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Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as "adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors". Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities,Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit andMimikatz.[1]

ID: S0154
Type: MALWARE
Platforms: Windows, Linux, macOS
Contributors: Martin Sohn Christensen, Improsec; Josh Abraham
Version: 1.13
Created: 14 December 2017
Last Modified: 25 September 2024
Enterprise Layer
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Techniques Used

DomainIDNameUse
EnterpriseT1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism:Bypass User Account Control

Cobalt Strike can use a number of known techniques to bypass Windows UAC.[1][2]

.003Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism:Sudo and Sudo Caching

Cobalt Strike can usesudo to run a command.[2]

EnterpriseT1134.001Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/Theft

Cobalt Strike can steal access tokens from exiting processes.[1][2]

.003Access Token Manipulation:Make and Impersonate Token

Cobalt Strike can make tokens from known credentials.[1]

.004Access Token Manipulation:Parent PID Spoofing

Cobalt Strike can spawn processes with alternate PPIDs.[3][2]

EnterpriseT1087.002Account Discovery:Domain Account

Cobalt Strike can determine if the user on an infected machine is in the admin or domain admin group.[4]

EnterpriseT1071.001Application Layer Protocol:Web Protocols

Cobalt Strike can use a custom command and control protocol that can be encapsulated in HTTP or HTTPS. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.[1][5][2][6][7]

.002Application Layer Protocol:File Transfer Protocols

Cobalt Strike can conduct peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.[1][5]

.004Application Layer Protocol:DNS

Cobalt Strike can use a custom command and control protocol that can be encapsulated in DNS. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.[1][5][2]

EnterpriseT1197BITS Jobs

Cobalt Strike can download a hosted "beacon" payload usingBITSAdmin.[8][5][2]

EnterpriseT1185Browser Session Hijacking

Cobalt Strike can perform browser pivoting and inject into a user's browser to inherit cookies, authenticated HTTP sessions, and client SSL certificates.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter:PowerShell

Cobalt Strike can execute a payload on a remote host with PowerShell. This technique does not write any data to disk.[1][4]Cobalt Strike can also usePowerSploit and other scripting frameworks to perform execution.[9][3][5][2]

.003Command and Scripting Interpreter:Windows Command Shell

Cobalt Strike uses a command-line interface to interact with systems.[9][5][2][10]

.005Command and Scripting Interpreter:Visual Basic

Cobalt Strike can use VBA to perform execution.[9][3][5]

.006Command and Scripting Interpreter:Python

Cobalt Strike can use Python to perform execution.[9][3][5][2]

.007Command and Scripting Interpreter:JavaScript

TheCobalt Strike System Profiler can use JavaScript to perform reconnaissance actions.[5]

EnterpriseT1543.003Create or Modify System Process:Windows Service

Cobalt Strike can install a new service.[9]

EnterpriseT1132.001Data Encoding:Standard Encoding

Cobalt Strike can use Base64, URL-safe Base64, or NetBIOS encoding in its C2 traffic.[2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Cobalt Strike can collect data from a local system.[9][2]

EnterpriseT1001.003Data Obfuscation:Protocol or Service Impersonation

Cobalt Strike can leverage the HTTP protocol for C2 communication, while hiding the actual data in either an HTTP header, URI parameter, the transaction body, or appending it to the URI.[2]

EnterpriseT1030Data Transfer Size Limits

Cobalt Strike will break large data sets into smaller chunks for exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Cobalt Strike can deobfuscate shellcode using a rolling XOR and decrypt metadata from Beacon sessions.[5][2]

EnterpriseT1573.001Encrypted Channel:Symmetric Cryptography

Cobalt Strike has the ability to use AES-256 symmetric encryption in CBC mode with HMAC-SHA-256 to encrypt task commands and XOR to encrypt shell code and configuration data.[5]

.002Encrypted Channel:Asymmetric Cryptography

Cobalt Strike can use RSA asymmetric encryption with PKCS1 padding to encrypt data sent to the C2 server.[5]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

Cobalt Strike can exploit Oracle Java vulnerabilities for execution, including CVE-2011-3544, CVE-2013-2465, CVE-2012-4681, and CVE-2013-2460.[5][2]

EnterpriseT1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Cobalt Strike can exploit vulnerabilities such as MS14-058.[9][2]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Cobalt Strike can explore files on a compromised system.[2]

EnterpriseT1564.010Hide Artifacts:Process Argument Spoofing

Cobalt Strike can use spoof arguments in spawned processes that execute beacon commands.[2]

EnterpriseT1562.001Impair Defenses:Disable or Modify Tools

Cobalt Strike has the ability to use Smart Applet attacks to disable the Java SecurityManager sandbox.[5][2]

EnterpriseT1070.006Indicator Removal:Timestomp

Cobalt Strike can timestomp any files or payloads placed on a target machine to help them blend in.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Cobalt Strike can deliver additional payloads to victim machines.[5][2]

EnterpriseT1056.001Input Capture:Keylogging

Cobalt Strike can track key presses with a keylogger module.[1][11][2]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Cobalt Strike can modify Registry values withinHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\ to enable the execution of additional code.[5]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of running shell commands withoutcmd.exe and PowerShell commands withoutpowershell.exe[1][5][2]

EnterpriseT1046Network Service Discovery

Cobalt Strike can perform port scans from an infected host.[1][5][2]

EnterpriseT1135Network Share Discovery

Cobalt Strike can query shared drives on the local system.[9]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

Cobalt Strike can be configured to use TCP, ICMP, and UDP for C2 communications.[5][2]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Cobalt Strike can hash functions to obfuscate calls to the Windows API and use a public/private key pair to encrypt Beacon session metadata.[5][2]

.005Indicator Removal from Tools

Cobalt Strike includes a capability to modify the Beacon payload to eliminate known signatures or unpacking methods.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1137.001Office Application Startup:Office Template Macros

Cobalt Strike has the ability to use an Excel Workbook to execute additional code by enabling Office to trust macros and execute code without user permission.[5]

EnterpriseT1003.001OS Credential Dumping:LSASS Memory

Cobalt Strike can spawn a job to inject into LSASS memory and dump password hashes.[2]

.002OS Credential Dumping:Security Account Manager

Cobalt Strike can recover hashed passwords.[1]

EnterpriseT1069.001Permission Groups Discovery:Local Groups

Cobalt Strike can usenet localgroup to list local groups on a system.[2]

.002Permission Groups Discovery:Domain Groups

Cobalt Strike can identify targets by querying account groups on a domain contoller.[2]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload can collect information on process details.[1][5][2]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

Cobalt Strike can inject a variety of payloads into processes dynamically chosen by the adversary.[1][2][12]

.001Dynamic-link Library Injection

Cobalt Strike has the ability to load DLLs via reflective injection.[5][2]

.012Process Hollowing

Cobalt Strike can use process hollowing for execution.[9][2]

EnterpriseT1572Protocol Tunneling

Cobalt Strike uses a custom command and control protocol that is encapsulated in HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS. In addition, it conducts peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1090.001Proxy:Internal Proxy

Cobalt Strike can be configured to have commands relayed over a peer-to-peer network of infected hosts. This can be used to limit the number of egress points, or provide access to a host without direct internet access.[1][2]

.004Proxy:Domain Fronting

Cobalt Strike has the ability to accept a value for HTTP Host Header to enable domain fronting.[2]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Cobalt Strike can queryHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\ to determine if the security setting for restricting default programmatic access is enabled.[5][2]

EnterpriseT1620Reflective Code Loading

Cobalt Strike'sexecute-assembly command can run a .NET executable within the memory of a sacrificial process by loading the CLR.[2]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Services:Remote Desktop Protocol

Cobalt Strike can start a VNC-based remote desktop server and tunnel the connection through the already established C2 channel.[1][13]

.002Remote Services:SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Cobalt Strike can use Window admin shares (C$ and ADMIN$) for lateral movement.[9][10]

.003Remote Services:Distributed Component Object Model

Cobalt Strike can deliver Beacon payloads for lateral movement by leveraging remote COM execution.[14]

.004Remote Services:SSH

Cobalt Strike can SSH to a remote service.[9][2]

.006Remote Services:Windows Remote Management

Cobalt Strike can useWinRM to execute a payload on a remote host.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Cobalt Strike uses the native Windows Network Enumeration APIs to interrogate and discover targets in a Windows Active Directory network.[1][5][2]

EnterpriseT1029Scheduled Transfer

Cobalt Strike can set its Beacon payload to reach out to the C2 server on an arbitrary and random interval.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots.[1][11][2]

EnterpriseT1518Software Discovery

TheCobalt Strike System Profiler can discover applications through the browser and identify the version of Java the target has.[2]

EnterpriseT1553.002Subvert Trust Controls:Code Signing

Cobalt Strike can use self signed Java applets to execute signed applet attacks.[5][2]

EnterpriseT1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution:Rundll32

Cobalt Strike can userundll32.exe to load DLL from the command line.[2][12][10]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Cobalt Strike can determine the NetBios name and the IP addresses of targets machines including domain controllers.[4][2]

EnterpriseT1049System Network Connections Discovery

Cobalt Strike can produce a sessions report from compromised hosts.[5]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

Cobalt Strike can enumerate services on compromised hosts.[2]

EnterpriseT1569.002System Services:Service Execution

Cobalt Strike can usePsExec to execute a payload on a remote host. It can also use Service Control Manager to start new services.[1][9][2]

EnterpriseT1550.002Use Alternate Authentication Material:Pass the Hash

Cobalt Strike can perform pass the hash.[9]

EnterpriseT1078.002Valid Accounts:Domain Accounts

Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a domain user account.[1][3][2]

.003Valid Accounts:Local Accounts

Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a local user account.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Cobalt Strike can use WMI to deliver a payload to a remote host.[1][2][12]

Groups That Use This Software

IDNameReferences
G1053Storm-0501

Storm-0501 has utilizedCobalt Strike for C2 communications and used a unique "license_id" of "666."[15]

G1046Storm-1811

Storm-1811 operations include the use ofCobalt Strike.[16][17]

G0129Mustang Panda

[18][19][20][21][22][23][24]

G0027Threat Group-3390

[25]

G0050APT32

[26][27][28][29][30][11][31]

G1022ToddyCat

[7]

G0073APT19

[32]

G0037FIN6

[33]

G0092TA505

[34]

G0052CopyKittens

[35]

G0079DarkHydrus

[36][37]

G1040Play

[38]

G1006Earth Lusca

[39]

G0046FIN7

[40][41][42]

G1020Mustard Tempest

[43]

G0096APT41

[44][45][46][47]

G0045menuPass

[6]

G0143Aquatic Panda

[48]

G0080Cobalt Group

[49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56]

G0034Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has used multiple publicly available tools during operations, such as Cobalt Strike.[57]

G1043BlackByte

BlackByte has usedCobalt Strike as a post-exploitation tool.[58][59]

G0065Leviathan

[60][61][62]

G0016APT29

[63][64][65][66][67][68][69][70][71][72][73]

G1021Cinnamon Tempest

[43][74]

G0067APT37

[75]

G1014LuminousMoth

[76][77]

G0114Chimera

[78][79]

G0119Indrik Spider

[80][43][81]

G0102Wizard Spider

[82][83][84][85][86][87][88][89]

Campaigns

IDNameDescription
C0040APT41 DUST

Cobalt Strike was used duringAPT41 DUST.[46]

C0015C0015

[12]

C0017C0017

DuringC0017,APT41 used the DUSTPAN in-memory dropper to drop aCobalt Strike BEACON backdoor onto a compromised network.[47]

C0018C0018

[90]

C0021C0021

[91][92]

C0024SolarWinds Compromise

[63][64]

References

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  2. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
  3. Mudge, R. (2017, May 23). Cobalt Strike 3.8 – Who’s Your Daddy?. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
  4. Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.
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  36. Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018.
  37. Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
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  39. Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022.
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  41. The Record. (2022, January 7). FBI: FIN7 hackers target US companies with BadUSB devices to install ransomware. Retrieved January 14, 2022.
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