Wayman v. Southard

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Wayman v. Southard is a case decided on February 12, 1825, by theUnited States Supreme Court that concerned the ability of state legislatures to set rules and procedures in federal courts within their states. The Kentucky state legislature attempted to bring the procedures governingwrits of execution in federal courts in line with those in Kentucky state courts. The United States Court for the Seventh Circuit and District of Kentucky sent the question to the Supreme Court for certification. Chief JusticeJohn Marshall authored the opinion, in which he argued that federal courts were not subject to the statutes of state legislatures. Furthermore, Congress' delegation of the power to create procedures for federal courts to those courts themselves did not represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.[1]
In brief:The Kentucky state legislature attempted to set the procedures for trials involvingwrits of execution held in federal courts within the state. The circuit court sent the matter to the Supreme Court for certification. Chief JusticeJohn Marshall argued in the certification that the state legislature could not set procedures for federal courts. That power was delegated to Congress, who had delegated it to the federal courts themselves as an implied power.
Why it matters:The case established the right of federal courts to set their own procedures. It was also one of the seminal cases in the development of thenondelegation doctrine, so some of its arguments appeared in later cases such asPanama Refining Co. v. Ryan.
Background
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The Judiciary Act of 1802 allowed circuit courts to send legal questions to the Supreme Court for certification if the circuit judges could not resolve a disagreement. This law and the Certificate of Division procedure were phased out and replaced by the end of the 19th century, but they were still in force in 1825. The ruling inWayman v. Southard is a certificate authored by Chief JusticeJohn Marshall.[2]
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the federal court system, aside from the Supreme Court, which had been created by Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The act also gave federal courts the power to issuewrits of execution.[3]
The Process Act of 1792 had outlined many of the procedures for federal courts, but had not provided them for cases involving writs of execution.[4] The act also addressed some of the gaps and problems associated with the earlier Process Act of 1789.[5]
Oral argument
No oral arguments were held for this case, as the opinion was only a Certified Question.
Decision
The Supreme Court ruled that the state legislature of Kentucky could not set procedures for Kentucky's federal courts. According to the opinion, federal courts had the implied power to set their own procedures as part of their power to administer justice, which had been constitutionally delegated to them by Congress.
| “ | CERTIFICATE. This cause came on to be heard on the questions certified from the United States Court for the seventh circuit and District of Kentucky, and was argued by counsel: on consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion, that the statutes of Kentucky in relation to executions, which are referred to in the questions certified to this Court, on a division of opinion of the said Judges of the said Circuit Court, are not applicable to executions which issue on judgments rendered by the Courts of the United States; which is directed to be certified to the said Circuit Court.[1][6] | ” |
Opinions
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Opinion of the court
Article 1, Section 8 of theU.S. Constitution states:
| “ | The Congress shall have Power...To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.[1][6] | ” |
Writing for the court, Chief JusticeJohn Marshall argued that the necessary and proper clause gives Congress implied powers. Since Congress had delegated to federal courts the power to administer justice, it had also delegated the implied power to set the necessary procedures to accomplish that goal.
| “ | The judicial department is invested with jurisdiction in certain specified cases, in all which it has power to render judgment.
| ” |
In addition to the constitutional basis for this power, Marshall pointed to later laws passed by Congress. Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts the right to issue writs of execution.[3]
| “ | On the clearest principles of just construction, then, the 14th section of the Judiciary Act must be understood, as giving to the Courts of the Union, respectively, a power to issue executions on their judgments.
| ” |
Though the defendants had pointed to other sections, such as Sections 17 & 34, for specific procedures, Marshall dismissed these. Since neither the Constitution nor the relevant laws had provided explicit procedures for the federal courts in these matters, but both had given them the power to enforce justice, Marshall held that they must have implicitly included the power to set their own procedures.
State legislatures, furthermore, were incapable of receiving delegated power from Congress, leaving the federal courts themselves as the only logical choice.
| “ | If Congress cannot invest the Courts with the power of altering the modes of proceeding of their own officers, in the service of executions issued on their own judgments, how will gentlemen defend a delegation of the same power to the State legislatures? The State assemblies do not constitute a legislative body for the Union. They possess no portion of that legislative power which the Constitution vests in Congress, and cannot receive it by delegation.[1][6] | ” |
Marshall concluded the opinion by rejecting the arguments of the Kentucky state legislature and reiterating the independence of the federal courts.
| “ | CERTIFICATE. This cause came on to be heard on the questions certified from the United States Court for the seventh circuit and District of Kentucky, and was argued by counsel: on consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion, that the statutes of Kentucky in relation to executions, which are referred to in the questions certified to this Court, on a division of opinion of the said Judges of the said Circuit Court, are not applicable to executions which issue on judgments rendered by the Courts of the United States; which is directed to be certified to the said Circuit Court.[1][6] | ” |
Concurring opinions
There were no concurring opinions.
Dissenting opinions
There were not dissenting opinions.
Impact
Wayman v. Southard was one of the first cases to explore the limits of the delegation of congressional power. Marshall's opinion solidified the right of Congress to delegate power to other federal entities.
| “ | It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.[1][6] | ” |
He made a distinction between the essential legislative functions of Congress, which it should regulate itself, and the subordinate rules and procedures which he felt could be more practically established by other entities.
| “ | The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.[1][6] | ” |
Chief JusticeCharles E. Hughes used language from the preceding quote in the decision inPanama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935). Hughes incorporated Marshall's reasoning into his argument that Congress could not directly handle all of the responsibilities facing a modern state, which made its ability to delegate power essential to its ability to function.
Marshall made sure to emphasize that there were limits to Congress' ability to delegate its legislative power.
| “ | It is, undoubtedly, proper for the legislature to prescribe the manner in which these ministerial offices shall be performed, and this duty will never be devolved on any other department without urgent reasons.[1][6] | ” |
He later reiterated these concerns.
| “ | ... the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter unnecessarily.[1][6] | ” |
Chief Justice Hughes expressed similar concerns in hisPanama decision, since theseparation of powers was one of the foundational parts of the constitutional system. These concerns have fueled the development of thenondelegation doctrine, a body of jurisprudence that explores the procedures and limits governing the delegation of congressional power.
See also
- Gibbons v. Ogden
- Field v. Clark
- Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
- Whitman v. American Trucking Associations
- Nondelegation doctrine
- Separation of powers
- Rulemaking
- Supreme Court of the United States
- History of the Supreme Court
External links
Footnotes
- ↑1.001.011.021.031.041.051.061.071.081.091.10FindLaw,Wayman v. Southard, accessed November 18, 2017
- ↑The Library of Congress,A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774 - 1875, accessed November 18, 2017
- ↑3.03.1The Library of Congress,Judiciary Act of 1789, accessed November 18 2017
- ↑Wikisource,United States Statutes at Large/Volume 1/2nd Congress/1st Session/Chapter 36, accessed November 19, 2017
- ↑Wikisource,United States Statutes at Large/Volume 1/1st Congress/1st Session/Chapter 21, accessed November 19, 2017
- ↑6.06.16.26.36.46.56.66.76.86.9Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
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