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  4. OS Credential Dumping
  5. Cached Domain Credentials

OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials

Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.[1]

On Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash.[2] The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requiresPassword Cracking to recover the plaintext password.[3]

On Linux systems, Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at/var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb for SSSD or/var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such astdbdump, on these database files to dump the cached hashes and usePassword Cracking to obtain the plaintext password.[4]

With SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such asMimikatz,Reg, and secretsdump.py for Windows or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials.[4]

Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.[2]

ID: T1003.005
Sub-technique of: T1003
Platforms: Linux, Windows
Contributors: Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs; Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown; Yves Yonan
Version: 1.1
Created: 21 February 2020
Last Modified: 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

IDNameDescription
G0064 APT33

APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools likeLaZagne to gather credentials.[5][6]

S0119 Cachedump

Cachedump can extract cached password hashes from cache entry information.[7]

S0349 LaZagne

LaZagne can perform credential dumping from MSCache to obtain account and password information.[8]

G0077 Leafminer

Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information, including LaZagne.[9]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has performed credential dumping withLaZagne.[10][11]

G0049 OilRig

OilRig has used credential dumping tools such asLaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.[12][13][14][15]

S0439 Okrum

Okrum was seen using modified Quarks PwDump to perform credential dumping.[16]

S0192 Pupy

Pupy can use Lazagne for harvesting credentials.[17]

Mitigations

IDMitigationDescription
M1015 Active Directory Configuration

Consider adding users to the "Protected Users" Active Directory security group. This can help limit the caching of users' plaintext credentials.[18]

M1028 Operating System Configuration

Consider limiting the number of cached credentials (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current Version\Winlogon\cachedlogonscountvalue)[19]

M1027 Password Policies

Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network.

M1026 Privileged Account Management

Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.

M1017 User Training

Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts.

Detection Strategy

IDNameAnalytic IDAnalytic Description
DET0513Detection of Cached Domain Credential Dumping via Local Hash Cache AccessAN1417

Detects adversary behavior accessing Windows cached domain credential files using tools like Mimikatz, reg.exe, or PowerShell, often combined with registry exports or LSASS memory scraping.

AN1418

Detects access to SSSD or Quest VAS cached credential databases using tdbdump or other file access patterns, requiring sudo/root access.

References

  1. Microsoft. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
  2. Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
  3. Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
  4. Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.
  5. Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
  6. Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  7. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
  8. Zanni, A. (n.d.). The LaZagne Project !!!. Retrieved December 14, 2018.
  9. Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018.
  10. Lancaster, T.. (2017, November 14). Muddying the Water: Targeted Attacks in the Middle East. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
  1. Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2018, December 10). Seedworm: Group Compromises Government Agencies, Oil & Gas, NGOs, Telecoms, and IT Firms. Retrieved December 14, 2018.
  2. Unit42. (2016, May 1). Evasive Serpens Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved February 6, 2023.
  3. Davis, S. and Caban, D. (2017, December 19). APT34 - New Targeted Attack in the Middle East. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
  4. Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  5. Bromiley, M., et al.. (2019, July 18). Hard Pass: Declining APT34’s Invite to Join Their Professional Network. Retrieved August 26, 2019.
  6. Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.
  7. Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018.
  8. Microsoft. (2016, October 12). Protected Users Security Group. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  9. Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack, Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
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