Administrative State
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See also:Federal agency rules repealed under the Congressional Review Act

What is the Congressional Review Act (CRA)?
TheCongressional Review Act (CRA) is a law passed in 1996 that allows Congress to review and reject new federal regulations created by government agencies. It is a form oflegislative oversight of agency actions. Under the CRA,Congress has 60working days after a rule has been submitted to Congress to introduce ajoint resolution of disapproval. If Congress approves the resolution and the president signs it, the targeted rule is nullified.

This process of overturning an agencyrule is simpler than other lawmaking procedures. Joint resolutions of disapproval bypass thefilibuster in the Senate by limiting debate to 10 hours, sometimes less. They are also not subject to proposals for amendments, motions to postpone, or motions to proceed to other business.^[1]

Why does it matter?
The CRA is a method of legislative oversight of agency regulations; it and similar agency oversight mechanisms are part of Ballotpedia'slegislative control pillar of the administrative state. It is related to debates about theseparation of powers. As of June 2025, the CRA has been used to repeal36 rules, 32 of which have been during Donald Trump's presidencies (16 rules repealed during each).

What are the key arguments?
The CRA is part of a largerargument about the balance of power between executive agencies and the legislature.

Supporters of the CRA argue that it fosters accountability and congressional oversight, helping to prevent agency overreach and alignment of agency regulation with the priorities of elected leaders. Critics argue that the CRA undermines the ability of agencies to develop effective and consistent regulations and a stable regulatory framework.

What's the background?
The CRA was passed in 1996 and signed into law by PresidentBill Clinton (D).^[2] It is part of theSmall Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act section of the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, which was a legislative package designed to implement reforms that Republicans promised to enact during the 1994 election campaign in theContract With America.^[2][3][4]

Since the CRA was enacted in 1996, it has been used torepeal36 rules as of June 2025. More than 500 joint resolutions of disapproval were introduced between 1996 and March 2025. Over 109,000 federal rules were promulgated in that time.^[5][6]

Dive deeper:
Click the links below to jump to the section:

• Background
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• How the CRA works
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• Historical usage of the CRA
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• Noteworthy events
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Background

Passage of the CRA

The Congressional Review Act was passed in 1996 and signed into law by PresidentBill Clinton (D).^[2] It is part of theSmall Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act section of the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, which was a legislative package designed to implement reforms that Republicans promised to enact during the 1994 election campaign in theContract With America.^[2][3][4] TheContract included promises to reform congressional structure, social security, taxes, budgeting, congressional term limits, and regulatory policy.^[7] Republicans claimed that the reforms contained in theContract would "be the end of government that is too big, too intrusive, and too easy with the public's money."^[7]

Since the CRA was enacted in 1996, it has been used torepeal36 rules as of June 2025. More than 500 joint resolutions of disapproval were introduced between 1996 and March 2025. Over 109,000 federal rules were promulgated in that time.^[8][9] Of these 500 introduced joint resolutions, 32 were passed by Congress and signed by the President within the first year of a new administration, when the President and a majority in each chamber of Congress were from the same party. The CRA is most frequently used when a new president takes office, with most disapprovals targeting rules from the outgoing administration, often of the opposite party. Notable actions include:

• George W. Bush (R) signed the first resolution of disapproval in 2001.
• Donald Trump (R) signed 16 resolutions of disapproval in his first term — 15 in 2017 and one in 2018.
• Joe Biden(D) signed three joint resolutions of disapproval in 2021.
• Donald Trump (R) signed 16 joint resolutions of disapproval in his second term as of June 20, 2025.

Presidents have vetoed 17 CRA resolutions.Click here to learn more about how the CRA has been used since its enactment.

Purpose of the CRA

With the CRA, Congress intended to establish a review system to address the complaint that "Congress [had] effectively abdicated its constitutional role as the national legislature in allowing federal agencies so much latitude in implementing and interpreting congressional enactments," according to the official legislative history of the law.^[3] The same historical record states, "Congressional review gives the public the opportunity to call the attention of politically accountable, elected officials to concerns about new agency rules. If these concerns are sufficiently serious, Congress can stop the rule."^[3]

The CRA is alegislative oversight mechanism that requires a proactive effort by Congress to overturn federal agency rules. Unlike other mechanisms, such as theRegulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, which would impose automatic legislative approval for major rules before they take effect, the CRA operates reactively. Congress must introduce and pass a joint resolution of disapproval for a rule to be invalidated, and the President must sign it to finalize the repeal.

How the CRA works

Overview

Under the Congressional Review Act, a newfinal rule may be invalidated by a joint resolution of disapproval passed by Congress and signed by the president.^[10] The resolution also prevents the agency from issuing a similar rule in the future unless authorized by new legislation, and it barsjudicial review—meaning that a resolution of disapproval cannot be challenged in federal court.^[10] The law requires agencies to submit new and interim final rules to both houses of Congress and theGovernment Accountability Office (GAO) in order to take effect.^[10] The submission should include (1) a copy of the rule; (2) a general description; (3) the proposed effective date; and (4) cost-benefit and other analyses required by thePaperwork Reduction Act and theAdministrative Procedure Act.^[10][11]

The CRA, according to an overview published by theCongressional Research Service (CRS), "adopts the broadest definition ofrule contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)," which includes agency actions such as notices andguidance documents, in addition to final rules.^[12]

Joint resolution of disapproval

Illustration of the CRA lookback window from George Washington University's Regulatory Studies Center

Members of Congress may introduce a CRAresolution of disapproval within 60 days of a new rule notification by an agency.^[10] That time period is counted as 60 working days of a single session.^[10] If a rule is issued and submitted to Congress with less than 60 working days left in the congressional session, the next session of Congress is given time to introduce a resolution of disapproval. In this case, rules are treated as if introduced on the 15th day of the new congressional session, giving Congress a lookback window to consider CRA resolutions of disapproval against regulations put in place near the end of the previous administration.^[13] The CRA incorporates the definition of “rule” used in the Administrative Procedure Act which, in addition to regulations, includesguidance documents and policy memoranda.^[10]

In the Senate, the CRA provides a process for Senate bills to circumvent two obstacles— committee passage and voting— if the chamber acts upon the resolution of disapproval within 60 days of the agency notifying Congress of the rule:^[10][14]

• If a Senate committee has not reported a resolution of disapproval after 20 calendar days, 30 senators can sign a petition to discharge the resolution from the committee and place it on the Senate calendar.Cite error: Invalid<ref> tag; invalid names, e.g. too many
• Once on the Senate Calendar, it is not subject to amendments, motions to postpone, or motions to proceed to other business. The debate on a resolution is limited to 10 hours, though it can be further limited. Resolutions must be voted on immediately following their debate.Cite error: Invalid<ref> tag; invalid names, e.g. too many

In the House, the resolution is often considered under a closed special rule reported by theRules Committee, according to theCongressional Research Service.^[4] All votes under a CRA resolution are simple majority votes.^[4] As with other legislation, Congress may override a presidentialveto of a CRA resolution by a two-thirds vote of members.^[4]

If a resolution of disapproval passes, the targeted rule does not take effect.^[10] If the rule is already in effect, the resolution blocks enforcement, and the agency must act as though the rule never took effect.^[10]

The CRA does not apply to rules governing agency procedures, management, and personnel.^[10] A CRA resolution cannot invalidate parts of a rule or more than one rule at a time.^[10]

Review of major rules

See also:Major rule

The CRA includes two additional provisions for rules that are designated as major—that is, rules expected to cost the private sector at least $100 million annually or that have significant impacts on employment, investment, competition or prices:^[11]

• First, the comptroller general at GAO is required to submit an assessment of the rule to the congressional committees of jurisdiction within 15 calendar days of the rule's submission or its publication in theFederal Register.^[11]

• Second, Congress may delay a major rule from taking effect in order to have more time to consider the rule beyond the standard 60 days under the CRA.^[10]

The law gives the administrator of theOffice of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) the responsibility for determining whether a new rule is major.^[10]

Historical usage of the CRA

See also:Federal agency rules repealed under the Congressional Review Act andUses of the Congressional Review Act during the Trump administration andUses of the Congressional Review Act during the Biden administration

Before 2017, the only successful use of the CRA was in 2001 when the recently sworn-in Congress and PresidentGeorge W. Bush (R) reversed an ergonomic standards rule issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration during the final months of the previous administration.

During his presidency,Barack Obama (D) vetoed five CRA resolutions addressing environmental, labor, and financial policy.^[15][16]

In the first four months of his first term, PresidentDonald Trump (R) signed 14 CRA resolutions from Congress undoing a variety of rules issued near the end ofBarack Obama's (D) presidency.^{[17][18][15][19]} In total, Congress repealed 16 rules using the CRA during Trump's first term.^[20][21] Trump vetoed one resolution of disapproval near the end of his first term in 2020.^[22]

OnJune 30, 2021, Joe Biden (D) signed three CRA resolutions of disapproval, bringing the total number of rules repealed through the CRA to 20.^[23][24][25] Biden also vetoed 11 resolutions of disapproval during 2023 and 2024.

In his second term,Donald Trump (R) has signed 16 joint resolutions of disapproval as of June 20, 2025.

Resolutions of disapproval enacted by presidential administration through June 2025:

• George W. Bush:1 rule repealed under the CRA
• Barack Obama:0 rules repealed under the CRA
• Donald Trump - First term:16 rules repealed under the CRA
• Joe Biden:3 rules repealed under the CRA
• Donald Trump - Second term:16 rules repealed under the CRA as of June 20, 2025

Below is a table showing all of the rules repealed under theCongressional Review Act as of June 2025. It also shows the 17 CRA resolutions that were vetoed and failed to repeal rules:^{[26][27][28][29]}

Noteworthy events

Beyond repealing rules made by agencies following therulemaking process, theTrump administration took steps to apply the CRA toguidance documents, including guidance issued byindependent federal agencies.

May 21, 2018: CFPB guidance repealed

See also:Congress votes to repeal an agency guidance document for the first time

On May 21, 2018, President Trump signed a CRA resolution invalidating aguidance document issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).^[20] It was the first time that the CRA was used to overturn a guidance document rather than a rule issued through therulemaking procedures of theAdministrative Procedure Act. The repeal resolution was introduced to Congress in March 2018 by Sen.Jerry Moran (R-Kan.). TheU.S. Senate passed the resolution on April 18, 2018. The vote was 51-47, with all present Republicans and West Virginia DemocratJoe Manchin voting in favor. Sens.John McCain (R-Ariz.) andTammy Duckworth (D-Ill.) were absent.^[30] TheU.S. House of Representatives passed a corresponding resolution on May 8 by a vote of 234-175. The measure was mainly supported by Republicans, with 11 Democrats also voting for the resolution.^[31]

Guidance documents, agency documents created to explain, interpret, or advise interested parties about rules, laws, and procedures, are not typically subject to the CRA. However, on December 5, 2017, theGovernment Accountability Office (GAO) issued a determination that the CFPB's indirect auto lending bulletin was arule for the purposes of the CRA. The GAO made this determination in response to a study request from Sen.Pat Toomey (R-Pa.).^[32]

April 11, 2019: Memo outlined White House review of independent agencies and guidance documents

An April 11 guidance memo published by theOffice of Management and Budget (OMB) established rules for compliance with the CRA.^[33] It amended earlier OMB guidance for implementing the CRA published in 1999 to affirm thatOffice of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review procedures apply to historically independent agencies. It also stated that some guidance documents fall within the definition of rules subject to the CRA.^[33]

The guidance memo told agencies not to publish any rules in theFederal Register or anywhere else until both OIRA determined whether the rule is major and the agency has complied with the CRA.^[33]

The memo affirmed the broad scope of the CRA over rules coming out of theadministrative state. Under Clinton-eraExecutive Order 12866, agencies have to submit any significant regulatory actions to OIRA for review.^[33] However, agencies do not submit all CRA-covered actions to OIRA.^[34] In addition tonotice-and-comment rules, the new OMB memo said that agencies have to submit statements of policy and interpretive rules to OIRA and Congress.^[33] That instruction included guidance documents, which agencies often fail to submit for CRA review.^[34] The memo required agencies to include a CRA compliance statement in the body of new rules, which gives Congress notice that OIRA determined whether the rule was major.^[33]

Guidance documents, memoranda, and other statements by agencies issued outside the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) can have practical effects on the public even if they are not always legally binding. Some critics of the administrative state have called those kinds of agency actionsregulatory dark matter. The OMB memo included regulatory dark matter within the CRA review process and could result in "more accurate accounting of the economic effects of rules and guidance, with the opportunity for more informed action by Congress and the public," according to professor Bridget C. E. Dooling.^[33][34] Others saw the memo as more than a clarification of the existing requirements of the CRA. The memo was "a controversial step that has long been a goal of conservative groups," according to Damien Paletta, writing for theWashington Post.^[35] Paletta also wrote that "[t]he step could have the effect of nullifying or blocking a range of new regulatory initiatives."^[35]

April 4, 2025: Senate parliamentarian ruled against CRA resolutions that disapprove of EPA waivers

On April 4, 2025, theSenate Parliamentarian made a determination thatEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) waivers are not subject to motions of disapproval under the CRA.^[36] The EPA had previously granted waivers to theClean Air Act (CAA), under which the EPA agreed to allow California to adopt more-stringent motor vehicle emissions standards than those promulgated under the CAA. As of April 4, 2025, Congress was considering three CRA resolutions of disapproval of the EPA waivers.^[37] TheGovernment Accountability Office had previously ruled that these waivers were not rules under the CRA, and that they were therefore not subject to the resolution of disapproval process under the CAA.^[11] The parliamentarian's non-binding determination on April 4, 2025 agreed with this position, ruling that the EPA waivers were not rules under the CRA and were therefore not subject to the motion of disapproval process.^[38]

See also

• Congressional Review Act Learning Journey
• Federal agency rules repealed under the Congressional Review Act
• Uses of the Congressional Review Act during the Trump administrations
• Uses of the Congressional Review Act during the Biden administration
• Congress votes to repeal an agency guidance document for the first time
• U.S. Government Accountability Office
• Office of Management and Budget
• Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
• Related terms and laws:
  • Major rule
  • Joint resolution of disapproval
  • REINS Act
  • Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

External links

• Congressional Review Act (5 U.S. Code Chapter 8)
• U.S. Government Accountability Office
• Search Google News for this topic

Footnotes

v • e The Administrative State Main The Administrative State Project main page •Administrative State Project Index •Glossary of administrative state terms •Quotes about the administrative state •Administrative state •Rulemaking •Deference •Adjudication •Nondelegation doctrine •Ballotpedia's administrative state legislation tracker Pillars Agency control •Executive control •Judicial control •Legislative control •Public control Reporting Changes to the Federal Register •Completed OIRA review of federal administrative agency rules •Federal agency rules repealed under the Congressional Review Act •Historical additions to the Federal Register, 1936-2016 Laws Administrative Procedure Act •Antiquities Act •Civil Service Reform Act •Clayton Antitrust Act •Communications Act of 1934 •Congressional Review Act •Electronic Freedom of Information Act •Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 •Federal Housekeeping Statute •Federal Reserve Act •Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 •Freedom of Information Act •Government in the Sunshine Act •Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1952 •Information Quality Act •Interstate Commerce Act •National Labor Relations Act •Paperwork Reduction Act •Pendleton Act •Privacy Act of 1974 •Regulatory Flexibility Act •REINS Act •REINS Act (Wisconsin) •Securities Act of 1933 •Securities Exchange Act of 1934 •Sherman Antitrust Act •Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act •Truth in Regulating Act •Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Cases Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner •A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States •Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp •Auer v. Robbins •Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council •Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe •Federal Trade Commission (FTC) v. Standard Oil Company of California •Field v. Clark •Food and Drug Administration v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation •Humphrey's Executor v. United States •Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha •J.W. Hampton Jr. & Company v. United States •Lucia v. SEC •Marshall v. Barlow's •Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency •Mistretta v. United States •National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius •National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning Company •National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. •Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan •Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation •Skidmore v. Swift & Co. •United States v. Lopez •United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co. •Universal Camera Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board •Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council •Wayman v. Southard •Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service •Whitman v. American Trucking Associations •Wickard v. Filburn •Wiener v. United States Terms Adjudication (administrative state) •Administrative judge •Administrative law •Administrative law judge •Administrative state •Arbitrary-or-capricious test •Auer deference •Barrier to entry •Bootleggers and Baptists •Chevron deference (doctrine) •Civil servant •Civil service •Code of Federal Regulations •Codify (administrative state) •Comment period •Compliance costs •Congressional Record •Coordination (administrative state) •Deference (administrative state) •Direct and indirect costs (administrative state) •Enabling statute •Ex parte communication (administrative state) •Executive agency •Federal law •Federal Register •Federalism •Final rule •Formal rulemaking •Formalism (law) •Functionalism (law) •Guidance (administrative state) •Hybrid rulemaking •Incorporation by reference •Independent federal agency •Informal rulemaking •Joint resolution of disapproval (administrative state) •Major rule •Negotiated rulemaking •Nondelegation doctrine •OIRA prompt letter •Organic statute •Pragmatism (law) •Precautionary principle •Promulgate •Proposed rule •Publication rulemaking •Regulatory budget •Regulatory capture •Regulatory dark matter •Regulatory impact analysis •Regulatory policy officer •Regulatory reform officer •Regulatory review •Rent seeking •Retrospective regulatory review •Risk assessment (administrative state) •Rulemaking •Separation of powers •Significant regulatory action •Skidmore deference •Statutory authority •Substantive law and procedural law •Sue and settle •Sunset provision •Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions •United States Code •United States Statutes at Large Bibliography "Administrative Law - The 20th Century Bequeaths an 'Illegitimate Exotic' in Full and Terrifying Flower" by Stephen P. Dresch (2000) "Confronting the Administrative Threat" by Philip Hamburger and Tony Mills (2017) "Constitutionalism after the New Deal" by Cass R. Sunstein (1987) Federalist No. 23 by Alexander Hamilton (1787) "From Administrative State to Constitutional Government" by Joseph Postell (2012) "Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine" by Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule (2002) "Rulemaking as Legislating" by Kathryn Watts (2015) "The Checks & Balances of the Regulatory State" by Paul R. Verkuil (2016) "The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine" by Keith E. Whittington and Jason Iuliano (2017) "The Progressive Origins of the Administrative State: Wilson, Goodnow, and Landis" by Ronald J. Pestritto (2007) "The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State" by Gary Lawson (1994) "The Study of Administration" by Woodrow Wilson (1887) "The Threat to Liberty" by Steven F. Hayward (2017) "Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent with the Rule of Law" by Richard A. Epstein (2008) Agencies Administrative Conference of the United States •United States Civil Service Commission •U.S. Government Accountability Office •U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs •U.S. Office of Management and Budget