Aquatic Panda is a suspected China-based threat group with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. Active since at least May 2020,Aquatic Panda has primarily targeted entities in the telecommunications, technology, and government sectors.[1]
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1087 | Account Discovery | Aquatic Panda used the | |
| Enterprise | T1595 | .002 | Active Scanning:Vulnerability Scanning | Aquatic Panda has used publicly accessible DNS logging services to identify servers vulnerable to Log4j (CVE 2021-44228).[1] |
| Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data:Archive via Utility | Aquatic Panda has used several publicly available tools, including WinRAR and 7zip, to compress collected files and memory dumps prior to exfiltration.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter:PowerShell | Aquatic Panda has downloaded additional scripts and executed Base64 encoded commands in PowerShell.[1] |
| .003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter:Windows Command Shell | Aquatic Panda has attempted and failed to run Bash commands on a Windows host by passing them to | ||
| .004 | Command and Scripting Interpreter:Unix Shell | Aquatic Panda used malicious shell scripts in Linux environments following access via SSH to install Linux versions of Winnti malware.[2] | ||
| Enterprise | T1543 | .003 | Create or Modify System Process:Windows Service | Aquatic Panda created new Windows services for persistence that masqueraded as legitimate Windows services via name change.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | Aquatic Panda captured local Windows security event log data from victim machines using the | |
| Enterprise | T1574 | .001 | Hijack Execution Flow:DLL | Aquatic Panda has used DLL search-order hijacking to load |
| .006 | Hijack Execution Flow:Dynamic Linker Hijacking | Aquatic Panda modified the | ||
| Enterprise | T1562 | .001 | Impair Defenses:Disable or Modify Tools | Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools on compromised systems.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070 | .001 | Indicator Removal:Clear Windows Event Logs | Aquatic Panda clears Windows Event Logs following activity to evade defenses.[2] |
| .003 | Indicator Removal:Clear Command History | Aquatic Panda cleared command history in Linux environments to remove traces of activity after operations.[2] | ||
| .004 | Indicator Removal:File Deletion | Aquatic Panda has deleted malicious executables from compromised machines.[1][2] | ||
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Aquatic Panda has downloaded additional malware onto compromised hosts.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1654 | Log Enumeration | Aquatic Panda enumerated logs related to authentication in Linux environments prior to deleting selective entries for defense evasion purposes.[2] | |
| Enterprise | T1036 | .004 | Masquerading:Masquerade Task or Service | Aquatic Panda created new, malicious services using names such as |
| .005 | Masquerading:Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | Aquatic Panda renamed or moved malicious binaries to legitimate locations to evade defenses and blend into victim environments.[2] | ||
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | Aquatic Panda modified the victim registry to enable the | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | .010 | Obfuscated Files or Information:Command Obfuscation | Aquatic Panda has encoded PowerShell commands in Base64.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588 | .001 | Obtain Capabilities:Malware | Aquatic Panda has acquired and usednjRAT in its operations.[1] |
| .002 | Obtain Capabilities:Tool | Aquatic Panda has acquired and usedCobalt Strike in its operations.[1] | ||
| Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | OS Credential Dumping:LSASS Memory | Aquatic Panda has attempted to harvest credentials through LSASS memory dumping.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services | Aquatic Panda used remote scheduled tasks to install malicious software on victim systems during lateral movement actions.[2] | |
| .001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | Aquatic Panda leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally via RDP in victim environments.[2] | ||
| .002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Aquatic Panda used remote shares to enable lateral movement in victim environments.[2] | ||
| .004 | SSH | Aquatic Panda used SSH with captured user credentials to move laterally in victim environments.[2] | ||
| Enterprise | T1518 | .001 | Software Discovery:Security Software Discovery | Aquatic Panda has attempted to discover third party endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools on compromised systems.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1218 | .011 | System Binary Proxy Execution:Rundll32 | Aquatic Panda used rundll32.exe to proxy execution of a malicious DLL file identified as a keylogging binary.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Aquatic Panda has used native OS commands to understand privilege levels and system details.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | Aquatic Panda gathers information on recently logged-in users on victim devices.[2] | |
| Enterprise | T1007 | System Service Discovery | Aquatic Panda has attempted to discover services for third party EDR products.[1] | |
| Enterprise | T1550 | .002 | Use Alternate Authentication Material:Pass the Hash | Aquatic Panda used a registry edit to enable a Windows feature called |
| Enterprise | T1078 | .002 | Valid Accounts:Domain Accounts | Aquatic Panda used multiple mechanisms to capture valid user accounts for victim domains to enable lateral movement and access to additional hosts in victim environments.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | Aquatic Panda used WMI for lateral movement in victim environments.[2] | |