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Event Triggered Execution: AppInit DLLs

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in theAppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keysHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows orHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library.[1]

Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.[2] Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.

The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled.[3]

ID: T1546.010
Sub-technique of: T1546
Platforms: Windows
Version: 1.2
Created: 24 January 2020
Last Modified: 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

IDNameDescription
G0087 APT39

APT39 has used malware to setLoadAppInit_DLLs in the Registry keySOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows in order to establish persistence.[4]

S0107 Cherry Picker

Some variants ofCherry Picker use AppInit_DLLs to achieve persistence by creating the following Registry key:HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows "AppInit_DLLs"="pserver32.dll"[5]

S0458 Ramsay

Ramsay can insert itself into the address space of other applications using the AppInit DLL Registry key.[6]

S0098 T9000

If a victim meets certain criteria,T9000 uses the AppInit_DLL functionality to achieve persistence by ensuring that every user mode process that is spawned will load its malicious DLL, ResN32.dll. It does this by creating the following Registry keys:HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_DLLs – %APPDATA%\Intel\ResN32.dll andHKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\LoadAppInit_DLLs – 0x1.[7]

Mitigations

IDMitigationDescription
M1038 Execution Prevention

Adversaries can install new AppInit DLLs binaries to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through AppInit DLLs functionality by using application control[8] tools, like Windows Defender Application Control[9], AppLocker,[10][11] or Software Restriction Policies[12] where appropriate.[13]

M1051 Update Software

Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot.

Detection Strategy

IDNameAnalytic IDAnalytic Description
DET0557Detection Strategy for Event Triggered Execution: AppInit DLLs (Windows)AN1536

Registry key modification to AppInit_DLLs value followed by anomalous DLL loading by processes importing user32.dll, especially unsigned or uncommon DLLs, suggesting unauthorized AppInit persistence or privilege escalation.

References

  1. Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.
  2. Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry value. Retrieved July 15, 2015.
  3. Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July 15, 2015.
  4. FBI. (2020, September 17). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Rana Intelligence Computing, also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 39, Chafer, Cadelspy, Remexi, and ITG07. Retrieved December 10, 2020.
  5. Merritt, E.. (2015, November 16). Shining the Spotlight on Cherry Picker PoS Malware. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
  6. Sanmillan, I.. (2020, May 13). Ramsay: A cyber‑espionage toolkit tailored for air‑gapped networks. Retrieved May 27, 2020.
  7. Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, February 4). T9000: Advanced Modular Backdoor Uses Complex Anti-Analysis Techniques. Retrieved April 15, 2016.
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