| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol:Web Protocols | FoggyWeb has the ability to communicate with C2 servers over HTTP GET/POST requests.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1560 | .002 | Archive Collected Data:Archive via Library | FoggyWeb can invoke the |
| .003 | Archive Collected Data:Archive via Custom Method | FoggyWeb can use a dynamic XOR key and a custom XOR methodology to encode data before exfiltration. Also,FoggyWeb can encode C2 command output within a legitimate WebP file.[1] | ||
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | FoggyWeb can retrieve configuration data from a compromised AD FS server.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | FoggyWeb can be decrypted in memory using a Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (LEA)-128 key and decoded using a XOR key.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1573 | .001 | Encrypted Channel:Symmetric Cryptography | FoggyWeb has used a dynamic XOR key and custom XOR methodology for C2 communications.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | FoggyWeb can remotely exfiltrate sensitive information from a compromised AD FS server.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | FoggyWeb's loader can check for theFoggyWeb backdoor .pri file on a compromised AD FS server.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1574 | .001 | Hijack Execution Flow:DLL | FoggyWeb's loader has used DLL Search Order Hijacking to load malicious code instead of the legitimate |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | FoggyWeb can receive additional malicious components from an actor controlled C2 server and execute them on a compromised AD FS server.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | FoggyWeb can masquerade the output of C2 commands as a fake, but legitimately formatted WebP file.[1] | |
| .005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | FoggyWeb can be disguised as a Visual Studio file such as | ||
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | FoggyWeb's loader can use API functions to load theFoggyWeb backdoor into the same Application Domain within which the legitimate AD FS managed code is executed.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1040 | Network Sniffing | FoggyWeb can configure custom listeners to passively monitor all incoming HTTP GET and POST requests sent to the AD FS server from the intranet/internet and intercept HTTP requests that match the custom URI patterns defined by the actor.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | .004 | Obfuscated Files or Information:Compile After Delivery | FoggyWeb can compile and execute source code sent to the compromised AD FS server via a specific HTTP POST.[1] |
| .013 | Obfuscated Files or Information:Encrypted/Encoded File | |||
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | FoggyWeb's loader can enumerate all Common Language Runtimes (CLRs) and running Application Domains in the compromised AD FS server's | |
| Enterprise | T1620 | Reflective Code Loading | FoggyWeb's loader has reflectively loaded .NET-based assembly/payloads into memory.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1129 | Shared Modules | FoggyWeb's loader can call the | |
| Enterprise | T1552 | .004 | Unsecured Credentials:Private Keys | FoggyWeb can retrieve token signing certificates and token decryption certificates from a compromised AD FS server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1550 | Use Alternate Authentication Material | FoggyWeb can allow abuse of a compromised AD FS server's SAML token.[1] | |