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Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America.Fox Kitten has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.[1][2][3][4]

ID: G0117
Associated Groups: UNC757, Parisite, Pioneer Kitten, RUBIDIUM, Lemon Sandstorm
Version: 2.0
Created: 21 December 2020
Last Modified: 08 January 2024

Associated Group Descriptions

NameDescription
UNC757

[5][2]

Parisite

[3][1][2]

Pioneer Kitten

[2][5]

RUBIDIUM

[6]

Lemon Sandstorm

[6]

Enterprise Layer
downloadview

Techniques Used

DomainIDNameUse
EnterpriseT1087.001Account Discovery:Local Account

Fox Kitten has accessed ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat on compromised hosts.[5]

.002Account Discovery:Domain Account

Fox Kitten has used the Softerra LDAP browser to browse documentation on service accounts.[5]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive Collected Data:Archive via Utility

Fox Kitten has used 7-Zip to archive data.[5]

EnterpriseT1217Browser Information Discovery

Fox Kitten has used Google Chrome bookmarks to identify internal resources and assets.[5]

EnterpriseT1110Brute Force

Fox Kitten has brute forced RDP credentials.[4]

EnterpriseT1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

Fox Kitten has used a Perl reverse shell to communicate with C2.[4]

.001PowerShell

Fox Kitten has used PowerShell scripts to access credential data.[5]

.003Windows Command Shell

Fox Kitten has used cmd.exe likely as a password changing mechanism.[5]

EnterpriseT1136.001Create Account:Local Account

Fox Kitten has created a local user account with administrator privileges.[4]

EnterpriseT1555.005Credentials from Password Stores:Password Managers

Fox Kitten has used scripts to access credential information from the KeePass database.[5]

EnterpriseT1530Data from Cloud Storage

Fox Kitten has obtained files from the victim's cloud storage instances.[5]

EnterpriseT1213.005Data from Information Repositories:Messaging Applications

Fox Kitten has accessed victim security and IT environments and Microsoft Teams to mine valuable information.[5]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Fox Kitten has searched local system resources to access sensitive documents.[5]

EnterpriseT1039Data from Network Shared Drive

Fox Kitten has searched network shares to access sensitive documents.[5]

EnterpriseT1585Establish Accounts

Fox Kitten has created KeyBase accounts to communicate with ransomware victims.[4][7]

.001Social Media Accounts

Fox Kitten has used a Twitter account to communicate with ransomware victims.[4]

EnterpriseT1546.008Event Triggered Execution:Accessibility Features

Fox Kitten has used sticky keys to launch a command prompt.[5]

EnterpriseT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

Fox Kitten has exploited known vulnerabilities in Fortinet, PulseSecure, and Palo Alto VPN appliances.[1][3][2][5][4]

EnterpriseT1210Exploitation of Remote Services

Fox Kitten has exploited known vulnerabilities in remote services including RDP.[1][2][4]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Fox Kitten has used WizTree to obtain network files and directory listings.[5]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Fox Kitten has downloaded additional tools includingPsExec directly to endpoints.[5]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerading:Masquerade Task or Service

Fox Kitten has named the task for a reverse proxy lpupdate to appear legitimate.[5]

.005Masquerading:Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

Fox Kitten has named binaries and configuration files svhost and dllhost respectively to appear legitimate.[5]

EnterpriseT1046Network Service Discovery

Fox Kitten has used tools including NMAP to conduct broad scanning to identify open ports.[5][4]

EnterpriseT1027.010Obfuscated Files or Information:Command Obfuscation

Fox Kitten has base64 encoded scripts to avoid detection.[5]

.013Obfuscated Files or Information:Encrypted/Encoded File

Fox Kitten has base64 encoded payloads to avoid detection.[5]

EnterpriseT1003.001OS Credential Dumping:LSASS Memory

Fox Kitten has used prodump to dump credentials from LSASS.[5]

.003OS Credential Dumping:NTDS

Fox Kitten has used Volume Shadow Copy to access credential information from NTDS.[5]

EnterpriseT1572Protocol Tunneling

Fox Kitten has used protocol tunneling for communication and RDP activity on compromised hosts through the use of open source tools such asngrok and custom tool SSHMinion.[2][5][4]

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

Fox Kitten has used the open source reverse proxy tools including FRPC and Go Proxy to establish connections from C2 to local servers.[5][4][7]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

Fox Kitten has accessed Registry hives ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat.[5]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Services:Remote Desktop Protocol

Fox Kitten has used RDP to log in and move laterally in the target environment.[5][4]

.002Remote Services:SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Fox Kitten has used valid accounts to access SMB shares.[5]

.004Remote Services:SSH

Fox Kitten has used the PuTTY and Plink tools for lateral movement.[5]

.005Remote Services:VNC

Fox Kitten has installed TightVNC server and client on compromised servers and endpoints for lateral movement.[5]

EnterpriseT1018Remote System Discovery

Fox Kitten has used Angry IP Scanner to detect remote systems.[5]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled Task/Job:Scheduled Task

Fox Kitten has used Scheduled Tasks for persistence and to load and execute a reverse proxy binary.[5][4]

EnterpriseT1505.003Server Software Component:Web Shell

Fox Kitten has installed web shells on compromised hosts to maintain access.[5][4]

EnterpriseT1552.001Unsecured Credentials:Credentials In Files

Fox Kitten has accessed files to gain valid credentials.[5]

EnterpriseT1078Valid Accounts

Fox Kitten has used valid credentials with various services during lateral movement.[5]

EnterpriseT1102Web Service

Fox Kitten has used Amazon Web Services to host C2.[4]

Software

IDNameReferencesTechniques
S0020China Chopper[5]Application Layer Protocol:Web Protocols,Brute Force:Password Guessing,Command and Scripting Interpreter:Windows Command Shell,Data from Local System,File and Directory Discovery,Indicator Removal:Timestomp,Ingress Tool Transfer,Network Service Discovery,Obfuscated Files or Information:Software Packing,Server Software Component:Web Shell
S0508ngrok[2]Dynamic Resolution:Domain Generation Algorithms,Exfiltration Over Web Service,Protocol Tunneling,Proxy,Web Service
S0556Pay2Key[1][7]Data Encrypted for Impact,Encrypted Channel:Asymmetric Cryptography,Indicator Removal:File Deletion,Non-Application Layer Protocol,Proxy:Internal Proxy,Service Stop,System Information Discovery,System Network Configuration Discovery
S0029PsExec[5][7]Create Account:Domain Account,Create or Modify System Process:Windows Service,Lateral Tool Transfer,Remote Services:SMB/Windows Admin Shares,System Services:Service Execution

References

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