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Aquatic Panda

Aquatic Panda is a suspected China-based threat group with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. Active since at least May 2020,Aquatic Panda has primarily targeted entities in the telecommunications, technology, and government sectors.[1]

ID: G0143
Contributors: NST Assure Research Team, NetSentries Technologies; Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India; Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation; Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India; Jai Minton, CrowdStrike; Jennifer Kim Roman, CrowdStrike
Version: 2.0
Created: 18 January 2022
Last Modified: 10 October 2024
Enterprise Layer
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Techniques Used

DomainIDNameUse
EnterpriseT1087Account Discovery

Aquatic Panda used thelast command in Linux environments to identify recently logged-in users on victim machines.[2]

EnterpriseT1595.002Active Scanning:Vulnerability Scanning

Aquatic Panda has used publicly accessible DNS logging services to identify servers vulnerable to Log4j (CVE 2021-44228).[1]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive Collected Data:Archive via Utility

Aquatic Panda has used several publicly available tools, including WinRAR and 7zip, to compress collected files and memory dumps prior to exfiltration.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter:PowerShell

Aquatic Panda has downloaded additional scripts and executed Base64 encoded commands in PowerShell.[1]

.003Command and Scripting Interpreter:Windows Command Shell

Aquatic Panda has attempted and failed to run Bash commands on a Windows host by passing them tocmd /C.[1]

.004Command and Scripting Interpreter:Unix Shell

Aquatic Panda used malicious shell scripts in Linux environments following access via SSH to install Linux versions of Winnti malware.[2]

EnterpriseT1543.003Create or Modify System Process:Windows Service

Aquatic Panda created new Windows services for persistence that masqueraded as legitimate Windows services via name change.[2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Aquatic Panda captured local Windows security event log data from victim machines using thewevtutil utility to extract contents to anevtx output file.[2]

EnterpriseT1574.001Hijack Execution Flow:DLL

Aquatic Panda has used DLL search-order hijacking to loadexe,dll, anddat files into memory.[1]Aquatic Panda loaded a malicious DLL into the legitimate Windows Security Health Service executable (SecurityHealthService.exe) to execute malicious code on victim systems.[2]

.006Hijack Execution Flow:Dynamic Linker Hijacking

Aquatic Panda modified theld.so preload file in Linux environments to enable persistence for Winnti malware.[2]

EnterpriseT1562.001Impair Defenses:Disable or Modify Tools

Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools on compromised systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.001Indicator Removal:Clear Windows Event Logs

Aquatic Panda clears Windows Event Logs following activity to evade defenses.[2]

.003Indicator Removal:Clear Command History

Aquatic Panda cleared command history in Linux environments to remove traces of activity after operations.[2]

.004Indicator Removal:File Deletion

Aquatic Panda has deleted malicious executables from compromised machines.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Aquatic Panda has downloaded additional malware onto compromised hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1654Log Enumeration

Aquatic Panda enumerated logs related to authentication in Linux environments prior to deleting selective entries for defense evasion purposes.[2]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerading:Masquerade Task or Service

Aquatic Panda created new, malicious services using names such asWindows User Service to attempt to blend in with legitimate items on victim systems.[2]

.005Masquerading:Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

Aquatic Panda renamed or moved malicious binaries to legitimate locations to evade defenses and blend into victim environments.[2]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

Aquatic Panda modified the victim registry to enable theRestrictedAdmin mode feature, allowing for pass the hash behaviors to function via RDP.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.010Obfuscated Files or Information:Command Obfuscation

Aquatic Panda has encoded PowerShell commands in Base64.[1]

EnterpriseT1588.001Obtain Capabilities:Malware

Aquatic Panda has acquired and usednjRAT in its operations.[1]

.002Obtain Capabilities:Tool

Aquatic Panda has acquired and usedCobalt Strike in its operations.[1]

EnterpriseT1003.001OS Credential Dumping:LSASS Memory

Aquatic Panda has attempted to harvest credentials through LSASS memory dumping.[1]

EnterpriseT1021Remote Services

Aquatic Panda used remote scheduled tasks to install malicious software on victim systems during lateral movement actions.[2]

.001Remote Desktop Protocol

Aquatic Panda leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally via RDP in victim environments.[2]

.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Aquatic Panda used remote shares to enable lateral movement in victim environments.[2]

.004SSH

Aquatic Panda used SSH with captured user credentials to move laterally in victim environments.[2]

EnterpriseT1518.001Software Discovery:Security Software Discovery

Aquatic Panda has attempted to discover third party endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools on compromised systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution:Rundll32

Aquatic Panda used rundll32.exe to proxy execution of a malicious DLL file identified as a keylogging binary.[2]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Aquatic Panda has used native OS commands to understand privilege levels and system details.[1]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

Aquatic Panda gathers information on recently logged-in users on victim devices.[2]

EnterpriseT1007System Service Discovery

Aquatic Panda has attempted to discover services for third party EDR products.[1]

EnterpriseT1550.002Use Alternate Authentication Material:Pass the Hash

Aquatic Panda used a registry edit to enable a Windows feature calledRestrictedAdmin in victim environments. This change allowedAquatic Panda to leverage "pass the hash" mechanisms as the alteration allows for RDP connections with a valid account name and hash only, without possessing a cleartext password value.[2]

EnterpriseT1078.002Valid Accounts:Domain Accounts

Aquatic Panda used multiple mechanisms to capture valid user accounts for victim domains to enable lateral movement and access to additional hosts in victim environments.[2]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Aquatic Panda used WMI for lateral movement in victim environments.[2]

Software

IDNameReferencesTechniques
S0154Cobalt Strike[1]Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism:Sudo and Sudo Caching,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism:Bypass User Account Control,Access Token Manipulation:Parent PID Spoofing,Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/Theft,Access Token Manipulation:Make and Impersonate Token,Account Discovery:Domain Account,Application Layer Protocol:DNS,Application Layer Protocol:Web Protocols,Application Layer Protocol:File Transfer Protocols,BITS Jobs,Browser Session Hijacking,Command and Scripting Interpreter:JavaScript,Command and Scripting Interpreter:Visual Basic,Command and Scripting Interpreter:PowerShell,Command and Scripting Interpreter:Python,Command and Scripting Interpreter:Windows Command Shell,Create or Modify System Process:Windows Service,Data Encoding:Standard Encoding,Data from Local System,Data Obfuscation:Protocol or Service Impersonation,Data Transfer Size Limits,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Encrypted Channel:Asymmetric Cryptography,Encrypted Channel:Symmetric Cryptography,Exploitation for Client Execution,Exploitation for Privilege Escalation,File and Directory Discovery,Hide Artifacts:Process Argument Spoofing,Impair Defenses:Disable or Modify Tools,Indicator Removal:Timestomp,Ingress Tool Transfer,Input Capture:Keylogging,Modify Registry,Native API,Network Service Discovery,Network Share Discovery,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Obfuscated Files or Information:Indicator Removal from Tools,Obfuscated Files or Information,Office Application Startup:Office Template Macros,OS Credential Dumping:LSASS Memory,OS Credential Dumping:Security Account Manager,Permission Groups Discovery:Domain Groups,Permission Groups Discovery:Local Groups,Process Discovery,Process Injection:Dynamic-link Library Injection,Process Injection:Process Hollowing,Process Injection,Protocol Tunneling,Proxy:Domain Fronting,Proxy:Internal Proxy,Query Registry,Reflective Code Loading,Remote Services:Remote Desktop Protocol,Remote Services:SSH,Remote Services:Windows Remote Management,Remote Services:SMB/Windows Admin Shares,Remote Services:Distributed Component Object Model,Remote System Discovery,Scheduled Transfer,Screen Capture,Software Discovery,Subvert Trust Controls:Code Signing,System Binary Proxy Execution:Rundll32,System Network Configuration Discovery,System Network Connections Discovery,System Service Discovery,System Services:Service Execution,Use Alternate Authentication Material:Pass the Hash,Valid Accounts:Domain Accounts,Valid Accounts:Local Accounts,Windows Management Instrumentation
S0385njRAT[1]Application Layer Protocol:Web Protocols,Application Window Discovery,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Command and Scripting Interpreter:PowerShell,Command and Scripting Interpreter:Windows Command Shell,Credentials from Password Stores:Credentials from Web Browsers,Data Encoding:Standard Encoding,Data from Local System,Dynamic Resolution:Fast Flux DNS,Exfiltration Over C2 Channel,File and Directory Discovery,Impair Defenses:Disable or Modify System Firewall,Indicator Removal:File Deletion,Indicator Removal:Clear Persistence,Ingress Tool Transfer,Input Capture:Keylogging,Modify Registry,Native API,Non-Standard Port,Obfuscated Files or Information:Encrypted/Encoded File,Obfuscated Files or Information:Compile After Delivery,Peripheral Device Discovery,Process Discovery,Query Registry,Remote Services:Remote Desktop Protocol,Remote System Discovery,Replication Through Removable Media,Screen Capture,System Information Discovery,System Owner/User Discovery,Video Capture
S0596ShadowPadAquatic Panda usedShadowPad as a remote access tool to victim environments.[2]Application Layer Protocol:DNS,Application Layer Protocol:File Transfer Protocols,Application Layer Protocol:Web Protocols,Data Encoding:Non-Standard Encoding,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Dynamic Resolution:Domain Generation Algorithms,Indicator Removal,Ingress Tool Transfer,Local Storage Discovery,Modify Registry,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Obfuscated Files or Information:Fileless Storage,Obfuscated Files or Information,Process Discovery,Process Injection,Process Injection:Dynamic-link Library Injection,Scheduled Transfer,System Information Discovery,System Network Configuration Discovery,System Owner/User Discovery,System Time Discovery
S0645WevtutilAquatic Panda usesWevtutil to extract Windows security event log data from victim machines.[2]Data from Local System,Impair Defenses:Disable Windows Event Logging,Indicator Removal:Clear Windows Event Logs
S0430Winnti for LinuxAquatic Panda usedWinnti for Linux for access to victim Linux hosts during intrusions[2].Application Layer Protocol:Web Protocols,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Encrypted Channel:Symmetric Cryptography,Ingress Tool Transfer,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Obfuscated Files or Information:Encrypted/Encoded File,Rootkit,Traffic Signaling
S0141Winnti for WindowsAquatic Panda usedWinnti for Windows for persistent access to Windows victims.[2]Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism:Bypass User Account Control,Application Layer Protocol:Web Protocols,Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder,Create or Modify System Process:Windows Service,Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information,Encrypted Channel:Symmetric Cryptography,Execution Guardrails:Environmental Keying,File and Directory Discovery,Indicator Removal:File Deletion,Indicator Removal:Timestomp,Ingress Tool Transfer,Masquerading:Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location,Native API,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Obfuscated Files or Information:Compression,Obfuscated Files or Information:Encrypted/Encoded File,Process Discovery,Proxy:External Proxy,Proxy:Internal Proxy,System Binary Proxy Execution:Rundll32,System Information Discovery,System Services:Service Execution

References

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