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Network Working Group                                         L. DunbarInternet Draft                                                FutureweiIntended status: Informational                               A. SajassiExpires: March 17, 2024                                        Cisco                                                               J. Drake                                                                Juniper                                                               B. Najem                                                            Bell Canada                                                     September 17, 2023                   BGP Usage for SD-WAN Overlay Networksdraft-ietf-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage-15Abstract   The document discusses the usage and applicability of BGP as the   control plane for multiple SD-WAN scenarios. The document aims to   demonstrate how the BGP-based control plane is used for large-scale   SD-WAN overlay networks with little manual intervention.   SD-WAN edge nodes are commonly interconnected by multiple types of   underlay networks owned and managed by different network providers.Status of this Memo   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the   provisions ofBCP 78 andBCP 79.   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the   provisions ofBCP 78 andBCP 79. This document may not be modified,   and derivative works of it may not be created, except to publish it   as an RFC and to translate it into languages other than English.   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-   Drafts.   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents   at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as   reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed athttp://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txtxxx, et al.             Expires March 17, 2024                 [Page 1]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed athttp://www.ietf.org/shadow.html   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 17, 2009.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors. All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document. Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with   respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this   document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in   Section 4.e of theTrust Legal Provisions and are provided without   warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents1. Introduction...................................................32. Conventions used in this document..............................43. Use Case Scenario Description and Requirements.................53.1. Requirements..............................................53.1.1. Supporting SD-WAN Segmentation.......................53.1.2. Client Service Requirement...........................63.1.3. SD-WAN Traffic Segmentation..........................63.1.4. Zero Touch Provisioning..............................73.1.5. Constrained Propagation of SD-WAN Edge Properties....83.2. Scenario #1: Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN.................93.3. Scenario #2: Differential Encrypted SD-WAN...............103.4. Scenario #3: Private VPN PE based SD-WAN.................124. Provisioning Model............................................134.1. Client Service Provisioning Model........................134.2. Policy Configuration.....................................144.3. IPsec related parameters Provisioning....................145. BGP Controlled SD-WAN.........................................145.1. Why BGP as Control Plane for SD-WAN?.....................145.2. BGP Walk Through for Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN........155.3. BGP Walk Through for Differential Encrypted SD-WAN.......17      5.4. BGP Walk Through for Application Flow-Based Segmentation.185.5. Benefit of Using Recursive Next Hop Resolution...........206. SD-WAN Forwarding Model.......................................20Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                 [Page 2]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 20236.1. Forwarding Model for Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN........216.1.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures..............216.1.2. Packet Walk-Through.................................216.2. Forwarding Model for Hybrid Underlay SD-WAN..............226.2.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures..............226.2.2. Packet Walk-Through.................................226.3. Forwarding Model for PE based SD-WAN.....................246.3.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures..............246.3.2. Packet Walk-Through.................................247. Manageability Considerations..................................258. Security Considerations.......................................259. IANA Considerations...........................................2510. References...................................................2510.1. Normative References....................................2610.2. Informative References..................................2611. Acknowledgments..............................................271. Introduction   Software Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN) optimizes the transport   of IP Packets over multiple underlay connectivity services. Here are   some of the main characteristics of "SD-WAN" networks:     - Transport Augmentation, referring to utilizing paths over       different underlay networks. There are often multiple parallel       overlay paths between any two SD-WAN edges; some are private       networks over which traffic can traverse with or without       encryption; others require encryption, e.g., over untrusted       public networks.     - Instead of all traffic hauled to Corporate HQ for centralized       policy control, direct Internet breakout from remote branch       offices is allowed.     - Some traffic can be forwarded by edge nodes, based on their       application identifiers instead of destination IP addresses, by       placing the traffic onto specific overlay paths based on the       application-specific policies.     - The traffic forwarding can also be based on specific performance       criteria (e.g., packet delay, packet loss, jitter) to provide       better application performance by choosing the underlay that       meets or exceeds the specified policies.   [Net2Cloud-Problem] describes the network-related problems relating   to connecting enterprises' branch offices to dynamic workloads in   different Cloud Data Centers (DC). SD-WAN has been positioned as aDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                 [Page 3]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   flexible way to solve those issues; however, this can create   significant scaling issues when hundreds or thousands of nodes need   to be interconnected by SD-WAN overlay networks.   This document describes using BGP as a control plane for SD-WAN   overlay networks and services. BGP for SD-WAN overlay is a different   layer from the underlay networks' BGP control plane instances.2. Conventions used in this document   Cloud DC:   Third party data centers that host applications and               workloads owned by different organizations or tenants.   Controller: Used interchangeably with SD-WAN controller to manage               SD-WAN overlay path creation/deletion and monitor the               path conditions between sites.   CPE:        Customer Premise Equipment   CPE-Based VPN: Virtual Private Secure network formed among CPEs.               This differentiates from more commonly used PE-based               VPNs [RFC4364].   Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN: A SD-WAN network in which all traffic               to/from the SD-WAN edges are carried by IPsec tunnels               regardless of underlay networks. I.e., the client               traffic is carried by IPsec tunnel even over MPLS               private networks.   ISP:        Internet Service Provider   NSP:        Network Service Provider. NSP usually provides more               advanced network services, such as MPLS VPN, private               leased lines, or managed Secure WAN connections, often               within a private, trusted domain. In contrast, an ISP               usually provides plain Internet services over public               untrusted domains.   PE:         Provider EdgeDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                 [Page 4]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   SD-WAN Edge Node: An edge node, which can be physical or virtual,               maps the attached clients' traffic to the wide area               network (WAN) overlay tunnels.   SD-WAN:     Software Defined Wide Area Network is an overlay network               that optimizes the transport of IP packets over multiple               underlays, forwarding traffic based on application               policies, some of which act on application identifiers               recognized at ingress.   SD-WAN IPsec SA: IPsec Security Association between two SD-WAN ports               or nodes.   SD-WAN over Hybrid Networks: SD-WAN over Hybrid Networks typically               have edge nodes utilizing bandwidth resources from               different types of underlay networks, some being private               networks and others being public Internet.   WAN Port:   A Port or Interface facing an ISP or Network Service               Provider (NSP), with an address allocated by the ISP or               the NSP.   C-PE:       SD-WAN Edge node, which can be Customer Premises               Equipment (CPE) for customer-managed SD-WAN, or Provider               Edge (PE) for provider-managed SD-WAN services.   ZTP:        Zero Touch Provisioning3. Use Case Scenario Description and Requirements   This section describes some essential requirements for SD-WAN   networks and several SD-WAN scenarios used by the subsequent   sections to explain how the BGP control plane is applied.3.1. Requirements3.1.1. Supporting SD-WAN Segmentation   "SD-WAN Segmentation" is a frequently used term in SD-WAN   deployment, referring to policy-driven network partitioning. An SD-   WAN segment is a virtual private network (SD-WAN VPN) consisting ofDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                 [Page 5]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   a set of edge nodes interconnected by tunnels, such as IPsec tunnels   and MPLS VPN tunnels.   This document assumes that SD-WAN VPN configuration on PE devices   will, as with MPLS VPN, make use of VRFs. Additionally, it assumes   that one SD-WAN VPN can be mapped to one or multiple virtual   topologies governed by the SD-WAN controller's policies.   When using BGP for SD-WAN, the Client Route UPDATE is the same as   MPLS VPN. Route Target in the BGP Extended Community can be used to   differentiate the routes belonging to different SD-WAN VPNs.   As SD-WAN is an overlay network arching over multiple types of   networks, MPLS L2VPN/L3VPN or pure L2 underlay can continue using   the VPN ID, VN-ID, or VLAN in the data plane to differentiate   packets belonging to different SD-WAN VPNs. For packets carried by   an IPsec tunnel, the IPsec tunnel's inner encapsulation header can   have the SD-WAN VPN Identifier to distinguish the packets belonging   to different SD-WAN VPNs.3.1.2. Client Service Requirement   The client interface of SD-WAN edges can be IP or Ethernet-based.   For Ethernet-based client interfaces, SD-WAN edge should support   VLAN-based service interfaces (EVPN Instances), VLAN bundle service   interfaces, or VLAN-Aware bundling service interfaces. EVPN service   requirements apply to client traffic, as described inSection 3.1 of   RFC8388.   For IP-based client interfaces, L3VPN service requirements are   applicable.3.1.3. SD-WAN Traffic Segmentation   SD-WAN Traffic Segmentation enables the separation of the traffic   based on the business and the security needs of different user   groups and/or application requirements. Each user group and/or   application may need different isolated topologies and/or policies   to fulfill the business requirements.   For example, a retail business requires the point-of-sales (PoS)   application to be on a different topology from other applications.   The PoS application is routed only to the payment processing entity   at a hub site; other applications can be routed to all other sites.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                 [Page 6]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   The traffic from the PoS application follows a tree topology in the   figure below, whereas other traffic can follow a multipoint-to-   multipoint topology.                              +--------+              Payment traffic |Payment |                +------+----+-+gateway +------+----+-----+               /      /     | +----+---+      |     \     \              /      /      |      |          |      \     \           +-+--+  +-+--+  +-+--+  |   +-+--+  +-+--+  +-+--+           |Site|  |Site|  |Site|  |   |Site|  |Site|  |Site|           | 1  |  |  2 |  | 3  |  |   |4   |  |  5 |  | 6  |           +--+-+  +--+-+  +--|-+  |   +--|-+  +--|-+  +--|-+              |       |       |    |      |       |       |            ==+=======+=======+====+======+=======+=======+===            Multi-point connection for non-payment traffic   Another example is an enterprise that wants to isolate the traffic   from different departments, with each department having its unique   topology and policy. The HR department may need to access specific   applications that are not accessible by the engineering department.   Also, contractors may have limited access to the enterprise   resources.3.1.4. Zero Touch Provisioning   SD-WAN zero-touch provisioning (ZTP) allows devices to be configured   and provisioned centrally. When an SD-WAN edge is installed at a   remote location, ZTP automates follow-up steps, including updates to   the OS, software version, and configuration, before client traffic   is forwarded. The ZTP can bootstrap a remote SD-WAN edge and   establish a secure connection to the local SD-WAN Controller, making   it convenient to add or delete an SD-WAN edge node (virtual or   physical). ZTP for a remote SD-WAN edge usually includes the   following steps:     - The SD-WAN edge's customer information and its device     identifier, such as the device series number, are added to the SD-     WAN Central Controller.     - Upon power-up, the SD-WAN edge can establish the transport layer     secure connection (such as TLS, DTLS) [BCP195] to its controller,     whose URL (or IP address) can be preconfigured on the edge device     by manufacture default, external USB or secure Email given to the     installer.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                 [Page 7]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023     - The SD-WAN Controller authenticates the ZTP request from the     remote SD-WAN edge with its configurations. Once the     authentication is successful, it can designate a local network     controller near the SD-WAN edge to pass down the initial     configurations via the secure TLS/DTLS secure channel. The local     network controller manages and monitors the communication policies     for traffic to/from the edge node.3.1.5. Constrained Propagation of SD-WAN Edge Properties   One SD-WAN edge node may only be authorized to communicate with a   small number of other SD-WAN edge nodes. In this circumstance, the   property of the SD-WAN edge node cannot be propagated to other nodes   that are not authorized to communicate. But a remote SD-WAN edge   node, upon powering up, may not have the right policies to know   which peers are authorized to communicate. Therefore, SD-WAN   deployment needs to have a central point to distribute the   properties of an SD-WAN edge node to its authorized peers.   BGP is well suited for this purpose.RFC4684 has specified the   procedure to constrain the distribution of BGP UPDATE to only a   subset of nodes. Each edge node informs the Route-Reflector (RR)   [RFC4456] on its interested SD-WAN VPNs. The RR only propagates the   BGP UPDATE from an edge to others within the same SD-WAN VPN.   As the connection between an SD-WAN edge and its RR can be over an   insecure network, an SD-WAN edge must establish a secure transport   layer connection (TLS, DTLS, etc.) to its designated RR upon power-   up. The BGP UPDATE messages must be sent over the secure channel   (TLS, DTLS, etc.) to the RR.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                 [Page 8]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023                              +---+                 Peer Group 1 |RR |   Peer Group 2                +======+====+=+   +======+====+=====+               /      /     | +---+      |     \     \              /      /      |            |      \     \           +-+--+  +-+--+  +-+--+      +-+--+  +-+--+  +-+--+           |C-PE|  |C-PE|  |C-PE|      |C-PE|  |C-PE|  |C-PE|           | 1  |  |  2 |  | 3  |      |4   |  |  5 |  | 6  |           +----+  +----+  +----+      +----+  +----+  +----+                Tenant 1                   Tenant 2          Figure 1: Peer Groups managed by RR   Tenant separation is achieved by the SD-WAN VPN identifiers   represented in the control plane and data plane, respectively.3.2. Scenario #1: Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN   Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN refers to an SD-WAN network with edge   nodes encrypting all traffic over the WAN underlay to other edge   nodes, regardless of whether the underlay is private or public. For   lack of better terminology, we call this Homogeneous Encrypted SD-   WAN throughout this document.   Here are some typical scenarios for using Homogeneous Encryption:   -  A small branch office connecting to its HQ offices via the   Internet. All traffic to/from this small branch office must be   encrypted, usually achieved by IPsec Tunnels [RFC6071].   -  A store in a shopping mall may need to securely connect to its   applications in one or more Cloud DCs via the Internet. A common way   of achieving this is to establish IPsec SAs to the Cloud DC gateway   to carry the sensitive data to/from the store.   As described in [SECURE-EVPN], the granularity of the IPsec SAs for   Homogeneous Encryption can be per site, per subnet, per tenant, or   per address. Once the IPsec SA is established for a specific   subnet/tenant/site, all traffic to/from the subnet/tenant/site is   encrypted.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                 [Page 9]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023                                     +---+                      +--------------|RR |------------+                     /  Untrusted    +-+-+             \                    /                                   \                   /                                     \     +----+  +---------+                             +------+  +----+     | CN3|--|         P1-----+ -------------+------ P1     |--| CN3|     +----+  | C-PE1   P2-----+              |       | C-PE2|  +----+     +----+  |         P3-----+     Wide     +------ P2     |  +----+     | CN2|--|         |      |     area     +------ P3     |--| CN1|      +-+--+  +---------+      |   network    |       +------+  +-+--+        \                     |              |                  /         \   +---------+      | all packets  |       +------+  /          +--|         P1-----+ encrypted    +------ P1     |-+              | C-PE3   P2-----+     by       |       | C-PE4|     +----+  |         P3-----+ IPsec SAs    +------ P2     |  +----+     | CN1|--|         P4-----+--------------+       |      |--| CN2|     +----+  +---------+                             +------+  +----+   CN: Client Networks, which is same as Tenant Networks used by NVo3                 Figure 2: Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN   One of the properties of Homogeneous Encryption is that the SD-WAN   Local Network Controller, e.g., RR in BGP-controlled SD-WAN, might   be connected to C-PEs via an untrusted public network, therefore,   requiring a secure connection between RR and C-PEs (TLS, DTLS,   etc.).   Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN has some properties similar to the   commonly deployed IPsec VPN, albeit the IPsec VPN is usually point-   to-point among a small number of nodes and with heavy manual   configuration for IPsec between nodes. In contrast, an SD-WAN   network can have many edge nodes and a central controller to manage   the configurations on the edge nodes.   Existing private VPNs (e.g., MPLS based) can use Homogeneous   Encrypted SD-WAN to extend over the public network to remote sites   to which the VPN operator does not own or lease infrastructural   connectivity, as described in [SECURE-EVPN].3.3. Scenario #2: Differential Encrypted SD-WAN   The Differential Encrypted SD-WAN refers to an SD-WAN network in   which traffic over the existing VPN is forwarded natively without   encryption, and the traffic over the Public Internet is encrypted.   Differential Encrypted SD-WAN is over hybrid private VPN and public   Internet underlays. Since IPsec requires additional processing powerDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 10]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   and the encrypted traffic over the Internet does not have the   premium SLA commonly offered by Private VPNs, especially over a long   distance, it is more desirable for traffic over a private VPN to be   forwarded without encryption.   One C-PE might have the Internet-facing WAN ports managed by   different ISPs/NSPs with the WAN ports' addresses assigned by the   corresponding ISPs/NSPs. Clients might have policies to specify: 1) Some flows can only be forwarded over private VPNs. 2) Some flows can be forwarded over either private VPNs or the public    Internet. The packets over the public Internet are encrypted. 3) Some flows, especially Internet-bound browsing ones, can be handed    off to the Internet without any encryption.   Suppose a flow traversing multiple segments, such as A<->B<->C<->D,   has Policy 2) above. The flow can cross different underlays in   different segments, such as over Private underlay between A<->B   without encryption or over the public Internet between B<->C   protected by an IPsec SA.   As shown in the figure below, C-PE-1 has two different types of   interfaces (A1 to Internet and A2 & A3 to VPN). The C-PE's loopback   address and the attached client addresses may or may not be visible   to the ISPs/NSPs. The WAN ports' addresses can be allocated by the   service providers or dynamically assigned (e.g., by DHCP).Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 11]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023                                       +---+                        +--------------|RR |----------+                       /  Untrusted    +-+-+           \                      /                                 \                     /                                   \     +----+  +---------+  packets encrypted over     +------+  +----+     | CN3|--|         A1-----+ Untrusted    +------ B1     |--| CN1|     +----+  | C-PE1   A2-\                          | C-PE2|  +----+     +----+  |         A3--+--+              +---+---B2     |  +----+     | CN2|--|         |   |PE+--------------+PE |---B3     |--| CN3|     +----+  +---------+   +--+   trusted    +---+   +------+  +----+                              |      WAN     |     +----+  +---------+   +--+   packets    +---+   +------+  +----+     | CN1|--|         C1--|PE| go natively  |PE |-- D1     |--| CN1|     +----+  | C-PE3   C2--+--+ without encry+---+   | C-PE4|  +----+             |         |      +--------------+       |      |             |         |                             |      |     +----+  |         |      without encrypt over   |      |  +----+     | CN2|--|         C3--+---- Untrusted  --+------D2     |--| CN2|     +----+  +---------+                             +------+  +----+     CN: Client Network                 Figure 3: SD-WAN with Hybrid Underlays     Also, the connection between C-PEs and their Controller (RR) might     be via the untrusted public network. It is necessary to encrypt     the communication between RR and C-PEs, by TLS, DTLS, etc.     There could be multiple SD-WAN edges (C-PEs) sharing common     property, such as a geographic location. Some applications over     SD-WAN may need to traverse specific geographic areas for various     reasons, such as to comply with regulatory rules, to utilize     specific value-added services, or others.     Services may not be congruent, i.e., the packets from A-> B may     traverse one underlay network, and the packets from B -> A may go     over a different underlay.3.4. Scenario #3: Private VPN PE based SD-WAN   This scenario refers to the existing VPN (e.g., EVPN or IPVPN) being   expanded by adding extra ports facing the untrusted Internet for PEs   to offload low-priority traffic when the VPN paths are congested.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 12]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   Throughout this document, this scenario is also called Internet   Offload for Private VPN, or PE-based SD-WAN.   Here are some differences from the Hybrid Underlay scenario (Section3.3):       - For MPLS-based VPN, PEs would have MPLS as payload          encapsulated within the IPsec tunnel egressing the Internet          WAN ports, MPLS-in-IP/GRE-in-IPsec.       - The BGP RR is connected to PEs in the same way as VPN, i.e.,          via the trusted network.   PE-based SD-WAN can be used by VPN service providers to temporarily   increase bandwidth between sites when not sure if the demand will   sustain for an extended period or as a temporary solution before the   permanent infrastructure is built or leased.                                   +---+                           +======>|PE2|                         //        +---+                        //          ^                       //           || VPN                      //     VPN    v                      ++--+        ++-+       +---+                      |PE1| <====> |RR| <===> |PE3|                      +-+-+        +--+       +-+-+                        |                       |                        +--- Public Internet -- +                                 Offload          Figure 4: Additional Internet paths added to the VPN4. Provisioning Model4.1. Client Service Provisioning Model   Client service provisioning can follow the same approach as MPLS   VRFs. A client VPN can establish the communication policy by   specifying the Route Targets to be imported and exported.   Alternatively, traditional Match and Action ACLs can identify the   specific routes allowed or denied to or from the client VPN.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 13]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   When an SD-WAN edge node is dedicated to one client with a single   virtual network, all prefixes attached to the client port(s) on the   edge node can be considered to be inside a single VRF, and the RR   can manage the policies for import/export policies for that VRF.4.2. Policy Configuration   One of the characteristics of an SD-WAN service is that packets can   be forwarded over multiple types of underlays. Policies are needed   to govern which underlay paths can carry an application flow, as   described bySection 8 of MEF70.1. An Application Flow consists of   packets that match specific criteria. For example, client-prefix-x   can only be mapped to MPLS topology.4.3. IPsec related parameters Provisioning   SD-WAN edge nodes must negotiate the supported IPsec encryption   algorithms (AES256, AES192, AES128, etc.), the hash algorithm (SHA2   512, SHA2 384, SHA2256, etc.), and the DH groups to establish IPsec   tunnels between them. Each SD-WAN edge may have the default values   assigned to them for the respective attributes, or alternatively,   retrieve the values for those attributes from its controller to   minimize the configuration. For a BGP-controlled SD-WAN, BGP UPDATE   messages can propagate each node's IPsec-related attribute values   for peers to choose the common values supported, traditionally done   by IPsec IKEv2 [RFC7296].5. BGP Controlled SD-WAN5.1. Why BGP as Control Plane for SD-WAN?   For an SD-WAN network with a small number of nodes, the traditional   hub and spoke model utilizing Next Hop Resolution Protocol (NHRP) or   Dynamic Smart VPN (DSVPN)/Dynamic Multipoint VPN (DMVPN) protocol   has been found to work reasonably well. DSVPN/DMVPN has a hub node   (or controller) managing the edge nodes, including local & public   addresses and tunnel identifiers mapping. However, for a sizeable   SD-WAN network, say more than 100 nodes with different underlays,   the traditional approach becomes very messy, complex, and error-   prone.   Here are some of the compelling reasons for using BGP:   -  Simplified peer authentication process:     With a secure management channel established between an edge node     and an RR, the RR can perform peer authentication on behalf of theDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 14]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023     edge node. The RR has policies on peer communication and the     built-in capability to constrain the propagation of the UPDATE     messages to the authorized edge nodes [RFC4684].   - Scalable IPsec tunnel management     When multiple IPsec tunnels are established between two pairwise     edge nodes, BGP Tunnel Attribute Update can associate multiple     IPsec tunnels with the client routes. In a traditional IPsec VPN,     separate routing protocols must run in parallel in each IPsec     Tunnel if the client routes can be load shared among the IPsec     tunnels.   - Simplified IPsec tunnel traffic selection configurations     The IPsec tunnel's traffic selector or admission control can be     inherently realized by specifying importing/exporting the Route     Targets representing the SD-WAN VPNs.5.2. BGP Walk Through for Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN   For the BGP-controlled Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN, a C-PE can   advertise its attached client routes and the properties of the IPsec   SA in one BGP UPDATE message.   In the figure below, the BGP UPDATE message from C-PE2 to RR can   have the client routes encoded in the MP-NLRI Path Attribute and the   IPsec Tunnel associated information encoded in the Tunnel-Encap   [RFC9012] Path Attributes as described in the [SECURE-EVPN].Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 15]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023                                  +---+                        +---------|RR |----------+                       / Untrusted+---+           \                      /                            \                     /                              \             +---------+                       +---------+           --+         |-----------------------|         |-192.0.2.4/30             |         |                       | C-PE2   |- VLAN = 15             | C-PE1   |                     +-|192.0.2.2|           --|192.0.2.1|                     | |         |-192.0.2.8/30             +---------+                     | +---------+                                             |                                             |                                             |             +---------+                     |           --|         |---------------------+             |         |             | C-PE3   |           --|192.0.2.3|             +---------+                 Figure 5: Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN   Alternatively, the C-PE2 can use two separate BGP UPDATE messages to   reduce the size of the BGP UPDATE messages, especially for IPsec   tunnels terminated at edge nodes or WAN ports, as IPsec SA tunnels   have many attributes which can change at different frequencies than   clients' routes updates, such as IPsec SA keys periodical changes.   When using two separate BGP UPDATE messages, which is described bySection 4 and 8 of [RFC9012], UPDATE U1 has its Nexthop to the node   loopback address and is recursively resolved to the IPsec SA tunnel   detailed attributes advertised by the UPDATE U2 for the Node   Loopback address.   Here are the details of the UPDATE messages:     - Suppose that a given packet "C" destined towards the client       addresses attached to C-PE2 (e.g., prefix 192.0.2.4/30) can be       carried by any IPsec tunnels terminated at C-PE2.     - The path along which "C" is to be forwarded is determined by BGP       UPDATE U1.     - UPDATE U1 does not have a Tunnel Encapsulation attribute.     - UPDATE U1 can include the Encapsulation Extended Community with       the option to have the Color Extended Community.     - The address of the next-hop of UPDATE U1 is router C-PE2.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 16]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023     - UPDATE U2 has a Tunnel Encapsulation attribute to describe the       IPsec SA detailed attributes.   UPDATE U1:     - MP-NLRI Path Attribute:         192.0.2.4/30         192.0.2.8/30     - Nexthop: 192.0.2.2 (C-PE2)     - Encapsulation Extended Community: TYPE = IPsec   UPDATE U2:     - MP-NLRI Path Attribute:         192.0.2.2 (C-PE2)     - Tunnel Encapsulation Path Attributes (as described in the     [SECURE-EVPN]) for IPsec SA detailed attributes, including the WAN     address to be used as the IP address of the IPsec encrypted     packets.   If different client routes attached to C-PE2 need to be reached by   separate IPsec tunnels, the Color-Extended-Community [RFC9012] is   used to associate routes with the tunnels. SeeSection 8 of   [RFC9012].   Suppose C-PE2 does not have a policy on the authorized peers for the   specific client routes. Then, the RR then needs to check the client   routes policies to constrain the BGP UPDATE messages propagation   only to the remote authorized edge nodes.5.3. BGP Walk Through for Differential Encrypted SD-WAN   In this scenario, some client routes can be forwarded over any one   of the tunnels terminating at the edge node. Some client routes can   only be forwarded over specific tunnels (such as only MPLS VPN).   An edge node can use the Color Extended Community (Section 4 & 8 of   [RFC9012]) in its BGP UPDATE message to associate the client routes   with the specific tunnels.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 17]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   For example, in Figure 5 above, suppose that Route 192.0.2.4/30 can   be carried by either MPLS or IPsec and Route 192.0.2.8/30 can only   be carried by MPLS; C-PE2 can use the following UPDATE messages:   UPDATE #1a for Route 192.0.2.4/30:     - MP-NLRI Path Attribute:         192.0.2.4/30         Nexthop: 192.0.2.2 (C-PE2)     - Encapsulation Extended Community: TYPE = SD-WAN-Hybrid     - Color Extended Community: RED   UPDATE #1b for Route 192.0.2.8/30:     - MP-NLRI Path Attribute:         192.0.2.8/30         Nexthop: 192.0.2.2 (C-PE2)     - Encapsulation Extended Community: TYPE = MPLS-in-GRE     - Color Extended Community: YELLOW   UPDATE #2a: for IPsec tunnels terminated at the node:     - MP-NLRI Path Attribute:         192.0.2.2 (C-PE2)     - Tunnel Encapsulation Path Attributes: TYPE=SD-WAN-Hybrid      Including the information about the WAN ports for receiving IPsec      encrypted packets, the IPsec properties, etc.     - Color Extended Community: RED   UPDATE #2b: for MPLS-in-GRE terminated at the node:     - MP-NLRI Path Attribute:         192.0.2.2 (C-PE2)     - Tunnel Encapsulation Path Attributes: TYPE=SD-WAN-Hybrid     - Color Extended Community: YELLOW   SD-WAN-Hybrid Tunnel Type is specified by [SD-WAN-EDGE-Discovery].5.4. BGP Walk Through for Application Flow-Based Segmentation   Suppose an application flow is identified by source or destination   IP addresses. Application Flow-based Segmentation described in 3.1.2   can be realized by constraining the BGP UPDATE messages, such that   only the nodes that meet the criteria of the application flowDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 18]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   receive these updates. The following BGP Update messages can be   advertised to ensure that the Payment Application only communicates   with the Payment Gateway shown in Figure 6:   BGP UPDATE #1a from C-PE2 to RR for the P2P topology that is only   propagated to Payment GW node:      - MP-NLRI Path Attribute:            - 192.0.2.9/30            - Nexthop: 192.0.2.2      - Encapsulation extended community: TYPE = IPsec      - Color Extended Community: BLUE   BGP UPDATE #1b from C-PE2 to RR is propagated to C-PE1 & C-PE3 for   the routes to be reached by C-PE1 and C-PE3:      - MP-NLRI Path Attribute:            - 192.0.2.4/30            - 192.0.2.8/30            - Nexthop:192.0.2.2       - Encapsulation extended community: TYPE =IPsec       - Color Extended Community: RED   BGP UPDATE #2a for the detailed IPsec attributes for IPsec tunnels   terminated at C-PE2 192.0.2.2 is propagated to C-PE1 & C-PE3.     - MP-NLRI Path Attribute:         192.0.2.2 (C-PE2)     - Tunnel Encapsulation Path Attributes: TYPE=IPsec (for all IPsec     SAs)     - Color Extended Community: RED   UPDATE #2b for the IPsec SA to the Payment GW is only propagated to   Payment GW:     - MP-NLRI Path Attribute:         192.0.2.2 (C-PE2)     - Tunnel Encapsulation Path Attributes: TYPE=IPsec (for the IPsec     SA to Payment GW).     - Color Extended Community: BlueDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 19]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023                                  +-------+                                  |Payment|                         +------->|  GW   |<----+                        /         +-------+      \                       /        Blue Tunnel       \                      /for Payment App:192.0.2.9/30\                     /                              \             +------/--+                      +------\--+           --|-----+   |                      |       +-| 192.0.2.9/30             |         |     Red Tunnels      |         |           --| C-PE1   |----------------------|         |-192.0.2.4/30             |192.0.2.1|                      |  C-PE2  |           --|         |----------------------|192.0.2.2|-192.0.2.8/30             |         |                      |         |             +---------+                     +|         |- VLAN=25;                                            / |         |192.0.2.10/30             +---------+                   /  +---------+           --|         |------------------+             | C-PE3   |                 /             |192.0.2.3|                /           --|         |---------------+             +---------+            Figure 6: Application Based SD-WAN Segmentation5.5. Benefit of Using Recursive Next Hop Resolution   Using the Recursive Next Hop Resolution described inSection 8 of   [RFC9012], the clients' route UPDATE messages become very compact,   and any attribute changes of the underlay network tunnels, such as   IPsec key refreshing, can be advertised independently of the client   route update. This method is handy when the underlay tunnels are   IPsec based, which requires periodic message exchange for the   pairwise re-keying process.6. SD-WAN Forwarding Model   This section describes how client traffic is forwarded in BGP   Controlled SD-WAN for the use cases described inSection 3.   The procedures described inSection 6 of RFC8388 are applicable for   the SD-WAN client traffic. Like the BGP-based VPN/EVPN client routes   UPDATE message, Route Target can distinguish routes from different   clients.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 20]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 20236.1. Forwarding Model for Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN6.1.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures   A single IPsec security association (SA) protects data in one   direction. In the Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN Scenario, two SAs   must be present to secure traffic in both directions between two C-   PE nodes, two client ports, or two prefixes. Using Figure 2 ofSection 3.2 as an example, for client CN2 attached to C-PE1, C-PE3,   and C-PE4 to have a full-mesh connection, six one-directional IPsec   SAs must be established: C-PE1 <-> C-PE3; C-PE1 <-> C-PE4; C-PE3 <->   C-PE4.   SD-WAN services to clients can be IP-based or Ethernet-based. An SD-   WAN edge can learn client routes from the client-facing ports via   OSPF, RIP, BGP, or static configuration for its IP-based services.   For Layer-2 SD-WAN services, the relevant EVPN parameters, such as   the ESI (Ethernet Segment Identifier), EVI, and CE-VID (Customer   Edge Virtual Instance Identifier) to EVI mapping, can be configured   similarly to EVPN described inRFC8388.   Instead of running IGP within each IPsec tunnel done by the   traditional IPsec VPN, BGP RR can propagate UPDATE messages of the   client routes attached to an SD-WAN edge node to its authorized   peers.   In addition, the BGP-RR (SD-WAN Controller) facilitates the IPsec SA   establishment and rekey management as described in [SECURE-EVPN].   The controller manages how clients' routes are associated with   individual IPsec SA. Therefore, it is no longer necessary to   manually configure the IPsec tunnel's endpoint addresses on each SD-   WAN edge node and set up policies for the allowed client prefixes.6.1.2. Packet Walk-Through   For unicast packets forwarding:     An IPsec SA terminated at a C-PE node can have multiple client     routes multiplexed in the IPsec SA (or tunnel). Packets to/from     the client prefixes are encapsulated in an inner tunnel, such as     GRE or VxLAN. Different client traffic can be differentiated by a     unique value in the inner encapsulation key or ID field. The GRE     or VxLAN tunnel is encapsulated by an outer IP header whose     destination & source addresses are the C-PE nodes loopback     addresses and most likely has the Protocol-code = ESP (50).     C-PE Node-based IPsec tunnel is inherently protected when the C-PE     has multiple WAN ports to different underlay paths. As shown inDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 21]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023     Figure 2, when one of the underlay paths fails, the IPsec traffic     can be forwarded to or received from a different physical port.     When a C-PE receives an IPsec encrypted packet from its WAN ports,     it decrypts the packet and forwards the inner packet to the client     port based on the inner packet's destination address.   For multicast packets forwarding:     IPsec was created to be a security protocol between two and only     two devices, so multicast service using IPsec is problematic. An     IPsec peer encrypts a packet so that only one other IPsec peer can     successfully perform the de-encryption. A straightforward way to     forward a multicast packet for the Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN is     to encapsulate the multicast packet in separate unicast IPsec SA     tunnels. More optimized forwarding multicast packets for the     Homogeneous Encrypted SD-WAN is out of the scope of this document.6.2. Forwarding Model for Hybrid Underlay SD-WAN   In this scenario, as shown in Figure 3 ofSection 3.3, traffic   forwarded over the trusted VPN paths can be native (i.e.,   unencrypted). The traffic forwarded over untrusted networks need to   be protected by IPsec SA.6.2.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures   Infrastructure setup: The proper MPLS infrastructure must be   configured among the edge nodes, i.e., the C-PE1/C-PE2/C-PE3/C-PE4   of Figure 3. The IPsec SA between WAN ports or nodes must be set up   as well. IPsec SA related attributes on edge nodes can be   distributed by BGP UPDATE messages as described inSection 5.   There could be policies governing how flows can be forwarded, as   specified by MEF70.1.  For example, "Private-only" indicates that   the flows can only traverse the MPLS VPN underlay paths.6.2.2. Packet Walk-Through   For unicast packets forwarding:     Upon receiving a packet from a client port, if the packet belongs     to a flow that can only be forwarded over the MPLS VPN, the     forwarding processing is the same as the MPLS VPN. Otherwise, the     C-PE node can make the local decision in choosing the least cost     path, including the prior established MPLS paths and IPsecDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 22]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023     Tunnels, to forward the packet. Packets forwarded over the trusted     MPLS VPN can be native without any additional encryption, while     the packets sent over the untrusted networks need to be encrypted     by IPsec SA.     For a C-PE with multiple WAN ports provided by different ISPs,     separate IPsec SAs can be established for the different WAN ports.     In this case, the C-PE have multiple IPsec tunnels in addition to     the MPLS path to choose from to forward the packets from the     client ports.     If the IPsec SA is chosen, the packet is encapsulated by the IPsec     header and encrypted by the IPsec SA before forwarding it to the     WAN.     For packets received from an MPLS path, processing is the same as     MPLS VPN.     For IPsec SA encrypted packets received from the WAN ports, the     packets are decrypted, and the inner payload is decapsulated and     forwarded per the forwarding table of the C-PE. For all packets     from the Internet-facing WAN ports, the additional anti-DDoS     mechanism has to be enabled to prevent potential attacks from the     Internet-facing ports. Control Plane should not learn routes from     the Internet-facing WAN ports.                                       +---+                        +--------------|RR |----------+                       /               +-+-+           \                      /                                 \                     /                                   \     +----+  +---------+  packets encrypted over    +---------+  +----+     | CN3|--|         A1-----+ Untrusted    +----- B1        |--| CN1|     +----+  | C-PE-a  A2-----+              +------B2 C-PE-b |  +----+             |192.0.2.1|                            |192.0.2.2|     +----+  |         |   +--+              +---+  |         |  +----+     | CN2|--|         A3  |PE+--------------+PE |--B3        |--| CN3|     +----+  +---------+   +--+   trusted    +---+  +---------+  +----+                              |     VPN      |                              +--------------+          Figure 8: SD-WAN with Hybrid Underlays   For multicast packets forwarding:     For multicast traffic, MPLS multicast [RFC6513,RFC6514, orRFC7988] can be used to forward multicast traffic.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 23]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023     If IPsec tunnels are chosen for a multicast packet, the packet is     encapsulated and encrypted by multiple separate IPsec tunnels to     the desired destinations.6.3. Forwarding Model for PE based SD-WAN6.3.1. Network and Service Startup Procedures   In this scenario, all PEs have secure interfaces facing the clients   and facing the MPLS backbone, with some PEs having extra ports to   the untrusted public Internet. The public Internet paths are for   offloading low priority traffic when the MPLS paths get congested.   The PEs are already connected to their RRs, and the configurations   for the clients and policies are already established.6.3.2. Packet Walk-Through   For PEs to offload some MPLS packets to the Internet path, each MPLS   packet is wrapped by an outer IP header as MPLS-in-IP or MPLS-in-GRE   [RFC4023]. The outer IP address can be an interface address or the   PE's loopback address.   When IPsec Tunnel mode is used to protect an MPLS-in-IP packet, the   entire MPLS-in-IP packet is placed after the IPsec tunnel header.   When IPsec transport mode is used to protect the MPLS packet, the   MPLS-in-IP packet's IP header becomes the outer IP header of the   IPsec packet, followed by an IPsec header, and then followed by the   MPLS label stack. The IPsec header must set the payload type to MPLS   by using the IP protocol number specified insection 3 of RFC4023.   If IPsec transport mode is applied to an MPLS-in-GRE packet, the GRE   header follows the IPsec header.   The IPsec SA's endpoints should not be the client-facing interface   addresses unless the traffic to/from those clients always goes   through the IPsec SA even when the MPLS backbone has enough capacity   to transport the traffic.   When the PEs' Internet-facing ports are behind the NAT [RFC3715], an   outer UDP field can be added outside the encrypted payload   [RFC3948]. Three UDP ports must be open on the PEs: UDP port 4500   (used for NAT traversal), UDP port 500 (used for IKE), and IP   protocol 50 (ESP). IPsec IKE (Internet Key Exchange) between the two   PEs would be over the NAT [RFC3947] as well.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 24]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   Upon receiving a packet from a client port, the forwarding   processing is the same as the MPLS VPN. If the MPLS backbone path to   the destination is deemed congested, the IPsec tunnel towards the   target PEs is used to encrypt the MPLS-in-IP packet.   Upon receiving a packet from the Internet-facing WAN port, the   packet is decrypted, and the inner MPLS payload is extracted to be   sent to the MPLS VPN engine.   Same as Scenario #2, the additional anti-DDoS mechanism must be   enabled to prevent potential attacks from the Internet-facing port.   Control Plane should not learn routes from the Internet-facing WAN   ports.7. Manageability Considerations     BGP-controlled SD-WAN utilizes the BGP RR to facilitate the routes     and underlay properties distribution among the authorized edge     nodes. With RR having the preconfigured policies about the     authorized peers, the peer-wise authentications of the IPsec IKE     (Internet Key Exchange) are significantly simplified.8. Security Considerations   Adding an Internet-facing WAN port to a C-PE can introduce the   following security risks:   1) Potential DDoS attacks from the Internet-facing ports.   2) Potential risk of illegal traffic being injected via the   Internet-facing WAN ports.   Therefore, the additional anti-DDoS mechanism must be enabled on all   Internet-facing ports to prevent potential attacks from those ports.   Control Plane should not learn any routes from the Internet-facing   WAN ports.9. IANA Considerations       No Action is needed.10. ReferencesDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 25]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 202310.1. Normative References   [BCP195]RFC8996,RFC9325.   [RFC3715] B. Aboba, W. Dixon, "IPsec-Network Address Translation             (NAT) Compatibility Requirements", March 2004.   [RFC3947] T. Kivinen, et al, "Negotiation of NAT Traversal in the             IKE", Jan. 2005.   [RFC3948] A. Huttunen, et al, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP             Packets", Jan 2005.   [RFC4023] T. Worster, Y. Rekhter, E. Rosen, "Encapsulating MPLS in             IP or Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", March 2005.   [RFC4364] E. Rosen, Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private             networks (VPNs)", Feb 2006.   [RFC4456] T. Bates, E. Chen, R. Chandra, "BGP Route Reflection: An             Alternative to Full Mesh Internal BGP (IBGP)", April 2006.   [RFC4684] P. Marques, et al, "Constrained Route Distribution for             BGP/MPLS IP VPNs", November 2006.   [RFC6071] S. Frankel, S. Krishan, "IP Security (IPsec) and Internet             Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap", Feb 2011.   [RFC7296] C. Kaufman, et al, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version             2 (IKEv2)", Oct 2014.   [RFC9012] K.Patel, et al "The BGP Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute",RFC9012, April 2021.10.2. Informative References   [SD-WAN-EDGE-Discovery] L. Dunbar, S. Hares, R. Raszuk, K. Majumdar,             "BGP UPDATE for SD-WAN Edge Discovery",draft-ietf-idr-sdwan-edge-discovery-10, June 2023.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 26]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023   [SECURE-EVPN] A. Sajassi, et al, "Secure EVPN",draft-ietf-bess-secure-evpn-00, Work-in-progress, June 2023.   [Net2Cloud-Problem] L. Dunbar and A. Malis, "Seamless Interconnect             Underlay to Cloud Overlay Problem Statement",draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-problem-statement-26, April 2023.   [MEF70.1] SD-WAN Service Attributes and Service Framework, Nov 2021.11. Acknowledgments   Acknowledgements to Andrew Alston, Adrian Farrel, Jim Guichard, Joel   Halpern, John Scudder, Darren Dukes, Andy Malis, Donald Eastlake,   and Victo Sheng for their review and contributions.   This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.Dunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 27]

Internet-Draft           BGP Usage for SD-WAN        September 17, 2023Authors' Addresses   Linda Dunbar   Futurewei   Email: ldunbar@futurewei.com   James Guichard   Futurewei   Email: james.n.guichard@futurewei.com   Ali Sajassi   Cisco   Email: sajassi@cisco.com   John Drake   Juniper   Email: jdrake@juniper.net   Basil Najem   Bell Canada   Email: basil.najem@bell.caContributor's Addresses   David Carrel   Graphiant   Email: carrel@graphiant.com   Ayan Banerjee   Cisco   Email: ayabaner@cisco.comDunbar, et al.          Expires March 17, 2024                [Page 28]
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