| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1567.001 | Exfiltration to Code Repository |
| T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
| T1567.003 | Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites |
| T1567.004 | Exfiltration Over Webhook |
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.
Examples of cloud storage services include Dropbox and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network are already communicating with the service.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G1024 | Akira | Akira will exfiltrate victim data using applications such asRclone.[1] |
| C0040 | APT41 DUST | APT41 DUST exfiltrated collected information to OneDrive.[2] |
| S0635 | BoomBox | BoomBox can upload data to dedicated per-victim folders in Dropbox.[3] |
| S0651 | BoxCaon | BoxCaon has the capability to download folders' contents on the system and upload the results back to its Dropbox drive.[4] |
| C0015 | C0015 | DuringC0015, the threat actors exfiltrated files and sensitive data to the MEGA cloud storage site using theRclone command |
| G0114 | Chimera | Chimera has exfiltrated stolen data to OneDrive accounts.[6] |
| G1021 | Cinnamon Tempest | Cinnamon Tempest has uploaded captured keystroke logs to the Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Service, Aliyun OSS.[7] |
| S0660 | Clambling | Clambling can send files from a victim's machine to Dropbox.[8][9] |
| G0142 | Confucius | Confucius has exfiltrated victim data to cloud storage service accounts.[10] |
| G1052 | Contagious Interview | Contagious Interview has exfiltrated stolen passwords to Dropbox.[11] |
| S1023 | CreepyDrive | CreepyDrive can use cloud services including OneDrive for data exfiltration.[12] |
| S0538 | Crutch | |
| G1006 | Earth Lusca | Earth Lusca has used the megacmd tool to upload stolen files from a victim network to MEGA.[14] |
| G1003 | Ember Bear | Ember Bear has used tools such asRclone to exfiltrate information from victim environments to cloud storage such as |
| S0363 | Empire | |
| G0046 | FIN7 | FIN7 has exfiltrated stolen data to the MEGA file sharing site.[17] |
| G0125 | HAFNIUM | HAFNIUM has exfiltrated data to file sharing sites, including MEGA.[18] |
| S0037 | HAMMERTOSS | HAMMERTOSS exfiltrates data by uploading it to accounts created by the actors on Web cloud storage providers for the adversaries to retrieve later.[19] |
| G1001 | HEXANE | HEXANE has used cloud services, including OneDrive, for data exfiltration.[12] |
| G0119 | Indrik Spider | Indrik Spider has exfiltrated data usingRclone or MEGASync prior to deploying ransomware.[20] |
| G0094 | Kimsuky | Kimsuky has exfiltrated stolen files and data to actor-controlled Blogspot accounts.[21]Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for uploading victim system information.[22] |
| G0065 | Leviathan | Leviathan has used an uploader known as LUNCHMONEY that can exfiltrate files to Dropbox.[23][24] |
| G1014 | LuminousMoth | LuminousMoth has exfiltrated data to Google Drive.[25] |
| G1051 | Medusa Group | Medusa Group has utilizedRclone to exfiltrate data from victim environments to cloud storage.[26][27] |
| G0129 | Mustang Panda | Mustang Panda has also exfiltrated archived files to cloud services such as Dropbox using |
| S0340 | Octopus | |
| S1170 | ODAgent | ODAgent can use an attacker-controlled OneDrive account for exfiltration.[31] |
| S1172 | OilBooster | OilBooster can exfiltrate files to an actor-controlled OneDrive account via the Microsoft Graph API.[31] |
| C0022 | Operation Dream Job | DuringOperation Dream Job,Lazarus Group used a custom build of open-source command-line dbxcli to exfiltrate stolen data to Dropbox.[32][33] |
| S1102 | Pcexter | Pcexter can upload stolen files to OneDrive storage accounts via HTTP |
| G1005 | POLONIUM | POLONIUM has exfiltrated stolen data toPOLONIUM-owned OneDrive and Dropbox accounts.[12] |
| S0629 | RainyDay | RainyDay can use a file exfiltration tool to upload specific files to Dropbox.[35] |
| S1040 | Rclone | Rclone can exfiltrate data to cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA.[36][5] |
| S1222 | RIFLESPINE | RIFLESPINE can upload results from executed C2 commands to cloud storage.[37] |
| S0240 | ROKRAT | ROKRAT can send collected data to cloud storage services such as PCloud.[38][39] |
| G1015 | Scattered Spider | Scattered Spider has exfiltrated victim data to the MEGA file sharing site, SnowFlake, and AWS S3 buckets.[40][41][42] |
| G1053 | Storm-0501 | Storm-0501 has exfiltrated stolen data to the MEGA file sharing site.[43]Storm-0501 has also utilizedRclone to exfiltrate data from victim environments to cloud storage such as MegaSync.[44]Storm-0501 has exfiltrated data to their own infrastructure utilizing AzCopy Command-Line tool (CLI).[45] |
| G0027 | Threat Group-3390 | Threat Group-3390 has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox.[8] |
| G1022 | ToddyCat | ToddyCat has used a DropBox uploader to exfiltrate stolen files.[34] |
| G0010 | Turla | Turla has used WebDAV to upload stolen USB files to a cloud drive.[46]Turla has also exfiltrated stolen files to OneDrive and 4shared.[47] |
| G0102 | Wizard Spider | Wizard Spider has exfiltrated stolen victim data to various cloud storage providers.[48] |
| G0128 | ZIRCONIUM |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1021 | Restrict Web-Based Content | Web proxies can be used to enforce an external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services. |
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0570 | Detection Strategy for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | AN1571 | Unusual processes (e.g., powershell.exe, excel.exe) accessing large local files and subsequently initiating HTTPS POST requests to domains associated with cloud storage services (e.g., dropbox.com, drive.google.com, box.com). Defender perspective: correlation between file reads in sensitive directories and high outbound traffic volume to known storage APIs. |
| AN1572 | Processes such as curl, wget, rclone, or custom scripts executing uploads to cloud storage endpoints. Defender perspective: detect chained events where tar/gzip is executed to compress files followed by HTTPS PUT/POST requests to known storage services. | ||
| AN1573 | Applications or scripts invoking cloud storage APIs (Dropbox sync, iCloud, Google Drive client) in unexpected contexts. Defender perspective: detect sensitive file reads by non-standard applications followed by unusual encrypted uploads to external cloud storage domains. | ||
| AN1574 | Unusual ESXi processes (vmx, hostd) reading datastore files and generating outbound HTTPS traffic toward external cloud storage endpoints. Defender perspective: anomalous datastore activity followed by network transfers to Dropbox, AWS S3, or other storage services. |