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  4. Create or Modify System Process
  5. Launch Daemon

Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon

Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and/Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include aLabel to identify the task,Program to provide a path to the executable, andRunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.[1][2][3]

Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using theRunAtLoad parameter set totrue and theProgram parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e.Masquerading). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.[4][5]

Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such asusr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.[6][7]

ID: T1543.004
Sub-technique of: T1543
ⓘ
Platforms: macOS
Version: 1.3
Created: 17 January 2020
Last Modified: 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

IDNameDescription
C0057 3CX Supply Chain Attack

During the3CX Supply Chain Attack,AppleJeus installs a Launch Daemon to execute the POOLRAT macOS backdoor software.[8]

S0584 AppleJeus

AppleJeus has placed a plist file within theLaunchDaemons folder and launched it manually.[9][10]

S0482 Bundlore

Bundlore can persist via a LaunchDaemon.[11]

S1105 COATHANGER

COATHANGER will create a daemon for timed check-ins with command and control infrastructure.[12]

S0497 Dacls

Dacls can establish persistence via a Launch Daemon.[13][14]

S0690 Green Lambert

Green Lambert can add a plist file in theLibrary/LaunchDaemons to establish persistence.[15][16]

S0451 LoudMiner

LoudMiner adds plist files with the naming formatcom.[random_name].plist in the/Library/LaunchDaemons folder with the RunAtLoad and KeepAlive keys set totrue.[17]

S0352 OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D

If running withroot permissions,OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder/Library/LaunchDaemons.[18][19]

S1219 REPTILE

TheREPTILE launcher can daemonize a process.[20]

S0595 ThiefQuest

When running with root privileges after aLaunch Agent is installed,ThiefQuest installs a plist file to the/Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder with theRunAtLoad key set totrue establishing persistence as a Launch Daemon.[21]

S0658 XCSSET

XCSSET uses the ssh launchdaemon to elevate privileges, bypass system controls, and enable remote access to the victim.[22]

Mitigations

IDMitigationDescription
M1047 Audit

Use auditing tools capable of detecting folder permissions abuse opportunities on systems, especially reviewing changes made to folders by third-party software.

M1018 User Account Management

Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new Launch Daemons.

Detection Strategy

IDNameAnalytic IDAnalytic Description
DET0401Detection Strategy for Launch Daemon Creation or Modification (macOS)AN1126

Creation or modification of.plist files in /Library/LaunchDaemons/, especially those with suspicious Program or ProgramArguments paths, combined with execution activity under launchd with elevated privileges. Detectable through correlated Unified Logs, file monitoring, and process telemetry.

References

  1. Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
  2. Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
  3. Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021.
  4. Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
  5. Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  6. Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
  7. Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
  8. Jeff Johnson, Fred Plan, Adrian Sanchez, Renato Fontana, Jake Nicastro, Dimiter Andonov, Marius Fodoreanu, Daniel Scott. (2023, April 20). 3CX Software Supply Chain Compromise Initiated by a Prior Software Supply Chain Compromise; Suspected North Korean Actor Responsible. Retrieved August 25, 2025.
  9. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
  10. Patrick Wardle. (2019, October 12). Pass the AppleJeus. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
  11. Sushko, O. (2019, April 17). macOS Bundlore: Mac Virus Bypassing macOS Security Features. Retrieved June 30, 2020.
  1. Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) & Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). (2024, February 6). Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands uncovers COATHANGER, a stealthy Chinese FortiGate RAT. Retrieved February 7, 2024.
  2. Stokes, P. (2020, July 27). Four Distinct Families of Lazarus Malware Target Apple’s macOS Platform. Retrieved August 7, 2020.
  3. Mabutas, G. (2020, May 11). New MacOS Dacls RAT Backdoor Shows Lazarus’ Multi-Platform Attack Capability. Retrieved August 10, 2020.
  4. Sandvik, Runa. (2021, October 1). Made In America: Green Lambert for OS X. Retrieved March 21, 2022.
  5. Sandvik, Runa. (2021, October 18). Green Lambert and ATT&CK. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  6. Malik, M. (2019, June 20). LoudMiner: Cross-platform mining in cracked VST software. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
  7. Horejsi, J. (2018, April 04). New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
  8. Phil Stokes. (2020, December 2). APT32 Multi-stage macOS Trojan Innovates on Crimeware Scripting Technique. Retrieved September 13, 2021.
  9. Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024.
  10. Patrick Wardle. (2020, June 29). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part i: infection, persistence, and more!. Retrieved March 18, 2021.
  11. Mac Threat Response, Mobile Research Team. (2020, August 13). The XCSSET Malware: Inserts Malicious Code Into Xcode Projects, Performs UXSS Backdoor Planting in Safari, and Leverages Two Zero-day Exploits. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
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