKey is further optimized as described inSection 3.2.¶
issuerUniqueID. Not supported.¶
subjectUniqueID. Not supported.¶
extensions. The 'extensions' field is encoded as a CBOR array where each extension is encoded as either¶
a CBOR int (seeSection 9.4) followed by an optional CBOR item of any type, or¶
an unwrapped CBOR OID tag[RFC9090] followed by an optional CBOR bool encoding 'critical' and the DER encoded value of the 'extnValue' encoded as a CBOR byte string, or¶
a CBOR PEN tag[RFC9090] followed by an optional CBOR bool encoding 'critical' and the DER encoded value of the 'extnValue' encoded as a CBOR byte string.¶
If the array contains exactly two ints and the absolute value of the first int is 2 (corresponding to keyUsage), the array is omitted and the extensions is encoded as a single CBOR int with the absolute value of the second int and the sign of the first int. Extensions are encoded as specified inSection 3.3. The extensions mandated to be supported by[RFC7925] and[IEEE-802.1AR] are given special treatment. An omitted 'extensions' field is encoded as an empty CBOR array.¶
signatureAlgorithm. The 'signatureAlgorithm' field including parameters is encoded as a CBOR int (seeSection 9.10) or as an array with an unwrapped CBOR OID tag[RFC9090] optionally followed by the parameters encoded as a CBOR byte string.¶
signatureValue. In general, the 'signatureValue' BIT STRING value field is encoded as the CBOR byte string issuerSignatureValue. This specification assumes the BIT STRING has zero unused bits and the unused bits byte is omitted. For natively signed C509 certificates the signatureValue is calculated over the CBOR sequence TBSCertificate. For ECDSA, the encoding of issuerSignatureValue is further optimized as described inSection 3.2¶
The following Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) defines the CBOR array C509Certificate and the CBOR sequence[RFC8742] TBSCertificate. The member names therefore only have documentary value. Applications not requiring a CBOR item MAY represent C509 certificates with the CBOR sequence ~C509Certificate (unwrapped C509Certificate).¶
C509Certificate = [ TBSCertificate, issuerSignatureValue : any,]; The elements of the following group are used in a CBOR Sequence:TBSCertificate = ( c509CertificateType: int, certificateSerialNumber: CertificateSerialNumber, issuer: Name, validityNotBefore: Time, validityNotAfter: Time, subject: Name, subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey: any, extensions: Extensions, issuerSignatureAlgorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier,)CertificateSerialNumber = ~biguintName = [ * RelativeDistinguishedName ] / text / bytesRelativeDistinguishedName = Attribute / [ 2* Attribute ]Attribute = ( attributeType: int, attributeValue: text ) // ( attributeType: ~oid, attributeValue: bytes ) // ( attributeType: pen, attributeValue: bytes )Time = ~time / nullAlgorithmIdentifier = int / ~oid / [ algorithm: ~oid, parameters: bytes ]Extensions = [ * Extension ] / intExtension = ( extensionID: int, extensionValue: any ) // ( extensionID: ~oid, ? critical: true, extensionValue: bytes ) // ( extensionID: pen, ? critical: true, extensionValue: bytes )
3.2.Encoding of subjectPublicKey and issuerSignatureValue
3.2.1.Encoding of subjectPublicKey
For RSA public keys (rsaEncryption), the SEQUENCE and INTEGER type and length fields are omitted and the two INTEGER value fields (modulus, exponent) are encoded as an array of two unwrapped CBOR unsigned bignum (~biguint), i.e. [ modulus : ~biguint, exponent : ~biguint ]. If the exponent is 65537, the array and the exponent is omitted and subjectPublicKey consist of only the modulus encoded as an unwrapped CBOR unsigned bignum (~biguint).¶
For elliptic curve public keys in Weierstraß form (id-ecPublicKey), keys may be point compressed as defined in Section 2.3.3 of[SECG]. Native C509 certificates with Weierstraß form keys use the octets 0x02, 0x03, and 0x04 as defined in[SECG]. If a DER encoded certificate with an uncompressed public key of type id-ecPublicKey is CBOR encoded with point compression, the octets 0xfe and 0xfd are used instead of 0x02 and 0x03 in the CBOR encoding to represent even and odd y-coordinate, respectively.¶
3.2.2.Encoding of issuerSignatureValue
For ECDSA signatures, the SEQUENCE and INTEGER type and length fields as well as the any leading 0x00 byte (to indicate that the number is not negative) are omitted. If the two INTEGER value fields have different lengths, the shorter INTEGER value field is padded with zeroes so that the two fields have the same length. The resulting byte string is encoded as a CBOR byte string.¶
3.3.Encoding of Extensions
This section details the encoding of the 'extensions' field. The 'extensions' field is encoded as a CBOR array where each extensionID is encoded either as a CBOR int or as an unwrapped CBOR OID tag. If 'extensionID' is encoded an int (seeSection 9.4), the sign is used to encode if the extension is critical and the 'critical' field is omitted. Critical extensions are encoded with a negative sign and non-critical extensions are encoded with a positive sign.¶
The 'extnValue' OCTET STRING value field is encoded as the CBOR byte string 'extensionValue' except for the extensions specified below. For some extensions, only commonly used parts are supported by the CBOR encoding. If unsupported parts are used, the CBOR encoding cannot be used.¶
A note on extension ID naming: in existing OID databases most IDs can be found in versions with and without an 'id-pe' or 'id-ce' prefix. We have excluded the prefix for the commonly used extensions defined in[RFC5280] and included them for extensions defined elsewhere.¶
CBOR encoding of the following extension values is fully supported:¶
Subject Key Identifier (subjectKeyIdentifier). The extensionValue is encoded as follows:¶
KeyIdentifier = bytes SubjectKeyIdentifier = KeyIdentifier¶
Key Usage (keyUsage). The 'KeyUsage' BIT STRING is interpreted as an unsigned integer in network byte order and encoded as a CBOR int. SeeSection 3.1 for special encoding in case keyUsage is the only extension present.¶
KeyUsage = int¶
Policy Mappings (policyMappings). extensionValue is encoded as follows:¶
PolicyMappings = [ + (issuerDomainPolicy: ~oid, subjectDomainPolicy: ~oid) ]¶
Basic Constraints (basicConstraints). If 'cA' = false then extensionValue = -2, if 'cA' = true and 'pathLenConstraint' is not present then extensionValue = -1, and if 'cA' = true and 'pathLenConstraint' is present then extensionValue = pathLenConstraint.¶
BasicConstraints = int¶
Policy Constraints (policyConstraints). extensionValue is encoded as follows:¶
PolicyConstraints = [ requireExplicitPolicy: uint / null, inhibitPolicyMapping: uint / null, ]¶
Extended Key Usage (extKeyUsage). extensionValue is encoded as an array of CBOR ints (seeSection 9.8), unwrapped CBOR OID tags[RFC9090], or CBOR PEN tags[RFC9090], where each int or OID / PEN tag encodes a key usage purpose. If the array contains a single KeyPurposeId, the array is omitted.¶
KeyPurposeId = int / ~oid / pen ExtKeyUsageSyntax = [ 2* KeyPurposeId ] / KeyPurposeId¶
Inhibit anyPolicy (inhibitAnyPolicy). extensionValue is encoded as follows:¶
InhibitAnyPolicy = uint¶
CBOR encoding of the following extension values are partly supported:¶
Subject Alternative Name (subjectAltName). If the subject alternative name only contains general names registered inSection 9.9 the extension value can be CBOR encoded. extensionValue is encoded as an array of (int, any) pairs where each pair encodes a general name (seeSection 9.9). If subjectAltName contains exactly one dNSName, the array and the int are omitted and extensionValue is the dNSName encoded as a CBOR text string. In addition to the general names defined in[RFC5280], the hardwareModuleName type of otherName has been given its own int due to its mandatory use in IEEE 802.1AR. When 'otherName + hardwareModuleName' is used, then [ ~oid, bytes ] is used to contain the pair ( hwType, hwSerialNum ) directly as specified in[RFC4108]. Only the general names inSection 9.9 are supported.¶
GeneralName = ( GeneralNameType : int, GeneralNameValue : any ) GeneralNames = [ + GeneralName ] SubjectAltName = GeneralNames / text¶
Issuer Alternative Name (issuerAltName). extensionValue is encoded exactly like subjectAltName.¶
IssuerAltName = GeneralNames / text¶
CRL Distribution Points (cRLDistributionPoints). If the CRL Distribution Points is a sequence of DistributionPointName, where each DistributionPointName only contains uniformResourceIdentifiers, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. extensionValue is encoded as follows:¶
DistributionPointName = [ 2* text ] / text CRLDistributionPoints = [ + DistributionPointName ]¶
Freshest CRL (freshestCRL). extensionValue is encoded exactly like cRLDistributionPoints.¶
FreshestCRL = CRLDistributionPoints¶
Authority Information Access (authorityInfoAccess). If all the GeneralNames in authorityInfoAccess are of type uniformResourceIdentifier, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. Each accessMethod is encoded as a CBOR int (seeSection 9.7) or an unwrapped CBOR OID tag[RFC9090]. The uniformResourceIdentifiers are encoded as CBOR text strings.¶
AccessDescription = ( accessMethod: int / ~oid , uri: text ) AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax = [ + AccessDescription ]¶
Subject Information Access (subjectInfoAccess). Encoded exactly like authorityInfoAccess.¶
SubjectInfoAccessSyntax = AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax¶
Authority Key Identifier (authorityKeyIdentifier). If the authority key identifier contains all of keyIdentifier, certIssuer, and certSerialNumberm or if only keyIdentifier is present the extension value can be CBOR encoded. If all three are present a CBOR array is used, if only keyIdentifier is present, the array is omitted:¶
KeyIdentifierArray = [ keyIdentifier: KeyIdentifier / null, authorityCertIssuer: GeneralNames, authorityCertSerialNumber: CertificateSerialNumber ] AuthorityKeyIdentifier = KeyIdentifierArray / KeyIdentifier¶
Certificate Policies (certificatePolicies). If noticeRef is not used and any explicitText are encoded as UTF8String, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. OIDs registered inSection 9.5 are encoded as an int. The policyQualifierId is encoded as an CBOR int (seeSection 9.6) or an unwrapped CBOR OID tag[RFC9090].¶
PolicyIdentifier = int / ~oid PolicyQualifierInfo = ( policyQualifierId: int / ~oid, qualifier: text, ) CertificatePolicies = [ + ( PolicyIdentifier, ? [ + PolicyQualifierInfo ] ) ]¶
Name Constraints (nameConstraints). If the name constraints only contain general names registered inSection 9.9 the extension value can be CBOR encoded. C509 uses the same additions and restrictions as defined inSection 4.2.1.10 of [RFC5280]. Note that the minimum and maximum fields are not used and therefore omitted.¶
GeneralSubtrees = [ + GeneralName ] NameConstraints = [ permittedSubtrees: GeneralSubtrees / null, excludedSubtrees: GeneralSubtrees / null, ]¶
Subject Directory Attributes (subjectDirectoryAttributes). Encoded as attributes in issuer and subject with the difference that there can be more than one attributeValue.¶
Attributes = ( attributeType: int, attributeValue: [+text] ) // ( attributeType: ~oid, attributeValue: [+bytes] ) SubjectDirectoryAttributes = [+Attributes]¶
AS Resources (id-pe-autonomousSysIds). If rdi is not present, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. Each ASId is encoded as an uint. With the exception of the first ASId, the ASid is encoded as the difference to the previous ASid.¶
AsIdsOrRanges = uint / [uint, uint] ASIdentifiers = [ + AsIdsOrRanges ] / null¶
AS Resources v2 (id-pe-autonomousSysIds-v2). Encoded exactly like autonomousSysIds.¶
IP Resources (id-pe-ipAddrBlocks). If rdi and SAFI is not present, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. Each AddressPrefix is encoded as a CBOR bytes string (without the unused bits octet) followed by the number of unused bits encoded as a CBOR uint. Each AddressRange is encoded as an array of two CBOR byte strings. The unused bits for min and max are omitted, but the unused bits in max IPAddress is set to ones. With the exception of the first Address, if the byte string has the same length as the previous Address, the Address is encoded as an uint with the the difference to the previous Address. It should be noted that using address differences for compactness prevents encoding an address range larger than 2^64 - 1 corresponding to the cbor integer max value.¶
Address = bytes / uint, AddressPrefix = (Address, unusedBits: uint) AddressRange = [Address, Address] IPAddressOrRange = AddressPrefix / AddressRange IPAddressChoice = [ + IPAddressOrRange ] / null IPAddrBlocks = [ AFI: uint, IPAddressChoice ]¶
IP Resources v2 (id-pe-ipAddrBlocks-v2). Encoded exactly like id-pe-ipAddrBlocks.¶
Signed Certificate Timestamp. If all the SCTs are version 1, and there are no SCT extensions, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. LogIDs are encoded as CBOR byte strings, the timestamp is encoded as a CBOR int (milliseconds since validityNotBefore), and the signature is encoded with an (AlgorithmIdentifier, any) pair in the same way as issuerSignatureAlgorithm and issuerSignatureValue.¶
SignedCerticateTimestamp = ( logID: bytes, timestamp: int, sigAlg: AlgorithmIdentifier, sigValue: any, ) SignedCertificateTimestamps = [ + SignedCerticateTimestamp ]¶
3.3.1.Example Encoding of Extensions
The examples below use values fromSection 9.4,Section 9.8, andSection 9.9:¶
A critical basicConstraints ('cA' = true) without pathLenConstraint is encoded as the two CBOR ints -4, -1.¶
A non-critical keyUsage with digitalSignature (0), nonRepudiation (1), keyEncipherment (2) and keyAgreement (4) asserted is encoded as the two CBOR ints 2, 23 (2^0 + 2^1 + 2^2 + 2^4 = 23).¶
A non-critical extKeyUsage containing id-kp-codeSigning and id-kp-OCSPSigning is encoded as the CBOR int 8 followed by the CBOR array [ 3, 6 ].¶
A non-critical subjectAltName containing only the dNSName example.com is encoded as the CBOR int 3 followed by the CBOR text string "example.com".¶
Thus, the extension field of a certificate containing all of the above extensions in the given order would be encoded as the CBOR array [ -4, -1, 2, 23, 8, [ 3, 6 ], 3, "example.com" ].¶
3.4.COSE Header Parameters
The formatting and processing for c5b, c5c, and c5t, and c5u, defined inTable 1 are similar to x5bag, x5chain, x5t, x5u defined in[RFC9360] except that the certificates are C509 instead of DER encoded X.509 and uses a COSE_C509 structure instead of COSE_X509. c5u provides an alternative way to identify an untrusted certificate bag/chain by reference with a URI. The content is a COSE_C509 item served with the application/cose-c509-cert media type, seeSection 9.13, with corresponding CoAP Content-Format defined inSection 9.17. A stored file format is defined in[RFC9277], with "magic number" TBD8 composed of the reserved CBOR tag 55799 concatenated with the CBOR tag calculated from the CoAP Content-Format value.¶
The COSE_C509 structure used in c5b, c5c, and c5u is defined as:¶
COSE_C509 = C509Certificate / [ 2* C509Certificate ]¶
As the contents of c5b, c5c, c5t, and c5u are untrusted input, the header parameters can be in either the protected or unprotected header bucket. The trust mechanism MUST process any certificates in the c5b, c5c, and c5u parameters as untrusted input. The presence of a self-signed certificate in the parameter MUST NOT cause the update of the set of trust anchors without some out-of-band confirmation.¶
| Name | Label | Value Type | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| c5b | TBD1 | COSE_C509 | An unordered bag of C509 certificates |
| c5c | TBD2 | COSE_C509 | An ordered chain of C509 certificates |
| c5t | TBD3 | COSE_CertHash | Hash of a C509Certificate |
| c5u | TBD4 | uri | URI pointing to a COSE_C509 containing a ordered chain of certificates |
Note that certificates can also be identified with a 'kid' header parameter by storing 'kid' and the associated bag or chain in a dictionary.¶
3.5.Private Key Structures
Certificate management also makes use of data structures including private keys, see e.g.[RFC7468]. This section defines the following CBOR encoded structures:¶
C509PrivateKey = [ subjectPrivateKeyAlgorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPrivateKey: any,]¶
The C509PrivateKey item is served with the application/cose-c509-privkey media type, seeSection 9.15, with corresponding CoAP Content-Format defined inSection 9.17. A stored file format is defined in[RFC9277], with "magic number" TBD12 composed of the reserved CBOR tag 55799 concatenated with the CBOR tag calculated from the CoAP Content-Format value.¶
C509PEM = [ C509PrivateKey, COSE_C509 / null,]¶
The C509PEM item is served with the application/cose-c509-pem media type, seeSection 9.16, with corresponding CoAP Content-Format defined inSection 9.17. A stored file format is defined in[RFC9277], with "magic number" TBD13 composed of the reserved CBOR tag 55799 concatenated with the CBOR tag calculated from the CoAP Content-Format value.¶
Editor's note: Include further details for encoding of subjectPrivateKey.¶
4.C509 Certificate Signing Request
This section defines the format of a C509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR), also known as a C509 Certificate Request, based on and compatible with RFC 2986[RFC2986], and reusing the formatting of C509 certificates defined inSection 3. The media type is application/cose-c509-pkcs10, seeSection 9.14, with corresponding CoAP Content-Format defined inSection 9.17. The "magic number" TBD9 is composed of the reserved CBOR tag 55799 concatenated with the CBOR tag calculated from the CoAP Content-Format value, see[RFC9277].¶
Different types of C509 Certificate Requests are defined, seeSection 9.2, all using the same CBOR encoding and differing only in what is being signed and what type of C509 certificate is being requested:¶
The C509 Certificate Request can either be an invertible CBOR re-encoding of a DER encoded RFC 2986 certification request, or it can be natively signed where the signature is calculated over the CBOR encoding instead of the DER encoding.¶
The requested C509 certificate in the C509 Certificate Request can either be of type 0 or of type 1, seeSection 9.1.¶
Combining these options enables the four instances of c509CertificateRequestType defined inSection 9.2. An implementation MAY only support c509CertificateRequestType = 0. The most common variants are expected to be:¶
c509CertificateRequestType = 0. This type indicates that the C509 Certificate Request is natively signed, and that the requested certificate format is C509 Type 0. This encoding removes the need for ASN.1 and DER parsing and re-encoding in the requesting party.¶
c509CertificateRequestType = 3. This type indicates that the C509 Certificate Request is CBOR re-encoded RFC 2986 certification requests, and that the requested certificate formate is C509 Type 1. This encoding is backwards compatible with legacy RFC 2986 certification requests and X.509 certificates, but enables a reduced transport overhead.¶
subjectSignatureAlgorithm can be a signature algorithm or a non-signature proof-of-possession algorithm, e.g., as defined in[RFC6955]. In the latter case, the signature is replaced by a MAC and requires a public Diffie-Hellman key of the verifier distributed out-of-band. Both kinds are listed in the C509 Signature Algorithms Registry, seeSection 9.10. Note that a key agreement key pair may be used with a signature algorithm in a certificate request, seeAppendix A.1.3.¶
Certificate request attributes, i.e. attributes for use with certificate requests providing additional information about the subject of the certificate, are defined inSection 5.4 of [RFC2985]. The attribute extensionRequest is supported with a dedicated element. Other certificate request attributes are included using the same Extensions structure as in extensionsRequest, both extensions and attributes are listed in the C509 Extensions Registry, seeFigure 8. The only other certificate request attribute specified in this document is challengePassword which is defined for utf8String values and encoded as CBOR text string, except if the text string contains only the symbols '0'–'9' or 'a'–'f', in which case it is encoded as a CBOR byte string.¶
C509CertificateRequest = [ TBSCertificateRequest, subjectSignatureValue: any,]; The elements of the following group are used in a CBOR Sequence:TBSCertificateRequest = ( c509CertificateRequestType: int, subject: Name, subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier, subjectPublicKey: any, extensionsRequest: Extensions, subjectSignatureAlgorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier,)challengePassword: tstr / bstr
After verifying the subjectSignatureValue, the CA MAY transform the C509CertificateRequest into a[RFC2986] CertificationRequestInfo for compatibility with existing procedures and code.¶
5.C509 Processing and Certificate Issuance
It is straightforward to integrate the C509 format into legacy X.509 processing during certificate issuance. C509 processing can be performed as an isolated function of the CA, or as a separate function trusted by the CA.¶
The Certificate Signing Request (CSR)) format defined in Section 4 follows the PKCS#10 format to enable a direct mapping to the certification request information, see Section 4.1 of[RFC2986].¶
When a certificate request is received, the CA, or function trusted by the CA, needs to perform some limited C509 processing and verify the proof-of-possession corresponding to the public key, before normal certificate generation can take place.¶
In the reverse direction, in case c509CertificateType = 1 was requested, a separate C509 processing function can perform the conversion from a generated X.509 certificate to C509 as a bump-in-the-wire. In case c509CertificateType = 0 was requested, the C509 processing needs to be performed before signing the certificate, in which case a tighter integration with the CA may be needed.¶
6.Legacy Considerations
C509 certificates can be deployed with legacy X.509 certificates and CA infrastructure. An existing CA can continue to use its existing procedures and code for PKCS#10, and DER encoded X.509 and only implement C509 as a thin processing layer on top. When receiving a C509 CSR, the CA transforms it into a DER encoded RFC 2986 CertificationRequestInfo and use that with existing processes and code to produce an RFC 5280 DER encoded X.509 certificate. The DER encoded X.509 is then transformed into a C509 certificate. At any later point, the C509 certificate can be used to recreate the original X.509 data structure needed to verify the signature.¶
For protocols like TLS/DTLS 1.2, where the handshake is sent unencrypted, the actual encoding and compression can be done at different locations depending on the deployment setting. For example, the mapping between C509 certificate and standard X.509 certificate can take place in a 6LoWPAN border gateway which allows the server side to stay unmodified. This case gives the advantage of the low overhead of a C509 certificate over a constrained wireless links. The conversion to X.509 within an IoT device will incur a computational overhead, however, measured in energy this is likely to be negligible compared to the reduced communication overhead.¶
For the setting with constrained server and server-only authentication, the server only needs to be provisioned with the C509 certificate and does not perform the conversion to X.509. This option is viable when client authentication can be asserted by other means.¶
For protocols like IKEv2, TLS/DTLS 1.3, and EDHOC, where certificates are encrypted, the proposed encoding needs to be done fully end-to-end, through adding the encoding/decoding functionality to the server.¶
7.Expected Certificate Sizes
The CBOR encoding of the sample certificate chains given inAppendix A results in the numbers shown inFigure 3 andFigure 4. COSE_X509 is defined in[RFC9360] and COSE_C509 is defined inSection 9.12. After RFC 7925 profiling, most duplicated information has been removed, and the remaining text strings are minimal in size. Therefore, the further size reduction reached with general compression mechanisms such as Brotli will be small, mainly corresponding to making the ASN.1 encoding more compact. CBOR encoding can however significantly compress RFC 7925 profiled certificates. For the example HTTPS certificate chains (www.ietf.org and tools.ietf.org) both C509 and Brotli perform well complementing each other. C509 use dedicated information to compress individual certificates, while Brotli can compress duplicate information in the entire chain. Note that C509 certificates of type 0 and 1 have the same size. For Brotli[RFC7932], the Rust crate Brotli 3.3.0 was used with compression level 11 and window size 22.¶
+---------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+| | COSE_X509 | COSE_C509 |+---------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+| RFC 7925 profiled IoT Certificate (1) | 317 | 139 |+---------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+| ECDSA HTTPS Certificate Chain (2) | 2193 | 1394 |+---------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+| RSA HTTPS Certificate Chain (4) | 5175 | 3934 |+---------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+
+-------------------+-------+----------------+------+---------------+| | X.509 | X.509 + Brotli | C509 | C509 + Brotli |+-------------------+-------+----------------+------+---------------+| RFC 7925 Cert (1) | 327 | 324 | 151 | 167 |+-------------------+-------+----------------+------+---------------+| RPKI Cert (1) | 20991 | 9134 | 8660 | 5668 |+-------------------+-------+----------------+------+---------------+| HTTPS Chain (2) | 2204 | 1455 | 1414 | 1063 |+-------------------+-------+----------------+------+---------------+| HTTPS Chain (4) | 5190 | 3244 | 3958 | 2845 |+-------------------+-------+----------------+------+---------------+| HTTPS Bag (8) | 11578 | 3979 | 8882 | 3519 |+-------------------+-------+----------------+------+---------------+
8.Security Considerations
The CBOR profiling of X.509 certificates does not change the security assumptions needed when deploying standard X.509 certificates but decreases the number of fields transmitted, which reduces the risk for implementation errors.¶
The use of natively signed C509 certificates removes the need for ASN.1 encoding, which is a rich source of security vulnerabilities.¶
Conversion between the certificate formats can be made in constant time to reduce risk of information leakage through side channels.¶
The mechanism in this draft does not reveal any additional information compared to X.509. Because of difference in size, it will be possible to detect that this profile is used. The gateway solution described inSection 6 requires unencrypted certificates and is not recommended.¶
9.IANA Considerations
This document creates several new registries under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". For all items, the 'Reference' field points to this document.¶
The expert reviewers for the registries defined in this document are expected to ensure that the usage solves a valid use case that could not be solved better in a different way, that it is not going to duplicate one that is already registered, and that the registered point is likely to be used in deployments. They are furthermore expected to check the clarity of purpose and use of the requested code points. Experts should take into account the expected usage of entries when approving point assignment, and the length of the encoded value should be weighed against the number of code points left that encode to that size and how constrained the systems it will be used on are. Values in the interval [-24, 23] have a 1 byte encodings, other values in the interval [-256, 255] have a 2 byte encodings, and the remaining values in the interval [-65536, 65535] have 3 byte encodings.¶
9.1.C509 Certificate Types Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Certificate Types" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| Value | Description |+=======+===========================================================+| 0 | Natively Signed C509 Certificate following X.509 v3 |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 1 | CBOR re-encoding of X.509 v3 Certificate |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
9.2.C509 Certificate Request Types Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Certificate Request Types" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| Value | Description |+=======+===========================================================+| 0 | Natively Signed C509 Certificate Request. || | Requested certificate is C509 Type 0. |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 1 | Natively Signed C509 Certificate Request. || | Requested certificate is C509 Type 1. |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 2 | CBOR re-encoding of RFC 2986 certification request. || | Requested certificate is C509 Type 0. |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 3 | CBOR re-encoding of RFC 2986 certification request. || | Requested certificate is C509 Type 1. |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
9.3.C509 Attributes Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Attributes" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an non-negative integer, and the other columns are text strings. For values in the interval [0, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". Values≥ 32768 are reserved for Private Use. For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| Value | Attribute |+=======+===========================================================+| 0 | Name: Email Address || | Identifiers: emailAddress, e-mailAddress || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1 || | DER: 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 1 | Name: Common Name || | Identifiers: commonName, cn || | OID: 2.5.4.3 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 03 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 2 | Name: Surname || | Identifiers: surname, sn || | OID: 2.5.4.4 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 04 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 3 | Name: Serial Number || | Identifiers: serialNumber || | OID: 2.5.4.5 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 05 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 4 | Name: Country || | Identifiers: countryName, c || | OID: 2.5.4.6 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 06 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 5 | Name: Locality || | Identifiers: localityName, locality, l || | OID: 2.5.4.7 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 07 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 6 | Name: State or Province || | Identifiers: stateOrProvinceName, st || | OID: 2.5.4.8 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 08 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 7 | Name: Street Address || | Identifiers: streetAddress, street || | OID: 2.5.4.9 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 09 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 8 | Name: Organization || | Identifiers: organizationName, o || | OID: 2.5.4.10 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 0A || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 9 | Name: Organizational Unit || | Identifiers: organizationalUnitName, ou || | OID: 2.5.4.11 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 0B || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 10 | Name: Title || | Identifiers: title || | OID: 2.5.4.12 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 0C || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 11 | Name: Business Category || | Identifiers: businessCategory || | OID: 2.5.4.15 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 0F || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 12 | Name: Postal Code || | Identifiers: postalCode || | OID: 2.5.4.17 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 11 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 13 | Name: Given Name || | Identifiers: givenName || | OID: 2.5.4.42 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 2A || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 14 | Name: Initials || | Identifiers: initials || | OID: 2.5.4.43 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 2B || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 15 | Name: Generation Qualifier || | Identifiers: generationQualifier || | OID: 2.5.4.44 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 2C || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 16 | Name: DN Qualifier || | Identifiers: dnQualifier || | OID: 2.5.4.46 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 2E || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 17 | Name: Pseudonym || | Identifiers: pseudonym || | OID: 2.5.4.65 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 41 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 18 | Name: Organization Identifier || | Identifiers: organizationIdentifier || | OID: 2.5.4.97 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 61 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 19 | Name: Inc. Locality || | Identifiers: jurisdictionOfIncorporationLocalityName || | OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.1 || | DER: 06 0B 2B 06 01 04 01 82 37 3C 02 01 01 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 20 | Name: Inc. State or Province || | Identifiers: jurisdictionOfIncorporation || | StateOrProvinceName || | OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2 || | DER: 06 0B 2B 06 01 04 01 82 37 3C 02 01 02 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 21 | Name: Inc. Country || | Identifiers: jurisdictionOfIncorporationCountryName || | OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3 || | DER: 06 0B 2B 06 01 04 01 82 37 3C 02 01 03 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 22 | Name: Domain Component || | Identifiers: domainComponent, dc || | OID: 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25 || | DER: 06 0A 09 92 26 89 93 F2 2C 64 01 19 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 24 | Name: Postal Address || | Identifiers: postalAddress || | OID: 2.5.4.16 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 10 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 25 | Name: Name || | Identifiers: name || | OID: 2.5.4.41 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 29 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 26 | Name: Telephone Number || | Identifiers: telephoneNumber || | OID: 2.5.4.20 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 14 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 27 | Name: Directory Management Domain Name || | Identifiers: dmdName || | OID: 2.5.4.54 || | DER: 06 03 55 04 36 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 28 | Name: userid || | Identifiers: uid || | OID: 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1 || | DER: 06 0A 09 92 26 89 93 F2 2C 64 01 01 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 29 | Name: Unstructured Name || | Identifiers: unstructuredName || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.2 || | DER: 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 02 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 30 | Name: Unstructured Address || | Identifiers: unstructuredAddress || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.8 || | DER: 06 0A 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 08 00 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
9.4.C509 Extensions Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Extensions Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, extensionValue, and Reference, where Value is an positive integer, and the other columns are text strings. The registry also contains CSR attributes for use in Certificate Requests, seeSection 4. For values in the interval [1, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". Values≥ 32768 are reserved for Private Use. For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| Value | Extension |+=======+===========================================================+| 1 | Name: Subject Key Identifier || | Identifiers: subjectKeyIdentifier || | OID: 2.5.29.14 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 0E || | Comments: || | extensionValue: SubjectKeyIdentifier |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 2 | Name: Key Usage || | Identifiers: keyUsage || | OID: 2.5.29.15 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 0F || | Comments: || | AttributeValue: KeyUsage |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 3 | Name: Subject Alternative Name || | Identifiers: subjectAltName || | OID: 2.5.29.17 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 11 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: SubjectAltName |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 4 | Name: Basic Constraints || | Identifiers: basicConstraints || | OID: 2.5.29.19 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 13 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: BasicConstraints |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 5 | Name: CRL Distribution Points || | Identifiers: cRLDistributionPoints || | OID: 2.5.29.31 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 1F || | Comments: || | extensionValue: CRLDistributionPoints |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 6 | Name: Certificate Policies || | Identifiers: certificatePolicies || | OID: 2.5.29.32 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 20 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: CertificatePolicies |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 7 | Name: Authority Key Identifier || | Identifiers: authorityKeyIdentifier || | OID: 2.5.29.35 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 23 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: AuthorityKeyIdentifier |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 8 | Name: Extended Key Usage || | Identifiers: extKeyUsage || | OID: 2.5.29.37 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 25 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: ExtKeyUsageSyntax |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 9 | Name: Authority Information Access || | Identifiers: authorityInfoAccess || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 01 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 10 | Name: Signed Certificate Timestamp List || | Identifiers: || | OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2 || | DER: 06 0A 2B 06 01 04 01 D6 79 02 04 02 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: SignedCertificateTimestampList |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 24 | Name: Subject Directory Attributes || | Identifiers: subjectDirectoryAttributes || | OID: 2.5.29.9 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 09 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: SubjectDirectoryAttributes |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 25 | Name: Issuer Alternative Name || | Identifiers: issuerAltName || | OID: 2.5.29.18 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 12 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: IssuerAltName |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 26 | Name: Name Constraints || | Identifiers: nameConstraints || | OID: 2.5.29.30 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 1E || | Comments: || | extensionValue: NameConstraints |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 27 | Name: Policy Mappings || | Identifiers: policyMappings || | OID: 2.5.29.33 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 21 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: PolicyMappings |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 28 | Name: Policy Constraints || | Identifiers: policyConstraints || | OID: 2.5.29.36 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 24 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: PolicyConstraints |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 29 | Name: Freshest CRL || | Identifiers: freshestCRL || | OID: 2.5.29.46 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 2E || | Comments: || | extensionValue: FreshestCRL |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 30 | Name: Inhibit anyPolicy || | Identifiers: inhibitAnyPolicy || | OID: 2.5.29.54 || | DER: 06 03 55 1D 36 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: InhibitAnyPolicy |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 31 | Name: Subject Information Access || | Identifiers: subjectInfoAccess || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 0B || | Comments: || | extensionValue: SubjectInfoAccessSyntax |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 32 | Name: IP Resources || | Identifiers: id-pe-ipAddrBlocks || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.7 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 07 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: IPAddrBlocks |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 33 | Name: AS Resources || | Identifiers: id-pe-autonomousSysIds || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.8 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 08 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: ASIdentifiers |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 34 | Name: IP Resources v2 || | Identifiers: id-pe-ipAddrBlocks-v2 || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.28 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 1C || | Comments: || | extensionValue: IPAddrBlocks |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 35 | Name: AS Resources v2 || | Identifiers: id-pe-autonomousSysIds-v2 || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.29 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 1D || | Comments: || | extensionValue: ASIdentifiers |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 36 | Name: Biometric Information || | Identifiers: id-pe-biometricInfo || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.2 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 02 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 37 | Name: Precertificate Signing Certificate || | Identifiers: || | OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4 || | DER: 06 0A 2B 06 01 04 01 D6 79 02 04 04 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 38 | Name: OCSP No Check || | Identifiers: id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.5 || | DER: 06 09 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 05 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 39 | Name: Qualified Certificate Statements || | Identifiers: id-pe-qcStatements || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 03 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 40 | Name: S/MIME Capabilities || | Identifiers: smimeCapabilities || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.15 || | DER: 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 0F || | Comments: || | extensionValue: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 41 | Name: TLS Features || | Identifiers: id-pe-tlsfeature || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 18 || | Comments: || | extensionValue: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 255 | Name: Challenge Password || | Identifiers: challengePassword || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.7 || | DER: 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 07 || | Comments: CSR Attribute || | extensionValue: ChallengePassword |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
9.5.C509 Certificate Policies Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Certificate Policies Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". Values≥ 32768 are reserved for Private Use. For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| Value | Certificate Policy |+=======+===========================================================+| 0 | Name: Any Policy || | Identifiers: anyPolicy || | OID: 2.5.29.32.0 || | DER: 06 04 55 1D 20 00 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 1 | Name: Domain Validation (DV) || | Identifiers: domain-validated || | OID: 2.23.140.1.2.1 || | DER: 06 06 67 81 0C 01 02 01 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 2 | Name: Organization Validation (OV) || | Identifiers: organization-validated || | OID: 2.23.140.1.2.2 || | DER: 06 06 67 81 0C 01 02 02 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 3 | Name: Individual Validation (IV) || | Identifiers: individual-validated || | OID: 2.23.140.1.2.3 || | DER: 06 06 67 81 0C 01 02 03 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 4 | Name: Extended Validation (EV) || | Identifiers: ev-guidelines || | OID: 2.23.140.1.1 || | DER: 06 05 67 81 0C 01 01 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 7 | Name: Resource PKI (RPKI) || | Identifiers: id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 0E 02 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 8 | Name: Resource PKI (RPKI) (Alternative) || | Identifiers: id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber-v2 || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.3 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 0E 03 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 10 | Name: Remote SIM Provisioning Role || | Certificate Issuer || | Identifiers: id-rspRole-ci || | OID: 2.23.146.1.2.1.0 || | DER: 06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 00 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 11 | Name: Remote SIM Provisioning Role || | eUICC || | Identifiers: id-rspRole-euicc || | OID: 2.23.146.1.2.1.1 || | DER: 06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 01 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 12 | Name: Remote SIM Provisioning Role || | eUICC Manufacturer || | Identifiers: id-rspRole-eum || | OID: 2.23.146.1.2.1.2 || | DER: 06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 02 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 13 | Name: Remote SIM Provisioning Role || | SM-DP+ TLS || | Identifiers: id-rspRole-dp-tls || | OID: 2.23.146.1.2.1.3 || | DER: 06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 03 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 14 | Name: Remote SIM Provisioning Role || | SM-DP+ Authentication || | Identifiers: id-rspRole-dp-auth || | OID: 2.23.146.1.2.1.4 || | DER: 06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 04 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 15 | Name: Remote SIM Provisioning Role || | SM-DP+ Profile Binding || | Identifiers: id-rspRole-dp-pb || | OID: 2.23.146.1.2.1.5 || | DER: 06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 05 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 16 | Name: Remote SIM Provisioning Role || | SM-DS TLS || | Identifiers: id-rspRole-ds-tls || | OID: 2.23.146.1.2.1.6 || | DER: 06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 06 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 17 | Name: Remote SIM Provisioning Role || | SM-DS Authentication || | Identifiers: id-rspRole-ds-auth || | OID: 2.23.146.1.2.1.7 || | DER: 06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 07 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
9.6.C509 Policies Qualifiers Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Policies Qualifiers Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". Values≥ 32768 are reserved for Private Use. For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| Value | Certificate Policy |+=======+===========================================================+| 1 | Name: Certification Practice Statement || | Identifiers: id-qt-cps, cps || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.2.1 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 02 01 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 2 | Name: User Notice || | Identifiers: id-qt-unotice, unotice || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.2.2 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 02 02 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
9.7.C509 Information Access Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Information Access Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| Value | Information Access |+=======+===========================================================+| 1 | Name: OCSP || | Identifiers: id-ad-ocsp, id-pkix-ocsp || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 2 | Name: CA Issuers || | Identifiers: id-ad-caIssuers, caIssuers || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 02 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 3 | Name: Time Stamping || | Identifiers: id-ad-timeStamping, timeStamping || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.3 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 03 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 5 | Name: CA Repository || | Identifiers: id-ad-caRepository || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.5 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 05 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 10 | Name: RPKI Manifest || | Identifiers: id-ad-rpkiManifest || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.10 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 0A || | Comments: RFC 6487 |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 11 | Name: Signed Object || | Identifiers: id-ad-signedObject || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.11 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 0B || | Comments: RFC 6487 |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 13 | Name: RPKI Notify || | Identifiers: id-ad-rpkiNotify || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.13 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 0D || | Comments: RFC 8182 |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
9.8.C509 Extended Key Usages Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Extended Key Usages Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". Values≥ 32768 are reserved for Private Use. For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| Value | Extended Key Usage |+=======+=========================================================+| 0 | Name: Any Extended Key Usage || | Identifiers: anyExtendedKeyUsage || | OID: 2.5.29.37.0 || | DER: 06 04 55 1D 25 00 || | Comments: RFC 5280 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 1 | Name: TLS Server authentication || | Identifiers: id-kp-serverAuth || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 || | Comments: RFC 5280 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 2 | Name: TLS Client Authentication || | Identifiers: id-kp-clientAuth || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 || | Comments: RFC 5280 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 3 | Name: Code Signing || | Identifiers: id-kp-codeSigning || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 03 || | Comments: RFC 5280 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 4 | Name: Email protection (S/MIME) || | Identifiers: id-kp-emailProtection || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 04 || | Comments: RFC 5280 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 8 | Name: Time Stamping || | Identifiers: id-kp-timeStamping, timestamping || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 08 || | Comments: |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 9 | Name: OCSP Signing || | Identifiers: id-kp-OCSPSigning || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 09 || | Comments: RFC 5280 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 10 | Name: Kerberos PKINIT Client Auth || | Identifiers: id-pkinit-KPClientAuth || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4 || | DER: 06 07 2B 06 01 05 02 03 04 || | Comments: RFC 4556 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 11 | Name: Kerberos PKINIT KDC || | Identifiers: id-pkinit-KPKdc || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.2.3.5 || | DER: 06 07 2B 06 01 05 02 03 05 || | Comments: RFC 4556 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 12 | Name: SSH Client || | Identifiers: id-kp-secureShellClient || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.21 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 15 || | Comments: RFC 6187 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 13 | Name: SSH Server || | Identifiers: id-kp-secureShellServer || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.22 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 16 || | Comments: RFC 6187 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 14 | Name: Bundle Security || | Identifiers: id-kp-bundleSecurity || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.35 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 23 || | Comments: RFC 9174 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 15 | Name: CMC Certification Authority || | Identifiers: id-kp-cmcCA || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.27 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 1B || | Comments: RFC 6402 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 16 | Name: CMC Registration Authority || | Identifiers: id-kp-cmcRA || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 1C || | Comments: RFC 6402 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 17 | Name: CMC Archive Server || | Identifiers: id-kp-cmcArchive || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.29 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 1D || | Comments: RFC 6402 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+| 18 | Name: CMC Key Generation Authority || | Identifiers: id-kp-cmKGA || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.32 || | DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 20 || | Comments: RFC 9480 |+-------+---------------------------------------------------------+
9.9.C509 General Names Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 General Names Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, General Name, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| Value | General Names |+=======+===========================================================+| -3 | Name: otherName with BundleEID || | Comments: id-on-bundleEID || | (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.11) || | 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 08 0B || | Value: eid-structure from RFC 9171 |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| -2 | Name: otherName with SmtpUTF8Mailbox || | Comments: id-on-SmtpUTF8Mailbox || | (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.9) || | 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 08 09 || | Value: text |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| -1 | Name: otherName with hardwareModuleName || | Comments: id-on-hardwareModuleName || | (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4) || | 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 08 04 || | Value: [ ~oid, bytes ] |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 0 | Name: otherName || | Comments: || | Value: [ ~oid, bytes ] |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 1 | Name: rfc822Name || | Comments: || | Value: text |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 2 | Name: dNSName || | Comments: || | Value: text |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 4 | Name: directoryName || | Comments: || | Value: Name |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 6 | Name: uniformResourceIdentifier || | Comments: || | Value: text |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 7 | Name: iPAddress || | Comments: || | Value: bytes |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 8 | Name: registeredID || | Comments: || | Value: ~oid |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
9.10.C509 Signature Algorithms Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Signature Algorithms" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The registry includes both signature algorithms and non-signature proof-of-possession algorithms. The columns of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, Parameters, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| Value | X.509 Signature Algorithms |+=======+===========================================================+| -256 | Name: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-1 || | Identifiers: sha1-with-rsa-signature, || | sha1WithRSAEncryption, || | sha-1WithRSAEncryption || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 || | Parameters: NULL || | DER: 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 05 05 00 || | Comments: Don't use |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| -255 | Name: ECDSA with SHA-1 || | Identifiers: ecdsa-with-SHA1 || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.1 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 09 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 01 || | Comments: Don't use. Compressed signature value |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 0 | Name: ECDSA with SHA-256 || | Identifiers: ecdsa-with-SHA256 || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 || | Comments: Compressed signature value |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 1 | Name: ECDSA with SHA-384 || | Identifiers: ecdsa-with-SHA384 || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 03 || | Comments: Compressed signature value |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 2 | Name: ECDSA with SHA-512 || | Identifiers: ecdsa-with-SHA512 || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 04 || | Comments: Compressed signature value |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 3 | Name: ECDSA with SHAKE128 || | Identifiers: id-ecdsa-with-shake128 || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.32 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 20 || | Comments: Compressed signature value |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 4 | Name: ECDSA with SHAKE256 || | Identifiers: id-ecdsa-with-shake256 || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.33 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 21 || | Comments: Compressed signature value |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 12 | Name: Ed25519 || | Identifiers: id-Ed25519, id-EdDSA25519 || | OID: 1.3.101.112 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 05 06 03 2B 65 70 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 13 | Name: Ed448 || | Identifiers: id-Ed448, id-EdDSA448 || | OID: 1.3.101.113 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 05 06 03 2B 65 71 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 14 | Name: SHA-256 with HMAC-SHA256 || | Identifiers: sa-ecdhPop-sha256-hmac-sha256 || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.26 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 1A || | Comments: Proof-of-possession algorithm, indexed with || | KDF and MAC, see RFC 6955. Requires || | recipient public static Diffie-Hellman key. |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 15 | Name: SHA-384 with HMAC-SHA384 || | Identifiers: sa-ecdhPop-sha384-hmac-sha384 || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.27 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 1B || | Comments: Proof-of-possession algorithm, indexed with || | KDF and MAC, see RFC 6955. Requires || | recipient public static Diffie-Hellman key. |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 16 | Name: SHA-512 with HMAC-SHA512 || | Identifiers: sa-ecdhPop-sha512-hmac-sha512 || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.28 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 1C || | Comments: Proof-of-possession algorithm, indexed with || | KDF and MAC, see RFC 6955. Requires || | recipient public static Diffie-Hellman key. |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 23 | Name: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-256 || | Identifiers: sha256WithRSAEncryption || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 || | Parameters: NULL || | DER: 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0B 05 00 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 24 | Name: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-384 || | Identifiers: sha384WithRSAEncryption || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 || | Parameters: NULL || | DER: 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0C 05 00 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 25 | Name: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-512 || | Identifiers: sha512WithRSAEncryption || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13 || | Parameters: NULL || | DER: 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0D 05 00 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 26 | Name: RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256 || | Identifiers: rsassa-pss, id-RSASSA-PSS || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 || | Parameters: SHA-256, MGF-1 with SHA-256, saltLength = 32 || | DER: 30 41 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A 30 34 || | A0 0F 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 || | 05 00 A1 1C 30 1A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 || | 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 || | 05 00 a2 03 02 01 20 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 27 | Name: RSASSA-PSS with SHA-384 || | Identifiers: rsassa-pss, id-RSASSA-PSS || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 || | Parameters: SHA-384, MGF-1 with SHA-384, saltLength = 48 || | DER: 30 41 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A 30 34 || | A0 0F 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 || | 05 00 A1 1C 30 1A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 || | 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 || | 05 00 A2 03 02 01 30 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 28 | Name: RSASSA-PSS with SHA-512 || | Identifiers: rsassa-pss, id-RSASSA-PSS || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 || | Parameters: SHA-512, MGF-1 with SHA-512, saltLength = 64 || | DER: 30 41 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A 30 34 || | A0 0F 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 || | 05 00 A1 1C 30 1A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 || | 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 || | 05 00 A2 03 02 01 40 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 29 | Name: RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128 || | Identifiers: id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.30 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 1E || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 30 | Name: RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256 || | Identifiers: id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 || | OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.31 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 1F || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 42 | Name: HSS / LMS || | Identifiers: id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig, id-alg-mts-hashsig || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3.17 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0D 06 0B 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 10 03 11 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 43 | Name: XMSS || | Identifiers: id_alg_xmss || | OID: 0.4.0.127.0.15.1.1.13.0 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0B 06 09 04 00 7F 00 0F 01 01 0D 00 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 44 | Name: XMSS^MT || | Identifiers: id_alg_xmssmt || | OID: 0.4.0.127.0.15.1.1.14.0 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0B 06 09 04 00 7F 00 0F 01 01 0E 00 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 45 | Name: SM2 with SM3 || | Identifiers: sm2-with-sm3 || | OID: 1.2.156.10197.1.501 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0A 06 08 2A 81 1C CF 55 01 83 75 || | Comments: Compressed signature value |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
9.11.C509 Public Key Algorithms Registry
IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Public Key Algorithms" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, Parameters, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". T The initial contents of the registry are:¶
+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| Value | X.509 Public Key Algorithms |+=======+===========================================================+| 0 | Name: RSA || | Identifiers: rsaEncryption || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 || | Parameters: NULL || | DER: 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 || | Comments: Compressed subjectPublicKey |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 1 | Name: EC Public Key (Weierstraß) with secp256r1 || | Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 || | Parameters: namedCurve = secp256r1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) || | DER: 30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 86 || | 48 CE 3D 03 01 07 || | Comments: Point compressed subjectPublicKey || | Also known as P-256, ansip256r1, prime256v1 |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 2 | Name: EC Public Key (Weierstraß) with secp384r1 || | Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 || | Parameters: namedCurve = secp384r1 (1.3.132.0.34) || | DER: 30 10 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 05 2B 81 || | 04 00 22 || | Comments: Point compressed subjectPublicKey || | Also known as P-384, ansip384r1 |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 3 | Name: EC Public Key (Weierstraß) with secp521r1 || | Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 || | Parameters: namedCurve = secp521r1 (1.3.132.0.35) || | DER: 30 10 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 05 2B 81 || | 04 00 23 || | Comments: Point compressed subjectPublicKey || | Also known as P-521, ansip521r1 |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 8 | Name: X25519 (Montgomery) || | Identifiers: id-X25519 || | OID: 1.3.101.110 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 05 06 03 2B 65 6E || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 9 | Name: X448 (Montgomery) || | Identifiers: id-X448 || | OID: 1.3.101.111 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 05 06 03 2B 65 6F || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 10 | Name: Ed25519 (Twisted Edwards) || | Identifiers: id-Ed25519, id-EdDSA25519 || | OID: 1.3.101.112 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 05 06 03 2B 65 70 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 11 | Name: Ed448 (Edwards) || | Identifiers: id-Ed448, id-EdDSA448 || | OID: 1.3.101.113 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 05 06 03 2B 65 71 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 16 | Name: HSS / LMS || | Identifiers: id-alg-hss-lms-hashsig, id-alg-mts-hashsig || | OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3.17 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0D 06 0B 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 10 03 11 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 17 | Name: XMSS || | Identifiers: id_alg_xmss || | OID: 0.4.0.127.0.15.1.1.13.0 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0B 06 09 04 00 7F 00 0F 01 01 0D 00 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 18 | Name: XMSS^MT || | Identifiers: id_alg_xmssmt || | OID: 0.4.0.127.0.15.1.1.14.0 || | Parameters: Absent || | DER: 30 0B 06 09 04 00 7F 00 0F 01 01 0E 00 || | Comments: |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 24 | Name: EC Public Key (Weierstraß) with || | brainpoolP256r1 || | Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 || | Parameters: namedCurve = brainpoolP256r1 || | (1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7) || | DER: 30 14 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 09 2B 24 || | 03 03 02 08 01 01 07 || | Comments: Point compressed subjectPublicKey |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 25 | Name: EC Public Key (Weierstraß) with || | brainpoolP384r1 || | Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 || | Parameters: namedCurve = brainpoolP384r1 || | (1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11) || | DER: 30 14 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 09 2B 24 || | 03 03 02 08 01 01 0B || | Comments: Point compressed subjectPublicKey |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 26 | Name: EC Public Key (Weierstraß) with || | brainpoolP512r1 || | Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 || | Parameters: namedCurve = brainpoolP512r1 || | (1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13) || | DER: 30 14 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 09 2B 24 || | 03 03 02 08 01 01 0D || | Comments: Point compressed subjectPublicKey |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 27 | Name: EC Public Key (Weierstraß) with || | FRP256v1 || | Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 || | Parameters: namedCurve = FRP256v1 || | (1.2.250.1.223.101.256.1) || | DER: 30 15 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 0A 2A 81 || | 7A 01 81 5F 65 82 00 01 || | Comments: Point compressed subjectPublicKey |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+| 28 | Name: EC Public Key (Weierstraß) with || | sm2p256v1 || | Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey || | OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 || | Parameters: namedCurve = sm2p256v1 || | (1.2.156.10197.1.301) || | DER: 30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 81 || | 1C CF 55 01 82 2D || | Comments: Point compressed subjectPublicKey |+-------+-----------------------------------------------------------+
9.11.1.Suitability of different public key algorithms for use within IoT scenarios
The public key algorithms registrySection 9.11 specify a number of algorithms, not all which are suitable for usage with constrained devices. RSA requires large keys and large signature sizes compared to elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which together with resource-efficient implementations of named elliptic curves (Montgomery, Edwards and Weierstraß curves), make them suitable candidates for IoT public key usage. These curves are represented by ids 1–11 and 24–28 inSection 9.11.¶
9.12.COSE Header Parameters Registry
IANA is requested to assign the entries inTable 1 to the "COSE Header Parameters" registry under the "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)" heading with this document as reference.¶
9.13.Media Type application/cose-c509-cert
When the application/cose-c509-cert media type is used, the data is a COSE_C509 structure. If the parameter "usage" is set to "chain", this sequence indicates a certificate chain.¶
IANA has registered the following media type[RFC6838]:¶
Type name: application¶
Subtype name: cose-c509-cert¶
Required parameters: N/A¶
Optional parameters: usage¶
Can be absent to provide no further information about the intended meaning of the order in the CBOR sequence of certificates.¶
Can be set to "chain" to indicate that the sequence of data items is to be interpreted as a certificate chain.¶
Encoding considerations: binary¶
Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[this document]].¶
Interoperability considerations: N/A¶
Published specification: [[this document]]¶
Applications that use this media type: Applications that employ COSE and use C509 as a certificate type.¶
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A¶
Additional information:¶
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A¶
Magic number(s): TBD8¶
File extension(s): .c509¶
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A¶
Person & email address to contact for further information: iesg@ietf.org¶
Intended usage: COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage: N/A¶
Author: COSE WG¶
Change controller: IESG¶
9.14.Media Type application/cose-c509-pkcs10
When the application/cose-c509-pkcs10 media type is used, the data is a C509CertificateRequest structure.¶
IANA has registered the following media type[RFC6838]:¶
Type name: application¶
Subtype name: cose-c509-pkcs10¶
Required parameters: N/A¶
Optional parameters: N/A¶
Encoding considerations: binary¶
Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[this document]].¶
Interoperability considerations: N/A¶
Published specification: [[this document]]¶
Applications that use this media type: Applications that employ COSE and C509 Certificate Request.¶
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A¶
Additional information:¶
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A¶
Magic number(s): TBD9¶
File extension(s): .c509¶
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A¶
Person & email address to contact for further information: iesg@ietf.org¶
Intended usage: COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage: N/A¶
Author: COSE WG¶
Change controller: IESG¶
9.15.Media Type application/cose-c509-privkey
When the application/cose-c509-privkey media type is used, the data is a C509PrivateKey structure.¶
IANA has registered the following media type[RFC6838]:¶
Type name: application¶
Subtype name: cose-c509-privkey¶
Required parameters: N/A¶
Optional parameters: usage¶
Encoding considerations: binary¶
Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[this document]].¶
Interoperability considerations: N/A¶
Published specification: [[this document]]¶
Applications that use this media type: Applications that employ COSE and use C509 as a certificate type.¶
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A¶
Additional information:¶
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A¶
Magic number(s): TBD12¶
File extension(s): .c509¶
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A¶
Person & email address to contact for further information: iesg@ietf.org¶
Intended usage: COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage: N/A¶
Author: COSE WG¶
Change controller: IESG¶
9.16.Media Type application/cose-c509-pem
When the application/cose-c509-pem media type is used, the data is a C509PEM structure.¶
IANA has registered the following media type[RFC6838]:¶
Type name: application¶
Subtype name: cose-c509-pem¶
Required parameters: N/A¶
Optional parameters: usage¶
Encoding considerations: binary¶
Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[this document]].¶
Interoperability considerations: N/A¶
Published specification: [[this document]]¶
Applications that use this media type: Applications that employ COSE and use C509 as a certificate type.¶
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A¶
Additional information:¶
Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A¶
Magic number(s): TBD13¶
File extension(s): .c509¶
Macintosh file type code(s): N/A¶
Person & email address to contact for further information: iesg@ietf.org¶
Intended usage: COMMON¶
Restrictions on usage: N/A¶
Author: COSE WG¶
Change controller: IESG¶
9.17.CoAP Content-Formats Registry
IANA is requested to add the media types "application/cose-c509-cert", "application/cose-c509-pkcs10", "application/cose-c509-privkey" and "application/cose-c509-pem" to the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry under the registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters".¶
9.18.TLS Certificate Types Registry
This document registers the following entry in the "TLS Certificate Types" registry under the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions" heading. The new certificate type can be used with additional TLS certificate compression[RFC8879]. C509 is defined in the same way as as X.509, but uses a different value and instead of DER-encoded X.509 certificate, opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1> contains a the CBOR sequence ~C509Certificate (an unwrapped C509Certificate).¶
Editor's Note: The TLS registrations should be discussed and approved by the TLS WG at a later stage. The TLS WG might e.g. want a separate draft in the TLS WG.¶
+-------+------------------+-------------+--------------------------+| Value | Name | Recommended | Comment |+=======+==================+=============+==========================+| TBD5 | C509 Certificate | Y | |+-------+------------------+-------------+--------------------------+¶
9.19.CBOR Tags Registry
This document registers the following entries in the "CBOR Tags" registry under the "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags" heading.¶
+------+------------------------------------------------------------+| Tag | X.509 Public Key Algorithms |+======+============================================================+| TDB6 | Data Item: COSE_C509 || | Semantics: An ordered chain of C509 certificates || | Reference: This document |+------+------------------------------------------------------------+¶
10.References
10.1.Normative References
- [RFC2119]
- Bradner, S.,"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,DOI 10.17487/RFC2119,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
- [RFC2985]
- Nystrom, M. andB. Kaliski,"PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0",RFC 2985,DOI 10.17487/RFC2985,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
- [RFC2986]
- Nystrom, M. andB. Kaliski,"PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7",RFC 2986,DOI 10.17487/RFC2986,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
- [RFC4108]
- Housley, R.,"Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to Protect Firmware Packages",RFC 4108,DOI 10.17487/RFC4108,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4108>.
- [RFC5280]
- Cooper, D.,Santesson, S.,Farrell, S.,Boeyen, S.,Housley, R., andW. Polk,"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",RFC 5280,DOI 10.17487/RFC5280,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
- [RFC6838]
- Freed, N.,Klensin, J., andT. Hansen,"Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures",BCP 13,RFC 6838,DOI 10.17487/RFC6838,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
- [RFC8174]
- Leiba, B.,"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words",BCP 14,RFC 8174,DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
- [RFC8610]
- Birkholz, H.,Vigano, C., andC. Bormann,"Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures",RFC 8610,DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
- [RFC8742]
- Bormann, C.,"Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Sequences",RFC 8742,DOI 10.17487/RFC8742,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8742>.
- [RFC8949]
- Bormann, C. andP. Hoffman,"Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)",STD 94,RFC 8949,DOI 10.17487/RFC8949,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
- [RFC9052]
- Schaad, J.,"CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process",STD 96,RFC 9052,DOI 10.17487/RFC9052,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
- [RFC9090]
- Bormann, C.,"Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags for Object Identifiers",RFC 9090,DOI 10.17487/RFC9090,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9090>.
- [RFC9277]
- Richardson, M. andC. Bormann,"On Stable Storage for Items in Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)",RFC 9277,DOI 10.17487/RFC9277,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9277>.
- [RFC9360]
- Schaad, J.,"CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509 Certificates",RFC 9360,DOI 10.17487/RFC9360,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9360>.
- [SECG]
- "Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, ver. 2",,<https://secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
10.2.Informative References
- [CAB-Code]
- CA/Browser Forum,"CA/Browser Forum, "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates Version 2.3"",,<https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-code-signing/>.
- [CAB-TLS]
- CA/Browser Forum,"CA/Browser Forum, "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates Version 1.7.6"",,<https://cabforum.org/baseline-requirements-documents/>.
- [CborMe]
- Bormann, C.,"CBOR Playground",,<https://cbor.me/>.
- [GSMA-eUICC]
- GSMA,"GSMA eUICC PKI Certificate Policy Version 2.1",,<https://www.gsma.com/esim/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/SGP.14-v2.1.pdf>.
- [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]
- Selander, G.,Mattsson, J. P., andF. Palombini,"Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)",Work in Progress,Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-23,,<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-23>.
- [I-D.ietf-tls-ctls]
- Rescorla, E.,Barnes, R.,Tschofenig, H., andB. M. Schwartz,"Compact TLS 1.3",Work in Progress,Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-ctls-09,,<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-ctls-09>.
- [I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile]
- Tschofenig, H.,Fossati, T., andM. Richardson,"TLS/DTLS 1.3 Profiles for the Internet of Things",Work in Progress,Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile-08,,<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile-08>.
- [IEEE-802.1AR]
- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,"IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks–Secure Device Identity",IEEE Standard 802.1AR-2018,,<https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1AR-2018.html>.
- [RFC6487]
- Huston, G.,Michaelson, G., andR. Loomans,"A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",RFC 6487,DOI 10.17487/RFC6487,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
- [RFC6955]
- Schaad, J. andH. Prafullchandra,"Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms",RFC 6955,DOI 10.17487/RFC6955,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6955>.
- [RFC7228]
- Bormann, C.,Ersue, M., andA. Keranen,"Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks",RFC 7228,DOI 10.17487/RFC7228,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
- [RFC7468]
- Josefsson, S. andS. Leonard,"Textual Encodings of PKIX, PKCS, and CMS Structures",RFC 7468,DOI 10.17487/RFC7468,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7468>.
- [RFC7925]
- Tschofenig, H., Ed. andT. Fossati,"Transport Layer Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profiles for the Internet of Things",RFC 7925,DOI 10.17487/RFC7925,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.
- [RFC7932]
- Alakuijala, J. andZ. Szabadka,"Brotli Compressed Data Format",RFC 7932,DOI 10.17487/RFC7932,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7932>.
- [RFC8446]
- Rescorla, E.,"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3",RFC 8446,DOI 10.17487/RFC8446,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
- [RFC8603]
- Jenkins, M. andL. Zieglar,"Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",RFC 8603,DOI 10.17487/RFC8603,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8603>.
- [RFC8879]
- Ghedini, A. andV. Vasiliev,"TLS Certificate Compression",RFC 8879,DOI 10.17487/RFC8879,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8879>.
- [RFC9000]
- Iyengar, J., Ed. andM. Thomson, Ed.,"QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport",RFC 9000,DOI 10.17487/RFC9000,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
- [RFC9147]
- Rescorla, E.,Tschofenig, H., andN. Modadugu,"The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3",RFC 9147,DOI 10.17487/RFC9147,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.
- [RFC9148]
- van der Stok, P.,Kampanakis, P.,Richardson, M., andS. Raza,"EST-coaps: Enrollment over Secure Transport with the Secure Constrained Application Protocol",RFC 9148,DOI 10.17487/RFC9148,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9148>.
- [RFC9190]
- Preuß Mattsson, J. andM. Sethi,"EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",RFC 9190,DOI 10.17487/RFC9190,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9190>.
- [RFC9191]
- Sethi, M.,Preuß Mattsson, J., andS. Turner,"Handling Large Certificates and Long Certificate Chains in TLS-Based EAP Methods",RFC 9191,DOI 10.17487/RFC9191,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9191>.
- [SP-800-56A]
- Barker, E.,Chen, L.,Roginsky, A.,Vassilev, A., andR. Davis,"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography",NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3,,<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3>.
- [X.509-IoT]
- Forsby, F.,Furuhed, M.,Papadimitratos, P., andS. Raza,"Lightweight X.509 Digital Certificates for the Internet of Things.",Springer, Cham. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 242.,,<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_14>.
Appendix A.Example C509 Certificates
A.1.Example RFC 7925 profiled X.509 Certificate
Example of[RFC7925] profiled X.509 certificate parsed with OpenSSL.¶
Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 128269 (0x1f50d) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Issuer: CN=RFC test CA Validity Not Before: Jan 1 00:00:00 2023 GMT Not After : Jan 1 00:00:00 2026 GMT Subject: CN=01-23-45-FF-FE-67-89-AB Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (256 bit) pub: 04:b1:21:6a:b9:6e:5b:3b:33:40:f5:bd:f0:2e:69: 3f:16:21:3a:04:52:5e:d4:44:50:b1:01:9c:2d:fd: 38:38:ab:ac:4e:14:d8:6c:09:83:ed:5e:9e:ef:24: 48:c6:86:1c:c4:06:54:71:77:e6:02:60:30:d0:51: f7:79:2a:c2:06 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Key Usage: Digital Signature Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:46:02:21:00:d4:32:0b:1d:68:49:e3:09:21:9d:30:03:7e: 13:81:66:f2:50:82:47:dd:da:e7:6c:ce:ea:55:05:3c:10:8e: 90:02:21:00:d5:51:f6:d6:01:06:f1:ab:b4:84:cf:be:62:56: c1:78:e4:ac:33:14:ea:19:19:1e:8b:60:7d:a5:ae:3b:da:16¶
The DER encoding of the above certificate is 316 bytes.¶
30 82 01 38 30 81 de a0 03 02 01 02 02 03 01 f5 0d 30 0a 06 08 2a 8648 ce 3d 04 03 02 30 16 31 14 30 12 06 03 55 04 03 0c 0b 52 46 43 2074 65 73 74 20 43 41 30 1e 17 0d 32 33 30 31 30 31 30 30 30 30 30 305a 17 0d 32 36 30 31 30 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 5a 30 22 31 20 30 1e 0603 55 04 03 0c 17 30 31 2d 32 33 2d 34 35 2d 46 46 2d 46 45 2d 36 372d 38 39 2d 41 42 30 59 30 13 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 02 01 06 08 2a 8648 ce 3d 03 01 07 03 42 00 04 b1 21 6a b9 6e 5b 3b 33 40 f5 bd f0 2e69 3f 16 21 3a 04 52 5e d4 44 50 b1 01 9c 2d fd 38 38 ab ac 4e 14 d86c 09 83 ed 5e 9e ef 24 48 c6 86 1c c4 06 54 71 77 e6 02 60 30 d0 51f7 79 2a c2 06 a3 0f 30 0d 30 0b 06 03 55 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 07 80 300a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 03 49 00 30 46 02 21 00 d4 32 0b 1d68 49 e3 09 21 9d 30 03 7e 13 81 66 f2 50 82 47 dd da e7 6c ce ea 5505 3c 10 8e 90 02 21 00 d5 51 f6 d6 01 06 f1 ab b4 84 cf be 62 56 c178 e4 ac 33 14 ea 19 19 1e 8b 60 7d a5 ae 3b da 16¶
A.1.1.Example C509 Certificate Encoding
The CBOR encoding (~C509Certificate) of the same X.509 certificate is shown below in CBOR diagnostic format.¶
/This defines a CBOR Sequence (RFC 8742):/ 1, / version and certificate type / h'01f50d', / serialNumber / "RFC test CA", / issuer / 1672531200, / notBefore / 1767225600, / notAfter / h'010123456789AB', / subject, EUI-64 / 1, / subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm / h'02B1216AB96E5B3B3340F5BDF02E693F16213A04525ED44450 B1019C2DFD3838AB', 1, / single extension: non-critical keyUsage digitalSignature / 0, / signatureAlgorithm / h'D4320B1D6849E309219D30037E138166F2508247DDDAE76CCE EA55053C108E90D551F6D60106F1ABB484CFBE6256C178E4AC 3314EA19191E8B607DA5AE3BDA16'¶
The size of the CBOR encoding (CBOR sequence) is 139 bytes. The point compressed public key is represented as described inSection 3.2.1.¶
0143 01 F5 0D6B 52 46 43 20 74 65 73 74 20 43 411A 63 B0 CD 001A 69 55 B9 0047 01 01 23 45 67 89 AB0158 21 02 B1 21 6A B9 6E 5B 3B 33 40 F5 BD F0 2E 69 3F 16 21 3A 04 525E D4 44 50 B1 01 9C 2D FD 38 38 AB010058 40 D4 32 0B 1D 68 49 E3 09 21 9D 30 03 7E 13 81 66 F2 50 82 47 DDDA E7 6C CE EA 55 05 3C 10 8E 90 D5 51 F6 D6 01 06 F1 AB B4 84 CF BE62 56 C1 78 E4 AC 33 14 EA 19 19 1E 8B 60 7D A5 AE 3B DA 16¶
A.1.2.Example: Natively Signed C509 Certificate
The corresponding natively signed C509 certificate in CBOR diagnostic format is identical, except for c509CertificateType, encoding of point compression (seeSection 3.2.1), and signatureValue.¶
/This defines a CBOR Sequence (RFC 8742):/ 0, h'01f50d', "RFC test CA", 1672531200, 1767225600, h'010123456789AB', 1, h'02B1216AB96E5B3B3340F5BDF02E693F16213A04525ED44450 B1019C2DFD3838AB', 1, 0, h'6FC903015259A38C0800A3D0B2969CA21977E8ED6EC344964D 4E1C6B37C8FB541274C3BB81B2F53073C5F101A5AC2A928865 83B6A2679B6E682D2A26945ED0B2'¶
The size of the CBOR encoding (CBOR sequence) is 139 bytes.¶
0043 01 F5 0D6B 52 46 43 20 74 65 73 74 20 43 411A 63 B0 CD 001A 69 55 B9 0047 01 01 23 45 67 89 AB0158 21 02 B1 21 6A B9 6E 5B 3B 33 40 F5 BD F0 2E 69 3F 16 21 3A 04 525E D4 44 50 B1 01 9C 2D FD 38 38 AB010058 40 6F C9 03 01 52 59 A3 8C 08 00 A3 D0 B2 96 9C A2 19 77 E8 ED 6EC3 44 96 4D 4E 1C 6B 37 C8 FB 54 12 74 C3 BB 81 B2 F5 30 73 C5 F1 01A5 AC 2A 92 88 65 83 B6 A2 67 9B 6E 68 2D 2A 26 94 5E D0 B2¶
A.1.3.C509 for Diffie-Hellman keys
The two previous examples illustrate the common key usage digitalSignature. A C509 certificate for a public Diffie-Hellman key would instead have key usage keyAgreement encoded according toSection 3.3 (in this case of single extension encoded as integer 16 instead of 1 for digital signature) but otherwise identical in format. Note that Section 5.6.3.2 of[SP-800-56A] allows a key agreement key pair to be used to sign a certificate request.¶
A.1.4.Example: Additional Keys for the Example Certificates
Below are the issuer key pair and the subject private key belonging to the above example certificates. The private keys are encoded as in COSE[RFC9052]. These issuer key pair can be used to sign or verify the example certificates and the subject private key allows the example certificates to be used in test vectors for other protocols like EDHOC.¶
issuerPublicKeyAlgorithm :1 (EC Public Key (Weierstraß) with secp256r1)issuerPublicKey :h'02AE4CDB01F614DEFC7121285FDC7F5C6D1D42C95647F061BA0080DF678867845E'issuerPrivateKey :h'DC66B3415456D649429B53223DF7532B942D6B0E0842C30BCA4C0ACF91547BB2'¶
subjectPrivateKey :h'D718111F3F9BD91B92FF6877F386BDBFCEA7154268FD7F2FB56EE17D99EA16D4'¶
A.2.Example IEEE 802.1AR profiled X.509 Certificate
An example of an IEEE 802.1AR profiled X.509 certificate (Secure Device Identifier, DevID) is provided in Appendix C.2 of[RFC9148]. The certificate is shown below including details of the hardwareModuleName type of otherName in subjectAltName, seeSection 3.3.¶
Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 9112578475118446130 (0x7e7661d7b54e4632) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc, OU=certification, CN=802.1AR CA Validity Not Before: Jan 31 11:29:16 2019 GMT Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc, OU=IoT/serialNumber=Wt1234 Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (256 bit) pub: 04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d: 9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5: 0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90: be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b: 56:38:e5:9f:d9 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 96:60:0D:87:16:BF:7F:D0:E7:52:D0:AC:76:07:77:AD:66:5D:02:A0 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 68:D1:65:51:F9:51:BF:C8:2A:43:1D:0D:9F:08:BC:2D:20:5B:11:60 X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: otherName: type-id: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4 (id-on-hardwareModuleName) value: hwType: 1.3.6.1.4.1.6175.10.1 hwSerialNum: 01:02:03:04 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Signature Value: 30:46:02:21:00:c0:d8:19:96:d2:50:7d:69:3f:3c:48:ea:a5: ee:94:91:bd:a6:db:21:40:99:d9:81:17:c6:3b:36:13:74:cd: 86:02:21:00:a7:74:98:9f:4c:32:1a:5c:f2:5d:83:2a:4d:33: 6a:08:ad:67:df:20:f1:50:64:21:18:8a:0a:de:6d:34:92:36¶
The DER encoding of the certificate is 577 bytes:¶
30 82 02 3D 30 82 01 E2 A0 03 02 01 02 02 08 7E 76 61 D7 B5 4E 46 3230 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 30 5D 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 0613 02 55 53 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 08 0C 02 43 41 31 14 30 12 06 0355 04 0A 0C 0B 45 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 20 49 6E 63 31 16 30 14 06 03 5504 0B 0C 0D 63 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 69 6F 6E 31 13 30 11 06 0355 04 03 0C 0A 38 30 32 2E 31 41 52 20 43 41 30 20 17 0D 31 39 30 3133 31 31 31 32 39 31 36 5A 18 0F 39 39 39 39 31 32 33 31 32 33 35 3935 39 5A 30 5C 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 0B 30 09 0603 55 04 08 0C 02 43 41 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 07 0C 02 4C 41 31 1430 12 06 03 55 04 0A 0C 0B 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 20 49 6E 63 31 0C 300A 06 03 55 04 0B 0C 03 49 6F 54 31 0F 30 0D 06 03 55 04 05 13 06 5774 31 32 33 34 30 59 30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 86 48CE 3D 03 01 07 03 42 00 04 C8 B4 21 F1 1C 25 E4 7E 3A C5 71 23 BF 2D9F DC 49 4F 02 8B C3 51 CC 80 C0 3F 15 0B F5 0C FF 95 8D 75 41 9D 81A6 A2 45 DF FA E7 90 BE 95 CF 75 F6 02 F9 15 26 18 F8 16 A2 B2 3B 5638 E5 9F D9 A3 81 8A 30 81 87 30 09 06 03 55 1D 13 04 02 30 00 30 1D06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 96 60 0D 87 16 BF 7F D0 E7 52 D0 AC 76 0777 AD 66 5D 02 A0 30 1F 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 68 D1 65 51F9 51 BF C8 2A 43 1D 0D 9F 08 BC 2D 20 5B 11 60 30 0E 06 03 55 1D 0F01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 05 A0 30 2A 06 03 55 1D 11 04 23 30 21 A0 1F 0608 2B 06 01 05 05 07 08 04 A0 13 30 11 06 09 2B 06 01 04 01 B4 3B 0A01 04 04 01 02 03 04 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 03 49 00 3046 02 21 00 C0 D8 19 96 D2 50 7D 69 3F 3C 48 EA A5 EE 94 91 BD A6 DB21 40 99 D9 81 17 C6 3B 36 13 74 CD 86 02 21 00 A7 74 98 9F 4C 32 1A5C F2 5D 83 2A 4D 33 6A 08 AD 67 DF 20 F1 50 64 21 18 8A 0A DE 6D 3492 36¶
A.2.1.Example C509 Certificate Encoding
The CBOR encoding (~C509Certificate) of the same X.509 certificate is shown below in CBOR diagnostic format.¶
/This defines a CBOR Sequence (RFC 8742):/ 1, h'7E7661D7B54E4632', [ -4, "US", 6, "CA", 8, "Example Inc", 9, "certification", 1, "802.1AR CA" ], 1548934156, null, [ -4, "US", 6, "CA", 5, "LA", 8, "example Inc", 9, "IoT", -3, "Wt1234" ], 1, h'03C8B421F11C25E47E3AC57123BF2D9FDC494F028BC351CC80C03F150BF50CFF95', [ 4, -2, 1, h'96600D8716BF7FD0E752D0AC760777AD665D02A0', 7, h'68D16551F951BFC82A431D0D9F08BC2D205B1160', -2, 5, 3, [-1, [h'2B06010401B01F0A01', h'01020304']] / subjectAltName w. hardwareModuleName / ], 0, h'C0D81996D2507D693F3C48EAA5EE9491BDA6DB214099D98117C63B361374CD86A7 74989F4C321A5CF25D832A4D336A08AD67DF20F1506421188A0ADE6D349236'¶
The size of the CBOR encoding (CBOR sequence) is 275 bytes:¶
01 48 7E 76 61 D7 B5 4E 46 32 8A 23 62 55 53 06 62 43 41 08 6B 45 7861 6D 70 6C 65 20 49 6E 63 09 6D 63 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 69 6F6E 01 6A 38 30 32 2E 31 41 52 20 43 41 1A 5C 52 DC 0C F6 8C 23 62 5553 06 62 43 41 05 62 4C 41 08 6B 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 20 49 6E 63 0963 49 6F 54 22 66 57 74 31 32 33 34 01 58 21 03 C8 B4 21 F1 1C 25 E47E 3A C5 71 23 BF 2D 9F DC 49 4F 02 8B C3 51 CC 80 C0 3F 15 0B F5 0CFF 95 8A 04 21 01 54 96 60 0D 87 16 BF 7F D0 E7 52 D0 AC 76 07 77 AD66 5D 02 A0 07 54 68 D1 65 51 F9 51 BF C8 2A 43 1D 0D 9F 08 BC 2D 205B 11 60 21 05 03 82 20 82 49 2B 06 01 04 01 B0 1F 0A 01 44 01 02 0304 00 58 40 C0 D8 19 96 D2 50 7D 69 3F 3C 48 EA A5 EE 94 91 BD A6 DB21 40 99 D9 81 17 C6 3B 36 13 74 CD 86 A7 74 98 9F 4C 32 1A 5C F2 5D83 2A 4D 33 6A 08 AD 67 DF 20 F1 50 64 21 18 8A 0A DE 6D 34 92 36¶
A.3.Example CAB Baseline ECDSA HTTPS X.509 Certificate
The www.ietf.org HTTPS server replies with a certificate message with 2 certificates. The DER encoding of the first certificate is 1209 bytes.¶
30 82 04 b5 30 82 04 5a a0 03 02 01 02 02 10 04 7f a1 e3 19 28 ee 403b a0 b8 3a 39 56 73 fc 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 30 4a 310b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 0a 13 1043 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e 31 20 30 1e 06 03 5504 03 13 17 43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 20 49 6e 63 20 45 43 43 2043 41 2d 33 30 1e 17 0d 32 30 30 37 32 39 30 30 30 30 30 30 5a 17 0d32 31 30 37 32 39 31 32 30 30 30 30 5a 30 6d 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 0406 13 02 55 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 08 13 02 43 41 31 16 30 14 0603 55 04 07 13 0d 53 61 6e 20 46 72 61 6e 63 69 73 63 6f 31 19 30 1706 03 55 04 0a 13 10 43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e31 1e 30 1c 06 03 55 04 03 13 15 73 6e 69 2e 63 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 6172 65 73 73 6c 2e 63 6f 6d 30 59 30 13 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 02 01 0608 2a 86 48 ce 3d 03 01 07 03 42 00 04 96 3e cd d8 4d cd 1b 93 a1 cf43 2d 1a 72 17 d6 c6 3b de 33 55 a0 2f 8c fb 5a d8 99 4c d4 4e 20 5f15 f6 e3 d2 3b 38 2b a6 49 9b b1 7f 34 1f a5 92 fa 21 86 1f 16 d3 1206 63 24 05 fd 70 42 bd a3 82 02 fd 30 82 02 f9 30 1f 06 03 55 1d 2304 18 30 16 80 14 a5 ce 37 ea eb b0 75 0e 94 67 88 b4 45 fa d9 24 1087 96 1f 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e 04 16 04 14 cc 0b 50 e7 d8 37 db f2 43f3 85 3d 48 60 f5 3b 39 be 9b 2a 30 2e 06 03 55 1d 11 04 27 30 25 8215 73 6e 69 2e 63 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 73 73 6c 2e 63 6f 6d 820c 77 77 77 2e 69 65 74 66 2e 6f 72 67 30 0e 06 03 55 1d 0f 01 01 ff04 04 03 02 07 80 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 25 04 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06 01 0505 07 03 01 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 7b 06 03 55 1d 1f 04 7430 72 30 37 a0 35 a0 33 86 31 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 72 6c 33 2e 6469 67 69 63 65 72 74 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 496e 63 45 43 43 43 41 2d 33 2e 63 72 6c 30 37 a0 35 a0 33 86 31 68 7474 70 3a 2f 2f 63 72 6c 34 2e 64 69 67 69 63 65 72 74 2e 63 6f 6d 2f43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 49 6e 63 45 43 43 43 41 2d 33 2e 63 726c 30 4c 06 03 55 1d 20 04 45 30 43 30 37 06 09 60 86 48 01 86 fd 6c01 01 30 2a 30 28 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 02 01 16 1c 68 74 74 70 733a 2f 2f 77 77 77 2e 64 69 67 69 63 65 72 74 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 43 50 5330 08 06 06 67 81 0c 01 02 02 30 76 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 01 01 046a 30 68 30 24 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 18 68 74 74 70 3a 2f2f 6f 63 73 70 2e 64 69 67 69 63 65 72 74 2e 63 6f 6d 30 40 06 08 2b06 01 05 05 07 30 02 86 34 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 61 63 65 72 74 732e 64 69 67 69 63 65 72 74 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 7265 49 6e 63 45 43 43 43 41 2d 33 2e 63 72 74 30 0c 06 03 55 1d 13 0101 ff 04 02 30 00 30 82 01 05 06 0a 2b 06 01 04 01 d6 79 02 04 02 0481 f6 04 81 f3 00 f1 00 76 00 f6 5c 94 2f d1 77 30 22 14 54 18 08 3094 56 8e e3 4d 13 19 33 bf df 0c 2f 20 0b cc 4e f1 64 e3 00 00 01 739c 83 5f 8e 00 00 04 03 00 47 30 45 02 21 00 f8 d1 b4 a9 3d 2f 0d 4c41 76 df b4 88 bc c7 3b 86 44 3d 7d e0 0e 6a c8 17 4d 89 48 a8 84 3668 02 20 29 ff 5a 34 06 8a 24 0c 69 50 27 88 e8 ee 25 ab 7e d2 cb cf68 6e ce 7b 5f 96 b4 31 a9 07 02 fa 00 77 00 5c dc 43 92 fe e6 ab 4544 b1 5e 9a d4 56 e6 10 37 fb d5 fa 47 dc a1 73 94 b2 5e e6 f6 c7 0eca 00 00 01 73 9c 83 5f be 00 00 04 03 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 e8 91 c197 bf b0 e3 d3 0c b6 ce e6 0d 94 c3 c7 5f d1 17 53 36 93 11 08 d8 9812 d4 d2 9d 81 d0 02 21 00 a1 59 d1 6c 46 47 d1 48 37 57 fc d6 ce 4e75 ec 7b 5e f6 57 ef e0 28 f8 e5 cc 47 92 68 2d ac 43 30 0a 06 08 2a86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 03 49 00 30 46 02 21 00 bd 63 cf 4f 7e 5c fe 6c29 38 5e a7 1c fb fc 1e 3f 7b 1c d0 72 51 a2 21 f7 77 69 c0 f4 71 dfea 02 21 00 b5 c0 6c c4 58 54 fa 30 b2 82 88 b1 d3 bb 9a 66 61 ed 5031 72 5b 1a 82 02 e0 da 5b 59 f9 54 02¶
A.3.1.Example C509 Certificate Encoding
The CBOR encoding (~C509Certificate) of the first X.509 certificate is shown below in CBOR diagnostic format.¶
/This defines a CBOR Sequence (RFC 8742):/1,h'047FA1E31928EE403BA0B83A395673FC',[ -4, "US", -8, "Cloudflare, Inc.", -1, "Cloudflare Inc ECC CA-3"],1595980800,1627560000,[ -4, "US", -6, "CA", -5, "San Francisco", -8, "Cloudflare, Inc.", -1, "sni.cloudflaressl.com"],1,h'03963ECDD84DCD1B93A1CF432D1A7217D6C63BDE3355A02F8CFB5AD8994CD44E20',[ 7, h'A5CE37EAEBB0750E946788B445FAD9241087961F', 1, h'CC0B50E7D837DBF243F3853D4860F53B39BE9B2A', 3, [2, "sni.cloudflaressl.com", 2, "www.ietf.org"],-2, 1, 8, [1, 2], 5, ["http://crl3.digicert.com/CloudflareIncECCCA-3.crl", "http://crl4.digicert.com/CloudflareIncECCCA-3.crl"], 6, [h'6086480186FD6C0101', [1, "https://www.digicert.com/CPS"], 2], 9, [1, "http://ocsp.digicert.com", 2, "http://cacerts.digicert.com/CloudflareIncECCCA-3.crt"],-4, -2,10, [ h'F65C942FD1773022145418083094568EE34D131933BFDF0C2F200BCC4EF164E3', 77922190, 0, h'F8D1B4A93D2F0D4C4176DFB488BCC73B86443D7DE00E6AC8174D8948A8843668 29FF5A34068A240C69502788E8EE25AB7ED2CBCF686ECE7B5F96B431A90702FA', h'5CDC4392FEE6AB4544B15E9AD456E61037FBD5FA47DCA17394B25EE6F6C70ECA', 77922238, 0, h'E891C197BFB0E3D30CB6CEE60D94C3C75FD1175336931108D89812D4D29D81D0 A159D16C4647D1483757FCD6CE4E75EC7B5EF657EFE028F8E5CC4792682DAC43' ]],0,h'BD63CF4F7E5CFE6C29385EA71CFBFC1E3F7B1CD07251A221F77769C0F471DFEA B5C06CC45854FA30B28288B1D3BB9A6661ED5031725B1A8202E0DA5B59F95402'¶
The size of the CBOR encoding (CBOR sequence) is 783 bytes.¶
A.4.Example CAB Baseline RSA HTTPS X.509 Certificate
The tools.ietf.org HTTPS server replies with a certificate message with 4 certificates. The DER encoding of the first certificate is 1647 bytes.¶
30 82 06 6b 30 82 05 53 a0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00 a6 a5 5c 87 0e 39 b40e 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 81 c6 31 0b 30 0906 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 13 07 41 72 697a 6f 6e 61 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 07 13 0a 53 63 6f 74 74 73 64 616c 65 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 0a 13 1c 53 74 61 72 66 69 65 6c 64 2054 65 63 68 6e 6f 6c 6f 67 69 65 73 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e 31 33 30 31 0603 55 04 0b 13 2a 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 65 72 74 73 2e 73 74 61 7266 69 65 6c 64 74 65 63 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 72 65 70 6f 73 69 74 6f 7279 2f 31 34 30 32 06 03 55 04 03 13 2b 53 74 61 72 66 69 65 6c 64 2053 65 63 75 72 65 20 43 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 20 41 75 74 686f 72 69 74 79 20 2d 20 47 32 30 1e 17 0d 32 30 31 30 30 31 31 39 3338 33 36 5a 17 0d 32 31 31 31 30 32 31 39 33 38 33 36 5a 30 3e 31 2130 1f 06 03 55 04 0b 13 18 44 6f 6d 61 69 6e 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 6f 6c20 56 61 6c 69 64 61 74 65 64 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 0c 10 2a 2e74 6f 6f 6c 73 2e 69 65 74 66 2e 6f 72 67 30 82 01 22 30 0d 06 09 2a86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 0f 00 30 82 01 0a 02 82 01 0100 b1 e1 37 e8 eb 82 d6 89 fa db f5 c2 4b 77 f0 2c 4a de 72 6e 3e 1360 d1 a8 66 1e c4 ad 3d 32 60 e5 f0 99 b5 f4 7a 7a 48 55 21 ee 0e 3912 f9 ce 0d ca f5 69 61 c7 04 ed 6e 0f 1d 3b 1e 50 88 79 3a 0e 31 4116 f1 b1 02 64 68 a5 cd f5 4a 0a ca 99 96 35 08 c3 7e 27 5d d0 a9 cff3 e7 28 af 37 d8 b6 7b dd f3 7e ae 6e 97 7f f7 ca 69 4e cc d0 06 df5d 27 9b 3b 12 e7 e6 fe 08 6b 52 7b 82 11 7c 72 b3 46 eb c1 e8 78 b80f cb e1 eb bd 06 44 58 dc 83 50 b2 a0 62 5b dc 81 b8 36 e3 9e 7c 79b2 a9 53 8a e0 0b c9 4a 2a 13 39 31 13 bd 2c cf a8 70 cf 8c 8d 3d 01a3 88 ae 12 00 36 1d 1e 24 2b dd 79 d8 53 01 26 ed 28 4f c9 86 94 834e c8 e1 14 2e 85 b3 af d4 6e dd 69 46 af 41 25 0e 7a ad 8b f2 92 ca79 d9 7b 32 4f f7 77 e8 f9 b4 4f 23 5c d4 5c 03 ae d8 ab 3a ca 13 5f5d 5d 5d a1 02 03 01 00 01 a3 82 02 e1 30 82 02 dd 30 0c 06 03 55 1d13 01 01 ff 04 02 30 00 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 25 04 16 30 14 06 08 2b 0601 05 05 07 03 01 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 0e 06 03 55 1d 0f01 01 ff 04 04 03 02 05 a0 30 3d 06 03 55 1d 1f 04 36 30 34 30 32 a030 a0 2e 86 2c 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 72 6c 2e 73 74 61 72 66 69 656c 64 74 65 63 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 73 66 69 67 32 73 31 2d 32 34 32 2e63 72 6c 30 63 06 03 55 1d 20 04 5c 30 5a 30 4e 06 0b 60 86 48 01 86fd 6e 01 07 17 01 30 3f 30 3d 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 02 01 16 31 6874 74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 73 2e 73 74 61 7266 69 65 6c 64 74 65 63 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 72 65 70 6f 73 69 74 6f 7279 2f 30 08 06 06 67 81 0c 01 02 01 30 81 82 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 0701 01 04 76 30 74 30 2a 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 1e 68 74 7470 3a 2f 2f 6f 63 73 70 2e 73 74 61 72 66 69 65 6c 64 74 65 63 68 2e63 6f 6d 2f 30 46 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 02 86 3a 68 74 74 70 3a2f 2f 63 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 73 2e 73 74 61 72 66 69 65 6c64 74 65 63 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 72 65 70 6f 73 69 74 6f 72 79 2f 73 6669 67 32 2e 63 72 74 30 1f 06 03 55 1d 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 25 45 8168 50 26 38 3d 3b 2d 2c be cd 6a d9 b6 3d b3 66 63 30 2b 06 03 55 1d11 04 24 30 22 82 10 2a 2e 74 6f 6f 6c 73 2e 69 65 74 66 2e 6f 72 6782 0e 74 6f 6f 6c 73 2e 69 65 74 66 2e 6f 72 67 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e04 16 04 14 ad 8a b4 1c 07 51 d7 92 89 07 b0 b7 84 62 2f 36 55 7a 5f4d 30 82 01 06 06 0a 2b 06 01 04 01 d6 79 02 04 02 04 81 f7 04 81 f400 f2 00 77 00 f6 5c 94 2f d1 77 30 22 14 54 18 08 30 94 56 8e e3 4d13 19 33 bf df 0c 2f 20 0b cc 4e f1 64 e3 00 00 01 74 e5 ac 71 13 0000 04 03 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 8c f5 48 52 ce 56 35 43 39 11 cf 10 cdb9 1f 52 b3 36 39 22 3a d1 38 a4 1d ec a6 fe de 1f e9 0f 02 21 00 bca2 25 43 66 c1 9a 26 91 c4 7a 00 b5 b6 53 ab bd 44 c2 f8 ba ae f4 d2da f2 52 7c e6 45 49 95 00 77 00 5c dc 43 92 fe e6 ab 45 44 b1 5e 9ad4 56 e6 10 37 fb d5 fa 47 dc a1 73 94 b2 5e e6 f6 c7 0e ca 00 00 0174 e5 ac 72 3c 00 00 04 03 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 a5 e0 90 6e 63 e9 1d4f dd ef ff 03 52 b9 1e 50 89 60 07 56 4b 44 8a 38 28 f5 96 dc 6b 2872 6d 02 21 00 fc 91 ea ed 02 16 88 66 05 4e e1 8a 2e 53 46 c4 cc 51fe b3 fa 10 a9 1d 2e db f9 91 25 f8 6c e6 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f70d 01 01 0b 05 00 03 82 01 01 00 14 04 3f a0 be d2 ee 3f a8 6e 3a 1f78 8e a0 4c 35 53 0f 11 06 1f ff 60 a1 6d 0b 83 e9 d9 2a db b3 3f 9db3 d7 e0 59 4c 19 a8 e4 19 a5 0c a7 70 72 77 63 d5 fe 64 51 0a d2 7ad6 50 a5 8a 92 38 ec cb 2f 0f 5a c0 64 58 4d 5c 06 b9 73 63 68 27 8b89 34 dc 79 c7 1d 3a fd 34 5f 83 14 41 58 49 80 68 29 80 39 8a 86 7269 cc 79 37 ce e3 97 f7 dc f3 95 88 ed 81 03 29 00 d2 a2 c7 ba ab d63a 8e ca 09 0b d9 fb 39 26 4b ff 03 d8 8e 2d 3f 6b 21 ca 8a 7d d8 5ffb 94 ba 83 de 9c fc 15 8d 61 fa 67 2d b0 c7 db 3d 25 0a 41 4a 85 d37f 49 46 37 3c f4 b1 75 d0 52 f3 dd c7 66 f1 4b fd aa 00 ed bf e4 7eed 01 ec 7b e4 f6 46 fc 31 fd 72 fe 03 d2 f2 65 af 4d 7e e2 81 9b 7afd 30 3c f5 52 f4 05 34 a0 8a 3e 19 41 58 c8 a8 e0 51 71 84 09 15 aeec a5 77 75 fa 18 f7 d5 77 d5 31 cc c7 2d¶
A.4.1.Example C509 Certificate Encoding
The CBOR encoding (~C509Certificate) of the first X.509 certificate is shown below in CBOR diagnostic format.¶
/This defines a CBOR Sequence (RFC 8742):/1,h'A6A55C870E39B40E',[ -4, "US", -6, "Arizona", -5, "Scottsdale", -8, "Starfield Technologies, Inc.", -9, "http://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/", -1, "Starfield Secure Certificate Authority - G2"],1601581116,1635881916,[ -9, "Domain Control Validated", 1, "*.tools.ietf.org"],0,h'B1E137E8EB82D689FADBF5C24B77F02C4ADE726E3E1360D1A8661EC4AD3D3260 E5F099B5F47A7A485521EE0E3912F9CE0DCAF56961C704ED6E0F1D3B1E508879 3A0E314116F1B1026468A5CDF54A0ACA99963508C37E275DD0A9CFF3E728AF37 D8B67BDDF37EAE6E977FF7CA694ECCD006DF5D279B3B12E7E6FE086B527B8211 7C72B346EBC1E878B80FCBE1EBBD064458DC8350B2A0625BDC81B836E39E7C79 B2A9538AE00BC94A2A13393113BD2CCFA870CF8C8D3D01A388AE1200361D1E24 2BDD79D8530126ED284FC98694834EC8E1142E85B3AFD46EDD6946AF41250E7A AD8BF292CA79D97B324FF777E8F9B44F235CD45C03AED8AB3ACA135F5D5D5DA1',[-4, -2, 8, [ 1, 2 ], -2, 5, 5, ["http://crl.starfieldtech.com/sfig2s1-242.crl"], 6, [ h'6086480186fd6e01071701', [1, "http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/"], 1 ], 9, [ 1, "http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com/", 2, "http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/sfig2.crt" ], 7, h'254581685026383D3B2D2CBECD6AD9B63DB36663', 3, [ 2, "*.tools.ietf.org", 2, "tools.ietf.org" ], 1, h'AD8AB41C0751D7928907B0B784622F36557A5F4D',10, [ h'F65C942FD1773022145418083094568EE34D131933BFDF0C2F200BCC4EF164E3', 1715, 0, h'8CF54852CE5635433911CF10CDB91F52B33639223AD138A41DECA6FEDE1FE90F BCA2254366C19A2691C47A00B5B653ABBD44C2F8BAAEF4D2DAF2527CE6454995', h'5CDC4392FEE6AB4544B15E9AD456E61037FBD5FA47DCA17394B25EE6F6C70ECA', 2012, 0, h'A5E0906E63E91D4FDDEFFF0352B91E50896007564B448A3828F596DC6B28726D FC91EAED02168866054EE18A2E5346C4CC51FEB3FA10A91D2EDBF99125F86CE6' ]],23,h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¶
The size of the CBOR encoding (CBOR sequence) is 1245 bytes.¶
Acknowledgments
The authors want to thank Henk Birkholz, Carsten Bormann, Russ Housley, Olle Johansson, Benjamin Kaduk, Lijun Liao, Ilari Liusvaara, Laurence Lundblade, Francesca Palombini, Thomas Peterson, Michael Richardson, Stefan Santesson, Jim Schaad, Brian Sipos, Fraser Tweedale, and Rene Struik for reviewing and commenting on intermediate versions of the draft and helping with GitHub.¶
draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-09
| Document | Document type | This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active". | |
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| Authors | John Preuß Mattsson,Göran Selander,Shahid Raza,Joel Höglund,Martin Furuhed | ||
| Replaces | draft-mattsson-cose-cbor-cert-compress | ||
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion |