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Skidmore v. Swift & Co.

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What is deference in the context of the administrative state?

Deference, or judicial deference, is a principle of judicial review in which a federal court yields to an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court has developed several forms of deference in reviewing federal agency actions, includingChevron deference,Skidmore deference, andAuer deference. Learn aboutstate-level responses to deference here.


Supreme Court of the United States
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
Reference: 323 US 134 (1944)
Term: 1944
Important Dates
Granted: May 29, 1944
Argued: Oct 13, 1944
Decided: Dec 4, 1944
Outcome
United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed
Majority
Robert H. Jackson •Owen Roberts •Hugo Black •Stanley Reed •Felix Frankfurter •William Douglas •Frank Murphy •Wiley Rutledge •Harlan Fiske Stone
Concurring
None
Dissenting
None

Skidmore v. Swift & Co. is a case decided on Dec 4, 1944, by theUnited States Supreme Court. It involved rules governing overtime pay under theFair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the degree to which courts should defer to administrative agencies in the interpretation of laws. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that no public or case law precluded waiting time from also being considered working time, reversing the ruling of theFifth Circuit Court of Appeals.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: Workers at a Swift & Co. meatpacking plant in Texas sued to recover overtime pay for their time spent monitoring fire alarms at the plant after hours.
  • The issue: Could waiting time also be considered working time, or should the court defer to the Administrator's judgment that the two could overlap?
  • The outcome: The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that time spent on inactive duty could sometimes be considered working time, and set guidelines for accepting agency interpretations of statutes.


    • In brief:Employees of Swift & Co. sued under theFair Labor Standards Act to recover overtime wages for time spent on fire watch at the outside of normal working hours. The District and Appeals courts rejected their claim on the grounds that the time in question had been predominantly waiting time, rather than working time. The Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that time spent on inactive duty could qualify as work in some cases. The court also issued guidelines for courts to determine when todefer to an agency's interpretation of a statute.

    Why it matters:The ruling established the procedure known asSkidmore deference for courts to determine when to defer to nonbinding recommendations by administrative agencies.

    Background

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    TheFair Labor Standards Act of 1938, part of the New Deal, had created new rules governing hours, wages, and overtime pay. Among other things, the act created the Wage and Hour Division within the Department of Labor, headed by an Administrator who formulated guidelines and made recommendations regarding hours and wages. The Administrator's recommendations were not binding on courts and the ruling inSkidmore helped clarify the extent to which courts shoulddefer to administrative interpretations of laws (seeSkidmore deference). The act also allowed workers to file suit against their employer for perceived violations of the law, as the employees of Swift & Co. did in this case.[2]

    Seven employees of the Swift & Co. meatpacking plant in Fort Worth, Texas, sued the company under the Fair Labor Standards to recover overtime, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees related to time they had spent monitoring fire alarms at the plant after hours. The employees had performed this work under an oral agreement with their employers for a fixed salary and had been provided with a fire hall building equipped with sleeping quarters, heat and air conditioning, and various games. Fire alarms were rare, so the majority of this time was spent sleeping or at leisure, though the workers were expected to remain near the alarms and respond to any emergency situations that occurred. The District Court rejected the workers' claim and the Fifth Circuit Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling, after which the case advanced to the Supreme Court.[1]

    Oral argument

    Oral argument was held on Oct 13, 1944. The case was decided on Dec 4, 1944.[3]

    Decision

    The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that no principle in public or case law precluded working time from also being considered working time, reversing the judgment of theUnited States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit.

    JusticeRobert H. Jackson wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief JusticeHarlan Fiske Stone and JusticesOwen Roberts,Hugo Black,Stanley Reed,Felix Frankfurter,William Douglas,Frank Murphy,Wiley Rutledge.[1]

    Opinions

    Opinion of the court

    Writing for the court, JusticeRobert H. Jackson argued that no public or case law held that waiting and working time could not overlap.

    “...we hold that no principle of law found either in the statute or in Court decisions precludes waiting time from also being working time.[1][4]”

    In his bulletin, the Wage and Hours Administrator had written that every case involving inactive duty required its own careful consideration, but that in general waiting and working time could overlap.

    “The Administrator thinks the problems presented by inactive duty require a flexible solution, rather than the all-in or all-out rules respectively urged by the parties in this case, and his Bulletin endeavors to suggest standards and examples to guide in particular situations.

    ...
    In general, the answer depends 'upon the degree to which the employee is free to engage in personal activities during periods of idleness when he is subject to call and the number of consecutive hours that the employee is subject to call without being required to perform active work.' 'Hours worked are not limited to the time spent in active labor but include time given by the employee to the employer. ...'[1][4]

    		”

    Justice Jackson argued that although Congress had left the task of defining the boundaries of the act to the courts, it had also created the position of Wage and Hour Administrator within the Department of Labor with a mandate to bring injunctions to restrain violations of the act. Although the Administrator's recommendations were nonbinding, the nature of his work provided him with expertise in the relevant areas, so the courts should take his opinions into consideration. In this case, the District Court had erred in its judgment that time spent on inactive duty could not be considered working time.

    “in this case, although the District Court referred to the Administrator's Bulletin, its evaluation and inquiry were apparently restricted by its notion that waiting time may not be work, an understanding of the law which we hold to be erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.[1][4]”

    Impact

    The ruling inSkidmore v. Swift & Co. outlined the procedure for what would later be calledSkidmore deference. The ruling inChristensen v. Harris County expanded upon Justice Jackson's guidelines for deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute and helped formalize the concept ofSkidmore deference. In contrast toChevron deference. which applies to binding agency regulations and is stronger,Skidmore deference applies to informal documents, such as opinion letters and bulletins, and requires less deference by courts to agencies. Specifically, courts exercisingSkidmore deference may determine the degree of deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute by the extent to which they find that interpretation convincing.

    “We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.[1][4]”

    See also

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