Connectionism, Systematicity, and the Frame Problem

@article{Haselager1998ConnectionismSA,  title={Connectionism, Systematicity, and the Frame Problem},  author={W.F.G. Haselager and J. F. H. van Rappard},  journal={Minds and Machines},  year={1998},  volume={8},  pages={161-179},  url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:12016883}}
It is concluded that the frame problem provides a difficulty to connectionism that is no less serious than the obstacle it constitutes for classical cognitive science.

23 Citations

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