Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods

@article{HalonenAkatwijuka2012NatureOH,  title={Nature of human capital, technology and ownership of public goods},  author={Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka},  journal={Journal of Public Economics},  year={2012},  volume={96},  pages={939-945},  url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:154075467}}

11 Citations

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28 References

Spillovers, Investment Incentives and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm

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The government wants a certain good or service to be provided. Should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed? Building on the incomplete contracting

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