| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1074.001 | Local Data Staging |
| T1074.002 | Remote Data Staging |
Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such asArchive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality withincmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary mayCreate Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance.[1]
By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0007 | APT28 | APT28 has staged archives of collected data on a target's Outlook Web Access (OWA) server.[2] |
| S1043 | ccf32 | ccf32 has copied files to a remote machine infected withChinoxy or another backdoor.[3] |
| G0114 | Chimera | Chimera has staged stolen data on designated servers in the target environment.[4] |
| G0037 | FIN6 | FIN6 actors have compressed data from remote systems and moved it to another staging system before exfiltration.[5] |
| G0061 | FIN8 | FIN8 aggregates staged data from a network into a single location.[6] |
| G0065 | Leviathan | Leviathan has staged data remotely prior to exfiltration.[7] |
| G0045 | menuPass | menuPass has staged data on remote MSP systems or other victim networks prior to exfiltration.[8][9] |
| G1019 | MoustachedBouncer | MoustachedBouncer has used plugins to save captured screenshots to |
| C0002 | Night Dragon | DuringNight Dragon, threat actors copied files to company web servers and subsequently downloaded them.[11] |
| G1041 | Sea Turtle | Sea Turtle staged collected email archives in the public web directory of a website that was accessible from the internet.[12] |
| C0024 | SolarWinds Compromise | During theSolarWinds Compromise,APT29 staged data and files in password-protected archives on a victim's OWA server.[13] |
| G0027 | Threat Group-3390 | Threat Group-3390 has moved staged encrypted archives to Internet-facing servers that had previously been compromised withChina Chopper prior to exfiltration.[14] |
| G1022 | ToddyCat | ToddyCat manually transferred collected files to an exfiltration host using xcopy.[15] |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| ID | Name | Analytic ID | Analytic Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| DET0071 | Detection of Remote Data Staging Prior to Exfiltration | AN0194 | Detects file transfers or mounting operations from remote hosts followed by write actions into a local staging directory, often using SMB or remote shell activity. |
| AN0195 | Detects inbound SCP, rsync, or NFS mounts from remote systems followed by aggregation of files into known staging paths like /mnt/staging or /var/tmp. | ||
| AN0196 | Detects rsync or scp inbound from other hosts that then aggregate content into /Users/Shared or /private/tmp, often involving compressed files or scripts. | ||
| AN0197 | Detects remote writes or snapshots mounted from other systems into a central ESXi VMFS path or NFS store used for remote staging of files before exfiltration. | ||
| AN0198 | Detects remote write activity across cloud VMs or object storage buckets within the same region/account that correlate with data aggregation across hosts. |