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OpenPGP Web Key Directory
draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-21

This document is an Internet-Draft (I-D). Anyone may submit an I-D to the IETF. This I-D isnot endorsed by the IETF and hasno formal standing in theIETF standards process.
DocumentTypeActive Internet-Draft (individual)
AuthorWerner Koch
Last updated 2025-11-24
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draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-21
Network Working Group                                            W. KochInternet-Draft                                             g10 Code GmbHIntended status: Informational                          24 November 2025Expires: 28 May 2026                       OpenPGP Web Key Directory                  draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-21Abstract   This specification describes a service to locate OpenPGP and LibrePGP   keys by mail address using a Web service and the HTTPS protocol.  It   also provides a method for secure communication between the key owner   and the mail provider to publish and revoke the public key.Status of This Memo   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."   This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 May 2026.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                  [Page 1]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025Table of Contents   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2   2.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2   3.  Web Key Directory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2     3.1.  Key Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3   4.  Web Key Directory Update Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6     4.1.  The Submission Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7     4.2.  The Submission Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7     4.3.  The Confirmation Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8     4.4.  The Confirmation Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9     4.5.  Policy Flags  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12     6.1.  Well-Known URI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13   Appendix A.  Sample Protocol Run  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13     A.1.  Sample Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14     A.2.  Sample Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14   Appendix B.  Changes Since -14  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  191.  Introduction   This memo describes a method to associate OpenPGP keys with a mail   address and how to look them up using a web service with a well-known   URI.  In addition a mail based protocol is given to allow a client to   setup such an association and to maintain it.2.  Notational Conventions   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].3.  Web Key Directory   A major use case for OpenPGP is the encryption of mail.  A common   difficulty of sending encrypted mails to a new communication partner   is to find the appropriate public key of the recipient.  Unless an   off-channel key exchange has been done, there are no easy ways to   discover the required key.  The common practice is to search the   network of public key servers for a key matching the recipient's mail   address.  This practise bears the problem that the keyservers are not   able to give a positive confirmation that a key actually belongs to   the mail addresses given in the key.  Further, there are often   several keys matching a mail address and thus one needs to pick a keyKoch                       Expires 28 May 2026                  [Page 2]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025   on good luck.  This is clearly not a secure way to setup an end-to-   end encryption.  Even if the need for a trusted key for an initial   mail message is relinquished, a non-authenticated key may be a wrong   one and the actual recipient would receive a mail which she can't   decrypt, due to the use of a wrong key.   Methods to overcome this problem are   *  sending an initial unencrypted message with the public key      attached,   *  using the OpenPGP DANE protocol to lookup the recipients key via      the DNS.   The first method has the obvious problems of not even trying to   encrypt the initial mail, an extra mail round-trip, and problems with   unattended key discovery.   The latter method works fine but requires that mail providers need to   set up a separate DNS resolver to provide the key.  The   administration of a DNS zone is often not in the hands of small mail   installations.  Thus an update of the DNS resource records needs to   be delegated to the ISP running the DNS service.  Further, DNS   lookups are not encrypted and missing all confidentially.  Even if   the participating MUAs are using STARTTLS to encrypt the mail   exchange, a DNS lookup for the key unnecessarily identifies the   local-part of the recipients mail address to any passive   eavesdroppers.   This memo specified a new method for key discovery using an encrypted   https connection.3.1.  Key Discovery   Although URIs are able to encode all kind of characters,   straightforward implementations of a key directory may want to store   the local-part of a mail address directly in the file system.  This   forbids the use of certain characters in the local-part.  To allow   for such an implementation method the URI uses an encoded form of the   local-part which can be directly mapped to a file name.   OpenPGP defines its User IDs, and thus the mail address, as UTF-8   strings.  To help with the common pattern of using capitalized names   (e.g.  "Joe.Doe@example.org") for mail addresses, and under the   premise that almost all MTAs treat the local-part case-insensitive   and that the domain-part is required to be compared case-insensitive   anyway, all upper-case ASCII characters in a User ID are mapped to   lowercase.  Non-ASCII characters are not changed.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                  [Page 3]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025   The so mapped local-part is hashed using the SHA-1 algorithm.  The   resulting 160 bit digest is encoded using the Z-Base-32 method as   described in [RFC6189], section 5.1.6.  The resulting string has a   fixed length of 32 octets.   There are two variants on how to form the request URI: The advanced   and the direct method.  Implementations MUST first try the advanced   method.  Only if an address for the required sub-domain does not   exist, they SHOULD fall back to the direct method.  A non-responding   server does not mean that the fall back should be carried out.   The advanced method requires that a sub-domain with the fixed name   openpgpkey is created and queried.  The URI is constructed by   concatenating these items:   *  The scheme https://,   *  the string openpgpkey,   *  the domain-part,   *  the string /.well-known/openpgpkey/,   *  the domain-part in lowercase,   *  the string /hu/,   *  the above constructed 32 octet string,   *  the unchanged local-part as a parameter with name l using proper      percent escaping.   An example for such an advanced method URI to lookup the key for   Joe.Doe@Example.ORG is:     https://openpgpkey.example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/     example.org/hu/iy9q119eutrkn8s1mk4r39qejnbu3n5q?l=Joe.Doe   (line has been wrapped for rendering purposes)   The direct method requires no additional DNS entries and constructs   the URI by concatenating these items:   *  The scheme https://,   *  the domain-part,   *  the string /.well-known/openpgpkey/hu/,Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                  [Page 4]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025   *  the above constructed 32 octet string,   *  the unchanged local-part as a parameter with name l using proper      percent escaping.   Example for a direct method URI:     https://example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey/     hu/iy9q119eutrkn8s1mk4r39qejnbu3n5q?l=Joe.Doe   (line has been wrapped for rendering purposes)   Sites which do not use the advanced method but employ wildcard DNS   for their sub-domains MUST make sure that the openpgpkey sub-domain   is not subject to the wildcarding.  This can be done by inserting an   empty TXT RR for this sub-domain.   The HTTP GET method MUST return the binary representation of the   OpenPGP key for the given mail address.  The key needs to carry a   User ID packet ([RFC4880]) with that mail address.  Note that the key   may be revoked or expired - it is up to the client to handle such   conditions.  To ease distribution of revoked keys, a server may   return revoked keys in addition to a new key.  The keys are returned   by a single request as concatenated key blocks.   The server MUST accept the HTTP HEAD method to allow a client to   check for the existence of a key.   The server SHOULD use "application/octet-stream" as the Content-Type   for the data but clients SHOULD also accept any other Content-Type.   The server SHOULD NOT return an ASCII armored version of the key.   The server MUST serve a Policy Flags file as specified below.  That   file is even required if the Web Key Directory Update Protocol is not   supported.   The benefit of the advanced method is its greater flexibility in   setting up the Web Key Directory in environments where more than one   mail domain is hosted.  DNS SRV resource records, as used in earlier   specifications of this protocol, posed a problem for implementations   which have only limited access to DNS resolvers.  Note that the   direct method allows to provide a Web Key Directory without any DNS   changes.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                  [Page 5]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 20254.  Web Key Directory Update Protocol   To put keys into the key directory a protocol to automate the task is   desirable.  The protocol defined here is entirely based on mail and   the assumption that a mail provider can securely deliver mail to the   INBOX of a user (e.g. an IMAP folder).  Note that the same protocol   may also be used for submitting keys for use with OpenPGP DANE.   In the following sections the term "target key" denotes the to be   published key, the term "submission key" the key associated with the   submission-address of the mail provider.  The string "WELLKNOWN"   denotes the first part of an URI specific for a domain.  In the   examples the domain "example.org" is assumed, thus:     WELLKNOWN := https://openpgpkey.example.org/.well-known/                  openpgpkey/example.org   (line has been wrapped for rendering purposes)   or if the sub-domain openpgpkey does not exist (direct method):     WELLKNOWN := https://example.org/.well-known/openpgpkey   We assume that the user already created a key for her mail account   alice@example.org.  To install the key at her provider's Web Key   Directory, she performs the following steps:   1.  She retrieves a file which contains one line with the mail       address used to submit the key to the mail provider.  See below       for the syntax of that file.  For a mail address at the domain       "example.org" the URI of the file is       WELLKNOWN/submission-address   2.  She sends her key using SMTP (or any other transport mechanism)       to the provider using the submission address and key format as       specified by PGP/MIME.   3.  The provider checks that the received key has a User ID which       matches an account name of the provider.   4.  The provider sends an encrypted message containing a nonce and       the fingerprint of the key to the mail account of the user.  Note       that a similar scheme is used by the well known caff(1) tool to       help with key signing parties.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                  [Page 6]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025   5.  A legitimate user will be able to decrypt the message because she       created the key and is in charge of the private key.  This step       verifies that the submitted key has actually been created by the       owner of the account.   6.  The user sends the decrypted nonce back to the submission address       as a confirmation that the private key is owned by her and that       the provider may now publish the key.  The confirmation mail to       the provider MUST be encrypted using the provider's public key as       retrieved using the key lookup protocol described above.   7.  The provider receives the nonce, matches it with its database of       pending confirmations and then publishes the key.  Finally the       provider sends a mail back to the user to notify her of the       publication of her key.   The message data structures used for the above protocol are specified   in detail below.4.1.  The Submission Address   The address of the submission file is     WELLKNOWN/submission-address   The file consists of exactly one line, terminated by a LF, or the   sequence of CR and LF, with the full mail address to be used for   submission of a key to the mail provider.  For example the content of   the file may be     key-submission-example.org@directory.example.org4.2.  The Submission Mail   The mail used to submit a key to the mail provider MUST comply to the   PGP/MIME specification ([RFC3156], section 7), which states that the   Content-Type must be "application/pgp-keys", there are no required or   optional parameters, and the body part contains the ASCII-armored   transferable Public Key Packets as defined in [RFC4880], section   11.1.   The mail provider MUST publish a key capable of signing and   encryption for the submission-address in the Web Key Directory or via   DANE.  The key to be published MUST be submitted using a PGP/MIME   encrypted message ([RFC3156], section 4).  The message MUST NOT be   signed (because the authenticity of the signing key has not yet been   confirmed).  After decryption of the message at the mail provider a   single "application/pgp-keys" part, as specified above, is expected.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                  [Page 7]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 20254.3.  The Confirmation Request   The mail provider sends a confirmation mail in response to a received   key publication request.  The message MUST be sent from the   submission-address of the mail provider to the mail address extracted   from the target key.  The message needs to be a PGP/MIME signed   message using the submission key of the provider for the signature.   The signed message MUST have two parts:   The first part MUST have "text" as its Content-Type and can be used   to explain the purpose of the mail.  For example it may point to this   specification and explain on how to manually perform the protocol.   By evaluating the Content-Language header of the request the provider   may send back a localized version.   The second part MUST have a Content-Type of "application/   vnd.gnupg.wkd" and carry an OpenPGP encrypted message in ASCII Armor   format.  If the protocol version is unknown or less than 5 the   Content-Type "application/vnd.gnupg.wks" MUST be used for backward   compatibility.  The message MUST be encrypted to the target key and   MUST NOT be signed.  After decryption a text file in the Web Key data   format must be yielded.   That data format consists of name-value pairs with one name-value   pair per LF or CR+LF terminated line.  Empty lines are allowed and   will be ignored by the receiver.  A colon is used to terminate a   name.   In a confirmation request the following names MUST be send in the   specified order:   *  "type": The value must be "confirmation-request".   *  "sender": This is the mailbox the user is expected to sent the      confirmation response to.  The value must match the mailbox part      of the "From:" address of this request.  Exactly one address MUST      be given.   *  "address": The value is the addr-spec part of the target key's      mail address.  The value SHOULD match the addr-spec part of the      recipient's address.  The value MUST be UTF-8 encoded as required      for an OpenPGP User ID.   *  "fingerprint": The value is the fingerprint of the target key.      The fingerprint is given in uppercase hex encoding without any      interleaving spaces.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                  [Page 8]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025   *  "nonce": The value is a string with a minimum length of 16 octets      and a maximum length of 64 octets.  The string must entirely be      made up of random ASCII letters or digits.  This nonce will be      sent back to the mail provider as proof that the recipient is the      legitimate owner of the target-key.   The receiver of that message is expected to verify the outer   signature and disregard the entire message if it can't be verified or   has not been signed by the key associated with the submission   address.   After the message has been verified the receiver decrypts the second   part of the signed message, checks that the "fingerprint" matches the   target key, checks that the "address" matches a User ID of the target   key, and checks the other constrains of the request format.  If any   constraint is not asserted, or the fingerprint or User ID do not   match the target key, or there is no pending publication requests   (i.e. a mail recently sent to the submission address), the user MAY   be notified about this fake confirmation attempt.   In other cases the confirmation request is legitimate and the MUA   shall silently send a response as described in the next section.   The rationale for the outer signature used with this request is to   allow early detection of spam mails.  This can be done prior to the   decryption step and avoids asking the user to enter a passphrase to   perform the decryption for a non-legitimate message.  The use of a   simple encrypted attachment, instead of using PGP/MIME encryption, is   to convey the Content-Type of that attachment in the clear and also   to prevent automatic decryption of that attachment by PGP/MIME aware   clients.  The MUA may in fact detect this confirmation request and   present a customized dialog for confirming that request.4.4.  The Confirmation Response   A response to a confirmation request MUST only be send in the   positive case; there is no negative confirmation response.  A mail   service provider is expected to cancel a pending key submission after   a suitable time without a confirmation.  The mail service provider   SHOULD NOT retry the sending of a confirmation request after the   first request has been send successfully.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                  [Page 9]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025   The user MUST send the confirmation response from her target mail   address to the "from" address of the confirmation request.  The   message MUST be signed and encrypted using the PGP/MIME Combined   format ([RFC3156], section 6.2).  The signing key is the target key   and the encryption key is the key associated with the provider's   submission address.  The server MAY verify the signature and silently   discard the message if it is not found to be valid;   The Content-Type used for the plaintext message MUST match the   Content-Type of the request.  The format is the same as described   above for the Confirmation Request.  The body must contain four name-   value pairs in this order:   *  "type": The value must be "confirmation-response".   *  "sender": The value is the value of the "sender" parameter from      the confirmation request.   *  "address": The value is the value of the "address" parameter from      the confirmation request.   *  "nonce": The value is the value of the "nonce" parameter from the      confirmation request.   The server MUST check the "nonce" against the one sent in the request   and publish the key only if the nonce matches and has not been re-   used.4.5.  Policy Flags   For key generation and submission it is useful to tell the client   about certain properties of the mail provider in advance.  This can   be done with a file at the URL     WELLKNOWN/policy   A site supporting the Web Key Directory MUST serve this file; it is   sufficient if that file has a zero length.  Clients may use this file   to check for Web Key Directory support.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                 [Page 10]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025   The file contains keywords and optionally values, one per line with   each line terminated by a LF or the sequence of CR and LF.  Empty   lines and lines starting with a '#' character are considered comment   lines.  A keyword is made up of lowercase letters, digits, hyphens,   or dots.  An underscore is allowed as a name space delimiters; see   below.  The first character must be a letter.  Keywords which are   defined to require a value are directly followed by a colon and then   after optional white space the value.  Clients MUST use case-   insensitive matching for the keyword.   Currently defined keywords are:   *  "mailbox-only": The mail server provider does only accept keys      with only a mailbox in the User ID.  In particular User IDs with a      real name in addition to the mailbox will be rejected as invalid.   *  "dane-only": The mail server provider does not run a Web Key      Directory but only an OpenPGP DANE service.  The Web Key Directory      Update protocol is used to update the keys for the DANE service.      The use of this keyword is deprecated.   *  "auth-submit": The submission of the mail to the server is done      using an authenticated connection.  Thus the submitted key will be      published immediately without any confirmation request.   *  "protocol-version": This keyword can be used to explicitly claim      the support of a specific version of the Web Key Directory update      protocol.  This is in general not needed but implementations may      have workarounds for providers which only support an old protocol      version.  If these providers update to a newer version they should      add this keyword so that the implementation can disable the      workaround.  The value is an integer corresponding to the      respective draft revision number.   *  "submission-address": An alternative way to specify the submission      address.  The value is the addr-spec part of the address to send      requests to this server.  If this keyword is used in addition to      the submission-address file, both MUST have the same value.   More keywords will be defined in updates to this I-D.  There is no   registry except for this document.  For experimental use of new   features or for provider specific settings, keywords MUST be prefixed   with a domain name and an underscore.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                 [Page 11]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 20255.  Security Considerations   The use of SHA-1 for the mapping of the local-part to a fixed string   is not a security feature but merely used to map the local-part to a   fixed-sized string made from a well defined set of characters.  It is   not intended to conceal information about a mail address.   The domain name part of the mail address is not part of the hash to   avoid problems with internationalized domain names.  Instead a   separate URL is required for each domain name.   To make it a bit harder to test for published keys, the server   responsible to serve the WELLKNOWN directory SHOULD NOT create an   index file for that directory or any sub-directory.   The mail provider MUST make sure to publish a key in a way that only   the mail address belonging to the requested user is part of the User   ID packets included in the returned key.  Other User ID packets and   their associated binding signatures MUST be removed before   publication.  Confirmation requests MUST only be send for such to be   published User ID.  It is further recommended that a client filters a   received key or a key send for a publication requests so that only   the specific User ID with the mail address of the provider is   imported or send.   A client MUST NOT accept a HTTP authentication challenge (HTTP code   401) because the information in the Web Key Directory is public and   needs no authentication.  Allowing an authentication challenge has   the problem to easily confuse a user with a password prompt and   tricking him into falsely entering the passphrase used to protect his   private key or to login to his mail provider.   The use of DNS SRV records as specified in former revisions of this   document reduces the certainty that a mail address belongs to a   domain.  For example an attacker may change the target to a host in a   sub-domain under their control and thus gain full control over all   keys.6.  IANA Considerations6.1.  Well-Known URI   IANA is requested to assign a well-known URI in the "Well-Known URIs"   registry as defined by [RFC8615]:   URI suffix: openpgpkey   Change controller: IETFKoch                       Expires 28 May 2026                 [Page 12]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025   Specification document: This7.  Acknowledgments   The author would like to acknowledge the help of the individuals who   kindly voiced their opinions on the GnuPG mailing lists, in   particular, the help of Bernhard Reiter and Guilhem Moulin.8.  Normative References   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.   [RFC3156]  Elkins, M., Del Torto, D., Levien, R., and T. Roessler,              "MIME Security with OpenPGP", RFC 3156,              DOI 10.17487/RFC3156, August 2001,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3156>.   [RFC4880]  Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.              Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880,              DOI 10.17487/RFC4880, November 2007,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4880>.   [RFC6189]  Zimmermann, P., Johnston, A., Ed., and J. Callas, "ZRTP:              Media Path Key Agreement for Unicast Secure RTP",              RFC 6189, DOI 10.17487/RFC6189, April 2011,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6189>.   [RFC8615]  Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers              (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8615>.Appendix A.  Sample Protocol Run   The following non-normative example can be used by implementors as   guidance.   Note that GnuPG version 2.1.12 supports the key discovery described   in version -00 of this document (auto-key-locate method "wkd").   Version 2.1.16 can run the protocol described in this document but is   also able to run the protocol version specified by -01.  For backward   compatibility this example uses the Content-Type as required for   versions of this protocol prior to -04; if the client knows that the   server support -04 "vnd.gnupg.wkd" should be used.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                 [Page 13]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025A.1.  Sample Keys   This is the provider's submission key:     -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----     lFgEV/TAohYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAB/k9YQfSTI8qQqqK1KimH/BsvzsowWItSQPT     FP+fOC4AAP46uJ3Snno3Vy+kORye3rf0VvWvuz82voEQLxG6WpfHhREEtBprZXkt     c3VibWlzc2lvbkBleGFtcGxlLm5ldIh5BBMWCAAhBQJX9MCiAhsDBQsJCAcCBhUI     CQoLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEKhtNooW0cqEWMUA/0e9XaeptszWC9ZvPg8INL6a     BvRqPBYGU7PGmuXsxBovAQDyckOykG0UAfHVyN1w4gSK/biMcnqVr857i8/HuvjW     C5xdBFf0wKISCisGAQQBl1UBBQEBB0Apvaoe4MtSEJ1fpds/4DFl2kXXBpnVji/s     Wg9btdthNQMBCAcAAP9FJX99T1LEJzBnvBBnc6bimnT6/1OKM9RdO4R0/uVP6BFL     iGEEGBYIAAkFAlf0wKICGwwACgkQqG02ihbRyoTlGwD9FBr92osjL7HkhhZZ7Z2D     My3b9zpoZeMjvPg5YPqpdKMA/jhZoHuZCRMBYf7YRFb8aXtuyetDFZYrkjnum+OG     HFAD     =Hnwd     -----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----   This is the target key to be published:     -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----     lFgEV2o9XRYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAZ8zkuQDL9x7rcvvoo6s3iEF1j88Dknd9nZhL     nTEoBRkAAP94nCZMM4WY2IORXfM6phLGSz3RsHvs/vA1Opaus4+R3BKJtBtwYXRy     aWNlLmx1bXVtYmFAZXhhbXBsZS5uZXSIeQQTFggAIQUCV2o9XQIbAwULCQgHAgYV     CAkKCwIEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRATlWNoKgINCpkNAQDFDcwJUzsxu7aJUiPdpYXj     4uVarrXakxEE8mGFotWhLAD9GH4rqLDYIE3NKEU0s+Okt4tEIwJaV8H1NNPPPMiK     3g2cXQRXaj2NEgorBgEEAZdVAQUBAQdAFnnmZc99TuKk5iCq9wmYZUVF2RcXN2Cs     qAl8iGQQUWsDAQgHAAD/VN/VGmlcwGBPcLTya2hfU4t37nMcFCKdNSXjJ5DFA0AP     PohhBBgWCAAJBQJXaj2NAhsMAAoJEBOVY2gqAg0Ky4UA/0GmVaXzXemLvv1Xw4yx     Eaz/KfKKGc4RJ+38fyqUzw8NAQCohQ+ki3I5f84EXLZEiUiLsnVtOn1HNxvND/gW     TiFZBA==     =GHi7     -----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----A.2.  Sample Messages   The first message triggers the publication requests.Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                 [Page 14]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025     From: patrice.lumumba@example.net     To: key-submission@example.net     Subject: Key publishing request     MIME-Version: 1.0     Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;             protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";             boundary="=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-="     Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:15:51 +0000     --=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=     Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted     Version: 1     --=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=     Content-Type: application/octet-stream     -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----     hF4DUgLY5tvmW2sSAQdAR1AcqvFpQe/fHRZbf0xcnl9Tb+AtwaX2yZnZXGELGHsw     1/e3E0JptwM5tpRAVe71ooF8Zq4jl76ZgQKfj/SyjpLJxyoEDy2N5wTQaqW4JtML     0ukB1vh7dIRDxBJX/LQIJC0wz8o1Q3vjcLJKFFvDb7YrerABpPIzwOAupcgIbQHj     5m1+2WU5CL8ffyJy2h1jV2X4OnvWF1Sn6J6SVD6DfZpOPRt9TxSemJrN1LJ3lG0N     ts8AuYmCOeC1H2r5TYyxqkC98JF8+Nvyxd/fwne8IOjK9uixkNMC5H9/ZOH0YWCb     wBnNB4iXuym4OIPxiLkDymsVF0ww/XrODE9Y259EGmO45VFNrJAX3HFs9/PcMCVk     n2qMyEkr8LHiXeEPun6Z54RHUPYv2cUkEZ0hhSJ+rtBxkc/5D/cAScCEXRKFSKEF     jLJAvLK/u/ga5DAzVai+vh6b6Bq+YVPaD9GWMhWj4CgR90p9LULi6S/Hzwhv9Wzf     8fJoJOaDjyvRDgr09jYLWamxkS9NWxqwy6MXJvxwbNdd5XtqiW4Y4o0Ll1hDJhxR     ljn/XvotXKwhKN+4QGhIXDVt4Dl4XxS5ptWfVTau8W8DYqDsU2obEcfsirZv53M1     Q9FCD8CD9+dkBt8VAJekCWVhEltcRHxlrznbk2jxm93xSD2o6gZ5X0VSaSUXyEhm     J+8F3gyTHGgbq/TgyjFoockWh5EtGgAFuWvmPJCF5PO/UaNeoKwgwSJBu6oTXkHx     R4nvvMRcj5UgTsKpZ79NiDQukbjG5ScNT5TCUiiZsBXBqBx3fD61EH6cAuh4P3Kr     iM7PY4fwAHo890Dx+Qlt     =WIhx     -----END PGP MESSAGE-----     --=-=01-e8k41e11ob31eefa36wo=-=--   The server decrypts this message toKoch                       Expires 28 May 2026                 [Page 15]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025     Content-Type: application/pgp-keys     -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----     mDMEV2o9XRYJKwYBBAHaRw8BAQdAZ8zkuQDL9x7rcvvoo6s3iEF1j88Dknd9nZhL     nTEoBRm0G3BhdHJpY2UubHVtdW1iYUBleGFtcGxlLm5ldIh5BBMWCAAhBQJXaj1d     AhsDBQsJCAcCBhUICQoLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEBOVY2gqAg0KmQ0BAMUNzAlT     OzG7tolSI92lhePi5VqutdqTEQTyYYWi1aEsAP0YfiuosNggTc0oRTSz46S3i0Qj     AlpXwfU00888yIreDbg4BFdqPY0SCisGAQQBl1UBBQEBB0AWeeZlz31O4qTmIKr3     CZhlRUXZFxc3YKyoCXyIZBBRawMBCAeIYQQYFggACQUCV2o9jQIbDAAKCRATlWNo     KgINCsuFAP9BplWl813pi779V8OMsRGs/ynyihnOESft/H8qlM8PDQEAqIUPpIty     OX/OBFy2RIlIi7J1bTp9RzcbzQ/4Fk4hWQQ=     =qRfF     -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----   and returns this confirmation requestKoch                       Expires 28 May 2026                 [Page 16]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025     From: key-submission@example.net     To: patrice.lumumba@example.net     Subject: Confirm your key publication     MIME-Version: 1.0     Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;       protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";       boundary="=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-="     Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:16:57 +0000     --=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=     Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted     Version: 1     --=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=     Content-Type: application/octet-stream     -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----     hF4DkYWHjk/NdMASAQdAluQeqhECpU2T0zEyBAEbFzhLkpubN160wjkFCrtUc0Mw     FwYgM2fp9cvTMdJ/xjkvmAcIEOT4AY/hn1yFQ4z0KG0gCkSac+8mkDylnPdxlXYw     0sBSAXlbqpVA7eUpFuU2Zs10zbIXxlwe6osR5wUIJut/RCOsYQmfvxC55x8mUX5/     zgTnNzlMzye5ws4pTgAeQm2x0Yv018L8IZgY5KxwJLBzlss0wLZ45ZcS80hR11Fx     NCow1fKF8lMnOJxagTEOih807nctz8vT5bR1gx0d7N3LM+th8nAg9/6Ghf1XTpLo     MzwGW0FtOG7Dg1Uxbw2bjaOuRBeh6IIpmNAw1pmIfnNu7PpoRydU5w1K/R8MT06z     MKdJ7IW5mVGes9EGnG3e4mjuILvNaZhfYy+a73IhDSaPm3oqdl1Qx7tbNg6lGjn6     KStCYAcPGPp3m7aWkfsPGThOVRhEXqaFFywfwSVEj1pdIRjDFA==     =Cdjh     -----END PGP MESSAGE-----     --=-=01-wrzqued738dfx4x97u7y=-=--   The client decrypts this PGP/MIME message as     Content-Type: application/vnd.gnupg.wks     Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit     type: confirmation-request     sender: key-submission@example.net     address: patrice.lumumba@example.net     fingerprint: B21DEAB4F875FB3DA42F1D1D139563682A020D0A     nonce: f5pscz57zj6fk11wekk8gx4cmrb659a7   creates this responseKoch                       Expires 28 May 2026                 [Page 17]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025     Content-Type: application/vnd.gnupg.wks     Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit     type: confirmation-response     sender: key-submission@example.net     address: patrice.lumumba@example.net     nonce: f5pscz57zj6fk11wekk8gx4cmrb659a7   and sends it PGP/MIME Combined signed and encrypted to the server     From: patrice.lumumba@example.net     To: key-submission@example.net     Subject: Key publication confirmation     MIME-Version: 1.0     Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;       protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";       boundary="=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-="     Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2016 10:18:52 +0000     --=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=     Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted     Version: 1     --=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=     Content-Type: application/octet-stream     -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----     hF4DUgLY5tvmW2sSAQdAlq98ugycHadQGRe0+055eGUzdQtORR+u5LuJU+oYXHkw     4V1z0S1QPO9BWixHA62PtjAOShT2xN+1v8T2gq3mdgCEMCHX/Nj6INuu+HXF8o0D     0sC5AfEwq24oKF/6Q8vb1L/KUzFeitnWBnxS1i9XONlG9FTpSGfBir9szqz3QtMu     8Sma+X4g/i/rbO5ZtY9v0r+NCh0fY+fMj8Iaqw8IJUcUWcL2oz+GaHU+CIaJWUyk     suqjw5Zw9WVPQ2nXHZTVOKPk4b8Y8f34GvoqP9ZyVFhZ+/9xcvE3fHOoZKeIK9Yi     4Bxza2HvWRkkKc48Orf5AjK45Wm/G72m72d/KiYfzBm0W4T5QkVqRnX+vpoQc+bo     thEE715ma9SnZMcY3fRcPnhjlDxDneB5DD7WNdiz+wZL0OiHW/kT8Eo4/OZnb72M     t44hd8xB8wbfhz5/zmgmlG4IGGA4MomZyg7G/fo24xaIqkjgnJ1GryWaztNQM6Xx     34kDLTF1fkjqmMZOtTEFKwC5dzrp1qb7B4ZWsFXC+bSLC5teaRajmOr4T5tXCFV7     TL0gNBsg/bRBU6wmFDaOaJjleoTsh/7YNJaMsoiMx7NrHe+uVqaEbE4HsWU=     =tlCO     -----END PGP MESSAGE-----     --=-=01-iacqg4og4pqz11a5cg1o=-=--Koch                       Expires 28 May 2026                 [Page 18]Internet-Draft          OpenPGP Web Key Directory          November 2025Appendix B.  Changes Since -14   *  Deprectated dane-only keyword.Author's Address   Werner Koch   g10 Code GmbH   Germany   Email: wk@gnupg.orgKoch                       Expires 28 May 2026                 [Page 19]

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