Network Working Group                                             Y. GuoInternet-Draft                                                    L. XiaIntended status: Informational                                    HuaweiExpires: 19 February 2026                                          Y. Fu                                                            China Unicom                                                          18 August 2025 Using ShangMi in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)                draft-guo-ipsecme-ikev2-using-shangmi-03Abstract   This document defines a set of cryptographic transforms for use in   the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2).  The transforms   are based on ISO and Chinese cryptographic standard algorithms   (called "ShangMi" or “SM” algorithms).   The use of these algorithms with IKEv2 is not endorsed by the IETF.   The SM algorithms is ISO standardization and are mandatory for some   scenario in China, so this document provides a description of how to   use the SM algorithms with IKEv2 and specifies a set of cryptographic   transforms so that implementers can produce interworking   implementations.About This Document   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.   Status information for this document may be found at   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-guo-ipsecme-ikev2-using-   shangmi/.   Discussion of this document takes place on the ipsec Working Group   mailing list (mailto:ipsec@ietf.org), which is archived at   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ipsec/.  Subscribe at   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec/.Status of This Memo   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026                [Page 1]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."   This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 February 2026.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights   and restrictions with respect to this document.Table of Contents   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3     1.1.  The SM Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4   3.  Transforms Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4     3.1.  Encryption Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4       3.1.1.  ENCR_SM4_CBC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4       3.1.2.  ENCR_SM4_GCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4       3.1.3.  ENCR_SM4_CCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5     3.2.  Pseudorandom Function Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6     3.3.  Integrity Algorithm Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6     3.4.  Key Exchange Method Transform . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7   4.  Authentication Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7   5.  Hash Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12   Appendix A.  Appendix A.  Test Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14     A.1.  SM4_CBC Test Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14     A.2.  SM4_GCM Test Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14     A.3.  SM4_CCM Test Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15     A.4.  SM3 Test Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15     A.5.  AUTH_HMAC_SM3 Test Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15   Appendix B.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026                [Page 2]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 20251.  Introduction   This document describes a number of new transforms and a new   authentication method using SM2 signature and SM3 hash function for   IKEv2 ([RFC7296]), based on ISO and Chinese cryptographic standard   algorithms ("SM" algorithms) for encryption, hash function, digital   signature, and key exchange method.  With the definition in this   document, the SM algorithms can be used to implement IPSec protocols.   For a more detailed introduction to SM cryptographic algorithms,   please see Section 1.1.  These transforms follow the IKEv2   requirements.  Specifically, all the encryption transforms use SM4 in   different encryption mode (e.g. CBC mode, Galois/Counter (GCM) mode   or Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode) . The key exchange mechanism   utilizes Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) over the SM2   elliptic curve, and the signature algorithm combines the SM3 hash   function and the SM2 elliptic curve signature scheme.1.1.  The SM Algorithms   Several different SM cryptographic algorithms are used to integrate   with IKEv2, including SM2 for key exchange and authentication, SM4   for encryption, and SM3 as the hash function.   SM2 is a set of cryptographic algorithms based on elliptic curve   cryptography, including a digital signature, public key encryption   and key exchange scheme.  In this document, only the SM2 digital   signature algorithm and basic key exchange scheme are involved, which   have already been added to ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 [ISO-SM2] (as well as   to [GBT.32918.2-2016]).  The parameter definition of SM2 is described   in [GBT.32918.5-2017].  SM4 is a block cipher defined in   [GBT.32907-2016] and now is being standardized by ISO to ISO/IEC   18033-3:2010 [ISO-SM4].  SM3 is a hash function that produces an   output of 256 bits.  SM3 has already been accepted by ISO in ISO/IEC   10118-3:2018 [ISO-SM3] and has also been described by   [GBT.32905-2016].   Caution: This specification is not a standard and does not have IETF   community consensus.  It makes use of cryptographic algorithms that   are national standards for China, as well as ISO/IEC standards (ISO/   IEC 14888-3:2018 [ISO-SM2]， ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 [ISO-SM4] and ISO/   IEC 10118-3:2018 [ISO-SM3]).  Neither the IETF nor the IRTF has   analyzed that algorithm for suitability for any given application,   and it may contain either intended or unintended weaknesses.Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026                [Page 3]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 20252.  Conventions and Definitions   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all   capitals, as shown here.3.  Transforms Description3.1.  Encryption Transforms   The new encryption transforms introduced in this document add three   encryption algorithms: ENCR_SM4_CBC, ENCR_SM4_GCM and ENCR_SM4_CCM.   ENCR_SM4_CBC is encryption transform based on SM4 for SM4[ISO-SM4]   and [GBT.32907-2016]encryption algorithm using CBC mode.   ENCR_SM4_GCM (Transform ID XX) and ENCR_SM4_CCM (Transform ID XX) are   AEAD transforms based on SM4 cipher in Galois/Counter mode and SM4   cipher in Counter with CBC-MAC mode, respectively.  The hash function   for both cipher suites is SM3 ([ISO-SM3]).3.1.1.  ENCR_SM4_CBC   The specification of ENCR_SM4_CBC is as follows: The CBC (Cipher   Block Chaining) mode is defined in [NIST.SP.800-38A] and utilized   with the SM4 algorithm in the following sections.  The input   plaintext of SM4-CBC MUST be a multiple of the block size, which is   128-bits in SM4.  SM4-CBC requires an additional input, the IV, that   is unpredictable for a particular execution of the encryption   process.  The IV does not have to be secret.  The IV itself, or   criteria enough to determine it, MAY be transmitted with ciphertext.   A simple test vector of ENCR _SM4_CBC is given in Appendix A of this   document.3.1.2.  ENCR_SM4_GCM   The ENCR_SM4_GCM authenticated encryption algorithm is defined in   [GCM], using SM4 as the block cipher, by providing the key, nonce,   plaintext, and additional associated data to that mode of operation.   An authentication tag conforming to the requirements of IKEv2 as   specified in [RFC5282] MUST be constructed using the partial contents   of the IKEv2 message, starting from the first octet of the Fixed IKE   Header through the last octet of the Payload Header of the Encrypted   Payload (i.e., the fourth octet of the Encrypted Payload).  This   includes any payloads that are between the Fixed IKE Header and theGuo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026                [Page 4]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025   Encrypted Payload.  The additional data input that forms the   authentication tag MUST be the partial contents of the IKEv2 message,   starting from the first octet of the Fixed IKE Header through the   last octet of the Payload Header of the Encrypted Payload (i.e., the   fourth octet of the Encrypted Payload).  This includes any payloads   that are between the Fixed IKE Header and the Encrypted Payload.  The   ENCR_SM4_GCM has four inputs: an SM4 key, an initialization vector   (IV), a plaintext content, and optional additional authenticated data   (AAD).  ENCR_SM4_GCM generates two outputs: a ciphertext and message   authentication code.   The input and output lengths are as follows:   The SM4 key length is 16 octets.   The max plaintext length is $2^{36} - 31$ octets.   The max AAD length is $2^{61} - 1$ octets.   The nonce length is 12 octets.   The authentication tag length is 16 octets.   The max ciphertext length is $2^{36} - 15$ octets.   The nonce is generated by the party performing the authenticated   encryption operation.  Within the scope of any authenticated   encryption key, the nonce value MUST be unique.  That is, the set of   nonce values used with any given key MUST NOT contain any duplicates.   Using the same nonce for two different messages encrypted with the   same key destroys the security properties of GCM mode.3.1.3.  ENCR_SM4_CCM   The ENCR_SM4_CCM authenticated encryption algorithm is defined in   [CCM] using SM4 as the block cipher.  The generation of the   authentication tag MUST conform to IKEv2 (See [RFC5282]) as described   in the above paragraph.  ENCR_SM4_CCM has four inputs: an SM4 key, a   nonce, a plaintext, and optional additional authenticated data (AAD).   ENCR_SM4_CCM generates two outputs: a ciphertext and a message   authentication code.   The input and output lengths are as follows:   The SM4 key length is 16 octets.   The max plaintext length is $2^{24} - 1$ octets.Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026                [Page 5]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025   The max AAD length is $2^{64} - 1$ octets.   The max ciphertext length is $2^{24} + 15$ octets   To have a common set of terms for ENCR _SM4_GCM and ENCR _SM4_CCM,   the ENCR _SM4_GCM IV is referred to as a nonce in the remainder of   this document.   A simple test vector of ENCR _SM4_GCM and ENCR _SM4_CCM is given in   Appendix A of this document.3.2.  Pseudorandom Function Transform   This specification defines a new transform of Type 2 (Pseudorandom   Function Transform IDs):   PRF_HMAC_SM3 (Transform ID XX).  The PRF uses the SM3 hash function   with a 256-bit output defined in [ISO-SM3] and [GBT.32905-2016] and   with HMAC construction.  The PRF has a 256-bit block size and a   256-bit output length.   PRF_ HMAC_SM3 is hash-based message authentication code (or HMAC),   which is defined in [RFC2104], using SM3 as the hash function.  The   PRF_ HMAC_SM3 has two inputs: HMAC key and the plaintext.  The output   of PRF_ HMAC_SM3 is 256 bits.3.3.  Integrity Algorithm Transform   This specification defines a new transform of Type 3 (Integrity   Algorithm Transform IDs):   AUTH_HMAC_SM3 (Transform ID XX).  The MAC uses the SM3 hash function   with a 256-bit output defined in [ISO-SM3] and [GBT.32905-2016] and   with HMAC construction.  AUTH_HMAC_SM3 is specified as described in   2.2.   While no fixed key length is specified in [RFC2104], this   specification requires that when used as an integrity/authentication   algorithm, a fixed key length equal to the output length of the hash   functions MUST be supported, and key lengths other than the output   length of the associated hash function MUST NOT be supported.  These   key length restrictions are the same with HMAC-SHA-256 (see [RFC4868]   Sec2.1.1).Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026                [Page 6]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 20253.4.  Key Exchange Method Transform   This specification defines one new transform of Type 4 (Key Exchange   Method Transform IDs): curveSM2.  This transform uses a fixed   elliptic curve parameter set defined in [GBT.32918.5-2017].  The   specification of curveSM2 is defined in clause 3.2 of RFC 8998   [RFC8998] as ”curveSM2”, which is used to define new cipher suites   for TLS 1.3 protocol.   Implementations of the key exchange mechanism defined in this   document MUST conform to what [GBT.32918.5-2017] requires; that is to   say, the only valid elliptic curve parameter set for the ”curveSM2”   key exchange is defined as follows:   curveSM2: A prime field of 256 bits.   $y^2 = x^3+ ax + b$   p = FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF   FFFFFFFF   a = FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF   FFFFFFFC   b = 28E9FA9E 9D9F5E34 4D5A9E4B CF6509A7 F39789F5 15AB8F92 DDBCBD41   4D940E93   n = FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 7203DF6B 21C6052B 53BBF409   39D54123   Gx = 32C4AE2C 1F198119 5F990446 6A39C994 8FE30BBF F2660BE1 715A4589   334C74C7   Gy = BC3736A2 F4F6779C 59BDCEE3 6B692153 D0A9877C C62A4740 02DF32E5   2139F0A04.  Authentication Method   This section specifies the use of the SM2 signature algorithm as the   authentication method for IKEv2 protocol.   The SM2 signature algorithm is defined in [ISO-SM2].  The SM2   signature algorithm is based on elliptic curves.  The SM2 signature   algorithm uses a fixed elliptic curve parameter set defined in   [GBT.32918.5-2017].  This curve is named "curveSM2" as defined in   section 2.4.Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026                [Page 7]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025   Implementations of the signature scheme mechanism defined in this   document MUST conform to what [GBT.32918.5-2017] requires.5.  Hash Algorithms   The SM2 digital signature algorithm uses the SM3 hash functions   defined in [ISO-SM3] and [GBT.32905-2016].  This specification   defines one new value for the "IKEv2 Hash Algorithms" registry: SM3   (value XX) for the SM3 hash function with a 256-bit output length.   The specification of SM3 is defined as follows:   The SM3 algorithm is intended to address multiple use cases for   commercial cryptography, including, but not limited to: - the use of   digital signatures and their verification; - the generation and   verification of message authenticity codes; as well as - the   generation of random numbers.   SM3 has a Merkle-Damgard construction and is similar to SHA-2   [NIST.FIPS.180-4]of the MD4 [RFC6150] family, with the addition of   several strengthening features including a more complex step function   and stronger message dependency than SHA-256 [RFC6234].  SM3 produces   an output hash value of 256 bits long, based on 512-bit input message   blocks, on input lengths up to 2^(m) [GBT.32905-2016].  This details   the SM3 algorithm and its internal steps can be find in   [GBT.32905-2016].6.  IANA Considerations   IANA maintains a registry called "Internet Key Exchange Version 2   (IKEv2) Parameters" with subregistries like "Transform Type Values",   “IKEv2 Authentication Method” and “IKEv2 Hash Algorithms”.   This document describes 3 new encryption transforms, 1 pseudorandom   function transform, 1 integrity algorithm transform, 1 key exchange   method transform and a new authentication method using SM2 signature   and SM3 hash function for IKEv2 ([RFC7296]).   IANA is requested to assign 3 new Transform IDs to the "Transform   Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" subregistry,Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026                [Page 8]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025        +========+==============+===============+=================+        | Number | Name         | ESP Reference | IKEv2 Reference |        +========+==============+===============+=================+        | TBD    | ENCR_SM4_CBC | TBD           | TBD             |        +--------+--------------+---------------+-----------------+        | TBD    | ENCR_SM4_GCM | TBD           | TBD             |        +--------+--------------+---------------+-----------------+        | TBD    | ENCR_SM4_CCM | TBD           | TBD             |        +--------+--------------+---------------+-----------------+                                  Table 1   1 Transform ID to the “Transform Type 2 - Pseudorandom Function   Transform IDs” subregistry,        +========+==============+===============+=================+        | Number | Name         | ESP Reference | IKEv2 Reference |        +========+==============+===============+=================+        | TBD    | PRF_HMAC_SM3 | TBD           | TBD             |        +--------+--------------+---------------+-----------------+                                  Table 2   1 Transform ID to the “Transform Type 3 - Integrity Algorithm   Transform IDs” subregistry,       +========+===============+===============+=================+       | Number | Name          | ESP Reference | IKEv2 Reference |       +========+===============+===============+=================+       | TBD    | AUTH_HMAC_SM3 | TBD           | TBD             |       +--------+---------------+---------------+-----------------+                                 Table 3   1 Transform ID to the “Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange Method   Transform IDs” subregistry,          +========+==========+===============+=================+          | Number | Name     | ESP Reference | IKEv2 Reference |          +========+==========+===============+=================+          | TBD    | curveSM2 | TBD           | TBD             |          +--------+----------+---------------+-----------------+                                  Table 4   1 new Authentication Method to the “IKEv2 Authentication Method”   subregistry,Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026                [Page 9]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025               +=======+=======================+===========+               | Value | Authentication Method | Reference |               +=======+=======================+===========+               | TBD   | curveSM2              | TBD       |               +-------+-----------------------+-----------+                                  Table 5   and 1 new Hash function to the “IKEv2 Hash Algorithms” subregistry.                  +=======+================+===========+                  | Value | Hash Algorithm | Reference |                  +=======+================+===========+                  | TBD   | SM3            | TBD       |                  +-------+----------------+-----------+                                 Table 67.  Security Considerations   At the time of writing, there are no known weak keys for SM   cryptographic algorithms SM2, SM3 and SM4, and no security issues   have been found for these algorithms.   A related work [CQCY21] analyzed the security of SM2 algorithm , and   the cryptanalysis results shows that SM2 is existentially unforgeable   against adaptively chosen-message attacks in the generic group model   if the underlying hash function is uniform and collision-resistant   and the underlying conversion function is almost-invertible.   Besides, SM2 is secure against the generalized key substitution   attacks if the underlying hash functions H and h are modeled as non-   programmable random oracles (NPROs) [ZYZC15].   As a result of the increasing prevalence and exploitation of side-   channel attacks ([JYW20], [WDW18], [LZHZ18]), the SM4 algorithm is   now confronted with significant threats when utilized in smart cards   and other cryptographic devices.  However, these attacks can be   mitigated through the implementation of side-channel protection   ([ZCC24], [SZ24], [SCZ24], [JUP23]).  On the other hand, the classic   cryptanalysis techniques are not applicable to the entire cipher and   are impractical, do not compromise the overall security of SM4.8.  References8.1.  Normative ReferencesGuo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026               [Page 10]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025   [CCM]      NIST Special Publication 800-38C, "Recommendation for              Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for              Authentication and Confidentiality", DOI 10.6028/              NIST.SP.800-38C , May 2004,              <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/              SP800-38C.pdf>.   [GCM]      NIST Special Publication 800-38D, "Recommendation for              Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)              and GMAC", DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D , November 2007,              <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-              800-38D.pdf>.   [ISO-SM2]  International Organization for Standardization, "IT              Security techniques -- Digital signatures with appendix --              Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms", ISO/IEC              14888-3:2018 , November 2018.   [ISO-SM3]  International Organization for Standardization, "IT              Security techniques -- Hash-functions -- Part 3: Dedicated              hash-functions", ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 , October 2018.   [ISO-SM4]  International Organization for Standardization,              "Information technology -- Security techniques --              Encryption algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers", ISO/IEC              18033-3:2010 , December 2010.   [NIST.FIPS.180-4]              NIST FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION,              "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", NIST.FIPS.180-4 , August              2015, <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/              NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.   [NIST.SP.800-38A]              NIST Special Publication 800-38A, "NIST Special              Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes              of Operation --Methods and Techniques", INIST.SP.800-38A ,              December 2001,              <<http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38A>>.   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104>.Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026               [Page 11]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.   [RFC4868]  Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-              384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,              DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4868>.   [RFC5282]  Black, D. and D. McGrew, "Using Authenticated Encryption              Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key              Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 5282,              DOI 10.17487/RFC5282, August 2008,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5282>.   [RFC6150]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "MD4 to Historic Status",              RFC 6150, DOI 10.17487/RFC6150, March 2011,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6150>.   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234>.   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7296>.   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.   [RFC8998]  Yang, P., "ShangMi (SM) Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3",              RFC 8998, DOI 10.17487/RFC8998, March 2021,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8998>.8.2.  Informative References   [CQCY21]   Cui, X Qin, C Cai, T Yuen, H., "Security on SM2 and GOST              signatures against related key attacks", 2021 IEEE 20th              International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in              Computing and Communications (TrustCom) (pp. 155-163) ,              October 2021.Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026               [Page 12]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025   [GBT.32905-2016]              Standardization Administration of China, "Information              security technology --- SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm",              GB/T 32905-2016 , March 2017, <<http://www.gmbz.org.cn/              upload/2018-07-24/1532401392982079739.pdf>>.   [GBT.32907-2016]              Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of              China, "Information security technology -- SM4 block              cipher algorithm", GB/T 32907-2016 , March 2017,              <<http://www.gmbz.org.cn/              upload/2018-04-04/1522788048733065051.pdf>>.   [GBT.32918.2-2016]              Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of              China, "Information security technology --- Public key              cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves ---              Part 2: Digital signature algorithm", GB/T 32918.2-2016 ,              March 2017, <http://www.gmbz.org.cn/              upload/2018-07-24/1532401673138056311.pdf>.   [GBT.32918.5-2017]              Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of              China, "Information security technology --- Public key              cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves ---              Part 5: Parameter definition", GB/T 32918.5-2017 ,              December 2017, <<http://www.gmbz.org.cn/              upload/2018-07-24/1532401863206085511.pdf>>.   [JUP23]    Proceedings of the 26th Asia and South Pacific Design              Automation Conference, "FPGA based countermeasures against              side channel attacks on block ciphers", Proceedings of the              28th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference.              2023 365-371, 2023.   [JYW20]    JIN, H YANG, X WANG, Q YUAN, Y., "Improved differential              fault attack for SM4 cipher", Journal of Cryptologic              Research, 2020, 7(4) 453–464, July 2020,              <[{"DOI"=>"10.13868/j.cnki.jcr.000380"}]>.   [LZHZ18]   LOU, F ZHANG, J HUANG, X ZHAO, H LIU, X., "Research on              trace driven Cache analysis on SM4", Journal of              Cryptologic Research, 2018, 5(4) 430–441, 2018.Guo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026               [Page 13]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025   [SCZ24]    Proceedings of the 26th Asia and South Pacific Design              Automation Conference, "Micro-architectural cache side-              channel attacks and countermeasures", Proceedings of the              26th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference.              2021 441-448, 2024.   [SZ24]     Security and Communication Networks, "Survey of CPU              Cache‐Based Side‐Channel Attacks: Systematic Analysis,              Security Models, and Countermeasures", Security and              Communication Networks, 2021, 2021(1) 5559552, 2024.   [WDW18]    WU, Z DU, M WANG, Y WANG, K WANG, T YU, Z., "Chosen-              plaintext algorithm for chosen-plaintext power analysis              against SM4", Journal of Cryptologic Research, 2018,              5(4) 421–429, 2018.   [ZCC24]    Zhang J, Chen C, Cui J, et al, "Timing side-channel              attacks and countermeasures in CPU microarchitectures",              ACM Computing Surveys, 2024, 56(7) 1-40, 2024.   [ZYZC15]   Zhang, K Yang, J Zhang, C Chen, Z., "Security of the SM2              signature scheme against generalized key substitution              attacks", International Conference on Research in Security              Standardisation (pp. 140-153) , December 2015.Appendix A.  Appendix A.  Test Vectors   All values are in hexadecimal and are in network byte order (big   endian).A.1.  SM4_CBC Test Vectors   key:0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210   iv：FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF   in：0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210   out：F0A2B07E64DD2C2590F93E4EDD90FBB4A.2.  SM4_GCM Test Vectors   Initialization Vector：00001234567800000000ABCD   Key：0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210   Plaintext：AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB   CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF   EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGuo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026               [Page 14]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025   Associated Data：FEEDFACEDEADBEEFFEEDFACEDEADBEEFABADDAD2   CipherText：17F399F08C67D5EE19D0DC9969C4BB7D   5FD46FD3756489069157B282BB200735 D82710CA5C22F0CCFA7CBF93D496AC15   A56834CBCF98C397B4024A2691233B8D   Authentication Tag：83DE3541E4C2B58177E065A9BF7B62ECA.3.  SM4_CCM Test Vectors   Initialization Vector：00001234567800000000ABCD   Key：0123456789ABCDEFFEDCBA9876543210   Plaintext：AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB   CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF   EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA   Associated Data：FEEDFACEDEADBEEFFEEDFACEDEADBEEFABADDAD2   CipherText：48AF93501FA62ADBCD414CCE6034D895   DDA1BF8F132F042098661572E7483094 FD12E518CE062C98ACEE28D95DF4416B   ED31A2F04476C18BB40C84A74B97DC5B   Authentication Tag：16842D4FA186F56AB33256971FA110F4A.4.  SM3 Test Vectors   in: 616263   out: 66c7f0f462eeedd9d1f2d46bdc10e4e24167c4875cf2f7a2297da02b8f4ba8e0A.5.  AUTH_HMAC_SM3 Test Vectors   Key: 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF   in: abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq   out: DC813339153491AD81477754EB3DF00DBB3CC3E6A69F9CACCE737DB7E61342FFAppendix B.  Acknowledgments   TBDAuthors' AddressesGuo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026               [Page 15]Internet-Draft           Using ShangMi in IKEv2              August 2025   Yanfei Guo   Huawei Technologies   China   Email: guoyanfei3@huawei.com   Liang Xia   Huawei Technologies   China   Email: frank.xialiang@huawei.com   Yu Fu   China Unicom   China   Email: fuy186@chinaunicom.cnGuo, et al.             Expires 19 February 2026               [Page 16]