EXEGETICAL (ORIGINAL LANGUAGES)
Romans 3:7 f. The
ἐπεὶ πῶς κρινεῖ ὁ Θεὸς τ.
κόσμ. receives its
illustrative confirmation; for as to the case of God, who would thus be
unrighteous and nevertheless is to
judge the world, every ground for judging man as a sinner must be superseded by the circumstance already discussed, viz. that His truth has been
glorified by man’s falsehood (
Romans 3:4 f.); and (
Romans 3:8) as to the case of man himself, there would result the principle directly worthy of condemnation, that he should do evil in order that good might come. Comp Th. Schott, and in substance also Hofmann and Morison. The argument accordingly rests on the basis, that in the case put (
ἘΠΕΊ from
Romans 3:6) the relation of God to the judgment of the world would yield two absurd consequences. (See this, as early as Chrysostom.) Another view is that of Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Wolf, and many others, including Rückert, Kollner, Tholuck, Philippi and Umbreit, that the objection of
Romans 3:5 is here amplified. But it is quite as arbitrary and in fact impossible (hence Philippi resorts to the violent expedient of putting in a parenthesis not only
ΚΑΤᾺ ἌΝΘΡ.ΛΈΓΩ, but also
ΜῊ ΓΈΝΟΙΤΟ.…ΚΌΣΜΟΝ), with the reference of
ΓΆΡ, to overleap entirely
Romans 3:6, as it is strange to make the discourse so completely abrupt and to represent the Apostle as making no reply at all to the first part of the alleged amplification of the objection (to
Romans 3:7), and as replying to the second part (
Romans 3:8) only by an
anathema, sit! (
ὧν τ.
κρ.
ἔνδ.
ἔ.). Against the view of Reiche, who, following Koppe, Rosenmüller, and Flatt, thinks that the
Gentile is introduced as speaking in
Romans 3:7 (compare Olshausen), we may decisively urge the close connection therewith of
Romans 3:8,
where Paul includes himself also, but does not “take speech in hand again” (Reiche). See besides on
τὸν κόσμον,
Romans 3:6.
ἈΛΉΘΕΙΑ and
ΨΕΎΣΜΑΤΙ are terms chosen in reference to
Romans 3:4, because the question proposed in
Romans 3:5 was in fact suggested by that verse; but they represent, as
Romans 3:5 proves, the ideas of
ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΎΝΗ and
ἈΔΙΚΊΑ; hence:
the moral truth, i.e. the holy righteousness of God (see on
John 3:21;
Ephesians 5:9;
Php 4:8), and
the moral falsehood, i.e. the immorality (
Revelation 22:15), wickedness of man.[756]
ἐπερίσσευσεν εἰς τ.
δόξ.
αὐτοῦ]
has abounded richly to His glory, that is, has shown itself in superabundant measure, which redounds to His glory. The stress of this protasis lies on
ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ψεύσματι.
The
aorist denotes the result of the having abounded, which subsists at the day of judgment (realised as present by
τί.…
κρίνομαι) as up to that point accomplished fact.
ἔτι] namely, after that assumed result has occurred.
κἀγώ] emphasising the contradictory relation to the contents of the protasis, according to which this
ἐγώ seems actually to have
deserved something of God:
even I (Baeumlein,
Partik. p. 150) who have notwithstanding glorified God through my
ψεύσμα. So in substance (“
just I” according to Hermann,
a[757]
Viger. p. 837) also Tholuck and Morison; compare Philippi: “
even I still.” There lies in the expression something of boldness and defiance; but it is not equivalent to
καὶ αὐτός, or
αὐτός ἐγώ, to the meaning of which Th. Schott and Hofmann ultimately bring it (“
even personally still”). We may add that this first person, individualising just like the preceding one (
ἐν τ.
ἐμῷ ψ.), of course represents
the sinner in general (with an intended application to the
Jews, see on
Romans 3:5 f), and not
the Apostle himself, as Schrader and Fritzsche think. Against this latter theory it is decisive that
κρίνομαι after
Romans 3:6 must indicate, not the judgment of enemies, but necessarily the
divine act of judging.
ὡς ἁμαρτ.]
as a sinner, not “
as a Gentile” (Reiche, Mehring), and others.
Romans 3:8.
καὶ μή] Before
μή we must again supply
τί:
and why should we not, etc. Respecting
τί μή,
quidni, see Hartung,
Partikell. II. p. 162. Accordingly, as
καί continues the question, only a comma is to be placed after
κρίνομαι.
As regards the construction, Paul has dropped the plan of the sentence begun with
καὶ μή (
and why should we not do evil, etc.), being led away from it by the inserted remark, and has joined
ὅτι ποιήσωμενin direct address (
let us do) to the
λέγειν, so that
ὅτι is
recitative. But on account of this very blending there is no necessity either to make a parenthesis or to supply anything. For similar attractions (compare especially Xen.
Anab. vi. 4, 18) in which the discourse is interrupted by an intervening clause, and then continued in a regimen dependent on the latter and no longer suitable to the beginning, see Hermann
a[758]
Viger. p. 745, 894; Bernhardy, p. 464; Dissen,
a[759]
Dem. de cor. p. 346, 418; Krüger,
gramm. Unters. p. 457 ff. Many erroneous attempts have been made by commentators (see the various explanations in Morison) to bring out an unbroken construction, as
e.g. the supplying of
ἐροῦμεν or some such word after
μή (Erasmus, Calvin, Wolf, Koppe, Benecke, and others, also van Hengel). Even the expedient of Matthias is untenable.[760] The same may be said of that of Hofmann, who supplies an
ἐστίν after
καὶ μή, and renders: “
Why does it not happen to me according to that, as (
καθώς)
we are slandered,” etc. But if it is quite gratuitous to supply
ἐστί, it is still more so to make this
ἐστί equivalent to
γίνεται μοι. Besides the negation, which, according to our construction, harmonises with the deliberative sense, would necessarily be not
μή but
οὐ, since it would negative the reality of the
εἶναι understood (
1 Corinthians 6:7;
Luke 19:23;
Luke 20:5al[761]). The correct view is held also by Winer and Buttmann (p. 235, 211), Philippi and Morison.
καθὼς βλασφημ.]
as we (
Christians)
are calumniated, namely, as if we did evil in order that, etc. Then the following
καὶ καθὼς.…
λέγειν contains the accusation, current possibly in Rome also, that the Christians were in the habit of repeating this maxim even as a doctrinal proposition. As to the distinction between
φημί (to assert) and
λέγω, compare on
1 Corinthians 10:15. What may have occasioned such slanders against the Christians? Certainly their non-observance of the Mosaic law, to which they ventured to deem themselves not bound, in order to gain eternal life by the grace of God through faith in the redemptive work of Christ, which was an offence to the Jews. The plural is not to be referred to
Paul alone, which would be arbitrary on account of the preceding singular; the Christians are conceived as
Pauline (comp
Acts 21:21); and on the part of Jews and Judaizers (
τινές,
certain people, as in
1 Corinthians 15:12) are slanderously and falsely (for see
Romans 5:20,
Romans 6:1;
Romans 6:15 ff.) accused of
doing evil that good might come (might ensue as result). Under this
general category, namely, the calumniators reduced the bearing of the Christians, so far as the latter, without regulating their conduct by the Mosaic law, were nevertheless assured, and professed, that they should through faith in Christ obtain the divine blessings of salvation. That general accusation was an injurious abstract inference thence deduced.
ὧν]
i.e. of those, who follow this principle destructive of the whole moral order of God. They form the nearest logical subject. With just indignation the Apostle himself, having a deep sense of morality, makes us feel in conclusion by
ὧν τὸ κρῖμα κ.
τ.
λ[763] how
deserving of punishment is the consequence, which, if God be regarded as an unrighteous judge of the world, must ensue for moral conduct from the premiss that God is glorified by the sin of men. The reference of
ὧν to the
slanderers (Theodoret, Grotius, Tholuck, Mehring, Hofmann) is unsuitable, because it separates the weighty closing sentence from the argumentation itself, and makes it merely an accessory thought.
τὸ κρῖμα] The definite judicial sentence, decree of punishment at the last judgment.
ἜΝΔΙΚΟΝ]
accordant with justice, rightful. Compare
Hebrews 2:2. Frequently used in classic writers.
[756] Those who take ver. 7 f. as spoken in the person of the
Gentile (see especially Reiche) explain the
ἀλήθεια Θεοῦ of the true religion (how entirely opposed to ver. 4!),
ψεύσματι of idolatry, and
ἁμαρτωλός as Gentile.
[757]
d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.
[758]
d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.
[759]
d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.
[760] He brings forward the modal definition:
ὡς ἁμαρτωλός as the main element; then the modality of the
κρίνομαι opposed to this is
καὶ μὴ καθὼς βλασφημ.
κ.
τ.
λ.: “Why then am even I still judged like a
sinner, and not rather according to that, which we are slanderously reported of, and which some affirm that we say: namely,
according to this, Let us do evil, that
good may come?” Instead of saying:
καὶ μὴ ὡς ποιήσας τὰ ἀγαθά, Paul, in the indignation of excited feeling, gives to the thought which he had begun the different turn which it presents in the text. With this artificial interpretation, we must remember that Paul would have written
καὶ οὐ instead of
καὶ μή, since it is an objective relation that is here in question (compare
Colossians 2:8al.); that instead of
καθώς we should have expected the repetition of the
ὡς; and that the notion of
κρίνειν, as it prevails in the connection (compare also the following
τὸ κρῖμα), does not suit the assumed thought,
ὡς ποιήσας τὰ ἀγαθά. Comp. also Morison, p. 79.
[761]
l. and others; and other passages; and other editions.
[763] .
τ.
λ.
καὶ τὰ λοιπά.
Romans 3:7 f. These verses are extremely difficult, and are interpreted variously according to the force assigned to the
τί ἔτι κἀγὼ of
Romans 3:7. Who or what supplies the contrast to this emphatic “I also”? Some commentators, Gifford, for instance, find it in God, and God’s interest in the judgment. If my lie sets in relief the truth of God, and so magnifies His glory, is not that enough? Why, after God has had this satisfaction from my sin, “why further am
I also on my side brought to judgment as a sinner?” It is a serious, if not a final objection to this, that it merely repeats the argument of
Romans 3:5, which the Apostle has already refuted. Its very generality, too—for any man, as Gifford himself says, may thus protest against being judged,—lessens its relevance: for Paul is discussing not human evasions of God’s judgment, but Jewish objections to his previous arguments. Lipsius finds the contrast to
κἀγὼ in the Gentile world. A Jew is the speaker, or at all events the Apostle speaks in the character of one: “if my unbelief does magnify His faithfulness, is not that all that is required? Why am I, too, like the rest of the world, whose relation to God is so different, and whose judgment is so necessary, still brought into judgment?” This would be legitimate enough, probably, if it were not for what follows. But the slander of
Romans 3:8, which forms part of the same question as
τί ἔτι κἀγὼ κ.
τ.
λ., and to which reference is made again in chap.
Romans 6:1;
Romans 6:15, had not the Jews, but the Apostle in his Christian character, for its object; hence it seems preferable to take the
κἀγὼ as referring strictly to himself. That
Paul would come into judgment, in spite of the fact that
his faithlessness in becoming a Christian had only set off the faithfulness of God to Israel, no unbelieving Jew questioned: and Paul turns this conviction of theirs (with which, of course, he agrees, so far as it asserts that he will be judged) against themselves. If he, for his part, cannot evade judgment, on the ground that his sin (as they think it) has been a foil to God’s righteousness, no more can they on their part: they and he are in one position, and must be judged together: to condemn him is to expose themselves to condemnation; that is his point. The argument of
Romans 3:7 is both an
argumentum ad hominem and an
argumentum ad rem: Paul borrows from his opponents the premises that he himself is to be judged as a sinner, and that his lie has set off God’s truth: there is enough in these premises to serve his purpose, which is to show that these two propositions which do not exclude each other in his case do not do so in their case either. But, of course, he would interpret the second in a very different way from them. The question is continued in
Romans 3:8, though the construction is changed by the introduction of the parentheses with
καθὼς and the attachment to
λέγειν ὅτι of the clause which would naturally have gone with
τί μή; If judgment could be evaded by sinning to the glory of God, so Paul argues, he and other Christians like him might naturally act on the principle which slander imputed to them—that of doing evil that good might come. No doubt the slander was of Jewish origin. The doctrine that righteousness is a gift of God, not to be won by works of law, but by faith in Jesus Christ, can always be misrepresented as immoral: “sin the more, it will only the more magnify grace” Paul does not stoop to discuss it. The judgment that comes on those who by such perversions of reason and conscience seek to evade all judgment is just. This is all he has to say.
7.
For if, &c.] Here St Paul takes up the Opponent on his own ground; speaking as a human being whose sin (e.g. a falsehood) serves to make God’s truth “abound to His glory;” i.e. be more largely manifest in a way to win Him fresh praise:—in such a case is not Paul, is not A, B, or C, equally entitled with the Jewish opponent to be excused penalty?—In the Gr. of the clause “why am I yet, &c.,” the word “I” is strongly emphatic;
I also; i.e. “I, as well as my opponent.”—“Why am I
yet, &c.:”—i.e. “after the recognition of the effect of my sin on the advancement of God’s glory.”—“
By my lie;” lit.
in my lie; i.e. “on occasion of it, in connexion with it.”
Romans 3:7.
Εἰ γὰρ,
for if) An Ætiologia[34] [a sentiment, with the grounds on which it rests subjoined] set forth in the form of a dialogue, for the purpose of strengthening the objection which was introduced at the beginning of
Romans 3:5.
ψεύσματι,
through my lie) The things which God says are true, and he who does not believe these, makes God a liar, being in reality himself the liar.—
τί) that is,
why do I even still excuse myself, as if I had some reason to fear? Comp.
τί ἔτι, ch.
Romans 9:19;
Galatians 5:11.—
κᾀγὼ)
I also, to whom the truth of God has been revealed; not merely the heathen.—
κρίνομαι) corresponds to
κρίνεσθαι,
Romans 3:4;
Romans 3:6, LXX.;
Job 2:9 (
Job 40:4)
τί ἔτι ἐγὼ κρίνομαι;
[34] See Appendix.
Verse 7. -
For if the truth of God in my lie abounded to his glory, why am I also still judged as a sinner? One view is that this is a continuation or resumption of the question of ver. 5 on the part of the Jew, its drift being the same. But the word
κἀγὼ, as well as the position of the verse after
τῶς κρινε1FC0;ι, etc., suggests rather its being intended to express that any one throughout the world, as well as the Jew, might plead against' deserved judgment, if the Jew's supposed plea were valid. Nay, in that case, the apostle goes on to say, he, or any of us, might justify all wrongdoing for a supposed good end. Why not? Romans 3:7
Lie (ψεύσματι)
Only here in the New Testament. The expression carries us back toRomans 3:4, and is general for moral falsehood, unfaithfulness to the claims of conscience and of God, especially with reference to the proffer of salvation through Christ.
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