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Internet-DraftVoucher ArtifactDecember 2025
Watsen, et al.Expires 5 June 2026[Page]
Workgroup:
ANIMA Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-ietf-anima-rfc8366bis-19
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
K. Watsen
Watsen Networks
M. Richardson
Sandelman Software
M. Pritikin
Cisco Systems
T. Eckert
Futurewei Technologies Inc.
Q. Ma
Huawei

A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols

Abstract

This document defines a strategy to securely assign a Pledge to an Ownerusing an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, by the Pledge's manufacturer.This artifact is known as a "Voucher".

This document defines an artifact format as a YANG-defined JSON or CBOR documentthat has been signed using a variety of cryptographic systems.

The Voucher Artifact is normally generated bythe Pledge's manufacturer (i.e., the Manufacturer Authorized SigningAuthority (MASA)).

This document updates RFC8366: it includes a number of desired extensions into the YANG module.The Voucher Request YANG module defined in RFC8995 is also updated and now included in this document, as well as other YANG extensions needed for variants of BRSKI/RFC8995.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found athttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-rfc8366bis/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the anima Working Group mailing list (mailto:anima@ietf.org), which is archived athttps://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/anima/. Subscribe athttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found athttps://github.com/anima-wg/voucher.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is athttps://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 June 2026.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

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Table of Contents

1.Introduction

This document defines a strategy to securely assign a candidate device(Pledge) to an Owner using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly,by the Pledge's manufacturer, i.e., the Manufacturer AuthorizedSigning Authority (MASA). This artifact is known as the "Voucher".

The Voucher Artifact is a JSON[RFC8259] document thatconforms with a data model described by YANG[RFC7950].It may also be serialized to CBOR[CBOR].It is encoded using the rules defined in[RFC7951] or[RFC9254], andis signed using (by default) a CMS structure[RFC5652].

The primary purpose of a Voucher is to securely convey a trust anchorthat a Pledge can use to authenticate subsequent interactions.The trust anchor may be in the form of a certificate (the 'pinned-domain-cert' Attribute), a hash of a certificate, or it can be a raw public key (in constrained use cases).

This trust anchor represents the authority of the Owner of a network.Communicating this trust anchor securely to the Pledge is the job of the Voucher Artifact.The act of communicating this trust anchor is known as pinning the trust anchor, as the Pledge can then use the resulting anchor to authenticate other actors who are part of the network.The collection of all these actors is collectively known as the Domain.(This is not related to the domain name system, but rather the term is of mathematical origin)

A Voucher may be useful in several contexts, but the driving motivation herein is to support secure Onboarding mechanisms.This is accomplished by assigning an Owner to the Pledge, enabling it to authenticate the network that it is connected to.

[RFC8366] originally defined the Voucher as the only Voucher Artifact, leaving the Voucher Request that is used in BRSKI to be defined in[BRSKI].This document includes both Voucher and Voucher Request, and therefore updates[BRSKI].

YANG is not easily extended except by updating the YANG module definition.Since[RFC8366] was written, the common pattern is to publish YANG modules as two documents: one with only the YANG module, and the other one with usage, motivation and further explanation.This allows the YANG module to be updated without replacing all of the context.This document does not follow that pattern, but future documents may update only the YANG module.

This document introduces a mechanism to support future extensions without requiring the YANG module to be revised.This includes both a new IETF standard mechanism for extensions modeled after the mechanism present in[RFC8520], as well as a facility for manufacturer private extensions.

The lifetimes of Vouchers may vary.In some Onboarding protocols, the Vouchers may include a nonce restricting them to a single use, whereas the Vouchers in other Onboarding protocols may have anindicated lifetime.In order to support long lifetimes, this document recommends using short lifetimes with programmatic renewal, seeSection 9.1.

Some Onboarding protocols using the Voucher Artifact defined inthis document include:[ZERO-TOUCH],[SECUREJOIN],[BRSKI] and[cBRSKI].

2.Terminology

This document uses and defines the following terms.They are used in this document and related documents.

(Voucher) Artifact:

Used throughout this document to represent a Voucher or Voucher Request as instantiated in the formof a signed datastructure. The payload of the signed datastructure is called the Voucher Data.

Attribute:

A single named data element that can be stored in Voucher Data. The element's name and data type are defined byone of the YANG models as defined in this document.

Bootstrapping:

The process where a Pledge obtains cryptographic key material to identify and trust future interactions within a specific Domain network. Based on imprinted key material provided during the manufacturing process (see: Imprint). This term was used in[RFC8366], but has been supplanted by the term Onboarding.

Domain:

The set of entities or infrastructure under common administrativecontrol.The goal of the Onboarding protocol is to enable a Pledge tojoin a Domain and obtain domain-specific security credentials.This term is not related to "DNS domain"[RFC9499] although a Domain might be associated to a specific DNS domain.

Imprint:

The process where a device obtains the cryptographic key material toidentify and trust future interactions generally as part of the manufacturing.This term is taken from Konrad Lorenz's work in biology with new ducklings:"during a critical period, the duckling would assume that anythingthat looks like a mother duck is in fact their mother"[Stajano99theresurrecting]. An equivalent for a device is toobtain the fingerprint of the manufacturer's root certification authority (root CA)certificate. A device that Imprints on an attacker suffers a similarfate to a duckling that imprints on a hungry wolf. Imprinting is aterm from psychology and ethology, as described in[imprinting].

Join Registrar (and Coordinator):

A representative of the Domain that is configured, perhapsautonomically, to decide whether a new device is allowed to join theDomain. The administrator of the Domain interfaces with a JoinRegistrar (and Coordinator) to control this process.Typically, a Join Registrar is "inside" its Domain. For simplicity,this document often refers to this as just "Registrar".

MASA (Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority):

The entity that, for the purpose of this document, issues and signs theVouchers for a manufacturer's Pledges and keeps logs of Pledge ownership.In some Onboarding protocols, the MASA may have an Internetpresence and be integral to the Onboarding process, whereas inother protocols the MASA may be an offline service that has noactive role in the Onboarding process.

Malicious Registrar:

An on-path active attacker that presents itself as a legitimate Registrar.

Onboarding:

Onboarding describes the process to provide necessary operational data to a Pledgeand to complete the process of bringing the Pledge into an operational state.This data may include configuration data, but specifically deals with application-specific cryptographickey material (application-specific security credentials).Since[RFC8366], this term has replaced the term Bootstrapping.

Owner:

The entity that controls the private key of the trust anchor conveyed by the Voucher.Typically, the Owner is indicated by the 'pinned-domain-cert' Attribute.

Pledge:

The prospective component/device attempting to find and securely join a Domain.When shipped or in factory reset mode, it only trusts authorized representatives of themanufacturer.

Registrar:

See Join Registrar. This term is not related to the term DNS Registrar[RFC9499].

TOFU (Trust on First Use):

When a Pledge makes no security decisions but rather simplytrusts the first Domain entity it is contacted by.Used similarly to[RFC7435].This is also known as the "resurrecting duckling" model[Stajano99theresurrecting].

Voucher:

A Voucher Artifact, not a Voucher Request, that is a signed statementfrom the MASA service that indicates to a Pledgethe cryptographic identity of the Domain it should trust.When clarity is needed, it may be preceded by the type of the signature, such as CMS, JWS or COSE.

Voucher Data:

The raw (serialized) representation of the YANG data elements of a Voucher (Request) without any enclosing signature.Current serialization formats include JSON and CBOR.

Voucher Request:

A signed artifact sent from the Pledge to the Registrar, or from the Registrar to the MASA, for Voucher acquisition.When clarity is needed, it may be preceded by the type of the signature, such as CMS, JWS or COSE.

Pledge Voucher Request (PVR):

A signed artifact sent from the Pledge to the Registrar. It is a specific form of Voucher Request.

Registrar Voucher Request (RVR):

A signed artifact sent from the Registrar to the MASA. It is a specific form of Voucher Request.

3.Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED","MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted asdescribed in BCP 14[RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, theyappear in all capitals, as shown here.

4.Survey of Voucher Types

A Voucher is a cryptographically protected statement to the Pledgeauthorizing a zero-touch Onboarding with the Join Registrar of theDomain. The specific information a Voucher provides is influenced by theOnboarding use case.

The Voucher can convey the following information tothe Join Registrar and to the Pledge:

Assertion Basis:

Indicates the method that protectsthe Onboarding (this is distinct from the Voucher signature thatprotects the Voucher itself). Methods includemanufacturer-asserted ownership verification, assuredlogging operations, or reliance on Pledge behaviorsuch as secure or measured boot.The Join Registrar uses this information to make a determination as to whether to accept the Pledge into the network.Only some methods are normatively defined in thisdocument. Other methods are left for future work.

Authentication of Join Registrar:

Indicates how the Pledgecan authenticate the Join Registrar. This document definesa mechanism to pin the Domain certificate, or a raw public key.Pinning a symmetric key, or CN-ID ([RFC6125]) or DNS-IDinformation (as defined in[RFC9125]) is left for future work.

Anti-Replay Protections:

Time- or nonce-basedinformation to constrain the Voucher to specific time periods or Onboardingattempts.

A number of Onboarding scenarios can be met using differingcombinations of this information. All scenarios address the primarythreat of an on-path active attacker (or MiTM) impersonating the Registrar.If successful, this would gain control over the Pledge.The following combinations are "types" of Vouchers:

Table 1:Overview of Voucher types
Voucher TypeAssertion Registrar ID Validity 
 LoggedVerifiedTrust AnchorCN-ID or DNS-IDRTCNonce
Audit VoucherX X  X
Nonceless AuditX X X 
Owner AuditXXX XX
Owner ID Voucher XXXX 
Bearer VoucherX wildcardwildcardoptionalopt

NOTE: The "RTC" column denotes Voucher validation using a Real-Time Clock.

NOTE: All Voucher types include a "Pledge IDserial-number" (column not shown for space reasons).

Audit Voucher:

An audit Voucher is named after the logging assertion mechanismsthat the Registrar then "audits" to enforce its local policy. TheRegistrar mitigates the risk of a Malicious Registrar by auditing that no unknown Registrar, orknown Malicious Registrar, appears in the MASA's log entries for the Pledge.This does not directly prevent a Malicious Registrar but provides a response mechanism thatensures the on-path attack is unsuccessful.An advantage is that actual ownership knowledge (i.e., sales integration providing an indication of who purchased the device) is not required on the MASA service.

Nonceless Audit Voucher:

An audit Voucher with a validity period statement, but no guarantee of freshness. Fundamentally,it is the same as an audit Voucher except that it can be issued inadvance to support network partitions or to provide a permanentVoucher for remote deployments.Being issued in advance of the Pledge being online, the Pledge can not rely on a nonce to be included for freshness.This compromise in reducing the freshness allows for the resulting Voucher to be carried across air-gapped infrastructure.In addition, if the validity period has been set sufficiently long, the Voucher can be used after the manufacturer (and its delegates) has gone out of business.

Ownership Audit Voucher:

An audit Voucher where the MASA service has verified the Registraras the authorized Owner.The MASA service mitigates a MiTM Registrar by refusing to generateaudit Vouchers for unauthorized Registrars. The Registrar uses audittechniques to supplement the MASA. This provides an ideal sharing ofpolicy decisions and enforcement between the vendor and the Owner.

Ownership ID Voucher:

Named after inclusion of the Pledge's CN-ID or DNS-ID within theVoucher. The MASA service mitigates a MiTM Registrar by identifyingthe specific Registrar (via PKIX[RFC5280]) authorized to own the Pledge.

Bearer Voucher:

A bearer Voucher is named after the inclusion of a Registrar IDwildcard. Because the Registrar identity is not indicated, thisVoucher type must be treated as a secret and protected from exposureas any 'bearer' of the Voucher can claim the Pledge.This variation is included in the above table in order to clearlyshow how other Voucher types differ.This specification does not support bearer Vouchers at this time.There are other specifications in the industry which are equivalent though.Publishing a nonceless bearer Voucher effectively turns thespecified Pledge into a TOFU device with minimal mitigationagainst MiTM Registrars. Bearer Vouchers are therefore out of scope.

5.Changes since RFC8366

5.1.Attempts and motivation to extend RFC8366

[RFC8366] was published in 2018 during the development of[BRSKI],[ZERO-TOUCH] and other work-in-progress efforts.Since then the industry has matured significantly, and the in-the-field activity which this document supports has become known asOnboarding rather thanBootstrapping.

The focus of[BRSKI] was Onboarding of ISP and Enterprise owned wired routing and switching equipment, with IoT devices being a less important aspect.[ZERO-TOUCH] has focused upon Onboarding of CPE equipment like cable modems and other larger IoT devices, again with smaller IoT devices being of lesser importance.

Since[BRSKI] was published there is now a mature effort to do application-level Onboarding of constrained IoT devices defined by the Thread Group and the Fairhair Alliance (now OCF)[fairhair].The[cBRSKI] document has defined a version of[BRSKI] that is usable over constrained IEEE 802.15.4 6LoWPAN networks using CoAP and DTLS, while[I-D.ietf-lake-authz] provides for using CoAP and EDHOC on even more constrained devices with very constrained networks.

[PRM] has created a new methodology for Onboarding that does not depend upon a synchronous connection between the Pledge and the Registrar.This mechanism uses a mobile Registrar agent that works to collect and transfer signed artifacts via physical travel from one network to another.

Both[cBRSKI] and[PRM] require extensions to the Voucher Request and the resulting Voucher. The new Attributes are required to carry the additional data and describe the extended semantics.In addition[cBRSKI] uses the serialization mechanism described in[RFC9254] to produce significantly more compact artifacts.

When the process to define[cBRSKI] and[PRM] was started, there was a belief that the appropriate process was to use the[RFC7950]augment mechanism to further extend both the Voucher Request[BRSKI] and Voucher[RFC8366] artifacts.However,[PRM] needs to extend an enumerated type with additional values andaugment can not do this, so that was initially the impetus for this document.

An attempt was then made to determine what would happen if one wanted to have a constrained version of the[PRM] Voucher Artifact.The result was invalid YANG, with multiple definitions of the core Attributes from the[RFC8366] Voucher Artifact.After some discussion, it was determined that theaugment mechanism did not work for this use case,nor did it work better when the[RFC8040] "yang-data" extension was replaced with the[RFC8791] structure mechanisms.

After significant discussion the decision was made to simply roll all of the needed extensions into this document.

5.2.Informational Model changes since RFC8366

This document therefore represents a merge of YANG definitions from[RFC8366], the Voucher Request from[BRSKI], and extensions to each of these from[cBRSKI],[CLOUD] and[PRM].The difficulty with this approach is that the semantics of the definitions needed for the other documents is not included in this document, but rather in the respective other documents.

6.Signature mechanisms

Three signature systems have been defined for Vouchers Artifacts.

[cBRSKI] defines a mechanism that uses COSE[COSE], with the Voucher Data encoded using[RFC9254].However, as the SID[RFC9254] allocation process requires up-to-date YANG, the SID values for this mechanism are presented in this document.

[jBRSKI] defines a mechanism that uses JSON[RFC8259] and[JWS].

The CMS signing mechanism first defined in[RFC8366] continues to be defined here.

6.1.CMS Format Voucher Artifact

The IETF evolution of PKCS#7 is CMS[RFC5652].A CMS-signed Voucher, the default type, contains a ContentInfostructure with the Voucher Data.An OID for JSON-encoded Voucher Data is allocated inSection 11.4, andit is to be placed in the 'eContentType' field in the ContentInfo.

The signing structure is a CMS SignedData structure, as specified bySection 5.1 of[RFC5652], encoded using ASN.1 Distinguished EncodingRules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690[ITU-T.X690.2015].

[RFC5652] mandates thatSignedAttributesMUST be present when the content type is not 'id-data'.This mitigates attacks on CMS as described in[I-D.vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata].DecodersMUST verify thatSignedAttributes are present.

To facilitate interoperability,Section 11.3 the media type "application/voucher-cms+json" and the filename extension ".vcj" were registered by[RFC8366].

The CMS structureMUST contain a 'signerInfo' structure, asdescribed in Section 5.1 of[RFC5652], containing thesignature generated over the content using a private keytrusted by the recipient.Normally, the recipient is the Pledge and the signer is the MASA.In the Voucher Request, the signer is the Pledge (in the PVR), or the Registrar (in the RVR).

Note that Section 5.1 of[RFC5652] includes adiscussion about how to validate a CMS object, which is really aPKCS7 object (cmsVersion=1). Intermediate systems (such as theBootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures[BRSKI] Registrar)that might need to evaluate the Voucher in flightMUST be prepared forsuch an older format.No signaling of the format version is necessary, as the manufacturer knows the capabilitiesof the Pledge and will use an appropriate format Voucher for eachPledge.

The CMS structureSHOULD also contain all of the certificatesleading up to and including the signer's trust anchor certificateknown to the recipient. The inclusion of the trust anchor isunusual in many applications, but third parties cannot accuratelyaudit the transaction without it.

The CMS structureMAY also contain revocation objects for anyintermediate certificate authorities (CAs) between theVoucher issuer and the trust anchor known to the recipient.However, the use of CRLs and other validity mechanisms isdiscouraged, as the Pledge is unlikely to be able to performonline checks and is unlikely to have a trusted clock source.As described below, the use of short-lived Vouchers and/or aPledge-provided nonce provides a freshness guarantee.

7.Voucher Artifact

The Voucher's primary purpose is to securely assign a Pledge to anOwner.The Voucher informs the Pledge which entity it should consider to beits Owner.

This document defines a Voucher Artifact that is a CMS-signed encoding of theJSON-encoded Voucher Data as defined by the YANG moduleSection 7.3.Also, this document defines Voucher Data that is CBOR-encoded based on the same YANG model.The CBOR-encoded (signed) Voucher based on this CBOR Voucher Data is defined in[cBRSKI].

The Voucher Data format is described here as a practical basis for some uses (suchas in NETCONF), but more to clearly indicate what Vouchers look likein practice.This description also serves to validate the YANG data model.

[RFC8366] defined a media type and a filename extension for theCMS-encoded JSON type.The media type for JOSE format Vouchers is defined in[jBRSKI] and the media type for COSE format Vouchers is defined in[cBRSKI].Both include respective filename extensions.

The media type is used by the Pledge (requesting to the Registrar) and by the Registrar (requesting to the MASA) to signal what Voucher format is expected.Other aspects of the Voucher, such as it being nonceless or which kind of pinned anchor is used, are not part of the media type.

Only the format of Voucher that is expected is signaled in the form of a (MIME) mediatype in the HTTP "Accept" header[RFC7231].

For Vouchers stored/transferred via methods like a USB storage device (USB key), the Voucher format is usually signaled by a filename extension.

7.1.Tree Diagram

The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a Voucherdocument.The notation used in this diagram is described in[RFC8340].Each node in the diagram is fully described by the YANG module inSection 7.3.Please review the YANG module for a detailed description of theVoucher format.

module: ietf-voucher  structure voucher:    +-- created-on?                      yang:date-and-time    +-- extensions*                      union    +-- manufacturer-private?            binary    +-- assertion?                       enumeration    +-- serial-number                    string    +-- idevid-issuer?                   binary    +-- pinned-domain-cert?              binary    +-- pinned-domain-pubk?              binary    +-- pinned-domain-pubk-sha256?       binary    +-- domain-cert-revocation-checks?   boolean    +-- last-renewal-date?               yang:date-and-time    +-- expires-on?                      yang:date-and-time    +-- nonce?                           binary    +-- est-domain?                      ietf:uri    +-- additional-configuration-url?    ietf:uri

7.2.Examples

This section provides Voucher Data examples for illustrationpurposes. These examples conform to the JSON encoding rulesdefined in[RFC8259].

The following example illustrates an ephemeral Voucher (uses a nonce).The MASA generated this Voucher using the 'logged' assertion type, knowingthat it would be suitable for the Pledge making the request.

{  "ietf-voucher:voucher": {    "created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",    "assertion": "logged",    "serial-number": "JADA123456789",    "idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",    "pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",    "nonce": "base64encodedvalue=="  }}

The following example illustrates a non-ephemeral Voucher (containing no nonce, or "nonceless").While the Voucher itself expires after two weeks, it presumably canbe renewed for up to a year. The MASA generated this Voucherusing the 'verified' assertion type, which should satisfy all Pledges.

{  "ietf-voucher:voucher": {    "created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",    "expires-on": "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z",    "assertion": "verified",    "serial-number": "JADA123456789",    "idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",    "pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",    "domain-cert-revocation-checks": true,    "last-renewal-date": "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z"  }}

The final two examples illustrate a Voucher that includes an (example) extension perSection 7.5.The hypothetical YANG module name of the extension is "example-my-extension".First, a JSON serialization is shown.

{  "ietf-voucher:voucher": {    "created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",    "assertion": "logged",    "serial-number": "JADA123456789",    "idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",    "pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",    "nonce": "base64encodedvalue==",    "extensions": ["example-my-extension"],    "extension:example-my-extension": {      "my-ext-leaf1": "my-ext-leaf1-data"    }  }}

Next, a CBOR serialization is shown in CBOR diagnostic notation.This uses again the extension module 'example-my-extension' and refers to it using its SID value 305823299950.Note that for this example, long binary strings are abbreviated using the ellipsis (...) notation.

{  2451: {                          / ietf-voucher:voucher  /    2:  "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",    / created-on            /    1:  1,                         / assertion (logged)    /    11: "JADA123456789",           / serial-number         /    5:  h'04183016 ... 1736C3E0',  / idevid-issuer         /    8:  h'30820122 ... 12328CFF',  / pinned-domain-cert    /    7:  h'831D5198A6CA2C7F',       / nonce                 /    17: [305823299950],            / extensions            /    47(305823299950): {            / example-my-extension  /      1: "my-ext-leaf1-data"       / my-ext-leaf1          /    }  }}

[jBRSKI],Section 8 contains examples of Vouchers encoded in JSON, and signed with[JWS].[cBRSKI],Section 9 contains examples of Vouchers encoded in CBOR, and signed with[COSE].

7.3.YANG Module

During development of this merged YANG module, advice was given to better organize mutually exclusive Attributes such as 'pinned-domain-cert' vs 'pinned-domain-pubk', or 'expires-on' vs 'nonce'.Unfortunately,[CORESID] does not explain how and why choice statements are assigned SID values,and the tooling as of the end of 2025 is inconsistent with both the document, and the intuitive notions as to how this should work.As the simplest way forward, the choice mechanisms that were introduced have been commented out in the YANG, allowing the SID values to be generated correctly.As a result, the SID values presented inSection 7.4 andSection 8.3 are to be considered normative, rather than relying exclusively on the".sid" file[CORESID] generated from the YANG modules.The presented SID values are believed to be correct, but future reprocessing of the YANG module to a ".sid" file could result in changes as the tooling is fixed.Any such changes will be recorded as errata on this document.

<CODE BEGINS>=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================module ietf-voucher {  yang-version 1.1;  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher";  prefix vch;  import ietf-yang-types {    prefix yang;    reference      "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";  }  import ietf-inet-types {    prefix ietf;    reference      "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";  }  import ietf-yang-structure-ext {    prefix sx;  }  organization    "IETF ANIMA Working Group";  contact    "WG Web:   <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/anima/>     WG List:  <mailto:anima@ietf.org>     Author:   Kent Watsen               <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>     Author:   Michael Richardson               <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>     Author:   Max Pritikin               <mailto:pritikin@cisco.com>     Author:   Toerless Eckert               <mailto:tte@cs.fau.de>     Author:   Qiufang Ma               <mailto:maqiufang1@huawei.com>";  description    "This module defines the format for a voucher, which is     produced by a pledge's manufacturer or delegate (MASA)     to securely assign a pledge to an 'owner', so that the     pledge may establish a secure connection to the owner's     network infrastructure.     Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as     authors of the code.  All rights reserved.     Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or     without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to     the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set     forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions     Relating to IETF Documents     (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).     This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX     (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself     for full legal notices.     RFCEDITOR: please replace XXXX with the RFC number assigned.     The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL     NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',     'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as     described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,     they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";  revision 2023-01-10 {    description      "updated to support new assertion enumerated type";    reference      "RFC XXXX Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";  }  grouping voucher-artifact-grouping {    description      "Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";    leaf created-on {      type yang:date-and-time;      description        "A value indicating the date this voucher was created.         This node is primarily for human consumption and auditing.         Future work MAY create verification requirements based on         this node.";    }    leaf-list extensions {      type union {        type uint64; // when serialized to CBOR with SID        type string; // when serialized to CBOR or JSON      }      description        "A list of extension names that are used in this Voucher         file.  Each name is registered with the IANA.  Standard         extensions are described in an RFC, while vendor proprietary         ones are not.";    }    leaf manufacturer-private {      type binary;      description        "In CBOR serialization, this is a CBOR bstr containing any \                                                      valid CBOR that         the manufacturer wishes to share with it's Pledge.  In \                                                 JSON serializations,         this contains additional JSON instead, and it is base64URL \                                                           encoded.";    }    leaf assertion {      type enumeration {        enum verified {          value 0;          description            "Indicates that the ownership has been positively             verified by the MASA (e.g., through sales channel             integration).";        }        enum logged {          value 1;          description            "Indicates that the voucher has been issued after             minimal verification of ownership or control.  The             issuance has been logged for detection of             potential security issues (e.g., recipients of             vouchers might verify for themselves that unexpected             vouchers are not in the log).  This is similar to             unsecured trust-on-first-use principles but with the             logging providing a basis for detecting unexpected             events.";        }        enum proximity {          value 2;          description            "Indicates that the voucher has been issued after             the MASA verified a proximity proof provided by the             device and target domain.  The issuance has been             logged for detection of potential security issues.";        }        enum agent-proximity {          value 3;          description            "Mostly identical to proximity, but             indicates that the voucher has been issued             after the MASA has verified a statement that             a registrar agent has made contact with the device.";        }      }      description        "The assertion is a statement from the MASA regarding how         the owner was verified.  This statement enables pledges         to support more detailed policy checks.  Pledges MUST         ensure that the assertion provided is acceptable, per         local policy, before processing the voucher.";    }    leaf serial-number {      type string;      mandatory true;      description        "The serial-number of the hardware.  When processing a         voucher, a pledge MUST ensure that its serial-number         matches this value.  If no match occurs, then the         pledge MUST NOT process this voucher.";    }    leaf idevid-issuer {      type binary;      description        "The Authority Key Identifier OCTET STRING (as defined in         Section 4.2.1.1 of RFC 5280) from the pledge's IDevID         certificate.  Optional since some serial-numbers are         already unique within the scope of a MASA.         Inclusion of the statistically unique key identifier         ensures statistically unique identification of the         hardware.         When processing a voucher, a pledge MUST ensure that its         IDevID Authority Key Identifier matches this value.  If no         match occurs, then the pledge MUST NOT process this         voucher.         When issuing a voucher, the MASA MUST ensure that this         field is populated for serial-numbers that are not         otherwise unique within the scope of the MASA.";    }    // choice pinning {    //  description "One of these attributes is used by the    //               MASA to pin the registrar identity";    leaf pinned-domain-cert {      type binary;      description        "An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by         RFC 5280, using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)         encoding, as defined in ITU-T X.690.         This certificate is used by a pledge to trust a Public Key         Infrastructure in order to verify a domain certificate         supplied to the pledge separately by the bootstrapping         protocol.  The domain certificate MUST have this         certificate somewhere in its chain of certificates.         This certificate MAY be an end-entity certificate,         including a self-signed entity.";      reference        "RFC 5280:           Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate           and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.         ITU-T X.690:            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished            Encoding Rules (DER).";    }    leaf pinned-domain-pubk {      type binary;      description        "The pinned-domain-pubk may replace the         pinned-domain-cert in constrained uses of         the voucher. The pinned-domain-pubk         is the Raw Public Key of the Registrar.         This field is encoded as a Subject Public Key Info block         as specified in RFC7250, in section 3.         The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.         The EdDSA algorithm as specified in         draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.         Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.         Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY.";    }    leaf pinned-domain-pubk-sha256 {      type binary;      description        "The pinned-domain-pubk-sha256 is a second         alternative to pinned-domain-cert.  In many cases the         public key of the domain has already been transmitted         during the key agreement process, and it is wasteful         to transmit the public key another two times.         The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for         sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA         public key, but is only a minor savings compared to         a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.         Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this         specification which can define a new leaf for another         hash type.";    }    // }  choice pinning removed    leaf domain-cert-revocation-checks {      type boolean;      description        "A processing instruction to the pledge that it MUST (true)         or MUST NOT (false) verify the revocation status for the         pinned domain certificate.  If this field is not set, then         normal PKIX behavior applies to validation of the domain         certificate.";    }    leaf last-renewal-date {      type yang:date-and-time;      // this does not work, the XPath does not evaluate      // must '../nonceless/expires-on';      description        "The date that the MASA projects to be the last date it         will renew a voucher on. This field is merely         informative; it is not processed by pledges.         Circumstances may occur after a voucher is generated that         may alter a voucher's validity period.  For instance,         a vendor may associate validity periods with support         contracts, which may be terminated or extended         over time.";    }    //choice nonceless {    //  description "Either a nonce must be present, or an expires-\                                                          on header";    leaf expires-on {      type yang:date-and-time;      description        "A value indicating when this voucher expires.  The node is         optional as not all pledges support expirations, such as         pledges lacking a reliable clock.         If this field exists, then the pledges MUST ensure that         the expires-on time has not yet passed. A pledge without         an accurate clock cannot meet this requirement.         The expires-on value MUST NOT exceed the expiration date         of any of the listed 'pinned-domain-cert' certificates.";    }    leaf nonce {      type binary {        length "8..32";      }      description        "A value that can be used by a pledge in some bootstrapping         protocols to enable anti-replay protection.  This node is         optional because it is not used by all bootstrapping         protocols.         When present, the pledge MUST compare the provided nonce         value with another value that the pledge randomly         generated and sent to a bootstrap server in an earlier         bootstrapping message.  If the value is present, but         the values do not match, then the pledge MUST NOT process         this voucher.";    }    // } choice nonceless    leaf est-domain {      type ietf:uri;      description        "The est-domain is a URL from which the Pledge should           continue doing enrollment rather than with the           Cloud Registrar.           The pinned-domain-cert contains a trust-anchor           which is to be used to authenticate the server           found at this URI.          ";    }    leaf additional-configuration-url {      type ietf:uri;      description        "The additional-configuration attribute contains a           URL to which the Pledge can retrieve additional           configuration information.           The contents of this URL are manufacturer specific.           This is intended to do things like configure           a VoIP phone to point to the correct hosted           PBX, for example.";    }  }  // Top-level statement  sx:structure voucher {    uses voucher-artifact-grouping;  }}<CODE ENDS>

7.4.ietf-voucher SID values

[RFC9254] explains how to serialize YANG into CBOR, and for this a series of SID values are required.The below SID values are assigned to the 'ietf-voucher' YANG module elements and are considered normative.

      SID Assigned to--------- --------------------------------------------------     2451 data /ietf-voucher:voucher     2452 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/assertion     2453 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/created-on     2454 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks     2455 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/expires-on     2456 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/idevid-issuer     2457 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/last-renewal-date     2458 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/nonce     2459 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/pinned-domain-cert     2460 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/pinned-domain-pubk     2461 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/pinned-domain-pubk-sha256     2462 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/serial-number     2463 data .../additional-configuration-url     2464 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/est-domain     2465 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/manufacturer-private     2466 data /ietf-voucher:voucher/extensions

The 'assertion' Attribute is an enumerated type in[RFC8366], but no values were provided as part of the enumeration.This document provides enumerated values as part of the YANG module.

In the JSON serialization, the literal strings from the enumerated types are used so there is no ambiguity.

In the CBOR serialization, a small integer is used, and the enumeration values are repeated here for convenience.However, the YANG module should be considered authoritative.No IANA registry is provided or necessary because the YANG module (and this document) would be extended when there are new entries required.

Table 2:CBOR integers for the 'assertion' Attribute enum value
CBOR IntegerAssertion Type
0verified
1logged
2proximity
3agent-proximity

7.5.Voucher Extensions

An unstated assumption in[RFC8366] was that Vouchers could be extended in proprietary ways by manufacturers.This allows for manufacturers to communicate new things from the MASA to the Pledge, and since both are under control of the same entity, it seemed perfectly fine, even though it would violate the strict definition of the YANG model.

The JSON serialization of Vouchers implicitly accomodates the above, since the Voucher is just a map (or dictionary).Map keys are just strings, and creating unique strings is easy to do by including the manufacturer's DNS domain name.

In CBOR serialization[RFC9254], the situation is not so easy when SID keys are used.An extension might need to use "Private range"[CORESID] SID values, or acquire SID values for their own use.

Where the process has become complex is when making standard extensions, as has happened recently, resulting in this document.The processes which were anticipated to be useful (the YANG "augment" mechanism), turned out not to be, seeSection 5.1.

Instead, a process similar to what was done by[RFC8520] has been adopted.In the Voucher Data, any extensions are listed in a list Attribute named 'extensions'.In JSON serialization, these extensions each require a unique name, and therefore this nameMUST be allocated by IANA.The nameMUST be the same as the YANG extension module name.The 'extensions' list Attribute allows for new standard extensions to be defined without changes to the 'ietf-voucher' YANG module.Items within that list are either strings (in JSON serialization), or integers (in CBOR serialization using SIDs);both are always defined in the entries of the Voucher Extensions Registry (seeSection 11.5).

Extensions are full YANG modules, which are subject to the SID allocation process described in[RFC9254].When an extension is serialized, the extension is placed in a sub-map in the value of a new key/value pair in the 'voucher' container element.In JSON serialization, the corresponding key is the name of the extension, prefixed by the string "extension:".In CBOR serialization, the corresponding key is the SID which is allocated as the YANG extension module SID.This will typically require the absolute SID value Tag(47) to be applied to this key (seeSection 4.2.1 of [RFC9254]or the final example inSection 7.2).

Note that this differs from the mechanism described in[RFC8520]: there, a sub-map is not used.Instead, keys are created by combining the module name and the Attribute as a string, as a result of using the YANG"augment" mechanism.The[RFC8520] mechanism uses more bytes, but is also not easily translatable to CBOR.

As the Voucher Request YANG module is created by YANG augment of the Voucher YANG module, any extension defined for the Voucher is also valid for a Voucher Request.

7.6.Manufacturer Private Extensions

A manufacturer might need to communicate content in the Voucher (or in the Voucher Request), which are never subject to standardization.While they can use the Voucher extensions mechanism defined inSection 7.5, it does require allocation of a SID value in order to do minimal-sized encoding in case of CBOR Voucher Data.Note that[RFC9254] does not strictly require use of SIDs: instead of a SID value, the full string name can alwaysbe used. But this would significantly increase the size of the Voucher Data.

Instead, a manufacturerMAY use the 'manufacturer-private' Attribute to put any content they wish.In CBOR serialization, if a plain CBOR map would be used, it would be subject to delta encoding: so use of this Attribute requires that the contents are bstr-encoded[CBOR][RFC8949],Section 3.1 (Major type 2).In JSON serialization, delta encoding does not get in the way, and the manufacturerMAY use any encoding that is convenient for them, but base64URL encoding[RFC4648],Section 5 isRECOMMENDED.

8.Voucher Request Artifact

[BRSKI],Section 3 defined a "voucher-request" Artifact as an augmented Artifact from the "voucher" Artifact originally defined in[RFC8366].That definition has been moved to this document, and translated from the "yang-data" extension[RFC8040] to the "sx:structure" extension[RFC8791].

8.1.Tree Diagram

The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a Voucher Request document.The notation used in this diagram is described in[RFC8340].Each node in the diagram is fully described by the YANG module inSection 8.2.

module: ietf-voucher-request  structure voucher:    +-- created-on?                                yang:date-and-time    +-- extensions*                                union    +-- manufacturer-private?                      binary    +-- assertion?                                 enumeration    +-- serial-number                              string    +-- idevid-issuer?                             binary    +-- pinned-domain-cert?                        binary    +-- pinned-domain-pubk?                        binary    +-- pinned-domain-pubk-sha256?                 binary    +-- domain-cert-revocation-checks?             boolean    +-- last-renewal-date?                         yang:date-and-time    +-- expires-on?                                yang:date-and-time    +-- nonce?                                     binary    +-- est-domain?                                ietf:uri    +-- additional-configuration-url?              ietf:uri    +-- prior-signed-voucher-request?              binary    +-- proximity-registrar-cert?                  binary    +-- proximity-registrar-pubk?                  binary    +-- proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256?           binary    +-- agent-signed-data?                         binary    +-- agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert?   binary    +-- agent-sign-cert?                           binary

8.2."ietf-voucher-request" Module

The 'ietf-voucher-request' YANG module is derived from the 'ietf-voucher' module.

<CODE BEGINS>=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================module ietf-voucher-request {  yang-version 1.1;  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher-request";  prefix vcr;  import ietf-yang-structure-ext {    prefix sx;  }  import ietf-voucher {    prefix vch;    description      "This module defines the format for a voucher,       which is produced by a pledge's manufacturer or       delegate (MASA) to securely assign a pledge to       an 'owner', so that the pledge may establish a secure       connection to the owner's network infrastructure";    reference      "RFC XXXX: Voucher Artifact for       Bootstrapping Protocols";  }  organization    "IETF ANIMA Working Group";  contact    "WG Web:   <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/anima/>     WG List:  <mailto:anima@ietf.org>     Author:   Kent Watsen               <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>     Author:   Michael Richardson               <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>     Author:   Max Pritikin               <mailto:pritikin@cisco.com>     Author:   Toerless Eckert               <mailto:tte@cs.fau.de>     Author:   Qiufang Ma               <mailto:maqiufang1@huawei.com>";  description    "This module defines the format for a voucher request.     It is a superset of the voucher itself.     It provides content to the MASA for consideration     during a voucher request.     The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL     NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',     'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as     described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,     they appear in all capitals, as shown here.      Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as      authors of the code.  All rights reserved.      Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or      without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to      the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set      forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions      Relating to IETF Documents      (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).      This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX      (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself      for full legal notices.     RFCEDITOR: please replace XXXX with the RFC number assigned.      The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL      NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',      'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as      described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,      they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";  revision 2023-01-10 {    description      "Initial version";    reference      "RFC XXXX: Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure";  }  grouping voucher-request-grouping {    description      "Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";    uses vch:voucher-artifact-grouping {      refine "last-renewal-date" {        description          "A last-renewal-date field           is not valid in a voucher request, and           any occurrence MUST be ignored";      }      refine "domain-cert-revocation-checks" {        description          "The domain-cert-revocation-checks field           is not valid in a voucher request, and           any occurrence MUST be ignored";      }      refine "assertion" {        description          "Any assertion included in registrar voucher           requests SHOULD be ignored by the MASA.";      }    }    leaf prior-signed-voucher-request {      type binary;      description        "If it is necessary to change a voucher, or re-sign and         forward a voucher request that was previously provided \                                                              along a         protocol path, then the previously signed voucher SHOULD         be included in this field.         For example, a pledge might sign a voucher request         with a proximity-registrar-cert, and the registrar         then includes it as the prior-signed-voucher-request         field.  This is a simple mechanism for a chain of         trusted parties to change a voucher request, while         maintaining the prior signature information.         The Registrar and MASA MAY examine the prior signed         voucher information for the         purposes of policy decisions. The MASA SHOULD remove all         prior-signed-voucher-request information when         signing a voucher for imprinting so as to minimize         the final voucher size.";    }    leaf proximity-registrar-cert {      type binary;      description        "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by         RFC 5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1         distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified         in [ITU.X690.1994].         The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server         certificate_list sequence  (the end-entity TLS         certificate, see [RFC8446]) presented by the Registrar         to the Pledge.         This MUST be populated in a Pledge's voucher request         when a proximity assertion is requested.";    }    leaf proximity-registrar-pubk {      type binary;      description        "The proximity-registrar-pubk replaces         the proximity-registrar-cert in constrained uses of         the voucher-request.         The proximity-registrar-pubk is the         Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded         as specified in RFC7250, section 3.         The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.         The EdDSA algorithm as specified in         draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.         Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.         Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY, but due to         size is discouraged.";    }    leaf proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256 {      type binary;      description        "The proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256         is an alternative to both         proximity-registrar-pubk and pinned-domain-cert.         In many cases the public key of the domain has already         been transmitted during the key agreement protocol,         and it is wasteful to transmit the public key another         two times.         The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for         sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA         public key, but is only a minor savings compared to         a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.         Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this         specification which may define a new leaf for another         hash type.";    }    leaf agent-signed-data {      type binary;      description        "The agent-signed-data field contains a data artifact \                                                             provided         by the Registrar-Agent to the Pledge for inclusion into the         voucher request.         This artifact is signed by the Registrar-Agent and contains         data, which can be verified by the pledge and the registrar.         This data contains the pledge's serial-number and a created\                                                                  -on         information of the agent-signed-data.         The format is intentionally defined as binary to allow         the document using this leaf to determine the encoding.";    }    leaf agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert {      type binary;      description        "An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by         RFC 5280, Section 4, encoded using the ASN.1         distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified         in ITU X.690.         The first certificate in the registrar TLS server         certificate_list sequence (the end-entity TLS         certificate; see RFC 8446) presented by the         registrar to the registrar-agent and provided to         the pledge.         This MUST be populated in a pledge's voucher-request         when an agent-proximity assertion is requested.";      reference        "ITU X.690: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding         rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),         Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished         Encoding Rules (DER)         RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure         Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)         Profile         RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS)         Protocol Version 1.3";    }    leaf agent-sign-cert {      type binary;      description        "An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by         RFC 5280, Section 4, encoded using the ASN.1         distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified         in ITU X.690.         This certificate can be used by the pledge,         the registrar, and the MASA to verify the signature         of agent-signed-data. It is an optional component         for the pledge-voucher request.         This MUST be populated in a registrar's         voucher-request when an agent-proximity assertion         is requested.";      reference        "ITU X.690: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding         rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),         Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished         Encoding Rules (DER)         RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure         Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)         Profile";    }  }  // Top-level statement  // Called "voucher" to match RFC8995  sx:structure voucher {    uses voucher-request-grouping;  }}<CODE ENDS>

8.3.ietf-voucher-request SID values

[RFC9254] explains how to serialize YANG into CBOR, and for this a series of SID values are required.The below SID values are assigned to the 'ietf-voucher-request' YANG module elements and are considered normative.

      SID Assigned to--------- --------------------------------------------------     2501 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher     2502 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/assertion     2503 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/created-on     2504 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks     2505 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/expires-on     2506 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/idevid-issuer     2507 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/last-renewal-date     2508 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/nonce     2509 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/pinned-domain-cert     2510 data .../prior-signed-voucher-request     2511 data .../proximity-registrar-cert     2512 data .../proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256     2513 data .../proximity-registrar-pubk     2514 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/serial-number     2515 data .../agent-provided-proximity-registrar-cert     2516 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/agent-sign-cert     2517 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/agent-signed-data     2518 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/pinned-domain-pubk     2519 data .../pinned-domain-pubk-sha256     2520 data .../additional-configuration-url     2521 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/est-domain     2522 data /ietf-voucher-request:voucher/extensions     2523 data .../manufacturer-private

The 'assertion' Attribute is an enumerated type, and has values as defined inTable 2.

9.Design Considerations

9.1.Renewals Instead of Revocations

The lifetimes of Vouchers may vary. In some Onboarding protocols,the Vouchers may be created and consumed immediately, whereas in otherOnboarding solutions, there may be a significant time delay betweenwhen a Voucher is created and when it is consumed.In cases when there is a time delay, there is a need for the Pledgeto ensure that the assertions made when the Voucher was created arestill valid.

A revocation artifact is generally used to verify the continued validityof an assertion such as a PKIX certificate[RFC5280], web token, or Voucher. Withthis approach, a potentially long-lived assertion is paired with a reasonablyfresh revocation status check to ensure that the assertion is still valid.However, this approach increases solution complexity, as it introduces theneed for additional protocols and code paths to distribute and process therevocations.

Addressing the shortcomings of revocations, this document recommendsinstead the use of lightweight renewals of short-lived non-revocableVouchers. That is, rather than issue a long-lived Voucher, where the'expires-on' Attribute is set to some distant date, the expectationis for the MASA to instead issue a short-lived Voucher, where the'expires-on' Attribute is set to a relatively near date, along with a promise(reflected in the 'last-renewal-date' Attribute) to reissue the Voucher againwhen needed. Importantly, while issuing the initial Voucher may incurheavyweight verification checks ("Are you who you say you are?" "Does thePledge actually belong to you?"), reissuing the Voucher should be alightweight process, as it ostensibly only updates the Voucher'svalidity period.With this approach, there isonly the one Artifact, and only one code path is needed to processit; there is no possibility of a Pledge choosing to skip therevocation status check because, for instance, the OCSP Responder ([RFC5280]) isnot reachable.

While this document recommends issuing short-lived Vouchers, theVoucher Artifact does not restrict the ability to create long-livedVouchers, if required; however, no revocation method is described.

Note that a Voucher may be signed by a chain of intermediate CAsleading up to the trust anchor CA known by the Pledge. Eventhough the Voucher itself is not revocable, it is still revoked,per se, if one of the intermediate CA certificates is revoked.

9.2.Voucher Per Pledge

The solution described herein originally enabled a single Voucher toapply to many Pledges, using lists of regular expressions to representranges of serial numbers. However, it was determined that blocking therenewal of a Voucher that applied to many devices would be excessivewhen only the ownership for a single Pledge needed to be blocked.Thus, the Voucher format now only supports a single serial numberto be listed.

10.Security Considerations

10.1.Clock Sensitivity

An attacker could use an expired Voucher to gain control overa device that has no understanding of time. The device cannottrust NTP as a time reference, as an attacker could controlthe NTP stream.

There are three things to defend against this: 1) devices arerequired to verify that the 'expires-on' Attribute has not yet passed,2) devices without access to time can use nonces toget ephemeral Vouchers, and 3) Vouchers without expiration timesmay be used, which will appear in the audit log, informing thesecurity decision.

This document defines a Voucher format that contains time valuesfor expirations, which require an accurate clockin order to be processed correctly. Vendors planning onissuing Vouchers with expiration values must ensure that deviceshave an accurate clock when shipped from manufacturingfacilities and take steps to prevent clock tampering.If it is not possible to ensure clock accuracy, thenVouchers with time values for expirations should not be issued.

10.2.Protect MASA Signing Key in HSM

Pursuant to the recommendation made in Section 6.1 for the MASA to bedeployed as an online Voucher signing service, it isRECOMMENDED thatthe MASA's private key used for signing Vouchers is protected bya hardware security module (HSM).

10.3.Test Domain Certificate Validity When Signing

If a Domain certificate is compromised, then any outstandingVouchers for that Domain could be used by the attacker. In this case, the Domainadministrator is clearly expected to initiate revocation of anyDomain identity certificates (as is normal in PKIX[RFC5280] solutions).

Similarly, they are expected to contact the MASA to indicate thatan outstanding (presumably short lifetime) Voucher should be blocked fromautomated renewal.Protocols for Voucher distribution areRECOMMENDED to check for revocation of Domain identity certificatesbefore the signing of Vouchers.

10.4.YANG Module Security Considerations

The YANG modules specified in this document define the schemafor data that is subsequently encapsulated by secure signed-data structure,such as the CMS signed-data described inSection 6.1. As such,all of the YANG modeled data is protected from modification.

Implementations should be aware that the signed data is onlyprotected from external modification; the data is still visible.This potential disclosure of information doesn't affect securityso much as privacy. In particular, adversaries can gleaninformation such as which devices belong to which organizationsand which CRL Distribution Point and/or OCSP Responder URLs areaccessed to validate the Vouchers. When privacy is important,the CMS signed-data content typeSHOULD be encrypted, either byconveying it via a mutually authenticated secure transport protocol(e.g., TLS[RFC5246]) or by encapsulating the signed-datacontent type with an enveloped-data content type (Section 6of[RFC5652]), though details for how to do this are outsidethe scope of this document.

The use of YANG to define data structures, via the "yang-data"statement, is relatively new and distinct from the traditional use ofYANG to define an API accessed by network management protocols such asNETCONF[RFC6241] and RESTCONF[RFC8040]. For this reason, theseguidelines do not follow the template described by Section 3.7 of[YANG-GUIDE].

11.IANA Considerations

11.1.The IETF XML Registry

This document registers two URIs in the "IETF XML Registry"[RFC3688].

IANA has registered the following:

  • URI:

    urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher

    Registrant Contact:

    The ANIMA WG of the IETF.

    XML:

    N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This reference should be updated to point to this document.

11.2.The YANG Module Names Registry

This document registers two YANG module in the "YANG Module Names"registry[RFC6020].

IANA has registered the following:

  • name:

    ietf-voucher

    namespace:

    urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher

    prefix:

    vch

    reference:

    RFC 8366

This reference should be updated to point to this document.

11.3.The Media Types Registry

IANA has registered the media type:application/voucher-cms+json, and this registration should be updated to point to this document.

11.4.The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry

IANA has registered the OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.40, 'id-ct-animaJSONVoucher'.This registration should be updated to point to this document.

11.5.The Voucher Extensions Registry

IANA is asked to create a registry of Voucher extensions as follows:

  • Registry name:

    Voucher Extensions Registry

    Registry policy:

    First Come First Served

    Reference:

    an optional document

    Extension name:

    UTF-8-encoded string, not to exceed 40 characters.

    Extension SID:

    the YANG module SID value that defines the extension perSection 7.5.

Each extensionMUST follow the rules specified in this specification.As is usual, the IANA issues early allocations in accordance with[RFC7120].

Note that the SID module value is allocated as part of a[CORESID] process.This may be from a SID range managed by IANA, or from any other MegaRange.Future work may allow for PEN based allocations.IANA does not need to separately allocate a SID value for this column.

Extension name strings for standards track documents are single words, given by the YANG Module Name.They do not contain dots.For vendor proprietary extensions, the stringSHOULD be made unique by putting the extension name in the form a fully-qualified domain name (FQDN)[RFC3696], such as "fuubar.example.com"

Vendor proprietary extensions do not need to be registered with IANA, but vendorsMAY do so.

Designated Experts should review for standards track documents for clarity, but the process is essentially tied to WG and IESG process:There are no choices in the extension names (which is always the YANG module name), or SID value (which is from another IANA process).For non-standards track extensions, the Designated Expert should review whatever document is provided, if any.The stability of the reference may be of concern. The Designated Expert should determine if the work overlaps with existing efforts; and if so suggest merging.However, as registration is optional, the Designated Expert should not block any registrations.

12.References

12.1.Normative References

[BRSKI]
Pritikin, M.,Richardson, M.,Eckert, T.,Behringer, M., andK. Watsen,"Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)",RFC 8995,DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.
[CBOR]
Internet Standard 94,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std94>.
At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
Bormann, C. andP. Hoffman,"Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)",STD 94,RFC 8949,DOI 10.17487/RFC8949,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[cBRSKI]
Richardson, M.,Van der Stok, P.,Kampanakis, P., andE. Dijk,"Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (cBRSKI)",Work in Progress,Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-29,,<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-29>.
[CLOUD]
Friel, O.,Shekh-Yusef, R., andM. Richardson,"Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) Cloud Registrar",Work in Progress,Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-brski-cloud-19,,<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-brski-cloud-19>.
[CORESID]
Veillette, M., Ed.,Pelov, A., Ed.,Petrov, I., Ed.,Bormann, C., andM. Richardson,"YANG Schema Item iDentifier (YANG SID)",RFC 9595,DOI 10.17487/RFC9595,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9595>.
[IDEVID]
IEEE Standard,"IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",,<https://1.ieee802.org/security/802-1ar/>.
[ITU-T.X690.2015]
International Telecommunication Union,"Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)",ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1,,<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>.
[jBRSKI]
Werner, T. andM. Richardson,"JWS signed Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols",Work in Progress,Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-16,,<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-16>.
[PRM]
Fries, S.,Werner, T.,Lear, E., andM. Richardson,"BRSKI with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM)",Work in Progress,Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm-23,,<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm-23>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S.,"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,DOI 10.17487/RFC2119,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280]
Cooper, D.,Santesson, S.,Farrell, S.,Boeyen, S.,Housley, R., andW. Polk,"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",RFC 5280,DOI 10.17487/RFC5280,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC5652]
Housley, R.,"Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",STD 70,RFC 5652,DOI 10.17487/RFC5652,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.
[RFC6020]
Bjorklund, M., Ed.,"YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",RFC 6020,DOI 10.17487/RFC6020,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6020>.
[RFC7120]
Cotton, M.,"Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code Points",BCP 100,RFC 7120,DOI 10.17487/RFC7120,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7120>.
[RFC7950]
Bjorklund, M., Ed.,"The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",RFC 7950,DOI 10.17487/RFC7950,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7950>.
[RFC7951]
Lhotka, L.,"JSON Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",RFC 7951,DOI 10.17487/RFC7951,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7951>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B.,"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words",BCP 14,RFC 8174,DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259]
Bray, T., Ed.,"The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format",STD 90,RFC 8259,DOI 10.17487/RFC8259,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8259>.
[RFC8791]
Bierman, A.,Björklund, M., andK. Watsen,"YANG Data Structure Extensions",RFC 8791,DOI 10.17487/RFC8791,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8791>.
[RFC9148]
van der Stok, P.,Kampanakis, P.,Richardson, M., andS. Raza,"EST-coaps: Enrollment over Secure Transport with the Secure Constrained Application Protocol",RFC 9148,DOI 10.17487/RFC9148,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9148>.
[RFC9254]
Veillette, M., Ed.,Petrov, I., Ed.,Pelov, A.,Bormann, C., andM. Richardson,"Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)",RFC 9254,DOI 10.17487/RFC9254,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9254>.
[ZERO-TOUCH]
Watsen, K.,Farrer, I., andM. Abrahamsson,"Secure Zero Touch Provisioning (SZTP)",RFC 8572,DOI 10.17487/RFC8572,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8572>.

12.2.Informative References

[COSE]
Internet Standard 96,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std96>.
At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
Schaad, J.,"CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process",STD 96,RFC 9052,DOI 10.17487/RFC9052,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
Schaad, J.,"CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Countersignatures",STD 96,RFC 9338,DOI 10.17487/RFC9338,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9338>.
[fairhair]
Open Connectivity Foundation,"Fairhair Specification",,<https://openconnectivity.org/developer/specifications/fairhair/>.
[I-D.ietf-lake-authz]
Selander, G.,Mattsson, J. P.,Vučinić, M.,Fedrecheski, G., andM. Richardson,"Lightweight Authorization using Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (ELA)",Work in Progress,Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-authz-06,,<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-authz-06>.
[I-D.vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata]
Van Geest, D. andF. Strenzke,"Best Practices for CMS SignedData with Regards to Signed Attributes",Work in Progress,Internet-Draft, draft-vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata-02,,<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-vangeest-lamps-cms-euf-cma-signeddata-02>.
[imprinting]
Wikipedia,"Wikipedia article: Imprinting (psychology)",,<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Imprinting_(psychology)&oldid=1314466188>.
[JWS]
Jones, M.,Bradley, J., andN. Sakimura,"JSON Web Signature (JWS)",RFC 7515,DOI 10.17487/RFC7515,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.
[RFC3688]
Mealling, M.,"The IETF XML Registry",BCP 81,RFC 3688,DOI 10.17487/RFC3688,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3688>.
[RFC3696]
Klensin, J.,"Application Techniques for Checking and Transformation of Names",RFC 3696,DOI 10.17487/RFC3696,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3696>.
[RFC4648]
Josefsson, S.,"The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings",RFC 4648,DOI 10.17487/RFC4648,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
[RFC5246]
Dierks, T. andE. Rescorla,"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2",RFC 5246,DOI 10.17487/RFC5246,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.
[RFC6125]
Saint-Andre, P. andJ. Hodges,"Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)",RFC 6125,DOI 10.17487/RFC6125,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6125>.
[RFC6241]
Enns, R., Ed.,Bjorklund, M., Ed.,Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., andA. Bierman, Ed.,"Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",RFC 6241,DOI 10.17487/RFC6241,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>.
[RFC7231]
Fielding, R., Ed. andJ. Reschke, Ed.,"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content",RFC 7231,DOI 10.17487/RFC7231,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231>.
[RFC7435]
Dukhovni, V.,"Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time",RFC 7435,DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7435>.
[RFC8040]
Bierman, A.,Bjorklund, M., andK. Watsen,"RESTCONF Protocol",RFC 8040,DOI 10.17487/RFC8040,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8040>.
[RFC8340]
Bjorklund, M. andL. Berger, Ed.,"YANG Tree Diagrams",BCP 215,RFC 8340,DOI 10.17487/RFC8340,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8340>.
[RFC8366]
Watsen, K.,Richardson, M.,Pritikin, M., andT. Eckert,"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",RFC 8366,DOI 10.17487/RFC8366,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8366>.
[RFC8520]
Lear, E.,Droms, R., andD. Romascanu,"Manufacturer Usage Description Specification",RFC 8520,DOI 10.17487/RFC8520,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8520>.
[RFC8792]
Watsen, K.,Auerswald, E.,Farrel, A., andQ. Wu,"Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs",RFC 8792,DOI 10.17487/RFC8792,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8792>.
[RFC9125]
Farrel, A.,Drake, J.,Rosen, E.,Patel, K., andL. Jalil,"Gateway Auto-Discovery and Route Advertisement for Site Interconnection Using Segment Routing",RFC 9125,DOI 10.17487/RFC9125,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9125>.
[RFC9499]
Hoffman, P. andK. Fujiwara,"DNS Terminology",BCP 219,RFC 9499,DOI 10.17487/RFC9499,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9499>.
[SECUREJOIN]
Richardson, M.,"6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol",Work in Progress,Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-04,,<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-04>.
[Stajano99theresurrecting]
Stajano, F. andR. Anderson,"The Resurrecting Duckling: Security Issues for Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks",,<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/dtg/www/files/publications/public/files/tr.1999.2.pdf>.
[YANG-GUIDE]
Bierman, A.,"Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data Models",BCP 216,RFC 8407,DOI 10.17487/RFC8407,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8407>.

Appendix A.Examples

A.1.Key pairs associated with examples

The following Voucher Request has been produced using the IDevID[IDEVID] public (certificate) and private key.They are included so that other developers can match the same output.

The private RSA key:

-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----MHcCAQEEIBHNh6r8QRevRuo+tEmBJeFjQKf6bpFA/9NGoltv+9sNoAoGCCqGSM49AwEHoUQDQgAEA6N1Q4ezfMAKmoecrfb0OBMc1AyEH+BATkF58FsTSyBxs0SbSWLxFjDOuwB9gLGn2TsTUJumJ6VPw5Z/TP4hJw==-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

The IDevID certificate (public key):

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

The Certification Authority that created the IDevID:

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================Certificate:    Data:        Version: 3 (0x2)        Serial Number: 1016146354 (0x3c9129b2)        Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption        Issuer: CN = highway-test.example.com CA        Validity            Not Before: Apr  5 19:36:57 2021 GMT            Not After : May  6 05:36:57 2021 GMT        Subject: CN = highway-test.example.com CA        Subject Public Key Info:            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption                Public-Key: (3072 bit)                Modulus:                    00:b4:7b:27:42:49:9f:ed:85:47:74:ff:f6:50:cd:                    5d:22:1a:64:38:22:f8:09:d2:d6:f3:60:d8:98:7f:                    e5:84:52:1e:d9:ce:96:b4:dc:a6:43:74:67:27:d9:                    9d:42:7d:bf:1a:43:92:9b:d1:dd:34:9b:41:d2:e3:                    d5:59:b3:40:fc:b3:c9:e1:58:84:3f:87:f7:06:45:                    25:26:4c:bf:a1:45:72:a0:0a:5b:86:41:d7:8e:be:                    d3:38:b5:aa:66:69:bd:3a:fd:e9:b5:b8:a2:79:c4:                    f0:a5:3c:9e:91:94:32:1e:9c:b0:7f:25:46:5b:76:                    1d:86:23:85:b0:62:45:5c:a8:6f:fb:c5:26:e1:dd:                    a8:f2:68:ab:c5:8c:b4:58:b4:2e:96:49:fa:fe:d2:                    ea:a5:11:68:c2:8d:f4:58:ab:30:bd:dd:1b:29:97:                    00:18:6f:59:40:9c:3a:2a:e4:96:25:bb:12:f4:1a:                    11:72:6d:31:f6:b4:e1:cc:d8:9a:0c:aa:a8:aa:a4:                    64:e3:f1:06:1c:c0:09:df:62:ba:04:cb:70:b0:c4:                    f7:ca:35:22:ea:a9:c7:52:e1:ce:27:fb:6c:52:39:                    b7:22:b3:5d:97:cb:0a:9f:75:a3:af:16:ef:e6:b2:                    1b:6a:c3:0b:1d:15:fd:b8:d8:e7:8a:f6:f4:99:1c:                    23:97:4b:80:e9:79:a3:85:16:f8:dd:bd:77:ef:3a:                    3c:8e:e7:75:56:67:36:3a:dd:42:7b:84:2f:64:2f:                    13:0e:fa:b0:3b:11:13:7e:ae:78:a6:2f:46:dd:4b:                    11:88:e4:7b:19:ab:21:2d:1f:34:ba:61:cd:51:84:                    a5:ec:6a:c1:90:20:70:e3:aa:f4:01:fd:0c:6e:cd:                    04:47:99:31:70:79:6c:af:41:78:c1:04:2a:43:78:                    84:8a:fe:c3:3d:f2:41:c8:2a:a1:10:e0:b7:b4:4f:                    4e:e6:26:79:ac:49:64:cf:57:1e:2e:e3:2f:58:bd:                    6f:30:00:67:d7:8b:d6:13:60:bf                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)        X509v3 extensions:            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical                CA:TRUE            X509v3 Key Usage: critical                Certificate Sign, CRL Sign            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:                33:12:45:B7:1B:10:BE:F3:CB:64:E5:4C:50:80:7C:9D:88:\                                                             65:74:40            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:                33:12:45:B7:1B:10:BE:F3:CB:64:E5:4C:50:80:7C:9D:88:\                                                             65:74:40    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption    Signature Value:        05:37:28:85:37:39:71:87:ec:5c:f0:51:19:55:4a:b7:e0:2a:        e6:61:30:d4:e2:2b:ad:7a:db:12:fc:8a:a6:6e:15:82:80:10:        fa:5d:67:60:e8:54:14:e3:89:d6:4e:60:89:98:5b:ab:fe:32:        26:aa:02:35:68:4e:c6:2e:ce:08:36:d1:ea:a0:97:3d:76:38:        6e:9d:4b:6f:33:d2:fa:c2:7e:b0:59:bc:75:97:17:d1:1b:c5:        c4:58:ae:7b:7e:87:e5:87:2b:8b:6b:10:16:70:7c:c8:65:c7:        d0:62:5d:f3:b5:06:af:03:8b:32:dd:88:f0:07:2b:5d:61:58:        61:35:54:a6:ce:95:81:a2:6e:fa:b5:aa:25:e1:41:53:9d:e7:        4b:7e:93:88:79:6b:dd:a3:6e:9a:0d:bd:85:b4:2d:66:b9:cc:        01:13:f1:b5:d5:91:cc:86:5e:a7:c8:4a:8f:4d:9d:f8:17:31:        32:7d:50:d5:c2:79:a0:41:a0:69:83:33:16:14:35:26:10:3b:        23:eb:60:d9:28:68:99:d5:55:61:89:b5:35:5d:8b:fe:b1:96:        32:69:3e:8b:c2:a2:4e:e1:d8:76:04:3c:87:91:5d:66:9e:81:        a5:bf:18:2e:3e:39:da:4f:68:57:46:d2:1d:aa:81:51:3b:33:        72:da:e9:7d:12:b6:a1:fc:c7:1d:c1:9c:bd:92:e8:1b:d2:06:        e8:0b:82:2a:4f:23:5a:7a:fa:7b:86:a0:d7:c1:46:e7:04:47:        77:11:cd:da:7c:50:32:d2:6f:fd:1e:0a:df:cf:b1:20:d2:86:        ce:40:5a:27:61:49:2f:71:f5:04:ac:eb:c6:03:70:a4:70:13:        4a:af:41:35:83:dc:55:c0:29:7f:12:4f:d0:f1:bb:f7:61:4a:        9f:8d:61:b0:5e:89:46:49:e3:27:8b:42:82:5e:af:14:d5:d9:        91:69:3d:af:11:70:5b:a3:92:3b:e3:c8:2a:a4:38:e5:88:f2:        6f:09:f4:e5:04:3b-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

The private key for the Certification Authority that created the IDevID:

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

The MASA certificate that signs the Voucher:

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----MIIBcDCB9qADAgECAgQLhwoxMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMCYxJDAiBgNVBAMMG2hpZ2h3YXktdGVzdC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSBDQTAeFw0yMTA0MTMyMTQwMTZaFw0yMzA0MTMyMTQwMTZaMCgxJjAkBgNVBAMMHWhpZ2h3YXktdGVzdC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbSBNQVNBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEqgQVo0S54kT4yfkbBxumdHOcHrpsqbOpMKmiMln3oB1HAW25MJV+gqi4tMFfSJ0iEwt8kszfWXK4rLgJS2mnpaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNpADBmAjEArsthLdRcjW6GqgsGHcbTYLoyczYl0yOFSYcczpQjeRqeQVUkHRUioUi7CsCrPBNzAjEAhjxns5Wi4uX5rfkdnME0Mnj1z+rVRwOfAL/QWctRwpgEgSSKURNQsXWyL52otPS5-----END CERTIFICATE-----

The private key for MASA certificate signs the Voucher:

-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----MHcCAQEEIFhdd0eDdzip67kXx72K+KHGJQYJHNy8pkiLJ6CcvxMGoAoGCCqGSM49AwEHoUQDQgAEqgQVo0S54kT4yfkbBxumdHOcHrpsqbOpMKmiMln3oB1HAW25MJV+gqi4tMFfSJ0iEwt8kszfWXK4rLgJS2mnpQ==-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

A.2.Example CMS-signed Voucher Request

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

A.3.Example CMS-signed Voucher from MASA

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

A.4.Example JWS-signed Voucher from MASA

These examples are folded according to the[RFC8792] Single Backslash rule.

{  "payload": "eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXI6dm91Y2hlciI6eyJhc3NlcnRpb24iOiJwcm\94aW1pdHkiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoiY2FmZmUtOTg3NDUiLCJub25jZSI6IjYyYT\JlNzY5M2Q4MmZjZGEyNjI0ZGU1OGZiNjcyMmU1IiwiY3JlYXRlZC1vbiI6IjIwMjUtMT\AtMTVUMDA6MDA6MDBaIiwicGlubmVkLWRvbWFpbi1jZXJ0IjoiTUlJQmd6Q0NBU3FnQX\dJQkFnSUdBV09XZTBSRk1Bb0dDQ3FHU000OUJBTUNNRFV4RXpBUkJnTlZCQW9NQ2sxNV\FuVnphVzVsYzNNeERUQUxCZ05WQkFjTUJGTnBkR1V4RHpBTkJnTlZCQU1NQmxSbGMzUk\RRVEFlRncweE9EQTFNalV3T0RRM016QmFGdzB5T0RBMU1qVXdPRFEzTXpCYU1EVXhFek\FSQmdOVkJBb01DazE1UW5WemFXNWxjM014RFRBTEJnTlZCQWNNQkZOcGRHVXhEekFOQm\dOVkJBTU1CbFJsYzNSRFFUQlpNQk1HQnlxR1NNNDlBZ0VHQ0NxR1NNNDlBd0VIQTBJQU\JIOUVCdXVXVjdJS09ya040YjdsYTVJb2J5dFduV1p3Rm5QdHVsMDlhd3dVSEZQZStOWW\M1WjVwdUo2ZEFuK0FrVzFnY1poQlhWR0JBM0crSXlSV1VXU2pKakFrTUJJR0ExVWRFd0\VCL3dRSU1BWUJBZjhDQVFBd0RnWURWUjBQQVFIL0JBUURBZ0lFTUFvR0NDcUdTTTQ5Qk\FNQ0EwY0FNRVFDSURlWlc2SWZjeUsvLzBBVFk2S21NYjRNMFFJU1FTZFVGVjdQNzlLWV\ZJWVVBaUJRMVYrd0xSM1Uzd2NJWnhHSE1ISGx0N2M3ZzFDaFdNRVkveEFoU1NZaWlnPT\0ifX0",  "signatures": [    {      "protected": "eyJ4NWMiOlsiTUlJQmNEQ0I5cUFEQWdFQ0FnUUxod294TUFv\R0NDcUdTTTQ5QkFNQ01DWXhKREFpQmdOVkJBTU1HMmhwWjJoM1lYa3RkR1Z6ZEM1bGVH\RnRjR3hsTG1OdmJTQkRRVEFlRncweU1UQTBNVE15TVRRd01UWmFGdzB5TXpBME1UTXlN\VFF3TVRaYU1DZ3hKakFrQmdOVkJBTU1IV2hwWjJoM1lYa3RkR1Z6ZEM1bGVHRnRjR3hs\TG1OdmJTQk5RVk5CTUZrd0V3WUhLb1pJemowQ0FRWUlLb1pJemowREFRY0RRZ0FFcWdR\Vm8wUzU0a1Q0eWZrYkJ4dW1kSE9jSHJwc3FiT3BNS21pTWxuM29CMUhBVzI1TUpWK2dx\aTR0TUZmU0owaUV3dDhrc3pmV1hLNHJMZ0pTMm1ucGFNUU1BNHdEQVlEVlIwVEFRSC9C\QUl3QURBS0JnZ3Foa2pPUFFRREFnTnBBREJtQWpFQXJzdGhMZFJjalc2R3Fnc0dIY2JU\WUxveWN6WWwweU9GU1ljY3pwUWplUnFlUVZVa0hSVWlvVWk3Q3NDclBCTnpBakVBaGp4\bnM1V2k0dVg1cmZrZG5NRTBNbmoxeityVlJ3T2ZBTC9RV2N0UndwZ0VnU1NLVVJOUXNY\V3lMNTJvdFBTNSJdLCJ0eXAiOiJ2b3VjaGVyLWp3cytqc29uIiwiYWxnIjoiRVMyNTYi\fQ",      "signature": "s_gJM_4qzz1bxDtqh6Ybip42J_0_Y4CMdrMFb8lpPsAhDHVR\AESNRL3n6M_F8dGQHm1fu66x83cK9E5cPtEdag"    }  ]}
Figure 1:Example JWS Voucher

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the following people forlively discussions on list and in the halls (orderedby last name):William Atwood,Michael H. Behringer,Esko Dijk,Steffen Fries,Sheng Jiang,Thomas Werner.

Authors' Addresses

Kent Watsen
Watsen Networks
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software
Max Pritikin
Cisco Systems
Toerless Eckert
Futurewei Technologies Inc.
2330 Central Expy
Santa Clara,95050
United States of America
Qiufang Ma
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Nanjing
210012
China
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