INTAREA                                                     R. MoskowitzInternet-Draft                                            HTT ConsultingIntended status: Informational                                   S. CardExpires: 23 April 2026                                AX Enterprize, LLC                                                         20 October 2025                 The DRIP DET public Key Infrastructure                         draft-ietf-drip-dki-09Abstract   The DRIP Entity Tag (DET) public Key Infrastructure (DKI) is a   specific variant of classic Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) where   the organization is around the DET, in place of X.520 Distinguished   Names.  Further, the DKI uses DRIP Endorsements in place of X.509   certificates for establishing trust within the DKI.   There are two X.509 profiles for shadow PKI behind the DKI, with many   of their X.509 fields mirroring content in the DRIP Endorsements.   These PKIs can at times be used where X.509 is expected and non-   constrained communication links are available that can handle their   larger size.  It is recommended that a DRIP deployment implement both   of these along side the Endorsement trees.   C509 (CBOR) encoding of all X.509 certificates are also provided as   an alternative for where there are gains in reduced object size.   Author's note: This draft is a partial update of all the additions   needed for the DRIP-Full PKI to be ICAO ACCP compliant.Status of This Memo   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2026.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                 [Page 1]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.Table of Contents   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4     1.1.  The DKI without an Apex Entity  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6       1.1.1.  RAA Trust lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6       1.1.2.  RAA Cross-endorsements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7       1.1.3.  Bridge RAA with cross-endorsements to RAAs  . . . . .   7     1.2.  Value add to DKI in X.509 Certificates  . . . . . . . . .   8     1.3.  The C509 encoding of X.509 Certificates . . . . . . . . .   8   2.  Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8     2.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8     2.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9   3.  The DET public Key Infrastructure (DKI) . . . . . . . . . . .  10     3.1.  The DKI Levels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10       3.1.1.  The Apex  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10       3.1.2.  The RAAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10       3.1.3.  The HDAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11     3.2.  The Offline Requirement for Authentication DETs . . . . .  11     3.3.  DNS view of DKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12     3.4.  Managing DET Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12     3.5.  The Offline cache of HDA Issuing Endorsements . . . . . .  13       3.5.1.  HDA Offline Trust cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13   4.  The DKI's Shadow PKI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13     4.1.  Shadow DRIP-Lite with minimal content Certificates  . . .  14       4.1.1.  DRIP Lite X.509 certificate profile . . . . . . . . .  14       4.1.2.  DRIP Lite Mandatory Certificate Content . . . . . . .  15         4.1.2.1.  Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16         4.1.2.2.  Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16         4.1.2.3.  Subject Alternative Name  . . . . . . . . . . . .  16         4.1.2.4.  Issuer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17       4.1.3.  DRIP Lite Mandatory CA Certificate Content  . . . . .  17         4.1.3.1.  Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17       4.1.4.  DRIP Lite Optional CA Certificate Content . . . . . .  17         4.1.4.1.  CA Subject Alternative Name URI . . . . . . . . .  17Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                 [Page 2]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025         4.1.4.2.  Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17         4.1.4.3.  CA Policy OIDs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18       4.1.5.  The test DKI and Lite PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18     4.2.  Shadow PKI with DRIP-Full Certificates  . . . . . . . . .  18       4.2.1.  DRIP Full X.509 certificate profile . . . . . . . . .  18       4.2.2.  DRIP Full Mandatory Certificate Content . . . . . . .  20         4.2.2.1.  Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21         4.2.2.2.  Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21         4.2.2.3.  Subject Alternative Name  . . . . . . . . . . . .  21         4.2.2.4.  Issuer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21         4.2.2.5.  Subject Key Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22         4.2.2.6.  Authority Key Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . .  22       4.2.3.  DRIP Full Mandatory CA Certificate Content  . . . . .  22         4.2.3.1.  Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22       4.2.4.  DRIP Full Optional CA Certificate Content . . . . . .  22         4.2.4.1.  CA Subject Alternative Name URI . . . . . . . . .  23         4.2.4.2.  Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23         4.2.4.3.  CA Policy OIDs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23       4.2.5.  The DRIP-Full test PKI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26   5.  The DKI and the ICAO SWIM PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26   6.  DRIP Tamper Evident CA Servers and Protocols  . . . . . . . .  27     6.1.  CA servers LOA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28     6.2.  What Tamper Evident means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28       6.2.1.  Issuing CA special case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28     6.3.  The Data Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29     6.4.  QR Codes for the Exchange Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . .  30     6.5.  USB for the Exchange Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30     8.1.  Protecting against DKI/PKI compromise . . . . . . . . . .  31   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31   Appendix A.  Test DETs and Endorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33     A.1.  Test DNS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37   Appendix B.  Test X.509 certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38     B.1.  Test Lite X.509 certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38     B.2.  Test DRIP-Full X.509 certificates . . . . . . . . . . . .  42     B.3.  Test Lite C509 certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                 [Page 3]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20251.  Introduction   A DRIP Entity Tag (DET, [RFC9374]) public Key Infrastructure (DKI) is   designed as a strict hierarchy, governed by the administrator of the   DET prefix [IPv6-SPECIAL] and having the authority to authorize RAAs.   RAAs in turn authorize HDAs within their domain.  This authorization   is managed via a set of DETs whose sole use is to define the DKI.   The RAA Authorization DETs MUST reside in HID = RAA#|0 (Apex   Authorization DET in HID = 0|0).   There are three main classifications/types of DETs:      Authorization DETs         Used to assert the authorization of a DKI level.      Issuing DETs         Used to assert operations within DKI level.      Operational DETs         Used by operational entities within DKI level   All DETs exist in DET-Endorsements (Appendix B of [drip-registries]).   These DET-Endorsements provide the proof of registration and thus   trust.  These DETs, through chained Endorsements define the DKI as   follows:                          +----------+                          |   Auth   |                          +-o------o-+                            |      |                            |    +-o-----+           Apex             |   +--o----+|                            |   | Issue |+                            |   +---o---+                            |      |                            |    +-o-----+                            |   +--o----+|                            |   |CRL,Srv|+                            |   +-------+                            |          ******************|************************************                          +-o--------+                         +-o--------+|                         |   Auth   |+                         +--o-----o-+                            |     |                            |   +-o-----+           RAAs             |  +--o----+|Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                 [Page 4]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025                            |  | Issue |+                            |  +---o---+                            |     |                            |   +-o--------+                            |  +--o-------+|                            |  |  CRL,Srv ||                            |  |Oper,Pilot|+                            |  +----------+                            |          ******************|************************************                          +-o--------+                         +-o--------+|                         |   Auth   |+                         +----o-----+                              |                            +-o-------+           HDAs            +--o------+|                           |   Issue |+                           +---o-----+                               |    |                               |   +-o--------+                               |  +--o-------+|                               |  |  CRL,Srv ||                               |  |Oper,Pilot||                               |  |   UAS    |+                               |  +----------+          *******************************************************                       Figure 1: The DKI Endorsements   The Authorization DETs exist in a set of DET-Authorization-   Endorsements.  The lifetime of these endorsements SHOULD be no less   than 1 year, recommended 5 years, and should not exceed 10 years.   Endorsements SHOULD be reissued prior to expiry (may be for a new   DET).  DETs used to define this authorization are replaced per   undetermined policy (note these DETs do very little signing, see   Section 8.1).   This separation of DET type roles reduce the risk of private key loss   for the critical Authentication DETs by making them infrequently used   and only used in offline operations.  It does make the chain of trust   for a HDA customers' Operational DETs to be 4 Endorsements.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                 [Page 5]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20251.1.  The DKI without an Apex Entity   The hierarchical design of the DKI is the most efficient possible   with the least data transmission overhead.  But it requires the   participation of an Entity, in the role of the Apex, trusted by all   the RAAs.  The logical Entity for this role is the International   Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO), but the processes for ICAO to take   on this role are complex.  Work is ongoing with the ICAO, but timing   is indeterminate and immediately implementable alternatives are   needed.   The DKI can work by the RAAs establishing mutual trust within a   geographic region.  It is envisioned that the initial RAA assignments   will follow Section 6.2.1 of [drip-registries], Table 1.  Without an   Apex, each RAA self-endorses its Authentication DET, acting as its   own apex.  However, RAAs issued DETs (via their HDAs) will not exist   in the air by themselves (except perhaps for some small island   nations), thus a geographic regional consortium of RAAs will need to   deploy some mechanism for mutual trust for their End Entities to fly   together.   There are three reasonable approaches for RAAs to manage their mutual   trust and it is likely that all will occur:      1.  RAA Trust lists      2.  RAA Cross-endorsements      3.  Bridge RAA with cross-endorsements to RAAs   It is recommended that the RAA Trust List be used during initial DKI   testing.  The cross-endorsing options will need their own testing to   work out how best to deploy them.1.1.1.  RAA Trust lists   A consortium of RAAs MAY choose to maintain a list of RAAs they   trust.  It is recommended that this list consist of the RAA's   Authentication DET and HI.  Each RAA in the consortium SHOULD   maintain its own list, signed with its Authentication DET.   This Trust List MAY contain each RAA's Authentication DET self-   endorsement validity dates.  If a trusted RAA has more than one self-   endorsement (most likely to support key rollover), including these   dates makes it easier to have an RAA duplicated in the list.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                 [Page 6]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   How the RAAs communicate between themselves to maintain these lists   is out of scope here.  Each RAA SHOULD include validity dates in its   Trust List.  Frequency of Trust List updates is also out of scope   here.   Trust Lists is the simplest method to implement, but may not be the   simplest to maintain over time.   There is a natural Trust List of ALL RAAs, based on what is allocated   in the DRIP DNS tree.1.1.2.  RAA Cross-endorsements   A consortium of RAAs MAY choose to cross-endorse each's   Authentication DET.  This is done by one RAA endorsing for its   community, an other's Authentication DET.  This establishes one-way   trust; thus, in practice, each RAA needs to cross-endorse each RAA's   Authentication DET within the consortium.   RAA Cross-endorsements definitely has a scaling (n^2) problem.  It   works for a starting point or for a very small group of RAAs.   How these RAA Cross-endorsements are discovered has not been defined   at this point.  One potential is via a to-be-defined DNS HHIT RR   within the endorsing RAA's zone.  This information would need to be   cached by any potential offline entity.1.1.3.  Bridge RAA with cross-endorsements to RAAs   A consortium of RAAs MAY select one RAA to function as a "Bridge"   between all members of the consortium.  In this approach, the "Bridge   RAA" does not authorize any sub-HDAs.  Its sole purpose is the cross-   endorse to member RAAs.  The Bridge and each RAA cross endorse as in   Section 1.1.2.   Bridge RAA Cross-endorsementing reduces the scaling challenge to only   the number of RAAs in the consortium.  Plus there is little need to   communicate any changes in the cross-endorsementing to the various   parties within the consortium.  Thus this option scales the best out   of the three alternatives to DKI Apex hierarchy.   How these RAA Cross-endorsements are discovered has not been defined   at this point.  The Bridge RAA will have to be known to all parties   within the consortium.  One potential, as above, is via a to-be-   defined DNS HHIT RR (Appendix A of [drip-registries]) within the   endorsing RAA's zone.  This information would need to be cached by   any potential offline entity.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                 [Page 7]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20251.2.  Value add to DKI in X.509 Certificates   The Drip Architecture [RFC9434] does not use or need X.509   certificates or the associated Certificate Authories.  However, there   is considerable value for the Apex, RAAs, and HDAs to deploy the CAs   described herein.  Of considerable note is the inclusion of the ICAO   Level of Assurance (LOA) policy OIDs, Section 6.1, that inform trust   behind the DRIP Endorsement tree and the associated CAs.   A signing entity MUST follow the same LOA for all 3 objects:   Endorsements, DRIP-Lite, and DRIP-Full certificates.   There may be other UAS applications that will just work with X.509   certificates, but would have to be customized to use DIRP   Endorsements.1.3.  The C509 encoding of X.509 Certificates   A price in object size is paid in the ASN.1 encoding of X.509   certificates.  This is often a barrier for use over constrained links   and even storage demands on constrained processing platforms.  The   [C509-Certificates] provides an alternative encoding in two different   manners:      1.  An invertible CBOR re-encoding of DER encoded X.509          certificates [RFC5280], which can be reversed to obtain the          original DER encoded X.509 certificate.      2.  Natively signed C509 certificates, where the signature is          calculated over the CBOR encoding instead of over the DER          encoding as in 1.  This removes the need for ASN.1 and DER          parsing and the associated complexity but they are not          backwards compatible with implementations requiring DER          encoded X.509.   The invertible CBOR encoding is recommended for use here.  This can   be readily implemented through libraries that do the translation, as   needed, between X.509 and c509.2.  Terms and Definitions2.1.  Requirements Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all   capitals, as shown here.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                 [Page 8]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20252.2.  Definitions   This document uses the terms defined in Section 2.2 of Drip   Requirements and Terminology [RFC9153] and in Section 2 of Drip   Architecture [RFC9434].  The following new terms are used in the   document:   Authorization DETs      DETs whose use is to define a hierarchy level and endorse lower      hierarchy level Authorization DETs and finally Issuing DETs at      this hierarchy level.  They the DETs in the Authentication      Endorsements and X.509 certificates.   DKI      A DRIP Entity Tag (DET) public Key Infrastructure.  Similar to an      X.509 PKI, but built on the DRIP Endorsements.   IAL (Identity Assurance Level)      ICAO: "The confidence in the identity verification processes used      to establish the identity of an entity associated with a      certificate.  The robustness of identity proofing and the      certainty with which the identity is bound to the certificate."   International Aviation Trust Framework (IATF)      The ICAO IATF is comprised of a set of policies, requirements, and      best practices that will enable resilient and secured ground-      ground, air-ground, and air-air exchange of digital information,      and among both traditional and newly-emerging system stakeholders.   Issuing DETs      DETs whose use is to sign Endorsements and X.509 certificates for      Operational DETs that are at the same hierarchy level as the      Issuing DET.   LOA (Level of Assurance)      ICAO: "The confidence in the security measures that protect the      private key and manage the certificate lifecycle."   Operational DETs      DETs used by various entities in DRIP protocols and as non-      routable IPv6 addresses.  A partial list of such entities      includes: GCS, Infrastructure (e.g. wireless tower systems), UAS      Operators, Pilots-in-command, Servers, UA.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                 [Page 9]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   System Wide Information Management (SWIM)      The ICAO SWIM consists of Standards, Infrastructure and Governance      enabling the management of Air Navigation Systems (ANS) related      information and its exchange between qualified parties via      interoperable services.3.  The DET public Key Infrastructure (DKI)3.1.  The DKI Levels3.1.1.  The Apex   The Apex Authorization DET is used to endorse RAA Authorization DETs   and its own Apex Issuing DETs; it has no other use.  This is the case   for all Authorization DETs.  Apex Issuing DETs are used to endorse   DETs, with HID= 0|0, used by Apex services.   The DET Apex may be only theoretical if no Entity steps forward to   provide this role.3.1.2.  The RAAs   Each RAA use its Authorization DET (HID = RAA#|0) to endorse its RAA   Issuing DET(s) (also HID = RAA#|0) and for signing its HDA   Authorization DETs (HID = RAA#|HDA#).   An RAA may have multiple Issuing DETs (HID = RAA#|0), each for a   different use (e.g. CRL signing, RAA server signing).  It is expected   that, over time, an RAA will rollover its Issuing DETs, thus at times   there will be more than ONE Issuing DET per role in use.   These Issuing DETs, like those at the Apex level, constitute an   implicit HDA.  There is no Authorization DET for this implicit HDA,   but other than only signing for entities like servers needed by the   RAA, it should be considered as an HDA in terms of policies.   An RAA may directly issue DETs for Operators/Pilots, but it is   recommended that if the RAA has this responsiblity, it runs an HDA   specifically for this function.  This allows separation of the RAA   role from the HDA.  It is recommended that the RAA only offer   Endorsing/Signing services for the functions of running the RAA.   The initial RAA range assignments are defined in Section 6.2.1 of   [drip-registries], Table 1.  It is anticipated that DRIP usage will   expand to use into General/Civil Aviation.  Thus at some point a   block of RAAs will be set aside much like for the CTA-2063A   [CTA2063A] range.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 10]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20253.1.3.  The HDAs   Each HDA use its Authorization DET to endorse its HDA Issuing DETs   (e.g. RAA=267, HDA=567).   An HDA Issuing DET is used to endorse Operational DETs; those used by   the HDA for its services (e.g. USS) and for Devices (e.g.  UA, GCS,   ground infrastructure) partaking in the HDA's services.   If the Operational DET is a Manufacturer DET, the "valid not after"   date (vna) MUST be 99991231235959Z.   An HDA may directly issue DETs for Operators/Pilots.  It is   recommended that different Issuing HDAs be used for devices and   people.  They may be under the same Authentication HDA.  Of   importance is that there are different LOAs for CAs for people and   devices per Section 6.1.3.2.  The Offline Requirement for Authentication DETs   The Authentication DETs private keys MUST NEVER be on a system with   any network connectivity.  Also efforts MUST be taken to limit any   external digital media connections to these offline systems.   Compromise of an Authentication DET compromises its and all lower   hierarchy levels.  Such a compromise could result in a major re-   signing effort with a new Authentication DET.  Also, during the time   of compromise, fraudulent additions to the DKI could have occurred.   This means that the process whereby the Authentication DET is used to   sign the Endorsement/X.509 certificate of its level's Issuing DET(s)   and lower level Authentication DETs MUST be conducted in an offline   manner (e.g. Section 6).   This offline process need not be onerous.  For example, QR codes   could be used to pass CSR objects to the offline Authentication DET   system, and this system could produce QR codes containing the   Endorsements and X.509 certificates it signed (Section 6.4).   A video conference between the parties could have one side show its   QR code and the other copy and print it to move between the video   conferencing system and the offline system.  This is a simplification   of a larger signing operation, but shows how such a signing need not   require travel and expensive hand-off methodologies.   It should be noted that the endorsement of Issuing DETs follow the   same restriction, as it is done with the Authentication DET.  It MUST   be conducted in an offline manner.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 11]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20253.3.  DNS view of DKI   The primary view of the DKI is within DNS.  This is in the   3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa zone (Apex level of the DRIP IPv6 DET format).   In the DET DNS structure, only the Apex and RAA levels MUST be DNSSEC   signed.  The HDA level may be too dynamic for DNSSEC signing (e.g.   hundreds of new EE Operational DETs per hour); trust in the EE   Operational DETs within the HDA level comes through inclusion of the   HDA Endorsement of EE object.  A slow-churn HDA MAY use DNSSEC.  The   RAA and HDA levels MUST contain their Endorsement by higher object;   this provides the needed trust in the Endorsement of EE objects.  The   Apex level Endorsement is self-signed, thus trust in it is only   possible via DNSSEC.   Endorsements are stored in the DNS BRID RR (Section 5.2 of   [drip-registries]).  X.509 certificates in the DNS HHIT RR   (Section 5.1 of [drip-registries]).   Authors note: These RR will only be available once [drip-registries]   is published.  Until then, [RFC3597] will be used to encode these RR   Types.   Other RR within these levels will vary.  There also may be HIP, TLSA,   and/or URI RR.   Each level continues on down the 3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa zone for its   Authorization DET and Issuing DET(s).  RR with FQDNs for services   offered may also be present in various forms (e.g. a URI for the   commercial FQDN for the DKI Entity).  TLSA RR of DET SPKI may be   directly included here.  Same with HIP RR.  The Authorization   Endorsement SHOULD be present, as SHOULD be Issuing Endorsements.3.4.  Managing DET Revocation   For Operational DETs, there is no direct concept of DET revocation.   Operational DETs are either discoverable via DNS or not valid despite   being in a non-expired Endorsement signed an Issuing DET.  Thus if an   Issuing Entity needs to "revoke" an Operational DET it removes all   entries for it from DNS, so a short TTL on those records is   recommended.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 12]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   Authorization and Issuing DETs are not so easily "revoked"; something   akin to an X.509 CRL mechanism is needed.  This could best be dealt   with by Endorsements managed in the new DET RR that includes   revocation status.  Thus Section 5.2 of [drip-registries] defines the   specific RR for Endorsements that will be used here.  Minimally, at   least the revocation status and revocation date(s) need to be in this   RR.  Until this RR is available, there is no mechanism, other than   removal for Authorization and Issuing DET revocations.3.5.  The Offline cache of HDA Issuing Endorsements   The Offline cache of HDA Issuing Endorsements, used to verify various   EE signed objects without needing DNS access, SHOULD consist of the   HDA Authentication DET Endorsements of the HDA Issuing DETs.  Thus   the receiver has a trusted source of the HDA Issuing DET Public Key   (HI) in a DRIP standard object (136 bytes).  If the DKI DNS tree   includes GEO location data and coverage, a receiver could query some   service for a trusted cache within some radius of its location.  Such   as, please tell me of all HDAs within 100KM of...   This cache MAY contain the full chain up to the Apex.  This could be   helpful in limited connectivity environments when encountering an HDA   Issuing DET under a unknown Authenticated HDA or RAA.  The needed   trust chain could be shorter.3.5.1.  HDA Offline Trust cache   There are situations where a list of specific HDAs for an entity to   trust for some application is needed.  This can best be met by   maintaining a cache as above but only of the trusted HDA Issuing   Endorsements.  How a list of this limited trust is maintain and   distributed is out of scope of this document and is left to those   needing this specific feature.4.  The DKI's Shadow PKI   The following defines the components of a DKI's shadow PKI built from   X.509 certificates with content that mirrors that in the DKI   Endorsements.  There are two profiles provided, DRIP-Lite and DRIP-   Full.  Both may be used, or the community may select one for   deployment.  In both cases, the PKI tree mirrors that of the DKI   levels (Section 3.1).   It is recommended that at least the DRIP-Full Section 4.2 be   deployed, as its CA certificates contain ICAO policy OIDs the reflect   on the whole DKI deployment.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 13]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   A server MUST implement the generation of the DRIP Endorsement   object.  It SHOULD also generate both the PKI profiles.  In this   document, Endorsing Server and CA interchangeably.   At this point in defining the shadow PKIs, alternatives to a strict   hierarchy is still an open work item.  This work will follow the   pattern set in Section 1.1.4.1.  Shadow DRIP-Lite with minimal content Certificates   The DRIP-Lite is designed to fully mirror the DKI in the smallest   reasonable X.509 certificates (e.g. 240 bytes for DER), but still   adhere to [RFC5280] MUST field usage.4.1.1.  DRIP Lite X.509 certificate profile   The following is the profile for the DRIP X.509 Lite certificates   Certificate:       Data:           Version: 3 (0x2)           Serial Number:           Signature Algorithm: ED25519           Issuer: CN =           Validity               Not Before:               Not After :           Subject: {CN = or Empty}           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:           X509v3 extensions: {Operation Certs ONLY}               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical                   IP Address:       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:                      Figure 2: The X.509 Lite ProfileMoskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 14]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   +================+===============+=========+=============+==========+   | Field          | Authorization | Issuing | Operational | Comments |   +================+===============+=========+=============+==========+   | Serial         | MUST          | MUST    | MUST        | Section  |   | Number         |               |         |             | 4.1.2.1  |   +----------------+---------------+---------+-------------+----------+   | Subject        | MUST          | MUST    | MUST NOT    | Section  |   |                |               |         |             | 4.1.2.2  |   +----------------+---------------+---------+-------------+----------+   | Issuer         | MUST          | MUST    | MUST        | Section  |   |                |               |         |             | 4.1.2.4  |   +----------------+---------------+---------+-------------+----------+   | Subject        | MUST          | MUST    | MUST        | Section  |   | Alternative    |               |         |             | 4.1.2.3  |   | Name (SAN)     |               |         |             |          |   | IP6            |               |         |             |          |   +----------------+---------------+---------+-------------+----------+   | Subject        | MAY           | MAY     | MAY         | Section  |   | Alternative    |               |         |             | 4.1.4.1  |   | Name (SAN)     |               |         |             |          |   | URI            |               |         |             |          |   +----------------+---------------+---------+-------------+----------+   | Basic          | MUST          | MUST    | MUST NOT    | Section  |   | Constraints    |               |         |             | 4.1.3.1  |   +----------------+---------------+---------+-------------+----------+   | Subject Key    | MUST NOT      | MUST    | MUST NOT    | -        |   | Identifier     |               | NOT     |             |          |   | (SKI)          |               |         |             |          |   +----------------+---------------+---------+-------------+----------+   | Authority      | MUST NOT      | MUST    | MUST NOT    | -        |   | Key            |               | NOT     |             |          |   | Identifier     |               |         |             |          |   | (AKI)          |               |         |             |          |   +----------------+---------------+---------+-------------+----------+   | Key Usage      | MAY           | MAY     | MAY         | Section  |   |                |               |         |             | 4.1.4.2  |   +----------------+---------------+---------+-------------+----------+   | CA Policy      | MAY           | MAY     | MAY         | Section  |   | OIDs           |               |         |             | 4.1.4.3  |   +----------------+---------------+---------+-------------+----------+                      Table 1: DKIX-Lite Field Matrix4.1.2.  DRIP Lite Mandatory Certificate Content   The following detail the Mandatory to include content in all DRIP   Lite certificates.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 15]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20254.1.2.1.  Serial Number   The Serial Number is a MUST field, but it has no usage in this DRIP-   Lite.  It is 1-byte in size and thus duplicates are guaranteed.  To   drop this field could make many X.509 parsing libraries fail.   However, CA certificate's Serial Number MAY be the common 20 bytes.   This is to avoid possible issues with general software expecting this   size Serial Numbers for CAs.   If Serial Numbers are incrementally assigned, 31 bits are sufficient   for an Issuing CA with 2B DETs active.  A CA should determine its   best-used Serial Number field size to limit the impact of this field   on the certificate size.4.1.2.2.  Subject   The Subject field is only used in Authentication and Issuing   Certificates.  For Entity Certificates, the Subject is Empty and the   DET will be in Subject Alternative Name (SAN).  In the SAN, the DET   can be properly encoded as an IPv6 address.   The Subject field in Authentication and Issuing Certificates uses the   following format:                  DRIP-{APEX|RAA|HDA}-{A|I}[-RAA#][-HDA#]                  Examples:                      DRIP-RAA-A-16376                      DRIP-HDA-I-16376-16376             Figure 3: Lite CA Certificate Subject Name Format   The CA Subject Name serves a duo purpose: foremostly, to place the CA   within the DKI tree, but secondly for outside of DRIP usage to tag   that this CA's function is to serve DRIP Entities.4.1.2.3.  Subject Alternative Name   Subject Alternative Name is only used in Operational (End Entity)   certificates.  It is used to provide the DET as an IP address with an   Empty Subject (SAN MUST be flagged as Critical).Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 16]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   The Subject Alternative Name is also used in Manufacturer DET   certificates.  These may contain the hardwareModuleName as described   in [IEEE 802.1AR] that references [RFC4108].   Per [RFC5280] and [IEEE 802.1AR], Manufacturer DET certificates with   hardwareModuleName MUST have the notAfter date as 99991231235959Z.4.1.2.4.  Issuer   The Issuer MUST be the higher level's DET.   The Issuer for the Apex Authentication certificate MUST be its DET   (indicating self-signed).  If the RAA Authentication certificate is   self-signed (i.e., no Apex), its Issuer is its DET.   The Issuer content of its DET assists in finding this specific Issuer   in the DRIP ip6.arpa.  DNS tree and any additional information.4.1.3.  DRIP Lite Mandatory CA Certificate Content   The following detail the Mandatory content for DRIP Lite CA   certificates.4.1.3.1.  Basic Constraints   CA certificates MUST contain the CA=True object, flagged Critical as   a Basic Constraint.4.1.4.  DRIP Lite Optional CA Certificate Content   The following detail the Optional content for DRIP Lite CA   certificates.  Inclusion of these objects are based on the policies   of the CA using them and CAs higher in the trust chain.4.1.4.1.  CA Subject Alternative Name URI   This is the one exception to Section 4.1.2.3.  A CA certificate MAY   have a SAN URI, containing a pointer where additional information on   the CA and certificates under its control.  For example, an   authorized authority may access EE PII like an Operator phone number   through this URI link.4.1.4.2.  Key Usage   The CA certificate MAY contain the keyUsage extension.  For example,   it may assert Certificate Signing and flag this as Critical.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 17]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20254.1.4.3.  CA Policy OIDs   The CA MAY have policy OIDs defining rules for EEs within its domain.   The OIDs used here will tend to be within ICAO's arc of 1.3.27.16.4.1.5.  The test DKI and Lite PKI   The test DKI and Lite PKI, (Appendix A/Appendix B), were created   using the python scripts at [drip_scripts].  First csr-gen.py is used   to create an X.509 CSR (and optionally the EdDSA keypair).  This CSR   is minimal in content.  For example, a UA might only have knowledge   of its Manufacturer Serial Number and can generate its keypair.  Per   [drip-registration-cwt], this CSR may be sent to the CA with   additional information provided by the Operator, for example desired   validityDates.  The raa-endorse.py and hda-endorse.py scripts are   provided to produce the DRIP Endorsements and X.509 certificates.   At this time, with no Apex level, each RAA Authorization CA is self-   signed.  These are created using the RAA's CSR and its own keypair as   input to the raa-endorse.py script.  Normally, the raa-endorse.py   script is used to create the HDA's Authorization and Issuing CAs and   the hda-endorse.py script for the End Entity certificates.4.2.  Shadow PKI with DRIP-Full Certificates   The X.509 certificates are minimalistic (less than 400 bytes for   DER).  Any DRIP specific OIDs should come from the ICAO arc (e.g.   1.3.27.16.1).4.2.1.  DRIP Full X.509 certificate profile   The following is the profile for the DRIP X.509 certificatesMoskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 18]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   Certificate:       Data:           Version: 3 (0x2)           Serial Number:           Signature Algorithm: ED25519           Issuer: CN =           Validity               Not Before:               Not After :           Subject: {CN = or Empty}           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:           X509v3 extensions:                X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical {in EE}                   IP Address:              X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: {not in EE}               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:               X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical               X509v3 Key Usage: critical       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:                  Figure 4: DRIP X.509 certificate profileMoskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 19]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   +=============+===============+=============+=============+========+   | Field       | Authorization | Issuing     | Operational |Comments|   +=============+===============+=============+=============+========+   | Serial      | MUST          | MUST        | MUST        |Section |   | Number      |               |             |             |4.2.2.1 |   +-------------+---------------+-------------+-------------+--------+   | Subject     | MUST          | MUST        | MUST NOT    |Section |   |             |               |             |             |4.2.2.2 |   +-------------+---------------+-------------+-------------+--------+   | Issuer      | MUST          | MUST        | MUST        |Section |   |             |               |             |             |4.2.2.4 |   +-------------+---------------+-------------+-------------+--------+   | Subject     | MUST          | MUST        | MUST        |Section |   | Alternative |               |             |             |4.2.2.3 |   | Name (SAN)  |               |             |             |        |   | IP6         |               |             |             |        |   +-------------+---------------+-------------+-------------+--------+   | Subject     | MAY           | MAY         | MAY         |Section |   | Alternative |               |             |             |4.2.4.1 |   | Name (SAN)  |               |             |             |        |   | URI         |               |             |             |        |   +-------------+---------------+-------------+-------------+--------+   | Basic       | MUST          | MUST        | MUST NOT    |Section |   | Constraints |               |             |             |4.2.3.1 |   +-------------+---------------+-------------+-------------+--------+   | Subject Key | MUST          | MUST        | MUST NOT    |Section |   | Identifier  |               |             |             |4.2.2.5 |   | (SKI)       |               |             |             |        |   +-------------+---------------+-------------+-------------+--------+   | Authority   | MUST          | MUST        | MUST        |Section |   | Key         |               |             |             |4.2.2.6 |   | Identifier  |               |             |             |        |   | (AKI)       |               |             |             |        |   +-------------+---------------+-------------+-------------+--------+   | Key Usage   | SHOULD        | SHOULD      | SHOULD      |Section |   |             |               |             |             |4.2.4.2 |   +-------------+---------------+-------------+-------------+--------+   | CA Policy   | RECOMMENDED   | RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED |Section |   | OIDs        |               |             |             |4.2.4.3 |   +-------------+---------------+-------------+-------------+--------+                     Table 2: DKIX-Full Field Matrix4.2.2.  DRIP Full Mandatory Certificate Content   The following detail the Mandatory to include content in all DRIP   Lite certificates.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 20]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20254.2.2.1.  Serial Number   The certificates will contain a 20-byte randomly generated Serial   Number, compliant with CABForum recommendations.  Serial Numbers are   included for CRL functionality.4.2.2.2.  Subject   The Subject field is only used in Authentication and Issuing   Certificates.  For Entity Certificates, the Subject is Empty and the   DET will be in Subject Alternative Name (SAN).  In the SAN, the DET   can be properly encoded as an IPv6 address.   The Subject field in Authentication and Issuing Certificates uses the   following format:                  DRIP-{APEX|RAA|HDA}-{A|I}[-RAA#][-HDA#]                  Examples:                      DRIP-RAA-A-16376                      DRIP-HDA-I-16376-16376                Figure 5: CA Certificate Subject Name Format   The CA Subject Name serves a duo purpose: foremostly, to place the CA   within the DKI tree, but secondly for outside of DRIP usage to tag   that this CA's function is to serve DRIP Entities.4.2.2.3.  Subject Alternative Name   Subject Alternative Name is only used in Operational (End Entity)   certificates.  It is used to provide the DET as an IP address with an   Empty Subject (SAN MUST be flagged as Critical).   The Subject Alternative Name is also used in Manufacturer DET   certificates.  These may contain the hardwareModuleName as described   in [IEEE 802.1AR] that references [RFC4108].   Per [RFC5280] and [IEEE 802.1AR], Manufacturer DET certificates with   hardwareModuleName MUST have the notAfter date as 99991231235959Z.4.2.2.4.  Issuer   The Issuer MUST be the higher level's DET.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 21]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   The Issuer for the Apex Authentication certificate MUST be its DET   (indicating self-signed).  If the RAA Authentication certificate is   self-signed (i.e., no Apex), its Issuer is its DET.   The Issuer content of its DET assists in finding this specific Issuer   in the DRIP ip6.arpa.  DNS tree and any additional information.4.2.2.5.  Subject Key Identifier   The Subject Key Identifier MUST be the DET.  This is a major   deviation from "standard" X.509 certificates that hash (normally with   SHA2) the Public Key to fill the Subject Key Identifier.   The Subject Key Identifier is NOT included in EE certificates.  If   needed by some application, it is identical with SAN.4.2.2.6.  Authority Key Identifier   The Authority Key Identifier MUST be the higher level's Subject Key   Identifier (i.e. DET).  This partially follows standard practice to   chain up the Authority Key Identifier' from the Subject Key   Identifier, except for how the Subject Key Identifiers are populated.   The Authority Key Identifier for the Apex Authentication (or self-   signed RAA Authentication ) certificate MUST be the Subject Key   Identifier (indicating self-signed).4.2.3.  DRIP Full Mandatory CA Certificate Content   The following detail the Mandatory content for DRIP Full CA   certificates.4.2.3.1.  Basic Constraints   CA certificates MUST contain the CA=True object, flagged Critical as   a Basic Constraint.4.2.4.  DRIP Full Optional CA Certificate Content   The following detail the Optional content for DRIP Full CA   certificates.  Inclusion of these objects are based on the policies   of the CA using them and CAs higher in the trust chain.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 22]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20254.2.4.1.  CA Subject Alternative Name URI   This is the one exception to Section 4.2.2.3.  A CA certificate MAY   have a SAN URI, containing a pointer where additional information on   the CA and certificates under its control.  For example, an   authorized authority may access EE PII like an Operator phone number   through this URI link.4.2.4.2.  Key Usage   The CA certificate SHOULD contain the keyUsage extension.  For   example, it may assert Certificate Signing and flag this as Critical.4.2.4.3.  CA Policy OIDs   It is recommended that a CA have policy OIDs defining rules for EEs   within its domain.  The OIDs used here will tend to be within ICAO's   arc of 1.3.27.16.   If the CA certificate has policy OIDs, it MUST include an ICAO LOA   OID defining "the confidence in the security measures that protect   the private key and manage the certificate lifecycle".  Currently   defined OIDs [ICAO-Doc-10169] in ICAO's LOA arc of 1.3.27.16.1.1.0:   +=====+======================+======================================+   | OID |     Description      |            Applicability             |   +=====+======================+======================================+   |   1 |         Low          | This level is relevant to            |   |     |                      | environments where Risks and         |   |     |                      | consequences of data Compromise are  |   |     |                      | low.                                 |   |     |                      |                                      |   |     |                      | Subscriber Private Keys shall be     |   |     |                      | stored in software at this Identity  |   |     |                      | Assurance Level (IAL).               |   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+   |   2 |      LowDevice       | This policy is identical to that     |   |     |                      | defined for the Low Assurance        |   |     |                      | policy (above) with the exception    |   |     |                      | of identity proofing, re-key, and    |   |     |                      | Activation Data.                     |   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+   |   3 |   Low-TSP Mediated   | This policy is identical to that     |   |     |      Signature       | defined for the Low Assurance        |   |     |                      | policy (above) with the exception    |   |     |                      | that the Private key is not in the   |   |     |                      | possession of the user, but rather   |   |     |                      | by a Trust Service Provider.         |Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 23]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+   |   4 |        Medium        | This level is relevant to            |   |     |                      | environments where Risks and         |   |     |                      | consequences of data Compromise are  |   |     |                      | moderate.  This may include          |   |     |                      | transactions having substantial      |   |     |                      | monetary value or Risk of fraud or   |   |     |                      | involving access to private          |   |     |                      | information where the likelihood of  |   |     |                      | malicious access is substantial.     |   |     |                      |                                      |   |     |                      | Subscriber Private Keys shall be     |   |     |                      | stored in software at this IAL.      |   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+   |   5 |     MediumDevice     | This policy is identical to that     |   |     |                      | defined for the Medium Assurance     |   |     |                      | policy (above) with the exception    |   |     |                      | of identity proofing, re-key, and    |   |     |                      | Activation Data.                     |   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+   |   6 | Medium-TSP Mediated  | This policy is identical to that     |   |     |      Signature       | defined for the Medium Assurance     |   |     |                      | policy (above) with the exception    |   |     |                      | that the Private key is not in the   |   |     |                      | possession of the user, but rather   |   |     |                      | by a Trust Service Provider.         |   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+   |   7 |    MediumHardware    | This policy is identical to that     |   |     |                      | defined for the Medium Assurance     |   |     |                      | policy (above) with the exception    |   |     |                      | of Subscriber Cryptographic Module   |   |     |                      | requirements described in            |   |     |                      | [ICAO-Doc-10169].                    |   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+   |   8 | MediumDeviceHardware | This policy is identical to that     |   |     |                      | defined for the Medium Hardware      |   |     |                      | Assurance policy (above) with the    |   |     |                      | exception of identity proofing, re-  |   |     |                      | key, and Activation Data.            |   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+   |   9 |         High         | This level is relevant to            |   |     |                      | environments where Risks and         |   |     |                      | consequences of data Compromise are  |   |     |                      | high.                                |   |     |                      |                                      |   |     |                      | Certificates issued at the High-     |   |     |                      | cardAuth IAL shall only be issued    |   |     |                      | for Card Authentication, as defined  |Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 24]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   |     |                      | by NIST SP 800-73 or equivalent      |   |     |                      | standard.                            |   |     |                      |                                      |   |     |                      | Further, this policy is identical    |   |     |                      | to that defined for the identical    |   |     |                      | to the MediumHardware IAL except     |   |     |                      | where specifically noted in          |   |     |                      | [ICAO-Doc-10169].                    |   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+   |  10 |    High-CardAuth     | This level is relevant to            |   |     |                      | environments where Risks and         |   |     |                      | consequences of data Compromise are  |   |     |                      | high.                                |   |     |                      |                                      |   |     |                      | Certificates issued at the High-     |   |     |                      | cardAuth IAL shall only be issued    |   |     |                      | for Card Authentication, as defined  |   |     |                      | by NIST SP 800-73 or equivalent      |   |     |                      | standard.                            |   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+   |  11 | High-ContentSigning  | This level is relevant to            |   |     |                      | environments where Risks and         |   |     |                      | consequences of data Compromise are  |   |     |                      | High.  This may include              |   |     |                      | transactions having substantial      |   |     |                      | monetary value or Risk of fraud or   |   |     |                      | involving access to private          |   |     |                      | information where the likelihood of  |   |     |                      | malicious access is substantial.     |   |     |                      |                                      |   |     |                      | Certificates issued at the High IAL  |   |     |                      | shall only be issued to human        |   |     |                      | Subscribers.                         |   |     |                      |                                      |   |     |                      | Certificates issued at the High-     |   |     |                      | contentSigning IAL shall only be     |   |     |                      | issued to the CMS for signing the    |   |     |                      | HIGH card security objects (e.g.     |   |     |                      | Certificates, CRLs, OCSP             |   |     |                      | responses).                          |   |     |                      |                                      |   |     |                      | Further, this policy is identical    |   |     |                      | to that defined for the identical    |   |     |                      | to the MediumHardware IAL except     |   |     |                      | where specifically noted in          |   |     |                      | [ICAO-Doc-10169].                    |   +-----+----------------------+--------------------------------------+Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 25]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025          Table 3: ICAO LOA OID Assignments under 1.3.27.16.1.1.0   In this document, the term “Device” is defined as a Non-Person   Entity, i.e., an entity with a digital identity that acts in   cyberspace but is not a human actor.  This can include Organizations,   hardware devices (e.g. a UA), software applications, and information   artifacts.   End Entity Certificates issued to Devices shall assert policies   mapped to LowDevice, MediumDevice, MediumDeviceHardware, or High   Content Signing policies.  All other policies defined here should be   reserved for human Subscribers when used in End Entity Certificates.   Thus it is recommended that Issuing CAs/HDAs should be segregated by   device and human subscribers so policy can be stated at the CA level   rather in individual certificates.4.2.5.  The DRIP-Full test PKI   Author's Note: At this time, the following DRIP-Full test PKI and   Appendix B.2 is is a work-in-progress.   The DRIP-Full test PKI, following the test DKI, was built with   openSSL using the "req" command to create a CSR and the "ca" command   to sign the CSR, making the certificate.   It should be noted that these CSRs have all the content, less the   validityDates, for making a DRIP Endorsement, such that a registrar   may prefer to receive CSRs and use it to make both structures.  The   registrar, per CA practices will provide the validityDates per its   policy.   The self-signed certificates created by "req -x509" does not allow   selection of the validity dates, only the number of days from NOW.   The hack used around this limitation is to create a throw-away self-   signed certificate as above with the Apex's (or RAA's) DET.  Then   create a CSR with that DET and sign it with the throw-away   certificate, setting the validity dates as desired.  This now becomes   the actual Apex (or RAA's) self-signed Authentication certificate and   the throw-away certificate can now be thrown away.5.  The DKI and the ICAO SWIM PKI   ICAO advocates for a federated implementation model of individual   PKIs based on common standards, the total of which can be considered   an international aviation trust framework.  This is embodied in   Aviation Common Certificate Policy (ACCP) [ICAO-Doc-10169].  A test   of a compliant PKI is rolling out for testing the Aviation System   Wide Information Management (SWIM) environment.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 26]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   Currently, this PKI is using ECDSA P-256 in its certificates.  This   is equivalent to DET SuiteID of "3".  The subjectNames in use can   readily by mapped to RAAs (Section 6.2.1 of [drip-registries],   Table 1) and HDAs.  Thus it is a potential straight-forward technical   work item to add DET support into the PKI.   The DETs can readily be stored in subjectAltName or more   interestingly in subjectKeyIdentifier (and thus   authorityKeyIdentifier).   There are a number of advantages for SWIM to have DETs and the   matching DNS available.  For example, the "cost" of adding DETs to   these certificates could result in moving much of their content into   DNS SRV RR and potentially reduce their size by 1/3rd.  DETs as the   authorityKeyIdentifier would enable DNS for Trust Chain discovery.   Another approach is direct inclusion in this PKI of the DET "Lite" EE   certificates for constrained A2A communications.   Discussions are ongoing with those involved with the ACCP and this   could open up DET usage into General/Civil Aviation.6.  DRIP Tamper Evident CA Servers and Protocols   The DRIP architecture [RFC9434] anticipates thousands of CAs for the   thousands of administrative entities involved in the DRIP ecosystem.   Current business models for deploying public-facing CAs are just not   practical or affordable at this volume.  Yet these DRIP CAs need to   provide an acceptable LOA (Section 4.2.4.3).   In-depth analysis of the CA needs for the DKI have resulted in a   Tamper Evident CA design as described here.  This Tamper Evident   design SHOULD meet the Medium and MediumDevice LOAs in   Section 4.2.4.3.   If all data into and out from the DRIP CAs are strictly controlled,   the sole hard-to-detect risk is are the keypairs for the CA really   generated by the CA and not an artifact of corrupted code.   For the Apex, RAA Auth, and HDA Auth CAs they need to have as input   the next level down CSR and associated data and output the resultant   DRIP Endorsements and X.509 certificates.  These CAs are basically   kept locked away except during these occasional signing operations.   A CA with all data ports sealed and only the camera to read QR   encoded data and the screen to display similarly QR encoded data can   provide this Tamper Evident CA design.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 27]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   The HDA Issuing CA (and any other Issuing CA) will be too heavily   used to be locked away.  But if it is connected via USB to a USS   provider server and ONLY the same data objects as above are processed   via that USB connection, almost the same assurance level can be   shown.6.1.  CA servers LOA   Apex and RAA CA servers SHOULD meet at least the Medium LOA.  They   MAY meet the High LOA.   HDA Authentication CA servers SHOULD also meet at least the Medium   LOA.  They MAY meet the High LOA.  If they only support Devices, they   MAY assert the appropriate Device LOA.   HDA Issuing CA servers SHOULD also meet at least the Medium LOA.   They MAY meet the High LOA.  It is recommended that CAs separately   service Devices and People and assert the appropriate LOA.6.2.  What Tamper Evident means   Here, Tamper Evident means that any unofficial access to the CA is   recorded and steps can be taken to mitigate any damages.   Start with a system with a known software build and all needed   applications.  This part of the setup MUST be done without any   Internet connectivity.  Perhaps from known CD/DVD images.  During   this setup, all data ports, other than that used for the CD/DVD   reader are sealed with security tape.  After the build, that port is   also so sealed.   The only remaining input devices to the system is its camera and   keyboard.  The only output device is the integral display.   A notebook is best for this purpose, as once closed, security tape   can seal it closed thus any attempt to access the keyboard will be   evident.  Any use of this CA is videoed and the time from the   security seal broken to a new one attached is logged.   Thus any tampering with the system can be detected, as security seals   will have been removed to gain access.6.2.1.  Issuing CA special case   Issuing CAs present a special case and a serious challenge.  These   servers could be signing thousands of DETs per day; their use MUST be   an automated, always accessible service to the USS.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 28]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   One approach would be these CAs are hardwired to a USS server via a   USB null-modem cable that has security tape on both end connectors.   The application controlling this USB port on the CA ONLY accepts, and   outputs, a set of expected X.509 and related objects.  Any other data   sent over this USB to the server will return an error.  Any attempt   to attach a different device other than the USS server will cause a   fault.   By using a serial interface, there are significant limitations on   what the OS can be tricked to do.  Since this cable has security tape   on the connectors, any changing of the cable should be evident.   There might be other approaches to using a serial interface.6.3.  The Data Exchange   The full extent of this exchange is a work-in-progress.  It will be   modeled after the exchanges covered in [drip-registration-cwt].   The data used by the CA can be grouped into three catagories:      What the CA knows         Its keypair         Its RRA, HDA, and SuiteID (DET generated)         Its ICAO LOA         Its serialNumber length in bits         Does it sign CAs or Entities      Data from USS/Operator         Signee CSR file         Validity dates         Is HDA (if different from its CA's)         Is request to create a CA of for an Entity         If for CA, CA's name      Data returned to USS/Operator         DET, Endorsements and Certificates   This breakdown will advise the development of the CA operation.   Still missing, and needing work, is signing a trust list.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 29]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 20256.4.  QR Codes for the Exchange Protocol   QR codes can encode up to 3KB of data.  There are programs that can   monitor the server's camera (e.g. zbarcam), producing a data file   that can then be reviewed for correctness and processed.   Likewise, there are programs (e.g. qrencode) that can accept a data   file to create a QR code.  If the data file is larger than 3KB, it   MUST be fragmented and then generate multiple QR codes.   These QR codes can be passed between DRIP administrators in a   verifiable manner (to mitigate fraudulent activities) so that there   may not be a need for in-person key signing.  The HDA operator can   express a paper with the CSR QR code.  So proofing by the RAA   operator can validate this paper and the code really came from the   HDA operator.  After using this CSR, the RAA operator takes pictures   of the generated output QR codes and gets those to the HDA operator   who inputs them to their server as needed.6.5.  USB for the Exchange Protocol   The USB exchange applications are both simpler and more demanding   than the QR code approach.  There are standard libraries for   accepting data over USB and many ways to build this.  The application   monitors data coming in over USB and sends back data as appropriate.   The challenge comes in ensuring that any attempts to alter the USB   connection, as in unplugging the USS server and attaching a bootable   USB drive, are detected and blocked.  Only the exchange program has   access, at the system level, to the USB port, and only expected data   is accepted and returned.   Using a serial null-modem inline on the USB connection may be the   simplest way to enforce the USB behavior so that an attack on the USS   side could not get the CA side to accept attack code.  It would take   a physical cable change that would be visibly evident.7.  IANA Considerations   TBD8.  Security Considerations   Risks in the DKI are similar to those in any X.509 PKI.  The   methodologies to mitigate risk in PKI management should be considered   and implemented as appropriate.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 30]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   The DKI presents a tree-breath problem that is rarely seen in PKIs   and needs practical solutions to minimize cost of operations and not   introduce risks needlessly.  Consider that there can be 16,384 RAAs.   Assume only 10,000 RAAs, each of which Authentication DET Endorsement   has a 10 year validity period.  This means that, on average, 1,000   RAAs per year need to rekey their Authentication DET Endorsement, or   on average, 3 per day.  Current witnessed key signing processes will   not scale to this volume.  Some virtual method (like in Section 3.2)   is needed.8.1.  Protecting against DKI/PKI compromise   There is always a risk of key compromise that could be a major   setback to the operation of a PKI and likewise the DRIP DKI.  To   mitigate this risk, the Authentication DETs MUST only be used in   offline signing operations.  They MUST NEVER be used on connected   systems.  The information needed to create the Endorsements and X.509   certificates are brought to them on media that cannot transfer code,   for example in a QR code.  The objects that are created are then   transferred away from the offline system to be used where needed.   It should be noted that this offline process MUST be followed down   the DKI/PKI tree.  That is, the Apex has offline operations that   include signing the RAA Authentication DET that will be used in the   RAA's set up.9.  References9.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.9.2.  Informative References   [C509-Certificates]              Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., Raza, S., Höglund, J., and              M. Furuhed, "CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509              Certificates)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-              ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-15, 18 August 2025,              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-              cbor-encoded-cert-15>.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 31]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   [cbor_c509_code]              "CBOR-certificates", July 2024,              <https://github.com/cose-wg/CBOR-certificates/>.   [CTA2063A] ANSI/CTA, "ANSI/CTA 2063-A Small Unmanned Aerial Systems              Numbers", September 2019, <https://shop.cta.tech/products/              small-unmanned-aerial-systems-serial-numbers>.   [drip-registration-cwt]              Wiethuechter, A., "DRIP Entity Tag (DET) Registration              using CoAP & CWTs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,              draft-wiethuechter-drip-det-registration-coap-cwt-00, 27              September 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/              draft-wiethuechter-drip-det-registration-coap-cwt-00>.   [drip-registries]              Wiethuechter, A. and J. Reid, "DRIP Entity Tags in the              Domain Name System", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,              draft-ietf-drip-registries-33, 19 August 2025,              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-              registries-33>.   [drip_scripts]              "Python scripts to generate DETs and Endorsements", March              2025, <https://github.com/ietf-wg-drip/drip-scripts>.   [ICAO-Doc-10169]              ICAO, "ICAO Aviation Common Certificate Policy, Doc              10169", To be available by Q2, 2025.   [IEEE 802.1AR]              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area              Networks - Secure Device Identity",              DOI 10.1109/ieeestd.2018.8423794, 31 July 2018,              <https://doi.org/10.1109/ieeestd.2018.8423794>.   [IPv6-SPECIAL]              IANA, "IANA IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry",              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-              registry/>.   [RFC3597]  Gustafsson, A., "Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record              (RR) Types", RFC 3597, DOI 10.17487/RFC3597, September              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3597>.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 32]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   [RFC4108]  Housley, R., "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to              Protect Firmware Packages", RFC 4108,              DOI 10.17487/RFC4108, August 2005,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4108>.   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.   [RFC9153]  Card, S., Ed., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A.              Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)              Requirements and Terminology", RFC 9153,              DOI 10.17487/RFC9153, February 2022,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9153>.   [RFC9374]  Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,              "DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote              ID (UAS RID)", RFC 9374, DOI 10.17487/RFC9374, March 2023,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9374>.   [RFC9434]  Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., Zhao, S., Ed.,              and A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol              (DRIP) Architecture", RFC 9434, DOI 10.17487/RFC9434, July              2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9434>.Appendix A.  Test DETs and Endorsements   The following are test DETs and Endorsements for the test DKI.  This   testing environment is open to all.  There are 4 RAAs available for   others to build out.  HDAs under the 4 preset RAAs, or under any of   the 4, built out by others, are available.  Finally the test HDA is   available for setting up a handful of entities.  Any tester wanting   more than a few DETs for entities should plan on doing that under   their own HDA.   The following are the test values and objects.  They were generated   using the csr-gen.py and endorse.py scripts available at   [drip_scripts].  The endorse script currently creates all three   objects: Endorsement, Lite-cert, and Full-cert.   Note, that as there is no APEX level at this time, the RAA   Endorsement is self-signed.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 33]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   raa16376       Authorizing DET  (HID=16376|0)   # SN is there just because script needs it.   python csr-gen.py --keyname=raa16376 --serialnumber=0 --raa=16376/    --hda=0   cat raa16376-server-self.dat   raa = 16376   hda = 0   suiteid = 5   serialnumberbits = 15   cakey = "raa16376"   LOA_str = "1.3.27.16.1.1.0.1"   selfsign = True   cat raa16376-self.dat   hda = 0   vnb = "03/01/2025"   vna = "03/01/2027"   caname = "RAA-A-16376"   clientcsr = "raa16376"   clientpem = "raa16376"   entitycert = False   python endorse.py --serverdat=raa16376-server-self/    --commandfile=raa16376-self   CA   DET: 2001003ffe000005f885c8ee6ad2a7af   DET: 2001:003f:fe00:0005:f885:c8ee:6ad2:a7af   Client   DET: 2001003ffe000005f885c8ee6ad2a7af   DET: 2001:003f:fe00:0005:f885:c8ee:6ad2:a7af   Client HI: 9229539f2ae6a961d1c24977455da98162e53efc98df9eb30f72537       6993a7275   Client Endorsement by CA( 136.0  bytes): 67c294506b84fb502001003ff       e000005f885c8ee6ad2a7af9229539f2ae6a961d1c24977455da98162e53ef       c98df9eb30f725376993a72752001003ffe000005f885c8ee6ad2a7afc8d8c       f7eafe60e2ef99fc185521c4f59612cb961fcff24557ca51c66207c293bcc5       5849238401318c6781acdfebadbb2255fa1bdba376493a7c7f1fa66939c01   client SN: x2344Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 34]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   hda16376-16376       Authorizing DET  (HID=16376|16376)   # SN is there just because script needs it.   python csr-gen.py --keyname=hda16376-16376A --serialnumber=0   cat raa16376-server.dat   raa = 16376   hda = 0   suiteid = 5   serialnumberbits = 15   cakey = "raa16376"   LOA_str = "1.3.27.16.1.1.0.1"   selfsign = False   cat hda16376-16376A.dat   hda = 16376   vnb = "03/02/2025"   vna = "03/30/2026"   caname = "HDA-A-16376-16376"   clientcsr = "hda16376-16376A"   clientpem = "hda16376-16376A"   entitycert = False   python endorse.py --serverdat=raa16376-server/    --commandfile=hda16376-16376A   CA   DET: 2001003ffe000005f885c8ee6ad2a7af   DET: 2001:003f:fe00:0005:f885:c8ee:6ad2:a7af   Client   DET: 2001003ffe00000505cacfa11e780bd5   DET: 2001:003f:fe00:0005:05ca:cfa1:1e78:0bd5   Client HI: b82b27f86b013468fe48d85b54f01bf65385f302ab2e136dc51a3b9       29c88ce5a   Client Endorsement by CA( 136.0  bytes): 67c3e5d069c9f5402001003ff       e00000505cacfa11e780bd5b82b27f86b013468fe48d85b54f01bf65385f30       2ab2e136dc51a3b929c88ce5a2001003ffe000005f885c8ee6ad2a7af59789       8999ff2718e701681d4044a853cae8d9bb3b26e7a7cf934ff55f78bcfe6054       c544f249ec2b751022b7ff2bb53f28f7e012a2780cc5b3b3b01f85737cd09   client SN: x5589Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 35]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025       Issuing DET  (HID=16376|16376)   # SN is there just because script needs it.   python csr-gen.py --keyname=hda16376-16376I --serialnumber=0   cat hda16376-16376A-server.dat   raa = 16376   hda = 16376   suiteid = 5   serialnumberbits = 15   cakey = "hda16376-16376A"   LOA_str = "1.3.27.16.1.1.0.2"   selfsign = False   cat hda16376-16376I.dat   vnb="03/02/2025"   vna="02/27/2026"   caname = "HDA-I-16376-16376"   clientcsr = "hda16376-16376I"   clientpem = "hda16376-16376I"   entitycert = False   python endorse.py --serverdat=hda16376-16376A-server/    --commandfile=hda16376-16376I   CA   DET: 2001003ffe3ff805234fa4afcc22b5b4   DET: 2001:003f:fe3f:f805:234f:a4af:cc22:b5b4   Client   DET: 2001003ffe3ff8056dcf2c1a98a46c42   DET: 2001:003f:fe3f:f805:6dcf:2c1a:98a4:6c42   Client HI: cc75d75df778734d2e5b682f6ff938abf10a1026f788dca99945cbd       dacf3d723   Client Endorsement by CA( 136.0  bytes): 67c3e5d069a124d02001003ff       e3ff8056dcf2c1a98a46c42cc75d75df778734d2e5b682f6ff938abf10a102       6f788dca99945cbddacf3d7232001003ffe3ff805234fa4afcc22b5b46fb4b       40adc6892e306da23322947a04e8119f22b82df3faff4ff995a740131ac47f       7d76d94f86fc750b82c7a88bd7cf77ab67d4e93ce64b7e2b9200ab93ed40a   client SN: x5789Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 36]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025       UA DET in 16376.16376   python csr-gen.py --keyname=ua1-16376-16376/    --serialnumber=x1224AABBCCDDEE56789   cat hda16376-16376I-server.dat   raa = 16376   hda = 16376   suiteid = 5   serialnumberbits = 23   cakey = "hda16376-16376I"   selfsign = False   cat ua1-16376-16376.dat   vnb="03/04/2025"   vna="02/25/2026"   clientcsr = "ua1-16376-16376"   clientpem = "ua1-16376-16376"   entitycert = True   python endorse.py --serverdat=hda16376-16376I-server/    --commandfile=ua1-16376-16376   CA   DET: 2001003ffe3ff8056dcf2c1a98a46c42   DET: 2001:003f:fe3f:f805:6dcf:2c1a:98a4:6c42   Client   DET: 2001003ffe3ff80560ac736574d2c466   DET: 2001:003f:fe3f:f805:60ac:7365:74d2:c466   Client HI: 8a7a47db44c6582f0e1f995d55fe5eddff0b9712445b6368e1a55f6       0381b4cb7   Client Endorsement by CA( 136.0  bytes): 67c688d0699e81d02001003ff       e3ff80560ac736574d2c4668a7a47db44c6582f0e1f995d55fe5eddff0b971       2445b6368e1a55f60381b4cb72001003ffe3ff8056dcf2c1a98a46c4249c43       a994531b3562159583e53592032acda4e400ddda58ba303b5a2a2f4d248756       d314bd9fa7d1dc379714316f47ef5448f5b2495e5a49e160ec104dd5f0408   client SN: x1224AABBCCDDEE56789                  Figure 6: Test DKI DETs and EndorsementsA.1.  Test DNS   The DNS tree(s) for the above test data is still in limbo and will be   added in a later version of this draft with the proposed DET RR from   [drip-registries].Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 37]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025Appendix B.  Test X.509 certificatesB.1.  Test Lite X.509 certificates   The following the test DRIP X.509 certificates that mirror the test   Endorsements.     raa16376.pem (der is 300 bytes)   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIIBKDCB26ADAgECAgJltTAFBgMrZXAwKzEpMCcGA1UEAwwgMjAwMTAwM2ZmZTAw   MDAwNWY4ODVjOGVlNmFkMmE3YWYwHhcNMjUwMzAxMDAwMTAwWhcNMjcwMzAxMjM1   OTAwWjAbMRkwFwYDVQQDDBBEUklQLVJBQS1BLTE2Mzc2MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAkilT   nyrmqWHRwkl3RV2pgWLlPvyY356zD3JTdpk6cnWjMzAxMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMB   Af8wHgYDVR0RAQH/BBQwEocQIAEAP/4AAAX4hcjuatKnrzAFBgMrZXADQQDF/Nbb   cqZ0Ij96JWnru7APhPw1g+Ozfg2AvA02EbKX6J807TkfdOaar9jXdCYg5ekGVF1e   lir13hHReY0U1AAO   -----END CERTIFICATE-----   Certificate: 461 bytes       Data:           Version: 3 (0x2)           Serial Number: 26037 (0x65b5)           Signature Algorithm: ED25519           Issuer: CN=2001003ffe000005f885c8ee6ad2a7af           Validity               Not Before: Mar  1 00:01:00 2025 GMT               Not After : Mar  1 23:59:00 2027 GMT           Subject: CN=DRIP-RAA-A-16376           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:                       92:29:53:9f:2a:e6:a9:61:d1:c2:49:77:45:5d:a9:                       81:62:e5:3e:fc:98:df:9e:b3:0f:72:53:76:99:3a:                       72:75           X509v3 extensions:               X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical                   CA:TRUE               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical                   IP Address:2001:3F:FE00:5:F885:C8EE:6AD2:A7AF       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:           c5:fc:d6:db:72:a6:74:22:3f:7a:25:69:eb:bb:b0:0f:84:fc:           35:83:e3:b3:7e:0d:80:bc:0d:36:11:b2:97:e8:9f:34:ed:39:           1f:74:e6:9a:af:d8:d7:74:26:20:e5:e9:06:54:5d:5e:96:2a:           f5:de:11:d1:79:8d:14:d4:00:0eMoskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 38]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025     Authentication hda16376-16376A.pem (der is 306 bytes)   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIIBLjCB4aADAgECAgJ4bDAFBgMrZXAwKzEpMCcGA1UEAwwgMjAwMTAwM2ZmZTAw   MDAwNWY4ODVjOGVlNmFkMmE3YWYwHhcNMjUwMzAyMDAwMTAwWhcNMjYwMzMwMjM1   OTAwWjAhMR8wHQYDVQQDDBZEUklQLUhEQS1BLTE2Mzc2LTE2Mzc2MCowBQYDK2Vw   AyEAuCsn+GsBNGj+SNhbVPAb9lOF8wKrLhNtxRo7kpyIzlqjMzAxMA8GA1UdEwEB   /wQFMAMBAf8wHgYDVR0RAQH/BBQwEocQIAEAP/4AAAUFys+hHngL1TAFBgMrZXAD   QQBb26M21AgqKPYFjZlXhDzqnYMHn5cUSPOHeeEb0vJDb5u7OxxcJ/zIDbdN1lLr   KBhMSTmcvLBCKEimOuBrmqEC   -----END CERTIFICATE-----   Certificate:   469 bytes       Data:           Version: 3 (0x2)           Serial Number: 30828 (0x786c)           Signature Algorithm: ED25519           Issuer: CN=2001003ffe000005f885c8ee6ad2a7af           Validity               Not Before: Mar  2 00:01:00 2025 GMT               Not After : Mar 30 23:59:00 2026 GMT           Subject: CN=DRIP-HDA-A-16376-16376           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:                       b8:2b:27:f8:6b:01:34:68:fe:48:d8:5b:54:f0:1b:                       f6:53:85:f3:02:ab:2e:13:6d:c5:1a:3b:92:9c:88:                       ce:5a           X509v3 extensions:               X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical                   CA:TRUE               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical                   IP Address:2001:3F:FE00:5:5CA:CFA1:1E78:BD5       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:           5b:db:a3:36:d4:08:2a:28:f6:05:8d:99:57:84:3c:ea:9d:83:           07:9f:97:14:48:f3:87:79:e1:1b:d2:f2:43:6f:9b:bb:3b:1c:           5c:27:fc:c8:0d:b7:4d:d6:52:eb:28:18:4c:49:39:9c:bc:b0:           42:28:48:a6:3a:e0:6b:9a:a1:02Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 39]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025     Issuing hda16376-16376I.pem (der is 306 bytes)   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIIBLjCB4aADAgECAgJEwjAFBgMrZXAwKzEpMCcGA1UEAwwgMjAwMTAwM2ZmZTNm   ZjgwNTIzNGZhNGFmY2MyMmI1YjQwHhcNMjUwMzAyMDAwMTAwWhcNMjYwMjI3MjM1   OTAwWjAhMR8wHQYDVQQDDBZEUklQLUhEQS1JLTE2Mzc2LTE2Mzc2MCowBQYDK2Vw   AyEAzHXXXfd4c00uW2gvb/k4q/EKECb3iNypmUXL3azz1yOjMzAxMA8GA1UdEwEB   /wQFMAMBAf8wHgYDVR0RAQH/BBQwEocQIAEAP/4/+AVtzywamKRsQjAFBgMrZXAD   QQCVRoDFK8uZ9NzxcF+p42gfiBvBtA17b98VMYtKMJ7I80BddtxGWFha++x4IW7P   d7oLtxv75oHYcGqNyuzt23kI   -----END CERTIFICATE-----   Certificate:    493 bytes       Data:           Version: 3 (0x2)           Serial Number: 17602 (0x44c2)           Signature Algorithm: ED25519           Issuer: CN=2001003ffe3ff805234fa4afcc22b5b4           Validity               Not Before: Mar  2 00:01:00 2025 GMT               Not After : Feb 27 23:59:00 2026 GMT           Subject: CN=DRIP-HDA-I-16376-16376           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:                       cc:75:d7:5d:f7:78:73:4d:2e:5b:68:2f:6f:f9:38:                       ab:f1:0a:10:26:f7:88:dc:a9:99:45:cb:dd:ac:f3:                       d7:23           X509v3 extensions:               X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical                   CA:TRUE               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical                   IP Address:2001:3F:FE3F:F805:6DCF:2C1A:98A4:6C42       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:           95:46:80:c5:2b:cb:99:f4:dc:f1:70:5f:a9:e3:68:1f:88:1b:           c1:b4:0d:7b:6f:df:15:31:8b:4a:30:9e:c8:f3:40:5d:76:dc:           46:58:58:5a:fb:ec:78:21:6e:cf:77:ba:0b:b7:1b:fb:e6:81:           d8:70:6a:8d:ca:ec:ed:db:79:08     ua1-16376-16376csr.pem  290 bytes   Certificate Request:       Data:           Version: 1 (0x0)           Subject: serialNumber=x1224AABBCCDDEE56789           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 40]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:                       8a:7a:47:db:44:c6:58:2f:0e:1f:99:5d:55:fe:5e:                       dd:ff:0b:97:12:44:5b:63:68:e1:a5:5f:60:38:1b:                       4c:b7           Attributes:               (none)               Requested Extensions:       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:           2b:73:a9:6a:e7:07:3c:95:b4:71:95:06:43:ee:fc:3d:27:88:           54:46:68:42:76:c7:7b:e9:1b:4b:6e:e1:4a:37:be:5f:79:e2:           b8:6d:60:75:ea:49:13:54:75:e6:47:6a:14:8d:90:52:e1:32:           58:f1:06:29:f6:b1:7d:24:d7:05     ua1-16376-16376.pem (der is 256 bytes)   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIH9MIGwoAMCAQICAxMuRTAFBgMrZXAwKzEpMCcGA1UEAwwgMjAwMTAwM2ZmZTNm   ZjgwNTZkY2YyYzFhOThhNDZjNDIwHhcNMjUwMzA0MDAwMTAwWhcNMjYwMjI1MjM1   OTAwWjAAMCowBQYDK2VwAyEAinpH20TGWC8OH5ldVf5e3f8LlxJEW2No4aVfYDgb   TLejIjAgMB4GA1UdEQEB/wQUMBKHECABAD/+P/gFYKxzZXTSxGYwBQYDK2VwA0EA   tgNfDC2SyxjynnVchise4K3vSg7bDXg7hxoFn86Dcw3dOESaq7+N9cqO2PHOs9dP   y2vpKm5S54Vb+0XJocgWCA==   -----END CERTIFICATE-----   Certificate Request:  404 bytes       Data:           Version: 1 (0x0)           Serial Number: 1257029 (0x132e45)           Signature Algorithm: ED25519           Issuer: CN=2001003ffe3ff8056dcf2c1a98a46c42           Validity               Not Before: Mar  4 00:01:00 2025 GMT               Not After : Feb 25 23:59:00 2026 GMT           Subject:           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:                       8a:7a:47:db:44:c6:58:2f:0e:1f:99:5d:55:fe:5e:                       dd:ff:0b:97:12:44:5b:63:68:e1:a5:5f:60:38:1b:                       4c:b7           X509v3 extensions:               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical                   IP Address:2001:3F:FE3F:F805:60AC:7365:74D2:C466       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 41]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025           b6:03:5f:0c:2d:92:cb:18:f2:9e:75:5c:86:2b:1e:e0:ad:ef:           4a:0e:db:0d:78:3b:87:1a:05:9f:ce:83:73:0d:dd:38:44:9a:           ab:bf:8d:f5:ca:8e:d8:f1:ce:b3:d7:4f:cb:6b:e9:2a:6e:52:           e7:85:5b:fb:45:c9:a1:c8:16:08                   Figure 7: Test Lite X.509 certificatesB.2.  Test DRIP-Full X.509 certificates   The following the test DRIP DRIP-Full X.509 certificates that mirror   the test Endorsements of prior drafts.  These certificates are now   generated by the endorse.py script.  Thus the same CSRs are used in   creating all the endorsement objects.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 42]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025     raa16376Full.pem (der is 350 bytes)   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIIBWjCCAQygAwIBAgICK1owBQYDK2VwMCsxKTAnBgNVBAMMIDIwMDEwMDNmZmUw   MDAwMDVmODg1YzhlZTZhZDJhN2FmMB4XDTI1MDMwMTAwMDEwMFoXDTI3MDMwMTIz   NTkwMFowGzEZMBcGA1UEAwwQRFJJUC1SQUEtQS0xNjM3NjAqMAUGAytlcAMhAJIp   U58q5qlh0cJJd0VdqYFi5T78mN+esw9yU3aZOnJ1o2QwYjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTAD   AQH/MBQGA1UdIAQNMAswCQYHKxsQAQEAATAeBgNVHREBAf8EFDAShxAgAQA//gAA   BfiFyO5q0qevMBkGA1UdDgQSBBAgAQA//gAABfiFyO5q0qevMAUGAytlcANBAMCs   CvrMjSK/UpCX7xN02ueRWSwpGQcPWLw3Wnr9MOrMzayEMXRcdXRh89VEa6LD3lmC   tDf7yBxt3L4Z+hLSkA4=   -----END CERTIFICATE-----   Certificate:     Data:         Version: 3 (0x2)           Serial Number: 11098 (0x2b5a)           Signature Algorithm: ED25519           Issuer: CN=2001003ffe000005f885c8ee6ad2a7af           Validity               Not Before: Mar  1 00:01:00 2025 GMT               Not After : Mar  1 23:59:00 2027 GMT           Subject: CN=DRIP-RAA-A-16376           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:                       92:29:53:9f:2a:e6:a9:61:d1:c2:49:77:45:5d:a9:                       81:62:e5:3e:fc:98:df:9e:b3:0f:72:53:76:99:3a:                       72:75           X509v3 extensions:               X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical                   CA:TRUE               X509v3 Certificate Policies:                   Policy: 1.3.27.16.1.1.0.1               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical                   IP Address:2001:3F:FE00:5:F885:C8EE:6AD2:A7AF               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:                   20:01:00:3F:FE:00:00:05:F8:85:C8:EE:6A:D2:A7:AF       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:           c0:ac:0a:fa:cc:8d:22:bf:52:90:97:ef:13:74:da:e7:91:59:           2c:29:19:07:0f:58:bc:37:5a:7a:fd:30:ea:cc:cd:ac:84:31:           74:5c:75:74:61:f3:d5:44:6b:a2:c3:de:59:82:b4:37:fb:c8:           1c:6d:dc:be:19:fa:12:d2:90:0eMoskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 43]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025     Authentication hda16376-16376AFull.pem (der is 386 bytes)   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIIBfjCCATCgAwIBAgICWRswBQYDK2VwMCsxKTAnBgNVBAMMIDIwMDEwMDNmZmUw   MDAwMDVmODg1YzhlZTZhZDJhN2FmMB4XDTI1MDMwMjAwMDEwMFoXDTI2MDMzMDIz   NTkwMFowITEfMB0GA1UEAwwWRFJJUC1IREEtQS0xNjM3Ni0xNjM3NjAqMAUGAytl   cAMhALgrJ/hrATRo/kjYW1TwG/ZThfMCqy4TbcUaO5KciM5ao4GBMH8wDwYDVR0T   AQH/BAUwAwEB/zAUBgNVHSAEDTALMAkGBysbEAEBAAEwHgYDVR0RAQH/BBQwEocQ   IAEAP/4AAAUFys+hHngL1TAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQIAEAP/4AAAUFys+hHngL1TAbBgNV   HSMEFDASgBAgAQA//gAABfiFyO5q0qevMAUGAytlcANBAAGTWI4Iuq7LLjZeMboU   HGM+Fxn240wny6pkhWjVreWLF86IGO8nOWT7e6Z3mi2ZHHsFZ+JZYDgXhzpJ0KbX   JgY=   -----END CERTIFICATE-----   Certificate:     Data:         Version: 3 (0x2)           Serial Number: 22811 (0x591b)           Signature Algorithm: ED25519           Issuer: CN=2001003ffe000005f885c8ee6ad2a7af           Validity               Not Before: Mar  2 00:01:00 2025 GMT               Not After : Mar 30 23:59:00 2026 GMT           Subject: CN=DRIP-HDA-A-16376-16376           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:                       b8:2b:27:f8:6b:01:34:68:fe:48:d8:5b:54:f0:1b:                       f6:53:85:f3:02:ab:2e:13:6d:c5:1a:3b:92:9c:88:                       ce:5a           X509v3 extensions:               X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical                   CA:TRUE               X509v3 Certificate Policies:                   Policy: 1.3.27.16.1.1.0.1               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical                   IP Address:2001:3F:FE00:5:5CA:CFA1:1E78:BD5               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:                   20:01:00:3F:FE:00:00:05:05:CA:CF:A1:1E:78:0B:D5               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:                   20:01:00:3F:FE:00:00:05:F8:85:C8:EE:6A:D2:A7:AF       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:           01:93:58:8e:08:ba:ae:cb:2e:36:5e:31:ba:14:1c:63:3e:17:           19:f6:e3:4c:27:cb:aa:64:85:68:d5:ad:e5:8b:17:ce:88:18:           ef:27:39:64:fb:7b:a6:77:9a:2d:99:1c:7b:05:67:e2:59:60:           38:17:87:3a:49:d0:a6:d7:26:06Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 44]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025     Issuing hda16376-16376IFull.pem (der is 386 bytes)   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIIBfjCCATCgAwIBAgICW+4wBQYDK2VwMCsxKTAnBgNVBAMMIDIwMDEwMDNmZmUz   ZmY4MDUyMzRmYTRhZmNjMjJiNWI0MB4XDTI1MDMwMjAwMDEwMFoXDTI2MDIyNzIz   NTkwMFowITEfMB0GA1UEAwwWRFJJUC1IREEtSS0xNjM3Ni0xNjM3NjAqMAUGAytl   cAMhAMx11133eHNNLltoL2/5OKvxChAm94jcqZlFy92s89cjo4GBMH8wDwYDVR0T   AQH/BAUwAwEB/zAUBgNVHSAEDTALMAkGBysbEAEBAAIwHgYDVR0RAQH/BBQwEocQ   IAEAP/4/+AVtzywamKRsQjAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQIAEAP/4/+AVtzywamKRsQjAbBgNV   HSMEFDASgBAgAQA//j/4BSNPpK/MIrW0MAUGAytlcANBAB0Mcico1RPhPqYLDJeZ   oDnUY/U/eqQH3/IIEyTVvB1ZS30CAduTCFVq1B7G0VD3HGHvdPenj0vGpaak+OUw   0gQ=   -----END CERTIFICATE-----   Certificate:     Data:         Version: 3 (0x2)           Serial Number: 23534 (0x5bee)           Signature Algorithm: ED25519           Issuer: CN=2001003ffe3ff805234fa4afcc22b5b4           Validity               Not Before: Mar  2 00:01:00 2025 GMT               Not After : Feb 27 23:59:00 2026 GMT           Subject: CN=DRIP-HDA-I-16376-16376           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:                       cc:75:d7:5d:f7:78:73:4d:2e:5b:68:2f:6f:f9:38:                       ab:f1:0a:10:26:f7:88:dc:a9:99:45:cb:dd:ac:f3:                       d7:23           X509v3 extensions:               X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical                   CA:TRUE               X509v3 Certificate Policies:                   Policy: 1.3.27.16.1.1.0.2               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical                   IP Address:2001:3F:FE3F:F805:6DCF:2C1A:98A4:6C42               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:                   20:01:00:3F:FE:3F:F8:05:6D:CF:2C:1A:98:A4:6C:42               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:                   20:01:00:3F:FE:3F:F8:05:23:4F:A4:AF:CC:22:B5:B4       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:           1d:0c:72:27:28:d5:13:e1:3e:a6:0b:0c:97:99:a0:39:d4:63:           f5:3f:7a:a4:07:df:f2:08:13:24:d5:bc:1d:59:4b:7d:02:01:           db:93:08:55:6a:d4:1e:c6:d1:50:f7:1c:61:ef:74:f7:a7:8f:           4b:c6:a5:a6:a4:f8:e5:30:d2:04Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 45]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025     ua1-16376-16376Full.pem (der is 286 bytes)   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIIBGjCBzaADAgECAgMpQEAwBQYDK2VwMCsxKTAnBgNVBAMMIDIwMDEwMDNmZmUz   ZmY4MDU2ZGNmMmMxYTk4YTQ2YzQyMB4XDTI1MDMwNDAwMDEwMFoXDTI2MDIyNTIz   NTkwMFowADAqMAUGAytlcAMhAIp6R9tExlgvDh+ZXVX+Xt3/C5cSRFtjaOGlX2A4   G0y3oz8wPTAeBgNVHREBAf8EFDAShxAgAQA//j/4BWCsc2V00sRmMBsGA1UdIwQU   MBKAECABAD/+P/gFbc8sGpikbEIwBQYDK2VwA0EAOpsCcwdgW8A8PysqQxZoZulw   e2OnUpjPUeBx29A/EjRuGOmI1rMzPfFSuTV9VJ+hfUUhc9UgdnTfoF0CPEwSBw==   -----END CERTIFICATE-----   Certificate:       Data:           Version: 3 (0x2)           Serial Number: 2703424 (0x294040)           Signature Algorithm: ED25519           Issuer: CN=2001003ffe3ff8056dcf2c1a98a46c42           Validity               Not Before: Mar  4 00:01:00 2025 GMT               Not After : Feb 25 23:59:00 2026 GMT           Subject:           Subject Public Key Info:               Public Key Algorithm: ED25519                   ED25519 Public-Key:                   pub:                       8a:7a:47:db:44:c6:58:2f:0e:1f:99:5d:55:fe:5e:                       dd:ff:0b:97:12:44:5b:63:68:e1:a5:5f:60:38:1b:                       4c:b7           X509v3 extensions:               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical                   IP Address:2001:3F:FE3F:F805:60AC:7365:74D2:C466               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:                   20:01:00:3F:FE:3F:F8:05:6D:CF:2C:1A:98:A4:6C:42       Signature Algorithm: ED25519       Signature Value:           3a:9b:02:73:07:60:5b:c0:3c:3f:2b:2a:43:16:68:66:e9:70:           7b:63:a7:52:98:cf:51:e0:71:db:d0:3f:12:34:6e:18:e9:88:           d6:b3:33:3d:f1:52:b9:35:7d:54:9f:a1:7d:45:21:73:d5:20:           76:74:df:a0:5d:02:3c:4c:12:07                Figure 8: Test DRIP-Full X.509 certificatesB.3.  Test Lite C509 certificates   The CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509 Certificates)   [C509-Certificates] provides a standards-based approach to reduce the   size of X.509 certificates both on-the-wire and in storage.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 46]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025   These C509 certificates MAY be stored in the DET RR, but are more   likely to by used in over-the-air protocols and exist only for   transmission, being converted from/to their source X.509   certificates.   Test Rust code for X.509 to c509 conversion is available at   [cbor_c509_code].  The CBOR hex was converted to readable format at   http://cbor.me.   Author's Note: This section is still a Work in Progress.  Note that   we think there is a bug in the c509 code, making the certificate   version = 1, not 3.   The following are examples of a C509 cert.     raa16376.cert CBOR:   COSE_X509 (191 bytes)   8B 01 42 65 B5 78 20 32 30 30 31 30 30 33 66 66 65 30 30 30 30 30 35   66 38 38 35 63 38 65 65 36 61 64 32 61 37 61 66 1A 67 C2 4E 3C 1A 6B   86 06 44 70 44 52 49 50 2D 52 41 41 2D 41 2D 31 36 33 37 36 0A 58 20   92 29 53 9F 2A E6 A9 61 D1 C2 49 77 45 5D A9 81 62 E5 3E FC 98 DF 9E   B3 0F 72 53 76 99 3A 72 75 84 23 20 22 82 07 50 20 01 00 3F FE 00 00   05 F8 85 C8 EE 6A D2 A7 AF 0C 58 40 C5 FC D6 DB 72 A6 74 22 3F 7A 25   69 EB BB B0 0F 84 FC 35 83 E3 B3 7E 0D 80 BC 0D 36 11 B2 97 E8 9F 34   ED 39 1F 74 E6 9A AF D8 D7 74 26 20 E5 E9 06 54 5D 5E 96 2A F5 DE 11   D1 79 8D 14 D4 00 0E   [1, h'65B5', "2001003ffe000005f885c8ee6ad2a7af",    1740787260, 1803945540, "DRIP-RAA-A-16376", 10,    h'9229539F2AE6A961D1C24977455DA98162E53EFC98DF9EB30F725376993A7275',    [-4, -1, -3, [7, h'2001003FFE000005F885C8EE6AD2A7AF']], 12,    h'C5FCD6DB72A674223F7A2569EBBBB00F84FC3583E3B37E0D80BC0D3611B297E    89F34ED391F74E69AAFD8D7742620E5E906545D5E962AF5DE11D1798D14D4000E']Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 47]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025     ua1-16376-16376 CBOR:   COSE_X509 (174 bytes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h'132E45', "2001003ffe3ff8056dcf2c1a98a46c42", 1741046460,    1772063940, [], 10,    h'8A7A47DB44C6582F0E1F995D55FE5EDDFF0B9712445B6368E1A55F60381B4CB7',    [-3, [7, h'2001003FFE3FF80560AC736574D2C466']], 12,    h'B6035F0C2D92CB18F29E755C862B1EE0ADEF4A0EDB0D783B871A059FCE8373    0DDD38449AABBF8DF5CA8ED8F1CEB3D74FCB6BE92A6E52E7855BFB45C9A1C81608']     ua1-16376-16376Full CBOR:   COSE_X509 (192 bytes)   8B 01 43 29 40 40 78 20 32 30 30 31 30 30 33 66 66 65 33 66 66 38 30   35 36 64 63 66 32 63 31 61 39 38 61 34 36 63 34 32 1A 67 C6 42 BC 1A   69 9F 8C C4 80 0A 58 20 8A 7A 47 DB 44 C6 58 2F 0E 1F 99 5D 55 FE 5E   DD FF 0B 97 12 44 5B 63 68 E1 A5 5F 60 38 1B 4C B7 84 22 82 07 50 20   01 00 3F FE 3F F8 05 60 AC 73 65 74 D2 C4 66 07 50 20 01 00 3F FE 3F   F8 05 6D CF 2C 1A 98 A4 6C 42 0C 58 40 3A 9B 02 73 07 60 5B C0 3C 3F   2B 2A 43 16 68 66 E9 70 7B 63 A7 52 98 CF 51 E0 71 DB D0 3F 12 34 6E   18 E9 88 D6 B3 33 3D F1 52 B9 35 7D 54 9F A1 7D 45 21 73 D5 20 76 74   DF A0 5D 02 3C 4C 12 07   [1, h'294040', "2001003ffe3ff8056dcf2c1a98a46c42", 1741046460,    1772063940, [], 10,    h'8A7A47DB44C6582F0E1F995D55FE5EDDFF0B9712445B6368E1A55F60381B4CB7',    [-3, [7, h'2001003FFE3FF80560AC736574D2C466'], 7,    h'2001003FFE3FF8056DCF2C1A98A46C42'], 12,    h'3A9B027307605BC03C3F2B2A43166866E9707B63A75298CF51E071DBD03F123    46E18E988D6B3333DF152B9357D549FA17D452173D5207674DFA05D023C4C1207']                   Figure 9: Test Lite C.509 certificatesAcknowledgments   Many people assisted in creating the python scripts for making DETs   and DRIP Endorsements.  Any roughness in the scripts is all my doing.   The COSE C509 authors are providing active help in creating the C509   equivalent objects.Moskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 48]Internet-Draft                  DRIP DKI                    October 2025Authors' Addresses   Robert Moskowitz   HTT Consulting   Oak Park, MI 48237   United States of America   Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com   Stuart W. Card   AX Enterprize, LLC   4947 Commercial Drive   Yorkville, NY 13495   United States of America   Email: stu.card@axenterprize.comMoskowitz & Card          Expires 23 April 2026                [Page 49]