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Marshall v. Barlow's

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Supreme Court of the United States
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.
Reference: 436 US 307 (1978)
Term: 1977
Important Dates
Argued: Jan 9, 1978
Decided: May 23, 1978
Outcome
United States District Court for the District of Idaho affirmed
Majority
Byron White •Warren Burger •Potter Stewart •Thurgood Marshall •Lewis Powell
Concurring
None
Dissenting
John Paul Stevens •Harry Blackmun •William Rehnquist

Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. is a case decided on May 23, 1978, by theUnited States Supreme Court in which the court ruled 5-3 that the Fourth Amendment prohibited inspectors of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) from conducting warrantless searches of business premises. The court affirmed the decision of theUnited States District Court for the District of Idaho and held that Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was unconstitutional.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS
  • The case: The proprietor of Barlow's Inc. refused to let OSHA inspectors search the work area without a warrant.
  • The issue: Could OSHA inspectors enter the work area of a company without a warrant, or did this violate the employer's Fourth Amendment rights?
  • The outcome: The Supreme Court ruled 5-3 that Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was unconstitutional because warrantless searches violated the Fourth Amendment.


    • Why it matters: TheUnited States Supreme Court held that warrantless searches by OSHA were unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The decision narrowed the scope of an exception to an existing prohibition against warrantless administrative inspections that had permitted some warrantless licensing and regulatory searches of closely regulated industries.[2]

    Background

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    An inspector from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) attempted to enter the work area of Barlow's Inc. without a search warrant but was refused entry by Ferrol G. Barlow, the proprietor. The secretary of labor then petitioned theDistrict Court of Idaho to issue an order compelling Barlow to admit the inspector without a warrant, which it granted. Barlow refused to obey the order and sought an injunction against Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which authorized the warrantless searches. The district court ruled in favor of Barlow, saying that a warrantless search would violate hisFourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure. The secretary of labor then appealed that ruling.

    The prior 1967 casesCamara v. Municipal Court andSee v. City of Seattle held that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements applied to administrative inspections of commercial and noncommercial premises. However, OSHA and other agencies had operated under an exception to the rule drawn fromColonnade Catering Corp. v. United States (1970) andUnited States v. Biswell (1972) that permitted warrantless licensing and regulatory inspections of closely regulated industries.[2]

    Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

    The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 created the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and set guidelines for its operation. Section 8(a) of the act authorized OSHA inspectors to conduct searches of businesses to check for safety violations. As the court noted in its opinion, no search warrant or other process was expressly required by the act.

    “(a) In order to carry out the purposes of this Act, the Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized --


    (1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and

    (2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent or employee.[3][4]

    		”

    Question presented

    Thepetitioner presented the following question to the court:[1]

    Question presented:
    • Whether the category of warrantless searches authorized by the statute is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?

    Oral argument

    Oral argument was held on Jan 9, 1978. The case was decided on May 23, 1978.[5]

    Outcome

    The Supreme Court ruled 5–3 that warrantless searches by OSHA inspectors violated theFourth Amendment, so Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was unconstitutional.

    JusticeByron White wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief JusticeWarren Burger and JusticesPotter Stewart,Thurgood Marshall,Lewis Powell.

    JusticeJohn Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by JusticesHarry Blackmun andWilliam Rehnquist.

    JusticeWilliam Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

    Opinions

    Opinion of the court

    Writing for the court, JusticeByron White cited theFourth Amendment as the most relevant statute in this case.

    “The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as private homes.[1][4]”

    White drew on the earlier ruling inCamara v. Municipal Court that held warrantless searches to be generally unreasonable, and on the ruling inSee v. Seattle which extended that reasoning to businesses.[6]

    “The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.[7][4]”


    White also held that this case did not fall under the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment established inColonnade Catering Corp. v. United States andUnited States v. Biswell for certain industries with a long history of close government supervision and regulation, as the secretary of labor had tried to argue.[8][9]

    The Secretary had maintained that warrantless searches added an element of surprise that was critical to the effectiveness of OSHA inspections. The court, however, rejected this argument.

    “We are unconvinced, however, that requiring warrants to inspect will impose serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts, will prevent inspections necessary to enforce the statute, or will make them less effective.[1][4]”


    The dangers of allowing warrantless searches were, in the court's view, too great.

    “The authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search. A warrant, by contrast, would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria. Also, a warrant would then and there advise the owner of the scope and objects of the search, beyond which limits the inspector is not expected to proceed.[1][4]”


    The court thus concluded that OSHA inspectors had no right to conduct warrantless searches and that Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 violated the Fourth Amendment and was unconstitutional.

    “We hold that Barlow's was entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspections without warrant or its equivalent and to an injunction enjoining the Act's enforcement to that extent. The judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed.[1][4]”

    Concurring opinions

    There were no concurring opinions.

    Dissenting opinions

    In his dissenting opinion, JusticeJohn Paul Stevens disagreed with two of the court's principal arguments.

    “Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act to safeguard employees against hazards in the work areas of businesses subject to the Act. To ensure compliance, Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to conduct routine, nonconsensual inspections. Today the Court holds that the Fourth Amendment prohibits such inspections without a warrant. The Court also holds that the constitutionally required warrant may be issued without any showing of probable cause. I disagree with both of these holdings.[1][4]”


    He illustrated his own view of the Fourth Amendment.

    “The Fourth Amendment contains two separate Clauses, each flatly prohibiting a category of governmental conduct. The first Clause states that the right to be free from unreasonable searches 'shall not be violated'; the second unequivocally prohibits the issuance of warrants except 'upon probable cause.' In this case the ultimate question is whether the category of warrantless searches authorized by the statute is 'unreasonable' within the meaning of the first Clause.[1][4]”


    The court, he argued, had misunderstood the relationship of the two parts of the Fourth Amendment to the case.

    “There is, however, also a category of searches which are reasonable within the meaning of the first Clause even though the probable-cause requirement of the Warrant Clause cannot be satisfied...The regulatory inspection program challenged in this case, in my judgment, falls within this category.

    ...
    Fidelity to the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the Warrant Clause has no application to routine, regulatory inspections of commercial premises.[1][4]

    		”


    He concluded that the court was substituting its own judgment for that of Congress.

    “...the Court today substitutes its judgment for that of Congress on the question of what inspection authority is needed to effectuate the purposes of the Act.

    ...
    Congress has determined that industrial safety is an urgent federal interest requiring regulation and supervision, and further, that warrantless inspections are necessary to accomplish the safety goals of the legislation. While one may question the wisdom of pervasive governmental oversight of industrial life, I decline to question Congress' judgment that the inspection power is a necessary enforcement device in achieving the goals of a valid exercise of regulatory power.[1][4]

    		”

    Impact

    The decision reiterated the importance of the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure in American jurisprudence. It also clarified the limits on the federal government's power to regulateinterstate commerce, which had served as the basis for many laws and agency actions. The justices held that the exception to warrantless administrative inspections that had allowed OSHA to conduct warrantless regulatory searches was not triggered solely by the fact that the business engaged in interstate commerce:

    “The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated industry of the type involved inColonnade andBiswell is the exception. The Secretary would make it the rule...It is quite unconvincing to argue that the imposition of minimum wages and maximum hours on employers who contracted with the Government under the Walsh-Healey Act prepared the entirety of American interstate commerce for regulation of working conditions to the minutest detail. Nor can any but the most fictional sense of voluntary consent to later searches be found in the single fact that one conducts a business affecting interstate commerce; under current practice and law, few businesses can be conducted without having some effect on interstate commerce.[1][4]”

    Justice White held that the ruling inMarshall v. Barlow's only applied to the actions of OSHA which were the focus of that case, though the Secretary of Labor had expressed concerns about the ruling's implications for inspections by other federal agencies.[10]

    “Finally, the Secretary urges that requiring a warrant for OSHA inspectors will mean that, as a practical matter, warrantless-search provisions in other regulatory statutes are also constitutionally infirm. The reasonableness of a warrantless search, however, will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute. Some of the statutes cited apply only to a single industry, where regulations might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement could apply. Some statutes already envision resort to federal-court enforcement when entry is refused, employing specific language in some cases and general language in others. In short, we base today's opinion on the facts and law concerned with OSHA and do not retreat from a holding appropriate to that statute because of its real or imagined effect on other, different administrative schemes.[1][4]”

    See also

    External links

    Footnotes

    1. ↑1.001.011.021.031.041.051.061.071.081.091.101.11FindLaw,Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., accessed November 20, 2017
    2. ↑2.02.1Duke Law Journal, "OSHA Inspections after Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.," 1979
    3. ↑OSHA.gov,Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, accessed November 20, 2017
    4. ↑4.004.014.024.034.044.054.064.074.084.094.104.11Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    5. ↑Oyez,Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., accessed November 20, 2017
    6. ↑FindLaw,Camara v. Municipal Court, accessed November 20, 2017
    7. ↑FindLaw,See v. City of Seattle, accessed November 20, 2017
    8. ↑Justia,Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, accessed November 20, 2017
    9. ↑FindLaw,United States v. Biswell, accessed November 20, 2017
    10. ↑See also David Shipley, "Warrantless Administrative Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc." (1979), University of Georgia Law, accessed November 20, 2017
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