Judicial deference

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What is judicial deference?
Judicial deference is anadministrative law principle under whichcourts yield to an executive agency’s interpretation of a statute, regulation, or policy when certain conditions are met. There are different types of judicial deference doctrines at both the federal and state levels. When courts do not apply a deference doctrine, they read the meaning of a statute, regulation, or policyde novo, deciding the meaning without deferring to any other authority.
Why does it matter?
Judicial deference is central to many debates about theadministrative state and the balance of power between executive branch agencies and the courts. Deference doctrines have seen substantial changes at both the federal and state levels in recent years. In 2025, as of August 1,five states have passed bills limiting state-level judicial deference.
What are key arguments?
Supporters of judicial deference argue it allows agencies to establish regulations based on their subject matter expertise, and allows courts to utilize agency expertise in cases involving complex or technical subject matter. They also say legislatures grant agencies the power to resolve statutory ambiguity, and that judicial deference upholdsseparation of powers principles.
Opponents of judicial deference argue it violates theseparation of powers by effectively giving judicial powers (like interpreting laws and regulations) to agency officials. Opponents also argue that deference is inconsistent with theAdministrative Procedure Act, which requires courts to "decide all relevant questions of law" in cases involving agencies.[1]
What's the background?
TheU.S. Supreme Court's use of principles of deference to executive interpretations dates back to the 1940s, with cases likeSkidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944), andBowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. (1945). The 1984Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council ruling, which established theChevron deference doctine, was an important milestone in judicial deference. Subsequent Supreme Court rulings established other federal-level deference doctrines. The Supreme Court overturnedChevron deference in its 2024Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo decision. While this decision did not apply to state-level deference doctrines, some states have subsequently passed lawslimiting judicial deference in state courts.
Click here to view a timeline of key events in the development of judicial deference at the federal level.
Click here to track state legislation related to judicial deference.
Dive Deeper:
- BackgroundRead more
- Types of deferenceRead more
- Data on deferenceRead more
- State responses to judicial deferenceRead more
Background
TheU.S. Supreme Court's 1984 ruling inChevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council established the principle ofChevron deference, which required a federal court to yield to an agency's interpretation of a statute that Congress instructed the agency to administer if the statute is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is deemed reasonable. Since the development ofChevron doctrine, theU.S. Supreme Court has adopted additional forms of deference to an agency's interpretation of either a statute that Congress instructed the agency to administer or a regulation promulgated by the agency. These deference regimes, known asSkidmore deference andAuer deference, are based onU.S. Supreme Court decisions issued during the 1940s. According to JusticeJohn Paul Stevens' 1984 opinion inChevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, theU.S. Supreme Court at the time had "long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer." JusticeAntonin Scalia echoed Stevens' claim in a 1989 lecture at Duke Law School, stating that "courts have been content to accept 'reasonable' executive interpretations of law for some time."[2][3]
Types of deference
Chevron deference
- See also:Chevron doctrine
According to JusticeScalia,Chevron deference is "the principle that the courts will accept an agency's reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous terms of a statute that the agency administers." UnderChevron deference, a federal court must defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency administers if the underlying statute is unclear and the agency's interpretation is deemed reasonable. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on June 28, 2024, to overturnChevron deference inLoper Bright v. Raimondo, holding that federal courts may not defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute.[4][3][5]
Skidmore deference
- See also:Skidmore deference
Skidmore deference, developed in the opinion for the 2000U.S. Supreme Court caseChristensen v. Harris County and named for the 1944U.S. Supreme Court decision inSkidmore v. Swift & Co., allows a federal court to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers according to the agency's ability to demonstrate persuasive reasoning. According to JusticeClarence Thomas' opinion inChristensen v. Harris County,Chevron deference is binding for agency rules developed through administrativerulemaking whileSkidmore deference is applied toagency interpretations "such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines."[5][6]
JusticeRobert H. Jackson's opinion inSkidmore v. Swift & Co. states:[5]
| “ | We consider that the rulings, interpretations, and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.[7][8] | ” |
UnlikeChevron deference, a federal court exercisingSkidmore deference is not compelled to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute. Instead, the court determines the appropriate level of deference based on the agency's ability to demonstrate that its interpretation is based on valid reasoning.[9][10]
Auer deference
- See also:Auer v. Robbins
Auer deference, also known asSeminole Rock deference, is named for the 1997U.S. Supreme Court decision inAuer v. Robbins that reaffirmed a deference regime first described in the court's 1945 ruling inBowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. UnderAuer deference, a federal court must defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation that the agency has promulgated. According to JusticeFrank Murphy's opinion inBowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., a court must yield to an agency's interpretation of its own unclear regulation unless the court finds that the interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."[5][11][12]
Data on deference, 1983-2005
In 2008, professors William Eskridge Jr. and Lauren Baer published a study of "all Supreme Court cases decided betweenChevron (1983 Term) andHamdan (2005 Term) in which a federal agency interpretation of a statute was at issue, 1,014 in all." According to the authors:[13]
| “ | For us, the most striking finding of our study was that in the majority of all cases—53.6% of them—the Court invoked no deference regime at all. This finding is especially notable in light of the fact that we searched hard for signs of deference and counted quite liberally (including Supreme Court reliance on amicus briefs, which formed the bulk of our consultative-deference category).[13][8] | ” |
The following table from Eskridge and Baer's study shows a breakdown of the various deference regimes cited by the Supreme Court in agency interpretation cases from 1983 to 2005:[13]
| The Supreme Court's Continuum of Deference | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Deference Regime | Form of Deference | Percentage of Cases in Population | Agency Win Rate |
| NoDeference | Ad hoc judicial reasoning | 53.6% | 66.0% |
| Anti-Deference | The Court invokes a presumption against the agency interpretation in criminal cases (the rule of lenity) and in some cases in which the agency interpretation raises serious constitutional concerns (the canon of constitutional avoidance) | 6.8% | 36.2% |
| Consultative Deference | The Court, without invoking a named deference regime, relies on some input from the agency (e.g. amicus briefs, interpretive rules or guidance, or manuals) and uses that input to guide its reasoning and decisionmaking process | 17.8% | 80.6% |
| Skidmore | Agency interpretation is entitled to "respect proportional to its power to persuade," with such power determined by the interpretation's "thoroughness, logic and expertness"; its "fit with prior interpretations"; etc. | 6.7% | 73.5% |
| Beth Israel | Pre-Chevron test permitting reasonable interpretations that are consistent with the statute | 4.8% | 73.5% |
| Chevron | Reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes accepted. If the statute is clear, no deference to agency | 8.3% | 76.2% |
| Seminole Rock | Strong deference afforded to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations | 1.1% | 90.9% |
| Curtiss-Wright | Super-strong deference to executive interpretations involving foreign affairs and national security | 0.9% | 100.0% |
State responses to judicial deference
Judicial deference is anadministrative law principle under whichcourts yield to an executive agency’s interpretation of a statute, regulation, or policy when certain conditions are met.State-level approaches to judicial deference vary significantly. States are not obliged to adopt federal deference doctrines. Twenty-seven states as of 2025, however, had implemented forms of judicial deference to state administrative agencies similar to the federal deference doctrines.[14][15] Below is a selection of state government responses to judicial deference:
Kansas lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2026)
Kansas GovernorLaura Kelly (D) on February 6, 2026, signed a bill into law to end judicial deference practices in the state. The bill, HB 2183, ends judicial deference to agency interpretations of state statutes or rules and requires courts to applyde novo review.
The bill was introduced on February 26, 2025, and amended on March 27, 2025. The bill passed theKansas State Senate on March 27, 2025, with a vote of 30-10, and passed theKansas House of Representatives on January 22, 2026, with a vote of 83-39.[16]
North Carolina Supreme Court strikes downAuer-like judicial deference practices (2025)
On October 17, 2025, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled 5-2 in the case ofAlvin Mitchell v. University of North Carolina Board of Governors.[17] In this decision, the Court ruled that state courts should not use a principle of judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations akin to the federal-levelAuer deference doctrine, and that they should instead use ade novo standard of review.[18]
North Carolina Supreme Court strikes downChevron-like judicial deference practices (2025)
On August 22, 2025, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled 5-2 in the case ofThurman Crofton Savage v. N.C. Department of Transportation.[19] In this decision, the Court ruled that state courts should not use a principle of judicial deference to agency interpretations of statute akin to the federal-levelChevron deference doctrine, and that they should instead use ade novo standard of review.[20]
Missouri lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2025)
Missouri GovernorMike Kehoe (R) on July 11, 2025, signed a bill into law to end judicial deference practices in the state. The bill, SB 221, ends judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes or rules and requires courts to applyde novo review.
The bill was introduced by SenatorNick Schroer (R) on January 8, 2025. The bill passed theMissouri State Senate on March 6, 2025, with a vote of 25-7 and passed theMissouri House of Representatives on May 15, 2025, with a vote of 120-20-11.[21]
Louisiana lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2025)
Louisiana GovernorJeff Landry (R) on June 8, 2025, signed a bill into law to end judicial deference practices in the state. The bill, HB 99, ends judicial deference to agency interpretations of state statutes or rules and requires courts to applyde novo review.
The bill was introduced by RepresentativeBeth Billings (R) on March 24, 2025. The bill passed theLouisiana House of Representatives on May 7, 2025, with a vote of 70-27, and passed theLouisiana State Senate on May 29, 2025, with a vote of 28-10.[22]
Oklahoma lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2025)
Oklahoma GovernorKevin Stitt (R) on May 5, 2025, signed a bill into law to end judicial deference practices in the state. The bill, HB 2729, ends judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes or rules and requires courts to applyde novo review.
The bill was introduced by RepresentativeGerrid Kendrix (R) and RepresentativeMicheal Bergstrom (R) on February 3, 2025, and was inspired by model legislation developed by The Goldwater Institute and the Pacific Legal Foundation. The bill passed theOklahoma State Senate on May 5, 2025, with a vote of 37-8 and passed theOklahoma House of Representatives on May 14, 2025, with a vote of 71-16.[23][24]
Texas lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2025)
Texas GovernorGreg Abbott (R) on April 23, 2025, signed a bill into law to end judicial deference practices in the state. The bill, SB 14, ends judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes or rules and requires courts to applyde novo review.
The bill was introduced by SenatorPhil King (R) on March 6, 2025, and was inspired by model legislation developed by The Goldwater Institute and the Pacific Legal Foundation. The bill passed theTexas State Senate on March 26, 2025, with a vote of 26-5 and passed theTexas House of Representatives on April 9, 2025, with a vote of 97-51.[25][26]
Utah lawmakers reaffirm state sovereignty and limits to judicial deference practices (2025)
Utah lawmakers signed a joint resolution supporting the principles offederalism and urging adherence to the Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) Supreme Court decision.[27]
Kentucky lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2025)
Kentucky legislators overrode GovernorAndy Beshear's (D) veto of SB 84 on March 27, 2025. The bill ends judicial deference to administrative bodies for the interpretation of statutes or rules and requires courts to applyde novo review.
The bill was inspired by SenatorSteve Rawlings (R) on February 4, 2025, and was inspired by a model legislation developed by The Goldwater Institute and the Pacific Legal Foundation. The final bill was vetoed by Governor Beshear on March 24, 2025. TheKentucky House of Representatives moved to override his veto with a vote of 32-6, and theKentucky State Senate overrode his veto with a vote of 74-18 on March 27, 2025.[28][29]
Idaho lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2024)
Idaho GovernorBrad Little (R) on March 29, 2024, signed a bill into law to end judicial deference practices in the state. The bill, HB 626, ends judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes or rules and requires courts to applyde novo review.
The bill was introduced by RepresentativeMike Moyle (R) and RepresentativeVito Barbieri (R) on February 22, 2024, and was inspired by model legislation developed by The Goldwater Institute and the Pacific Legal Foundation. The bill passed theIdaho House of Representatives on March 11, 2024, with a vote of 58-11-1 and passed theIdaho State Senate on March 25, 2024, with a vote of 31-1-2.[30][31]
Nebraska lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2024)
Nebraska GovernorJim Pillen (R) on March 27, 2024, signed a bill into law to end judicial deference practices in the state. The bill, LB 43, prohibits courts from deferring to agency interpretations of statutes or rules and requires courts to applyde novo review.
The bill was introduced by State SenatorRita Sanders (R) on January 5, 2023, and was inspired by model legislation developed by The Goldwater Institute and the Pacific Legal Foundation. The bill passed theNebraska State Senate on March 21, 2024, with a vote of 39-0-10.[32][33]
Indiana lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2024)
Indiana GovernorEric Holcomb (R) on March 13, 2024, signed a bill into law to end judicial deference practices in the state. The bill, HB 1003, ends judicial deference to agency interpretations of constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations.
The bill was introduced on January 8, 2024, by RepresentativeGregory Steuerwald (R), and was inspired by model legislation developed by The Goldwater Institute and the Pacific Legal Foundation. The bill passed theIndiana House of Representatives on January 23, 2024, with a vote of 85-10, and passed theIndiana State Senate on March 5, 2024, with a vote of 40-7.[34][35]
Ohio Supreme Court rejectsAuer deference (2023)
TheOhio Supreme Court on October 18, 2023, issued a ruling that ended the practice of state courts deferring to state agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations—a doctrine known asAuer deference in the federal courts.
In re Application of Alamo Solar I, LLC concerned challenges from a citizen group that opposed the development of two solar farms in Preble County, Ohio. The Ohio Power Sitting Board had approved the solar farms and imposed certain conditions on the development of the facilities. Though the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the agency action as lawful, JusticePat DeWine argued against the court’s exercise ofAuer deference.
Writing for the majority, Dewine cited the court’s 2022 decision inTWISM Ents., LLC v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors that endedChevron deference in the state. He further argued, “When a court defers to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, it allows the agency to assume the legislative power (the rule drafter), the judicial power (the rule interpreter), and the executive power (the rule enforcer).”
In a concurring opinion, JusticeJennifer L. Brunner argued that the court was not tasked with considering agency deference in the case. Brunner wrote that “the agency-deference issue addressed inTWISM … plays no part in our resolution of this case, and the majority’s discussion of TWISM is a distraction that is beyond the scope of what we were tasked with deciding.”[36][37]
Ohio Supreme Court limitsChevron deference (2022)
TheOhio Supreme Court on December 29, 2022, ruled against applications ofChevron deference in the state. InTWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, the court found that state courts do not need to defer to state agency interpretations of the law—a deference doctrine known asChevron deference at the federal level.[38]
Lower courts inTWISM deferred to the Ohio Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Surveyors’ interpretation of its engineering certification rules, which denied TWISM Enterprises’ application to provide professional engineering services because the company’s designated licensed engineer was an independent contractor rather than an employee. TWISM Enterprises appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, arguing that the agency’s interpretation of the governing statute was flawed because the law does not specify that the licensed engineer must be an employee of the business.[38]
JusticePat DeWine (with JusticesSharon L. Kennedy,Pat Fischer, andMichael P. Donnelly concurring) disagreed with the agency’s interpretation of the statute and argued that the judicial branch has the authority to determine whether the statutory interpretations of state agencies are lawful. DeWine, writing for the court, argued “that it is the role of the judiciary, not administrative agencies, to make the ultimate determination about what the law means. Thus, the judicial branch is never required to defer to an agency's interpretation of the law.” DeWine added that “an agency interpretation is simply one consideration a court may sometimes take into account in rendering the court's own independent judgment as to what the law is.”[38]
JusticesMaureen O’Connor,Melody Stewart, andJennifer Brunner concurred in the judgment only.[38]
Tennessee lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2022)
Tennessee Governor Bill Lee (R) on April 14, 2022, signed a bill aimed at ending judicial deference practices in the state.[39]
Senate Bill 2285 requires courts to interpret state statutes or rulesde novo, as opposed to deferring to state agency interpretations of laws or regulations. The law also states, “After applying all customary tools of interpretation, the court shall resolve any remaining ambiguity against increased agency authority.” This resembles the rule of lenity in criminal law, which resolves ambiguities in favor of the defendant.[39]
Colorado Supreme Court narrows state deference practices (2021)
In the wake of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s June 10, 2021, rejection of state-levelAuer deference, the Colorado Supreme Court followed suit in a June 14, 2021,en banc decision that narrowed applications ofBrand X deference andChevron deference practices in the state.[40]
InNieto v. Clark’s Market, the court declined to extendBrand X deference to a regulation issued by the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment (CDLE).Brand X deference requires courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes even when the interpretations conflict with prior court precedent. The challenged regulation inNieto adopted an interpretation of a state labor law that departed from precedent set by the state Court of Appeals, but the Colorado Supreme Court declined to extendBrand X deference to the agency’s interpretation in the case.[40]
“[T]he CDLE is a state agency, and the [U.S. Supreme] Court’s holding inBrand X is not binding as to parallel state administrative procedure statutes,” wrote Justice Melissa Hart in the opinion. “We have not yet similarly interpreted the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act, and we decline Nieto’s invitation to do so here.”[40]
The justices further rejected state-levelChevron deference, which compels a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an unclear statute. Justice Hart stated that while the court has appliedChevron-style deference in the past, “we have made clear that, while agency interpretations should be given due consideration, they are ‘not binding on the court.’”[40]
Mississippi Supreme Court rejects state-levelAuer deference, ends judicial deference in state (2021)
TheMississippi Supreme Court on June 10, 2021, ruled 8-1 inMississippi Methodist Hospital and Rehabilitation Center Inc. v. Mississippi Division of Medicaid to end the state practice of deferring to agency interpretations of regulations, a doctrine known asAuer deference at the federal level. The court’s decision, combined with its prior rejection of state-levelChevron deference, effectively banned judicial deference practices in the state, according to an analysis by Pacific Legal Foundation attorney Daniel Ortner.[41]
JusticeLeslie King wrote the opinion for the court, noting that the practice of “[d]eferring to agency interpretations of rules and regulations is inconsistent with the standard of review for statutory interpretation, causes confusion, causes inconsistencies in application and within our own caselaw, and violates article 1, section 2, of Mississippi’s Constitution.” The court’s decision institutes a new period ofde novo review over agency regulatory interpretations.[42]
The court ended the state-levelChevron deference doctrine, which requires courts to defer to agency interpretations of unclear statutes, in the 2018 caseKing v. Mississippi Military Department. The justices argued that the practice violated the separation of powers prescribed by the state constitution. TheKing decision instituted a new standard ofde novo review over such agency interpretations, which the court later reaffirmed in a 2020 tax and gambling case.
Georgia lawmakers approve limits on judicial deference in tax cases (2021)
Georgia GovernorBrian Kemp (R) on April 29, 2021, signed into law Senate Bill 185, which limited judicial deference in the state by ending deference to certain tax regulations.[43][44]
The bill, sponsored by state SenatorBo Hatchett (R) and six Republican cosponsors, required state courts and the Georgia Tax Tribunal to decide all questions of law without deference to the regulations or policy interpretations of the state’s Department of Revenue, among other provisions.[43]
TheGeorgia House of Representatives on March 22 voted 164-4 to approve the bill. The state Senate unanimously approved the legislation on March 1. Georgia lawmakers had failed to approve similar legislation in 2020 before the close of the legislative session.[43]
Arkansas Supreme Court endsChevron deference (2020)
An April 9, 2020, ruling by theArkansas Supreme Court limited how much deference agency interpretations of law would receive in the future. The court ruled inMeyers v. Yamato Kogyo Co. that the court should determine the meaning of state laws for itself and should not defer to state agency interpretations (a deference doctrine known asChevron deference in the federal courts).[45]
JusticeShawn Womack delivered the opinion of the court and cited “the risk of giving core judicial powers to executive agencies in violation of the constitutionalseparation of powers” if they did not clarify how courts were supposed toreview agency decisions.[45]
Womack wrote that the power and responsibility to interpret laws lies with the judicial branch while the executive branch enforces laws made and interpreted by the legislature and courts. He went on to say that by “giving deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes, the court effectively transfers the job of interpreting the law from the judiciary to the executive. This we cannot do.”[45]
Womack added that the court would review all future agency interpretations of statutes on ade novo basis, which means without relying on the agencies’ conclusions. He wrote that the court would interpret unambiguous laws based on the clear meaning of their texts. In cases where the law in question is ambiguous, he wrote that agency interpretations of that ambiguity would only be one of many tools the court would use to determine the meaning of the law.[45]
Special Justice Scott Hilburn joined the opinion written by Justice Womack. JusticeKaren R. Baker concurred with the decision but did not write a separate opinion. Chief JusticeDan Kemp did not participate in the case. JusticeJosephine Hart wrote a dissenting opinion focusing on the facts of the case and not judicial deference in general.[45]
Arkansas Supreme Court reiteratesChevron deference prohibition (2020)
The Arkansas Supreme Court on October 29, 2020, clarified inAmerican Honda Motor Co. v. Walther that state courts should not exercise deference to state agency interpretations of statutes (a deference doctrine known asChevron deference at the federal level). Instead, the court held that Arkansas state courts should review agency statutory interpretationsde novo.[46]
The court’s decision reiterated its May 2020 holding inMeyers v. Yamato Kogyo Co. that the court should determine the meaning of state laws and not defer to state agency interpretations of statutes.[46]
In an opinion by JusticeKaren Baker, the court cited its earlier holding inMeyers, stating that “it is the province and duty of this Court to determine what a statute means. In considering the meaning and effect of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. An unambiguous statute will be interpreted based solely on the clear meaning of the text. But where ambiguity exists, the agency’s interpretation will be one of our many tools used to provide guidance.”[46]
Wisconsin Legislature endsChevron deference, codifies Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling (2018)
TheWisconsin Legislature approved legislation on December 5, 2018, that codified the intent of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling inTetra Tech, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, which ended the practice of judicial deference to the statutory interpretations of administrative agencies in the state—a doctrine known asChevron deference in the federal courts. The judicial deference provision was part of a larger legislative package passed by legislators during a lame duck session.[47][48]
TheWisconsin Supreme Court issued a decision inTetra Tech, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue on June 26, 2018. The ruling ended the practice of judicial deference to the statutory interpretations made by administrative agencies in the state. The court stated in the case opinion, "We have also decided to end our practice of deferring to administrative agencies' conclusions of law. However, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.57(10), we will give 'due weight' to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of an administrative agency as we consider its arguments."[49]
The case concerned the Wisconsin Department of Revenue's interpretation of a statute that classified the environmental remediation work of Lower Fox River Remediation LLC and its contracted firm, Tetra Tech EC Inc., as taxable activities. In reviewing the case, the court also considered whether the practice of judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes, such as the disputed statutory interpretation of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, undermined the state judiciary's authority to interpret and determine the law. Though theWisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling and upheld the agency's interpretation that the companies' work constituted taxable activities, the court also determined that the practice of judicial deference to administrative agencies was contrary to Article VII, Section 2 of theWisconsin Constitution, which vests judicial power in the state judiciary.[49]
Florida voters approve ballot measure prohibiting judicial deference (2018)
TheFlorida Amendment 6, Marsy's Law Crime Victims Rights, Judicial Retirement Age, and Judicial Interpretation of Laws and Rules Amendment ballot measure, passed by voters onNovember 6, 2018, prohibited state courts from deferring to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation. The measure required state courts to interpret statutes or rulesde novo—that is, without deference to the legal opinions of administrative agencies or previous judgments.[50]
The ballot measure was one of eight constitutional amendments referred to theNovember 6, 2018, ballot by theFlorida Constitution Revision Commission (CRC) on April 16, 2018. The CRC bundled three proposed amendments related to trials, judges, and courts.[50]
Mississippi Supreme Court ends state-levelChevron deference (2018)
On June 7, 2018, theMississippi Supreme Court issued a decision inKing v. Mississippi Military Department that ended the practice of judicial deference to the statutory interpretations made by administrative agencies in the state—a doctrine known asChevron deference at the federal level. The court stated in the case opinion, "[W]e announce today that we abandon the old standard of review giving deference to agency interpretations of statutes. Our pronouncements describing the level of deference were vague and contradictory, such that the deference could be anywhere on a spectrum from 'great' to illusory. Moreover, in deciding no longer to give deference to agency interpretations, we step fully into the role the Constitution of 1890 provides for the courts and the courts alone, to interpret statutes."[51]
The case concerned a review of the dismissal of Cindy King, a former employee of the Mississippi Military Department. King appealed her dismissal to the Mississippi Employee Appeals Board, which dismissed the case on the grounds that the military department's employment activities were outside of the board's jurisdiction. In reviewing the case, the court also questioned whether the practice of judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes undermined the state judiciary's authority to interpret and determine the law. Though the court upheld King's dismissal on the grounds that the department's adjutant general has broad statutory discretion over agency employment outside of the scope of the board, the court also determined that judicial deference to agencies conflicted with the constitutional authority of the state judiciary to interpret statutes.[52]
Mississippi Supreme Court reaffirms end of state-levelChevron deference (2020)
The Mississippi Supreme Court on May 28, 2020, unanimously held in a tax and gambling case that a state tax statute requiring judicial deference to a state agency’s interpretation of an unclear law (Chevron deference) was unconstitutional because it prohibited the court from exercising its constitutional duty to interpret the law.[53]
The court reaffirmed its 2018 ruling inKing v. Mississippi Military Department, which ended the state-levelChevron deference doctrine on the grounds that the practice violated the separation of powers prescribed by the state constitution. TheKing decision instituted a new standard ofde novo review.[53]
The court further clarified in the tax case that theKing decision applied to any state statute requiring the Chevron deference doctrine.[53]
Arizona lawmakers end judicial deference practices (2018)
Arizona GovernorDoug Ducey (R) on April 11, 2018, signed into law House Bill 2238, which ended judicial deference practices in the state by instructing courts to decide all questions of law without deference to government agencies, including on matters of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory interpretation. This requirement "applies in any action for judicial review of any agency action that is authorized by law." The law also included two exceptions to this requirement. First, for healthcare-related appeals arising from a specific article of Arizona law, courts are instructed to defer to agencies unless they find that the agency action in question "is not supported by substantial evidence, is contrary to law, isarbitrary and capricious or is an abuse of discretion." Second, agencies created pursuant to theArizona Corporation Commission (the state's utility regulator) are exempt. At the time it was passed, the law was the first of its kind at the state or federal level.[54][55][56]
Utah Supreme Court ends judicial deference practices (2013)
TheUtah Supreme Court in 2013 held inMurray v. Utah Labor Commission that the court would no longer defer to agency interpretations of statutes or regulations. The court "distinguished between the distinct concepts of 'discretion' and 'deference,' and noted that while an agency may be given discretion in matters of policy, it could not be delegated deference in matters of law since the correct interpretation of a statute 'has a single "right" answer in terms of the trajectory of the law' and is best resolved by the judiciary without deference," according to administrative law scholar Daniel M. Ortner. The court went on to explicitly rejectChevron deference in the 2014 caseHughes General Contractors Inc. v. Utah Labor Commission andAuer deference in the 2016 caseEllis-Hall Consultants v. Public Service Commission.[41][57]
Kansas Supreme Court ends judicial deference practices (2013)
TheKansas Supreme Court held in the 2013 caseDouglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems LLC that the court would no longer defer to agency interpretations of statutes or regulations. JusticeLee A. Johnson wrote in the opinion that the exercise of judicial deference in the state "has been abandoned, abrogated, disallowed, disapproved, ousted, overruled, and permanently relegated to the history books where it will never again affect the outcome of an appeal."[41][58]
Michigan Supreme Court endsChevron deference (2008)
On July 23, 2008, theMichigan Supreme Court issued a decision inIn re: Complaint of Rovas against SBC Michigan that ended the practice of judicial deference to the statutory interpretations made by administrative agencies in the state—a deference doctrine known asChevron deference in the federal courts. The court stated in the case opinion, "[I]n accordance with longstanding Michigan precedent and basic separation of powers principles, we hold and reaffirm that an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to 'respectful consideration,' but courts may not abdicate their judicial responsibility to interpret statutes by giving unfettered deference to an agency's interpretation."[59]
The case concerned the interpretation of a provision of the Michigan Telecommunications Act by theMichigan Public Service Commission (PSC). In reviewing the case, the court questioned whether the practice of judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes undermined the state judiciary's authority to interpret and determine the law. The court disagreed with the PSC's interpretation of the statute, reversed the decision of the court of appeals, and also determined that judicial deference to agencies conflicted with the constitutional authority of the state judiciary to interpret statutes.[59]
Delaware Supreme Court endsChevron deference (1999)
TheDelaware Supreme Court in 1999 held inPublic Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale that the court would no longer defer to agency interpretations of statutes—a deference doctrine known asChevron deference in the federal courts. In its decision, the court "overturned past decisions to the contrary, and 'reaffirmed [its] plenary standard of review,'" according to administrative law scholar Daniel M. Ortner.[41][57]
State legislation related to judicial review and deference
The following table lists bills related to judicial deference to administrative decisions that have been introduced in state legislatures. Click the column headers to sort the table by that field.
| State | Bill number | Bill name | Current legislative status | Most recent action | Legislative session year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | SB248 | Administrative Procedure Act, standard of judicial review of agency rulings revised | Dead | Read for the Second Time and placed on the Calendar | 2025 |
| Alabama | SB167 | Alabama Administrative Procedure Act; standard of judicial review revised regarding agency's interpretation of law | Crossed over | Read for the Second Time and placed on the Calendar | 2026 |
| Georgia | HB1247 | Georgia Bureaucratic Deference Elimination Act; enact | Introduced | House Second Readers | 2026 |
| Idaho | H0562 | Amends existing law to provide for a scope of review. | Dead | Reported Printed and Referred to State Affairs | 2024 |
| Idaho | H0626 | Amends existing law to provide for a scope of review. | Enacted/Adopted | Reported Signed by Governor on March 28, 2024 Session Law Chapter 235 Effective: 07/01/2024 | 2024 |
| Illinois | HB1048 | COURTS-AGENCY DEFERENCE | Introduced | Referred to Rules Committee | 2025 |
| Illinois | HB1048 | COURTS-AGENCY DEFERENCE | Introduced | Referred to Rules Committee | 2026 |
| Indiana | HB1003 | Administrative law. | Enacted/Adopted | Public Law 128 | 2024 |
| Iowa | HF645 | A bill for an act relating to interpretation of law in administrative and judicial proceedings under the Iowa administrative procedure Act.(Formerly HF 415.) | Dead | Placed on calendar under unfinished business. S.J. 747. | 2024 |
| Iowa | SSB3119 | A bill for an act concerning the executive branch rulemaking process and other agency functions and related matters.(See SF 2370.) | Introduced | Committee report approving bill, renumbered as SF 2370. | 2024 |
| Iowa | HF36 | A bill for an act relating to interpretation of law in administrative and judicial proceedings under the Iowa administrative procedure Act.(See HF 853.) | Introduced | Committee report approving bill, renumbered as HF 853. | 2025 |
| Iowa | HF853 | A bill for an act relating to interpretation of law in administrative and judicial proceedings under the Iowa administrative procedure Act.(Formerly HF 36.) | Introduced | Referred to Judiciary. H.J. 896. | 2025 |
| Iowa | HF36 | A bill for an act relating to interpretation of law in administrative and judicial proceedings under the Iowa administrative procedure Act.(See HF 853.) | Introduced | Committee report approving bill, renumbered as HF 853. | 2026 |
| Iowa | HF853 | A bill for an act relating to interpretation of law in administrative and judicial proceedings under the Iowa administrative procedure Act.(Formerly HF 36.) | Introduced | Referred to Judiciary. H.J. 896. | 2026 |
| Kansas | SB222 | Prohibiting deference to a state agency's interpretation of a statute, rule or regulation or document by a state court or an officer hearing an administrative action. | Crossed over | House Hearing: Thursday, March 6, 2025, 3:30 PM Room 582-N | 2025 |
| Kansas | HB2183 | Modifying elements in the crimes of sexual exploitation of a child, unlawful transmission of a visual depiction of a child and breach of privacy to prohibit certain acts related to visual depictions in which the person depicted is indistinguishable from a real child, morphed from a real child's image or generated without any actual child involvement, provide an exception for cable services in the crime of breach of privacy and prohibit dissemination of certain items that appear to depict or purp | Enacted/Adopted | House Approved by Governor on Thursday, February 5, 2026 | 2026 |
| Kansas | SB222 | Prohibiting deference to a state agency's interpretation of a statute, rule or regulation or document by a state court or an officer hearing an administrative action. | Crossed over | House Hearing: Thursday, March 6, 2025, 3:30 PM Room 582-N | 2026 |
| Kentucky | SB84 | AN ACT relating to judicial review of state agency action. | Enacted/Adopted | delivered to Secretary of State (Acts Ch. 112) | 2025 |
| Louisiana | HB599 | Provides relative to adjudications and judicial review of adjudications (EG NO IMPACT See Note) | Dead | Senate Committee Amendment #3629 S&G Draft - Senate Committee Amendment #3629 S&G Draft | 2024 |
| Louisiana | HB99 | Provides relative to adjudications and judicial review of adjudications | Enacted/Adopted | Effective date: 06/08/2025. | 2025 |
| Maine | LD1840 | An Act to Reform the State's Administrative and Rule-making Procedures | Dead | Ought Not to Pass Pursuant To Joint Rule 310, Jun 1, 2023 | 2024 |
| Maine | LD1408 | An Act to Codify Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations | Dead | Ought Not to Pass Pursuant To Joint Rule 310, May 28, 2025 | 2025 |
| Maine | LD1408 | An Act to Codify Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations | Dead | Ought Not to Pass Pursuant To Joint Rule 310, May 28, 2025 | 2026 |
| Minnesota | HF3113 | Administrative Procedure Act requirements added to emphasize statutory authorization for rules, governor's statutory authority to authorize rules in an emergency rescinded, and court deference to agency rule interpretation precluded. | Introduced | Introduction and first reading, referred to State Government Finance and Policy | 2025 |
| Minnesota | SF3316 | Administrative Procedure Act requirements addition to emphasize statutory authorization for rules and governor's statutory authority to authorize rules in an emergency rescindment provision | Introduced | Referred to State and Local Government | 2025 |
| Minnesota | HF3113 | Administrative Procedure Act requirements added to emphasize statutory authorization for rules, governor's statutory authority to authorize rules in an emergency rescinded, and court deference to agency rule interpretation precluded. | Introduced | Introduction and first reading, referred to State Government Finance and Policy | 2026 |
| Minnesota | SF3316 | Administrative Procedure Act requirements addition to emphasize statutory authorization for rules and governor's statutory authority to authorize rules in an emergency rescindment provision | Introduced | Referred to State and Local Government | 2026 |
| Mississippi | HB1488 | Permit Freedom Act; create to require clear criteria and appeals process on permits to engage in constitutionally protected activity. | Dead | Died In Committee | 2025 |
| Mississippi | HB1604 | Permit Freedom Act; create to require clear criteria and appeals process on permits to engage in constitutionally protected activity. | Dead | Died In Committee | 2025 |
| Missouri | HB663 | Modifies the standard of review for agency interpretation of statutes, rules, regulations, and subregulatory documents | Dead | Referred: Rules - Administrative(H) | 2025 |
| Missouri | SB221 | Modifies the standard of review for agency interpretation of statutes, rules, regulations, and subregulatory documents | Enacted/Adopted | Signed by Governor | 2025 |
| Montana | HB52 | Generally revising administrative procedure laws relating to agency deference | Dead | (H) Died in Process | 2025 |
| Nebraska | LB43 | Adopt the First Freedom Act and the Personal Privacy Protection Act, authorize tribal regalia to be worn by students, change provisions relating to withholding records from the public, provide requirements for interpretation of statutes, rules, and regulations, and prohibit state agencies from imposing certain requirements on charitable organizations | Enacted/Adopted | Provisions/portions of LB650 amended into LB43 by AM2076 | 2024 |
| Nevada | SB340 | Revises provisions relating to governmental administration. (BDR 18-1008) | Dead | (Pursuant to Joint Standing Rule No. 14.3.3, no further action allowed.) | 2025 |
| New Hampshire | HB1211 | Relative to the scope of review of state agency interpretations. | Introduced | Introduced 01/07/2026 and referred to Executive Departments and Administration | 2025 |
| New Hampshire | HB1211 | Relative to the scope of review of state agency interpretations. | Introduced | Introduced 01/07/2026 and referred to Executive Departments and Administration | 2026 |
| New Mexico | SB423 | Review And Approval Of Rules | Dead | Senate Rules Committee (08:30:00 2/21/2025 Room 321) | 2025 |
| Oklahoma | SB1720 | Administrative Procedures Act; establishing guidelines for court interpretation of certain rules and regulations. Effective date. | Dead | Second Reading referred to Judiciary | 2024 |
| Oklahoma | SB192 | Administrative Procedures Act; establishing guidelines for court interpretation of statutes, rules, or other regulations. Effective date. | Introduced | Coauthored by Representative ODonnell (principal House author) | 2024 |
| Oklahoma | HB2729 | Administrative Procedures Act; judicial review; providing for timing of certain claim; requiring interpretation of statute, rule, or regulation be provided; establishing guidelines; effective date. | Enacted/Adopted | Approved by Governor 05/21/2025 | 2025 |
| Oklahoma | SB639 | Administrative Procedures Act; establishing guidelines for interpretation of statutes or administrative rules. Effective date. | Introduced | Coauthored by Representative Kendrix (principal House author) | 2025 |
| Oklahoma | SB70 | Administrative Procedures Act; establishing guidelines for interpretation of statutes or administrative rules. Effective date. | Introduced | Second Reading referred to Judiciary | 2025 |
| Oklahoma | SB712 | Administrative Procedures Act; requiring certain statutes and rules to be interpreted in certain manner. Effective date. | Introduced | Second Reading referred to Judiciary | 2025 |
| Oklahoma | SB819 | Administrative Procedures Act; establishing procedures for certain review. Effective date. | Introduced | Coauthored by Representative Steagall (principal House author) | 2025 |
| Oklahoma | SB918 | Administrative Procedures Act; requiring certain statutes and rules to be interpreted in a certain manner. Effective date. | Introduced | Coauthored by Senator Alvord | 2025 |
| Oklahoma | SB639 | Administrative Procedures Act; establishing guidelines for interpretation of statutes or administrative rules. Effective date. | Introduced | Coauthored by Representative Kendrix (principal House author) | 2026 |
| Oklahoma | SB70 | Administrative Procedures Act; establishing guidelines for interpretation of statutes or administrative rules. Effective date. | Introduced | Second Reading referred to Judiciary | 2026 |
| Oklahoma | SB712 | Administrative Procedures Act; requiring certain statutes and rules to be interpreted in certain manner. Effective date. | Introduced | Second Reading referred to Judiciary | 2026 |
| Oklahoma | SB819 | Administrative Procedures Act; establishing procedures for certain review. Effective date. | Introduced | Coauthored by Representative Steagall (principal House author) | 2026 |
| Oklahoma | SB918 | Administrative Procedures Act; requiring certain statutes and rules to be interpreted in a certain manner. Effective date. | Introduced | Coauthored by Senator Alvord | 2026 |
| Oregon | HB2255 | Relating to interpretation of laws. | Dead | In committee upon adjournment. | 2025 |
| Oregon | SB931 | Relating to interpretation of laws. | Dead | In committee upon adjournment. | 2025 |
| Rhode Island | H7667 | Provides that a court shall decide cases without deference to administrative agency interpretation of rules. | Dead | Committee recommended measure be held for further study | 2024 |
| Rhode Island | H5722 | Amends the administrative procedures act and provides that on the review of an agency decision by a court upon appeal, the court shall decide questions of law without deference to any previous determination or interpretation of the law by the agency. | Dead | Committee recommended measure be held for further study | 2025 |
| South Carolina | H3021 | Small Business Regulatory Freedom Act | Crossed over | Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 254, 3021 (09:30:00 1/22/2026 Gressette Room 105) | 2025 |
| South Carolina | S0254 | Small Business Regulatory Freedom Act | Introduced | Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 254, 3021 (09:30:00 1/22/2026 Gressette Room 105) | 2025 |
| South Carolina | H3021 | Small Business Regulatory Freedom Act | Crossed over | Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 254, 3021 (09:30:00 1/22/2026 Gressette Room 105) | 2026 |
| South Carolina | S0254 | Small Business Regulatory Freedom Act | Introduced | Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 254, 3021 (09:30:00 1/22/2026 Gressette Room 105) | 2026 |
| South Dakota | SB122 | Restrict the deference given by courts to a state agency's interpretation of a state statute, administrative rule, or policy. | Dead | Judiciary Deferred to the 41st legislative day, Passed, YEAS 4, NAYS 3. | 2025 |
| South Dakota | SB134 | Restrict deference to a state agency's interpretation of a state statute, administrative rule, or policy. | Introduced | Referred to Senate State Affairs S.J. 121 | 2026 |
| Texas | HB10 | Relating to reforming the procedure by which state agencies adopt rules and impose regulatory requirements and the deference given to the interpretation of laws and rules by state agencies in certain judicial proceedings. | Dead | Laid on the table subject to call | 2025 |
| Texas | HB832 | Relating to procedures regarding hearings and meetings held by or involving the University Interscholastic League. | Dead | Referred to Public Education | 2025 |
| Texas | SB14 | Relating to reforming the procedure by which state agencies adopt rules and impose regulatory requirements and the deference given to the interpretation of laws and rules by state agencies in certain judicial proceedings. | Enacted/Adopted | Effective on 9/1/25 | 2025 |
| United States of America | HR10051 | Driver Technology and Pedestrian Safety Act of 2024 | Dead | Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. | 2023 |
| United States of America | HR10300 | Chevron Re-Review Act Congressional Re-Review Act | Dead | Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Oversight and Accountability, Rules, and the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. | 2023 |
| United States of America | HR10051 | Driver Technology and Pedestrian Safety Act of 2024 | Dead | Referred to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. | 2024 |
| United States of America | HR10300 | Chevron Re-Review Act Congressional Re-Review Act | Dead | Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Oversight and Accountability, Rules, and the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. | 2024 |
| United States of America | HR288 | Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2023 | Dead | Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. | 2024 |
| United States of America | S4527 | Separation of Powers Restoration Act | Dead | Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. | 2024 |
| United States of America | S4727 | SOPRA Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2024 | Dead | Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 438. | 2024 |
| United States of America | S4987 | Restoring Congressional Authority Act | Dead | Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. | 2024 |
| United States of America | HR1605 | Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2025 | Introduced | Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 15 - 12. | 2025 |
| United States of America | HR274 | Sunset Chevron Act | Introduced | Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform, and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. | 2025 |
| United States of America | HR8889 | Sunset Chevron Act | Dead | Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Oversight and Accountability, and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. | 2025 |
| United States of America | S33 | SOPRA Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2025 | Introduced | Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. | 2025 |
| United States of America | HR1605 | Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2025 | Introduced | Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 15 - 12. | 2026 |
| United States of America | HR274 | Sunset Chevron Act | Introduced | Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform, and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. | 2026 |
| United States of America | HR8889 | Sunset Chevron Act | Dead | Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committees on Oversight and Accountability, and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. | 2026 |
| United States of America | S33 | SOPRA Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2025 | Introduced | Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. | 2026 |
| Utah | HB0470 | Federal Agency Regulatory Review Amendments | Enacted/Adopted | Governor Signed in Lieutenant Governor's office for filing | 2024 |
| Utah | SJR006 | Joint Resolution Supporting State Jurisdiction Under the Principle of Federalism | Enacted/Adopted | Senate/ to Lieutenant Governor in Lieutenant Governor's office for filing | 2025 |
| West Virginia | SB648 | Requiring courts to interpret statutes and regulations | Dead | To Government Organization | 2025 |
| West Virginia | SB513 | Requiring courts to interpret statutes and regulations | Introduced | To Government Organization | 2026 |
| West Virginia | SB648 | Requiring courts to interpret statutes and regulations | Dead | To Government Organization | 2026 |
| West Virginia | SB888 | Creating Judicial Deference Reform Act | Introduced | To Judiciary | 2026 |
See also
External links
- Supreme Court of the United States homepage
- Code of Federal Regulations
- Federal Register
- Search Google News for this topic
Footnotes
- ↑Cornell Law School, 5 U.S. Code § 706, accessed July 24, 2025
- ↑Cite error: Invalid
<ref>tag; no text was provided for refs namedyale - ↑3.03.1Duke Law Journal, "JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF LAW," June 1989
- ↑U.S. Supreme Court, "Loper Bright Enterprises et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al.," June 28, 2024
- ↑5.05.15.25.3The Georgetown Law Journal, "The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, January 1, 2008
- ↑Legal Information Institute, "CHRISTENSEN V. HARRIS COUNTY (98-1167) 529 U.S. 576 (2000) 158 F.3d 241, affirmed." accessed September 13, 2017
- ↑JUSTIA, "Skidmore v. Swift & Co.," accessed September 12, 2017
- ↑8.08.1Note: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
- ↑Cite error: Invalid
<ref>tag; no text was provided for refs namedcircle - ↑Notre Dame Law Review, "HIERARCHICALLY VARIABLE DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS," accessed September 12, 2017
- ↑JUSTIA, "Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 325 U.S. 410 (1945)," accessed September 13, 2017
- ↑Yale Law & Policy Review, "The Uneasy Case AgainstAuer andSeminole Rock," January 28, 2015
- ↑13.013.113.2The Georgetown Law Journal, "The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations fromChevron toHamdan," 2008
- ↑Wisconsin Law Review, "Chevron's 51 Imperfect Solutions," by Christopher J. Walker and Neena Menon, accessed October 27, 2025
- ↑Walker and Menon list 33 states with judicial deference doctrines as of 2024. Ballotpedia has tracked 6 states' move to ade novo standard of review in 2025, as of October 27, meaning that 27 states have extant judicial deference doctrines as of that date.
- ↑Kansas Legislature, "HB 2183," accessed February 13, 2026
- ↑North Carolina Supreme Court,Alvin Mitchell v. University of North Carolina Board of Governors, accessed December 17, 2025
- ↑JDSupra, "North Carolina Supreme Court Holds De Novo Review Required in Interpreting Agency Rules," November 19, 2025
- ↑North Carolina Supreme Court,Thurman Crofton Savage v. N.C. Department of Transportation, accessed August 26, 2025
- ↑Carolina Journal, "Top NC court rejects deference in case of fired DOT worker," August 22, 2025
- ↑Missouri Legislature, "Senate Bill 221" accessed July 23, 2025
- ↑Louisiana Legislature, "House Bill 99," accessed August 12, 2025
- ↑Oklahoma State Legislature, " Bill Information for HB 2729" accessed July 26, 2025
- ↑Goldwater Institute, "Oklahoma Knocks Out the Administrative State" May 23, 2025
- ↑Bill Track 50, " TX SB14" accessed July 27, 2025
- ↑Goldwater Institute, "No More Rubber Stamps: New Law Strengthens Judicial Review in Texas" April 24, 2025
- ↑Utah State Legislature, " S.J.R. 6 Joint Resolution Supporting State Jurisdiction Under the Principle of Federalism" accessed July 30, 2025
- ↑Kentucky General Assembly, "Senate Bill 84" accessed July 25, 2025
- ↑Goldwater Institute, "Victory! Kentucky Ends Judicial Deference to Unelected Government Bureaucrats" accessed July 25, 2025
- ↑Goldwater Institute, "Victory! Idaho Becomes Latest State to End Judicial Deference to Administrative State," March 29, 2024
- ↑Idaho Legislature, "House Bill 626" accessed April 3, 2024
- ↑Goldwater Institute, "Victory! Nebraska Ends Judicial Deference to Bureaucrats & Protects Donor Privacy," March 28, 2024
- ↑Nebraska Legislature, "LB43 - Adopt the First Freedom At and the Personal Privacy Act, authorize tribal regalia to be worn by students, change provisions relating to withholding records from the public, provide requirements for interpretation of statutes, rules, and regulations, and prohibit state agencies from imposing certain requirements on charitable organizations," accessed April 3, 2024
- ↑The Goldwater Institute, "Victory! Indiana Ends Judicial Deference to Unelected Government Bureaucrats," March 14, 2024
- ↑Indiana General Assembly, "Actions for House Bill 1003," accessed April 8, 2024
- ↑Ohio Capital Journal, "Ohio Supreme Court decision clears the path for Preble County solar farms," October 23, 2023
- ↑Supreme Court of Ohio, "In re Application of Alamo Solar I, L.L.C." October 18, 2023
- ↑38.038.138.238.3Supreme Court of Ohio, "TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors," December 29, 2022
- ↑39.039.1LegiScan, "Tennessee Senate Bill 2285," accessed May 20, 2022
- ↑40.040.140.240.3Colorado Supreme Court, "Nieto v. Clark's Market," June 14, 2021
- ↑41.041.141.241.3Yale Journal on Regulation, "The End of Deference: An Update from Mississippi, by Daniel Ortner," June 26, 2021
- ↑JUSTIA, "Mississippi Methodist Hospital & Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Mississippi Division of Medicaid et al.," June 10, 2021
- ↑43.043.143.2JDSupra, "Georgia Legislature approves Taxpayer Fairness Act limiting administrative deference," March 23, 2021
- ↑LegiScan, "Georgia Senate Bill 185," accessed May 24, 2022
- ↑45.045.145.245.345.4Supreme Court of Arkansas, "Meyers v. Yamato Kogyo Co.," April 9, 2020
- ↑46.046.146.2Supreme Court of Arkansas, "American Honda Motor Co. v. Walther," October 29, 2020
- ↑Wisconsin Legislature, "2017 SENATE BILL 884," accessed December 5, 2018
- ↑MacIver Institute, "Republicans Call Extraordinary Session To Protect Legacy Of Reforms," December 3, 2018
- ↑49.049.1Wisconsin Supreme Court, "Tetra Tech EC, Inc., and Lower Fox River Remediation LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue," June 26, 2018
- ↑50.050.1Reason Foundation, "Florida Ballot Amendment Analysis: Amendment 6," September 26, 2018
- ↑JD Supra, "Mississippi Supreme Court Rejects Deference to Agency Readings of Statutes," June 11, 2018
- ↑Mississippi Supreme Court, "CINDY W. KING v. MISSISSIPPI MILITARY DEPARTMENT," June 7, 2018
- ↑53.053.153.2Mississippi Supreme Court, "HWCC-Tunica LLC and BSLO LLC v. Mississippi Department of Revenue and Mississippi Gambling Commission," May 28, 2020
- ↑Pace Law Library, "Arizona Passes New Law Limiting Deference to Agencies," April 12, 2018
- ↑Arizona House of Representatives, "House Bill 2238," 2018
- ↑Endangered Species Law and Policy, "Arizona becomes the First State to Eliminate Chevron Deference," April 12, 2018
- ↑57.057.1SSRN, "The End of Deference: How States (and Territories and Tribes) Are Leading a (Sometimes Quiet) Revolution Against Administrative Deference Doctrines," 2020
- ↑Kansas Supreme Court, "Douglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems LLC," 2013
- ↑59.059.1Find Law, "IN RE: COMPLAINT OF ROVAS AGAINST SBC MICHIGAN," July 23, 2008