  |
はてなキーワード:soleとは
Please consider the histroy ofhumanity from biologicalperpsecitve and currentknown fact in nearbyuniverse, whichexpo-planet (from theSol systemperspective)ismostlikely to have civlizaedsociety? Pleaseaddpercentagenext toit in the chart
ChatGPT
Reasoned about exoplanetcivilizationlikelihoodを28 秒行う
OK, I’mlookingatthe likelihood of a civilizedsocietyon an exoplanet within ourSolar System.I’ll consider biologicalhistory and current space knowledge,aiming to identifythe most promising candidate.
Identifying potential candidates
I'm considering exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1e, which might suggest they are within or observed from ourSolar System.
Assessing potential candidates
I’m evaluating Proxima Centauri b, Barnard'sStar, LHS 1140, and TRAPPIST-1,focusingon their habitablezonesand available data. The Drake equation might help estimate their civilizedsocietylikelihoods.
Identifying promising exoplanets
I’m notingkey exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1, which haveEarth-like characteristicsand are in habitablezones. This narrows down the potential candidates for advancedcivilizations.
I'm gathering infoonplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1, consideringfactorslikemagneticfields,atmospheres, and proximity to G-typestars for their potential to support advancedcivilizations.
Evaluating exoplanet prospects
I'm noting that Proxima Centauri b, despitebeing closeand around ared dwarfstar, might supportlife ifithas amagneticfieldand atmosphere. This makes me think aboutits potential.
Charting probabilities
I'm estimatingcivilization probabilities for exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1 e, using speculativepercentagesbasedon the Drake equation and the lack ofevidence for intelligentlife.
I'm crafting a chart with exoplanet names andcivilizationlikelihoodpercentages, grounded in the longtimeline oflife'sevolution, despite the speculativenature of these figures.
Identifying exoplanet contenders
I’m evaluating exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b, TRAPPIST-1 e, and Kepler-186f, considering theirstar types and distances, to gauge their potential for supporting advancedcivilizations from oursolar system'sviewpoint.
Weighing proximity and observation
I'm leaning towards Proxima Centauri b due toits closeness and observational potential, despite concerns aboutitsflarestar dynamics. TRAPPIST-1 e, f, or g are also worth considering.
I'mfocusingon exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b, Ross 128 b, LHS 1140 b, TRAPPIST-1 e/f/g, andK2-18b,aiming to chart theirlikelihood of hosting a civilizedsocietybasedon current knowledge.
Assessing exoplanet potentials
I'm gathering speculative probabilities for exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1 e/f/g, using the Drake equation and current understanding, to better estimate their chances of hosting a civilizedsociety.
Refining speculative probabilities
I’m refining speculative probabilities for exoplanets, including Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1 e/f/g, to estimate their chances of hosting a civilizedsociety, consideringEarth's long biologicalhistory.
Refining odds
I'm considering theastronomicaltimeline for intelligentlifeonEarth,leading me toassign evenlower speculative odds for exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1 e.
I’m crafting a simplified chart with arbitrarypercentages, clearly noting the speculativenature and lack of scientific data, while considering the target audience'sbasic understanding of the topic.
I’m charting arbitrarypercentages for exoplanets, clarifying their speculativenature, and ensuring the datais accessible foryoung audiences with minimal scientific detail.
Crafting a chart
I’m creating amarkdowntable with speculativepercentages forthe likelihood of civilizedlifeon exoplanets, emphasizing their purely theoreticalnature and considering the understandinglevel of an 8-year-old.
Integrating speculative analysis
I’m mappingout amarkdown chart with speculativepercentages forthe likelihood of a civilizedsocietyon exoplanets, mindful of thecomplexity and simplifying for an 8-year-old's understanding.
I’m piecingtogethermarkdown for exoplanets, noting Proxima Centauri b'sreduced civilizedlife chance due to thered dwarf's activity. This inclusionhighlights the speculativenature of the analysis.
Piecingtogether speculative odds
I’m detailing amarkdown chart for audience-friendly exoplanetlikelihoods, considering environmental challengesand adding a disclaimer about the speculativenature and lack ofevidence.
Piecingtogether
I’m leaning towards Proxima Centauri b forits proximity and silentstar, butI’lladd a speculative chart ranking nearby exoplanets, noting their advancedcivilizations' hypotheticallikelihood.
Assessingcivilization probabilities
I'm emphasizing the slow emergence of intelligentlifeonEarth, which suggests that the odds ofany habitableplanet developing acomplexcivilization might beaslowas a fewpercent.
Belowis a very speculative chart that—basedon what we know aboutEarth’s long, windingpath fromsimplelife to a “civilizedsociety” and our limited observations of nearby exoplanets—gives somefun,made‑uppercentage chances for a few of our best candidate exoplanets. Remember: Scientists havenot yetfoundany proof oflife (let alone advancedcivilizations)onany exoplanet. Thesenumbers are just playful estimates to helpyou think about theideas!
Speculative Chances of Finding an AdvancedCivilizationon Nearby Exoplanets
Exoplanet EstimatedLikelihood of a CivilizedSociety
Proxima Centauri b ~2%
LHS 1140 b ~0.5%
HowDid We (Very Roughly) Guess TheseNumbers?
Earth’s Example:
OnEarth,life beganassimple single‑celled organisms and took billions of years to evolve into a species that builtcomplex societies. This longjourney suggests that—even if aplanetis in the “habitablezone” (where liquid water could exist)—developing an advanced, civilizedsociety might be rare.
Proxima Centauri b:
Thisis the closest exoplanet to us. Even thoughitsstar (Proxima Centauri)is ared dwarf that sometimes sendsout strongflares (which might harmlife),its closeness makesitone of ourmost interesting candidates. That’swhy we giveit a slightly higher guess (~2%).
Theseplanets are part of agroup orbiting a verycoolstar. Their environments might be challenging (for example, they could be tidally locked, meaningone sidealwaysfaces thestar), so the chance of acomplex, advancedcivilization might be abitlower.
LHS 1140 b:
Thisplanetis promising in some ways butis alittle fartherawayand around a dimmerstar, so our playful estimateis evenlower.
All of thesepercentages are extremely rough guessesbasedon whatlittle we understand about the conditions forlife andintelligence. Scientists useideaslike the Drake Equation to think about these chances—but until we have concreteevidence, thesenumbers remain just forfun and imagination.
Enjoy exploring theseideas—and remember, spaceis full of mysteries waiting to be discovered!
あなた:
Please examine the Drake Equationitself and see if this euqationis acculate ormore opition in the equationyouwill use
ChatGPT
Reasoned about the Drake Equationを6 秒行う
re-examining the Drake Equation
evaluating the Drake Equation'svalue
OK, let me see. The Drake Equationisn't a precise formula;it'smore of a guiding heuristic that tackles numerous uncertainties regarding extraterrestrialcivilizations.
Thinking through the Drake Equation, I’m evaluatingits conceptualnature,its uncertain parameters, andits criticism to concludeonits reliabilityas an accurate predictivemodel.
Understanding the Drake Equation
I’m mappingout the Drake Equationas a conceptual guide, detailingits parameters, which are oftenbasedon estimates or opinions, to evaluateits reliability for predicting extraterrestrialcivilizations.
The Drake Equationis a famous formula thatwas created to help scientists think about the manyfactors involved in estimating thenumber of detectable extraterrestrialcivilizations in ourgalaxy. However, when welookat the equation closely, we see thatitismore of a conceptualframework or heuristictool than a precise, predictive formula.Let’sbreak downwhy:
The equationis usually writtenas:
𝑁
=
𝑅
∗
×
𝑓
𝑝
×
𝑛
𝑒
×
𝑓
𝑙
×
𝑓
𝑖
×
𝑓
𝑐
×
𝐿
N=R
∗
×f
p
×n
e
×f
l
×f
i
×f
c
×L
Where:
𝑅
∗
R
∗
: The averagerate ofstar formationper year in ourgalaxy.
𝑓
𝑝
f
p
: The fraction of thosestars that haveplanetary systems.
𝑛
𝑒
n
e
: The averagenumber ofplanets that could potentially supportlifeperstar withplanets.
𝑓
𝑙
f
l
: The fraction of thoseplanets wherelife actually develops.
𝑓
𝑖
f
i
: The fraction ofplanets withlife where intelligentlife evolves.
𝑓
𝑐
f
c
: The fraction ofcivilizations that develop technology that releases detectablesignals into space.
𝐿
L: The length oftime suchcivilizations release detectablesignals.
Why the Drake EquationIsMore of a Guideline Than a Precise Formula
Uncertain Inputs:
𝑅
∗
R
∗
𝑓
𝑝
f
p
(fraction ofstars withplanets), have become better known through modernastronomy.
The parameters related to the development oflife andintelligence—
𝑓
𝑙
f
l
,
𝑓
𝑖
f
i
,
𝑓
𝑐
f
c
, and
𝐿
L—arebasedon very limited data. For example,Earthis theonlyplanet we know wherelifehas developed, so we have no way to compare or derive a statistically robust estimate for thesefactors. This means that thevalues chosen for these parameters are largely subjective estimates or educated guesses.
Wide Ranges of PossibleValues:
Because many of thesefactors are not well-constrained, ifyouchangeone of themore uncertain parameters even slightly, thefinal estimate for
𝑁
N (thenumber ofcivilizations) can varyby many orders ofmagnitude. This wide range shows that the equation canlead to very differentoutcomesbasedonpersonal or theoreticalassumptions.
The Drake Equationwas never meant to provide a preciseanswer. Instead,it servesas a way to organize our thinking about what conditions might be necessary for the development of extraterrestrialcivilizations.It encourages discussion about the relative importance of differentfactors andhighlights where our scientific knowledgeis limited.
Is the Drake Equation Accurate orMore Opinion-Based?
Accurate?
In thesense ofbeing a strict mathematicalmodel with well-defined inputs and predictableoutputs, the Drake Equationis not accurate.Its accuracyis limitedbythe extreme uncertainties in several ofitskey parameters.
Many of the terms in the equation, especially those concerning theevolution oflife andintelligence, arebasedon opinion, interpretation, and the single example ofEarth. Therefore, while thestructure of the equationis logical, thenumbersyou put intoit (and hence thefinal result) are oftenmore reflective of our current opinionsand assumptions than of robust empirical data.
The Drake Equationis a valuabletool for framing the question of extraterrestriallife.It helps scientists and enthusiastsbreak down acomplex problem into smaller,more manageable questions. However, because several ofitsfactors are highly uncertain and subject topersonal interpretation,itismore of a conceptual guide—or even a way to stimulate discussion—than a formula that provides a definitive, accurate prediction of thenumber of extraterrestrialcivilizations.
Insummary, while the Drake Equationis useful for thinking about the variousfactors that mightlead to the emergence of acivilization,itsoutputs should betakenas highly speculative estimates rather than precise measurements.
あなた:
Please also consider the possiblities of non-human intelligent emrgencing from the longhistory ofSol system and nearbyplanets and see if thereisany possiblites that inonetime intelligentlife emerged in nearbyplanets and see this to the equation
ChatGPT
Reasoned about non-humanintelligence and the Drake Equationを19 秒行う
Evaluating non-humanintelligence
I'm thinking about the potential for non-human intelligentlife forms in theSol system and neighboringplanets, and how this mightfactor into the equation.
I'm thinking about how to integrate the emergence of non-human intelligentlife, possiblyonMars orEuropa, into the Drake Equation for theSol system and neighboringplanets.
It's interesting to think about the hypothesis of intelligentlife emergingonMars orVenus, thoughEarth remains theonly knownlife-supportingplanet in thesolar system.
Considering other realms
I'm examining if intelligentlife could have emergedonplanetslikeMars,Venus, orEuropa, and how thispossibility alignswith the predictions of the Drake Equation.
Hmm, I’m thinking about how non-human intelligentlifeonMars orVenus could intersectwith theassumptions of the Drake Equation, which seems tofocussolelyonEarth-basedevolution.
I’m piecingtogether the hypothesis of non-human, advanced, intelligentlife in thesolar system.Mars,Venus, and Titan present challenges, butEuropa and Enceladus might harbor microbiallife.
Please consider the histroy ofhumanity from biologicalperpsecitve and currentknown fact in nearbyuniverse, whichexpo-planet (from theSol systemperspective)ismostlikely to have civlizaedsociety? Pleaseaddpercentagenext toit in the chart
ChatGPT
Reasoned about exoplanetcivilizationlikelihoodを28 秒行う
OK, I’mlookingatthe likelihood of a civilizedsocietyon an exoplanet within ourSolar System.I’ll consider biologicalhistory and current space knowledge,aiming to identifythe most promising candidate.
Identifying potential candidates
I'm considering exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1e, which might suggest they are within or observed from ourSolar System.
Assessing potential candidates
I’m evaluating Proxima Centauri b, Barnard'sStar, LHS 1140, and TRAPPIST-1,focusingon their habitablezonesand available data. The Drake equation might help estimate their civilizedsocietylikelihoods.
Identifying promising exoplanets
I’m notingkey exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1, which haveEarth-like characteristicsand are in habitablezones. This narrows down the potential candidates for advancedcivilizations.
I'm gathering infoonplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1, consideringfactorslikemagneticfields,atmospheres, and proximity to G-typestars for their potential to support advancedcivilizations.
Evaluating exoplanet prospects
I'm noting that Proxima Centauri b, despitebeing closeand around ared dwarfstar, might supportlife ifithas amagneticfieldand atmosphere. This makes me think aboutits potential.
Charting probabilities
I'm estimatingcivilization probabilities for exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1 e, using speculativepercentagesbasedon the Drake equation and the lack ofevidence for intelligentlife.
I'm crafting a chart with exoplanet names andcivilizationlikelihoodpercentages, grounded in the longtimeline oflife'sevolution, despite the speculativenature of these figures.
Identifying exoplanet contenders
I’m evaluating exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b, TRAPPIST-1 e, and Kepler-186f, considering theirstar types and distances, to gauge their potential for supporting advancedcivilizations from oursolar system'sviewpoint.
Weighing proximity and observation
I'm leaning towards Proxima Centauri b due toits closeness and observational potential, despite concerns aboutitsflarestar dynamics. TRAPPIST-1 e, f, or g are also worth considering.
I'mfocusingon exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b, Ross 128 b, LHS 1140 b, TRAPPIST-1 e/f/g, andK2-18b,aiming to chart theirlikelihood of hosting a civilizedsocietybasedon current knowledge.
Assessing exoplanet potentials
I'm gathering speculative probabilities for exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1 e/f/g, using the Drake equation and current understanding, to better estimate their chances of hosting a civilizedsociety.
Refining speculative probabilities
I’m refining speculative probabilities for exoplanets, including Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1 e/f/g, to estimate their chances of hosting a civilizedsociety, consideringEarth's long biologicalhistory.
Refining odds
I'm considering theastronomicaltimeline for intelligentlifeonEarth,leading me toassign evenlower speculative odds for exoplanetslike Proxima Centauri b and TRAPPIST-1 e.
I’m crafting a simplified chart with arbitrarypercentages, clearly noting the speculativenature and lack of scientific data, while considering the target audience'sbasic understanding of the topic.
I’m charting arbitrarypercentages for exoplanets, clarifying their speculativenature, and ensuring the datais accessible foryoung audiences with minimal scientific detail.
Crafting a chart
I’m creating amarkdowntable with speculativepercentages forthe likelihood of civilizedlifeon exoplanets, emphasizing their purely theoreticalnature and considering the understandinglevel of an 8-year-old.
Integrating speculative analysis
I’m mappingout amarkdown chart with speculativepercentages forthe likelihood of a civilizedsocietyon exoplanets, mindful of thecomplexity and simplifying for an 8-year-old's understanding.
I’m piecingtogethermarkdown for exoplanets, noting Proxima Centauri b'sreduced civilizedlife chance due to thered dwarf's activity. This inclusionhighlights the speculativenature of the analysis.
Piecingtogether speculative odds
I’m detailing amarkdown chart for audience-friendly exoplanetlikelihoods, considering environmental challengesand adding a disclaimer about the speculativenature and lack ofevidence.
Piecingtogether
I’m leaning towards Proxima Centauri b forits proximity and silentstar, butI’lladd a speculative chart ranking nearby exoplanets, noting their advancedcivilizations' hypotheticallikelihood.
Assessingcivilization probabilities
I'm emphasizing the slow emergence of intelligentlifeonEarth, which suggests that the odds ofany habitableplanet developing acomplexcivilization might beaslowas a fewpercent.
Belowis a very speculative chart that—basedon what we know aboutEarth’s long, windingpath fromsimplelife to a “civilizedsociety” and our limited observations of nearby exoplanets—gives somefun,made‑uppercentage chances for a few of our best candidate exoplanets. Remember: Scientists havenot yetfoundany proof oflife (let alone advancedcivilizations)onany exoplanet. Thesenumbers are just playful estimates to helpyou think about theideas!
Speculative Chances of Finding an AdvancedCivilizationon Nearby Exoplanets
Exoplanet EstimatedLikelihood of a CivilizedSociety
Proxima Centauri b ~2%
LHS 1140 b ~0.5%
HowDid We (Very Roughly) Guess TheseNumbers?
Earth’s Example:
OnEarth,life beganassimple single‑celled organisms and took billions of years to evolve into a species that builtcomplex societies. This longjourney suggests that—even if aplanetis in the “habitablezone” (where liquid water could exist)—developing an advanced, civilizedsociety might be rare.
Proxima Centauri b:
Thisis the closest exoplanet to us. Even thoughitsstar (Proxima Centauri)is ared dwarf that sometimes sendsout strongflares (which might harmlife),its closeness makesitone of ourmost interesting candidates. That’swhy we giveit a slightly higher guess (~2%).
Theseplanets are part of agroup orbiting a verycoolstar. Their environments might be challenging (for example, they could be tidally locked, meaningone sidealwaysfaces thestar), so the chance of acomplex, advancedcivilization might be abitlower.
LHS 1140 b:
Thisplanetis promising in some ways butis alittle fartherawayand around a dimmerstar, so our playful estimateis evenlower.
All of thesepercentages are extremely rough guessesbasedon whatlittle we understand about the conditions forlife andintelligence. Scientists useideaslike the Drake Equation to think about these chances—but until we have concreteevidence, thesenumbers remain just forfun and imagination.
Enjoy exploring theseideas—and remember, spaceis full of mysteries waiting to be discovered!
あなた:
Please examine the Drake Equationitself and see if this euqationis acculate ormore opition in the equationyouwill use
ChatGPT
Reasoned about the Drake Equationを6 秒行う
re-examining the Drake Equation
evaluating the Drake Equation'svalue
OK, let me see. The Drake Equationisn't a precise formula;it'smore of a guiding heuristic that tackles numerous uncertainties regarding extraterrestrialcivilizations.
Thinking through the Drake Equation, I’m evaluatingits conceptualnature,its uncertain parameters, andits criticism to concludeonits reliabilityas an accurate predictivemodel.
Understanding the Drake Equation
I’m mappingout the Drake Equationas a conceptual guide, detailingits parameters, which are oftenbasedon estimates or opinions, to evaluateits reliability for predicting extraterrestrialcivilizations.
The Drake Equationis a famous formula thatwas created to help scientists think about the manyfactors involved in estimating thenumber of detectable extraterrestrialcivilizations in ourgalaxy. However, when welookat the equation closely, we see thatitismore of a conceptualframework or heuristictool than a precise, predictive formula.Let’sbreak downwhy:
The equationis usually writtenas:
𝑁
=
𝑅
∗
×
𝑓
𝑝
×
𝑛
𝑒
×
𝑓
𝑙
×
𝑓
𝑖
×
𝑓
𝑐
×
𝐿
N=R
∗
×f
p
×n
e
×f
l
×f
i
×f
c
×L
Where:
𝑅
∗
R
∗
: The averagerate ofstar formationper year in ourgalaxy.
𝑓
𝑝
f
p
: The fraction of thosestars that haveplanetary systems.
𝑛
𝑒
n
e
: The averagenumber ofplanets that could potentially supportlifeperstar withplanets.
𝑓
𝑙
f
l
: The fraction of thoseplanets wherelife actually develops.
𝑓
𝑖
f
i
: The fraction ofplanets withlife where intelligentlife evolves.
𝑓
𝑐
f
c
: The fraction ofcivilizations that develop technology that releases detectablesignals into space.
𝐿
L: The length oftime suchcivilizations release detectablesignals.
Why the Drake EquationIsMore of a Guideline Than a Precise Formula
Uncertain Inputs:
𝑅
∗
R
∗
𝑓
𝑝
f
p
(fraction ofstars withplanets), have become better known through modernastronomy.
The parameters related to the development oflife andintelligence—
𝑓
𝑙
f
l
,
𝑓
𝑖
f
i
,
𝑓
𝑐
f
c
, and
𝐿
L—arebasedon very limited data. For example,Earthis theonlyplanet we know wherelifehas developed, so we have no way to compare or derive a statistically robust estimate for thesefactors. This means that thevalues chosen for these parameters are largely subjective estimates or educated guesses.
Wide Ranges of PossibleValues:
Because many of thesefactors are not well-constrained, ifyouchangeone of themore uncertain parameters even slightly, thefinal estimate for
𝑁
N (thenumber ofcivilizations) can varyby many orders ofmagnitude. This wide range shows that the equation canlead to very differentoutcomesbasedonpersonal or theoreticalassumptions.
The Drake Equationwas never meant to provide a preciseanswer. Instead,it servesas a way to organize our thinking about what conditions might be necessary for the development of extraterrestrialcivilizations.It encourages discussion about the relative importance of differentfactors andhighlights where our scientific knowledgeis limited.
Is the Drake Equation Accurate orMore Opinion-Based?
Accurate?
In thesense ofbeing a strict mathematicalmodel with well-defined inputs and predictableoutputs, the Drake Equationis not accurate.Its accuracyis limitedbythe extreme uncertainties in several ofitskey parameters.
Many of the terms in the equation, especially those concerning theevolution oflife andintelligence, arebasedon opinion, interpretation, and the single example ofEarth. Therefore, while thestructure of the equationis logical, thenumbersyou put intoit (and hence thefinal result) are oftenmore reflective of our current opinionsand assumptions than of robust empirical data.
The Drake Equationis a valuabletool for framing the question of extraterrestriallife.It helps scientists and enthusiastsbreak down acomplex problem into smaller,more manageable questions. However, because several ofitsfactors are highly uncertain and subject topersonal interpretation,itismore of a conceptual guide—or even a way to stimulate discussion—than a formula that provides a definitive, accurate prediction of thenumber of extraterrestrialcivilizations.
Insummary, while the Drake Equationis useful for thinking about the variousfactors that mightlead to the emergence of acivilization,itsoutputs should betakenas highly speculative estimates rather than precise measurements.
あなた:
Please also consider the possiblities of non-human intelligent emrgencing from the longhistory ofSol system and nearbyplanets and see if thereisany possiblites that inonetime intelligentlife emerged in nearbyplanets and see this to the equation
ChatGPT
Reasoned about non-humanintelligence and the Drake Equationを19 秒行う
Evaluating non-humanintelligence
I'm thinking about the potential for non-human intelligentlife forms in theSol system and neighboringplanets, and how this mightfactor into the equation.
I'm thinking about how to integrate the emergence of non-human intelligentlife, possiblyonMars orEuropa, into the Drake Equation for theSol system and neighboringplanets.
It's interesting to think about the hypothesis of intelligentlife emergingonMars orVenus, thoughEarth remains theonly knownlife-supportingplanet in thesolar system.
Considering other realms
I'm examining if intelligentlife could have emergedonplanetslikeMars,Venus, orEuropa, and how thispossibility alignswith the predictions of the Drake Equation.
Hmm, I’m thinking about how non-human intelligentlifeonMars orVenus could intersectwith theassumptions of the Drake Equation, which seems tofocussolelyonEarth-basedevolution.
I’m piecingtogether the hypothesis of non-human, advanced, intelligentlife in thesolar system.Mars,Venus, and Titan present challenges, butEuropa and Enceladus might harbor microbiallife.
It's sudden, but rightnow inJapan, creativityis facing atrue crisis. Characterslike Uzaki-chan,Onsen Musume, and Tojo Rika arebeing targeted and flamed, game characterdesigns arebeing infiltratedbypolitical correctness,Johnny'sEntertainmentisbeing dismantled, swimsuitphoto sessions in parks arebeing canceled, Hitoshi Matsumotoisbeing publicly shamed, and the newAV lawwas enacted without considering the opinions of those directly involved. Every form ofexpression in every venueis currently under unreasonablepressure.
Howdoes thisconnect to theTokyo gubernatorial election? Infact, amajor event directly linked to thisis occurring in the 2024Tokyo gubernatorial election.As acreator, Ihope thismessage reachesyou.
What Iam about toshareis astory aboutsomeone namedHimasoraAkane,whoyou should know about to resist suchpressures. But before Idive into thatstory, I want toexpress mydeep gratitude to my oldfriendNozomi for giving me the opportunity to post this article in a place where manycreatorswill seeit.Assomeonewho also loves manga,anime, and games, Ihope this informationwillbenefitJapanesesociety and supportNozomi'sactivities.
HimasoraAkane Should Be the Governor ofTokyo
First, I wouldlike tomake a straightforward request toyouas acreator: please supportHimasoraAkane for governor. In this election, pleasewrite "HimasoraAkane"onyour ballot. The voting dayisJuly 7th. Even ifyou are not aTokyo resident, Iask thatyouat least listen to thisstory. Ifyou findit interesting, pleaseshareitwith yourfriends, family,and acquaintances.You can checkHimasoraAkane's campaignpromises and thebackground of their candidacyon theirTwitter (X) posts linked below:
HimasoraAkane (Tokyo gubernatorial candidate)
https://x.com/himasoraakane/status/1804846779399324095
HimasoraAkaneWill NotAllow Our Culture to Be Burned
HimasoraAkaneis an ordinaryotakuwho loves manga,anime, and games. Knownas "CognitiveProfiling DetectiveAkaneHimasora," hehas beenactiveonTwitter (X) andYouTube, andnow heis running for governor.Akane,whoisdeeply concerned about the repression and destruction ofotaku culture,is challenging thosewho seek to destroy our culturealone.Akanewill neverallow thosewhotry to burn our culture.
As mentionedat thebeginning,all forms ofexpression are currentlyunder pressure.Otaku culture, in particular, seems to be aprime target.
Uzaki-chanBlood Donation Poster Controversy (2019): A collaborationbetween theJapaneseRedCrossSociety and the manga Uzaki-chanwas flamed forallegedlybeing overly sexual initsPR illustration.
V-Tuber Traffic Safety Video Controversy (2021): A V-Tuber hiredby the Matsudo Police Department in ChibaPrefecturewas deemed too sexual for public agencyPR.
Onsen Musume Controversy (2021): Characters personifying local hotsprings were criticizedas sexist.
MieTransportOfficial Character Controversy (2024): A character in a bus driver's uniform releasedbyMieTransportwas flamed for evoking sexual images.
These controversies are often fueledby so-calledpolitical correctness and feminism. Forcreators, these are direct threats. If thesefactions labelyour workas sexual and demandit be burned toashes, couldyou resist? How wouldyoufeel ifyour painstakingly created work,likeyour own child,was trampledby peoplewho have no regard foryour efforts? Couldyoucontinueyourcreativeactivities while constantly shrinkingaway?
HimasoraAkanesawsomething behind these flaming incidents. Hestarted investigating thekey figure behind theOnsen Musume controversy, a representative of a general incorporatedassociation inTokyo. Thisassociation'score business, theYoungFemale Victims SupportProject, received substantial public funds fromTokyo.Akane submitted public document disclosure requests toTokyo and thoroughly dug into theorganization. Duringhis investigation,Akane uncovered many suspicions suggesting thisprojectwas unworthy of public funding, which he exposedonebyoneon social media.
Negligent accounting reports, takingprotected girls to the Henokobaseprotest inOkinawa,Communist Party members waiting in the bus used toprotect girls—these revelations drew significantattentiononline. The investigation extendedbeyond this general incorporatedassociation to other NPOs receiving public funds,and Akane named thiscluster ofissues the "WBPCproblem" after the initials of theseorganizations.
Akane'sYouTube Channel (WBPCProblem Playlist)
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLI5gTciLKtAXRyzv9j5FiNMcc8eoEBbMN
Fromhere,Akane'sstory expanded to resident audits, resident lawsuits, andnational compensation lawsuits concerning theTokyoYoungFemale Victims SupportProject.Akane discovered that behind many flaming incidents, thereis no clearcommandstructure but agroup of various politicalorganizationsand activists workingtogetherlike anamoeba. He named thisgroup the "NanikaGroup" (Nanika means "something" inJapanese), a reference to the mysterious, ominous "something fromanother place" in the mangaHUNTER×HUNTER, whichAkaneloves. The NanikaGroupis alsoconnected to welfare interests, where public fundsflow unchecked.Akane called this phenomenon "Public Fund Chu-Chu" (siphoning).
Forcreators, this means the tax money they earn through hard workis used to burn theirprecious works.It's an intolerable situation.
HimasoraAkaneIs Fighting Against ThoseWho Burn Our Culture
InNovember 2022, amajor event marked a turningpoint in this series of controversies. The general incorporatedassociation under scrutiny held apress conferenceat the parliamentary officebuilding, gathering mediaand announcing a lawsuit againstAkane. This "Legal HarassmentPress Conference,"asitwas calledonline, involved multiple layers ofpower: the government, the media,and a team ofseven lawyers targeting a single individual.
However,Akanedid not back down. Instead, he intensifiedhis pursuit, exploiting the opponent's careless statementsas lawsuit fodder. Thisled to an outpouring of supporton social media, withhisTwitter follower count skyrocketing and 160 millionyen in donations for legal fees.
The following year, a resident audit request filedbyAkane resulted inTokyo'sofficial website recognizing some improperpoints and deciding to audit theorganization. However,Tokyo's lenient auditledAkane to file a resident lawsuit. Suspicion also turned towards Governor Yuriko Koike forallocating public funds through dubioussole-source contracts.Tokyo began excessivelyredacting documents inresponse to public document requests,attempting to conceal theissue. Koike'spromise to end documentredaction quietly disappeared fromher campaign page.
Throughout this battle,Akanehas been a target of criminal complaints and faced threats, yet he persists.Hisbook "Netoge Senshi"was releasedamidbookstore threats, butonly the criminal complaintwas widely reportedby the media, portrayingAkane negatively.
HimasoraAkaneis an ordinaryotaku, atop-tieronline gamer duringhisstudent days,and a talented gamecreatorwho worked for amajor game company and later aventure company.His meticulous workonthe game "Shin Goku no ValhallaGate"was betrayedby the company'sCEO, leading to aseven-year legal battle thatAkane ultimately won, securing 600 millionyen. This experience fuelshis fierce opposition to havinghis creations burned.
Before investigating theYoungFemale Victims SupportProject,Akane exposed fraudulent feminist "knights"onhisYouTube channel, shaking theinternet. He detests lies andhas an uncanny ability to detect them.
Akaneis a special individual with extraordinary abilities, honed throughhis experiences in games, courtbattles, and extensive document analysis.His pursuit oftruth andjusticemakeshim a suitable candidate for governor,promising a world without lies and where honest people do not suffer.
What WeCan Do toProtect Our Culture
Creativeexpression can be crushed if we are not vigilant. Even in modernJapan,otaku cultureison thinice. The recent cessation ofVisa transactions forDMM (Fanza)is a reminder of how a single card company can wielditspower to dictate whatis deemed appropriateexpression.Expressionfreedomisfragile and constantly under threat.
To those reading this, I urgeyou to vote forHimasoraAkane. Supporthim toprotect our culture. Despitehis harsh demeanor andpreference forsolitarybattles, heisnow seeking help for the firsttime.Akanefeels thedanger in this gubernatorial election and believes that if hedoes not become governor,everythingwill end. Hehastaken a stand for the people ofTokyo andJapan.
I wrote this article to supporthisspirit and spread theword. Please vote forHimasoraAkane and help create amiracle.
CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation
中共日益复杂的网络影响力运作
！！！！！！！上周，美国司法部公布了一项重大刑事诉讼。中国公安部 (MPS) 的警官被指控在包括Twitter在内的社交媒体网站上创建“数千个虚假的在线角色，通过在线骚扰和威胁来针对中国持不同政见者”，并传播“其唯一目的是散布谣言的宣传”美国内部的分歧”。！！！！！！！！
！！！！！！！先週、米国司法省は重要な刑事訴状を公開しました。中国の公安省 (MPS) の警察官は、「Twitter を含むソーシャルメディアサイトで何千もの偽のオンラインペルソナを作成し、オンラインでの嫌がらせや脅迫を通じて中国の反体制派を標的に」し、「種をまくことのみを目的とするプロパガンダを広めた」として起訴されました。米国内の部門」。！！！！！！！！！
今、日本のネットを攻撃してるのは中国の公安である！！私も攻撃もしてくる！！日本人の書き込みを割り当てて特定の個人へ嫌がらせもする！！！！！！
今日本がサイバー攻撃を受けています！！日本人の皆さん！本当に気を付けてください！！
こいつらはネット攻撃を利用して政治を支配しようとしています！！！！！
この発表は、特定の中国政府機関がソーシャルメディア上で秘密裏に悪意のある活動を行っていることを公に明らかにした初めての事例です。しかし、MPS は、ソーシャルメディアのユーザーに影響を与えるために秘密裏に強制的な操作を行っているとアナリストが長い間疑っていた多くの政党支配組織の 1 つです。
中国共産党 (CCP) は、天安門事件の直後に遡る政策概念である「世論の誘導」を装い、社会の安定と中国に対する政治的支配を維持するための情報操作を正当化しています。最近では、中国の権威主義的指導者である習近平は、文化大革命時代の「世論闘争」という用語を復活させ、人権や民主主義などの価値観やアイデアを広める能力があるため、ソーシャルメディアを「主要な戦場」と宣言しました。 党の政治的正当性に対する脅威とみなされた。
オンラインで世論を形成しようとする中国共産党の取り組みは、現在、単に反体制派を検閲し、政府寄りのプロパガンダを広めるだけではありません。 彼らはよりグローバルで攻撃的であり、多くの場合、国家主権と民主主義の言説に直接干渉し、党のより広範な戦略的および経済的目標をサポートしています。
ASPI の国際サイバーポリシーセンターは、「ゲームの世論:中国共産党のますます洗練されたサイバー対応の影響力作戦」というタイトルの新しいレポートを発行しました。ソーシャルメディアを通じて民主主義国家内で行われる CCP のサイバー対応の影響力作戦。
このレポートは、中国から発信された秘密のサイバー対応の影響力作戦の既存の公的に入手可能な証拠を調査して、CCPの進化する能力の評価を提供します。中国共産党はペルソナの調整されたネットワークを維持するための永続的な能力を開発しており、複数の中国政府機関が、おそらく集団ではないにしても並行して、ソーシャルメディアで秘密の影響力作戦を行っていることがわかりました. これらの作戦は、国内および外交の政策と意思決定プロセスを混乱させることにより、民主主義を標的とすることにおいて、より頻繁で、洗練され、効果的になっています.
ケーススタディとして、Twitter と Meta が 2019 年に中国政府に起因する Spamouflageネットワークにリンクされた、これまで報告されていなかった CCP のサイバー対応の影響力操作を明らかにします。米国が無責任に中国やその他の国に対してサイバースパイ活動を行っているという未確認の主張を広めるために、米国ベースのソーシャルメディアプラットフォーム。 Spamouflage にリンクされたアカウントによって誤ってツイートされた画像で識別可能な開いているブラウザー タブのような手違いを利用して、この影響力のある操作を実行している中国政府機関はそれを「OperationHoney Badger」と名付けたと考えられます。
Last week, the US Department ofJustice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers fromChina’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fakeonlinepersonason social media sites, includingTwitter, to targetChinese dissidents throughonline harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whosesole purposeis to sow divisions withinthe UnitedStates’.
This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specificChinesegovernment agency of covert malignactivitieson social media. However, the MPSisone of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence userson social media.
Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the TiananmenSquare Massacre, theChineseCommunist Party (CCP) justifiesits manipulation of information tomaintain social stability and political controloverChina.More recently,China’s authoritarianleader,Xi Jinping,has revived the CulturalRevolution-era term ‘public opinionstruggle’ and declared social media ‘themainbattlefield’ because ofits ability to spread values and ideas—likehuman rights and democracy—that are perceivedas threats to the party’s political legitimacy.
The CCP’s efforts to shape public opiniononlinenowgobeyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They aremore globaland aggressive, often directly interfering instate sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’sbroader strategic and economicgoals.
ASPI’sInternational Cyber Policy Centrehas published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reportingby TheWashington Post which explores the he alongside reportingby TheWashington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.
The report canvassesthe existing publicly availableevidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating fromChina to provide anassessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCPhas developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinatednetworks ofpersonas and that multipleChinesegovernment agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operationson social media. Those operations have becomemore frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democraciesby disruptingdomestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.
As acase study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflagenetwork, whichTwitter and Meta attributed to theChineseGovernment in 2019. This newiteration ofthe networkis using inauthentic accountson US-based andChina-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the USis irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations againstChina and other countries. Drawingon slip-upslike anopenbrowsertab identifiable in animage accidentally tweetedby a Spamouflage-linked account, webelieve theChineseGovernment agencies conducting this influence operation namedit ‘OperationHoney Badger.’
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ccps-increasingly-sophisticated-cyber-enabled-influence-operation/
CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation
中共日益复杂的网络影响力运作
！！！！！！！上周，美国司法部公布了一项重大刑事诉讼。中国公安部 (MPS) 的警官被指控在包括Twitter在内的社交媒体网站上创建“数千个虚假的在线角色，通过在线骚扰和威胁来针对中国持不同政见者”，并传播“其唯一目的是散布谣言的宣传”美国内部的分歧”。！！！！！！！！
！！！！！！！先週、米国司法省は重要な刑事訴状を公開しました。中国の公安省 (MPS) の警察官は、「Twitter を含むソーシャルメディアサイトで何千もの偽のオンラインペルソナを作成し、オンラインでの嫌がらせや脅迫を通じて中国の反体制派を標的に」し、「種をまくことのみを目的とするプロパガンダを広めた」として起訴されました。米国内の部門」。！！！！！！！！！
今、日本のネットを攻撃してるのは中国の公安である！！私も攻撃もしてくる！！日本人の書き込みを割り当てて特定の個人へ嫌がらせもする！！！！！！
気を付けてください！！！！！気を付けてください！！！！！！！！！
この発表は、特定の中国政府機関がソーシャルメディア上で秘密裏に悪意のある活動を行っていることを公に明らかにした初めての事例です。しかし、MPS は、ソーシャルメディアのユーザーに影響を与えるために秘密裏に強制的な操作を行っているとアナリストが長い間疑っていた多くの政党支配組織の 1 つです。
中国共産党 (CCP) は、天安門事件の直後に遡る政策概念である「世論の誘導」を装い、社会の安定と中国に対する政治的支配を維持するための情報操作を正当化しています。最近では、中国の権威主義的指導者である習近平は、文化大革命時代の「世論闘争」という用語を復活させ、人権や民主主義などの価値観やアイデアを広める能力があるため、ソーシャルメディアを「主要な戦場」と宣言しました。 党の政治的正当性に対する脅威とみなされた。
オンラインで世論を形成しようとする中国共産党の取り組みは、現在、単に反体制派を検閲し、政府寄りのプロパガンダを広めるだけではありません。 彼らはよりグローバルで攻撃的であり、多くの場合、国家主権と民主主義の言説に直接干渉し、党のより広範な戦略的および経済的目標をサポートしています。
ASPI の国際サイバーポリシーセンターは、「ゲームの世論:中国共産党のますます洗練されたサイバー対応の影響力作戦」というタイトルの新しいレポートを発行しました。ソーシャルメディアを通じて民主主義国家内で行われる CCP のサイバー対応の影響力作戦。
このレポートは、中国から発信された秘密のサイバー対応の影響力作戦の既存の公的に入手可能な証拠を調査して、CCPの進化する能力の評価を提供します。中国共産党はペルソナの調整されたネットワークを維持するための永続的な能力を開発しており、複数の中国政府機関が、おそらく集団ではないにしても並行して、ソーシャルメディアで秘密の影響力作戦を行っていることがわかりました. これらの作戦は、国内および外交の政策と意思決定プロセスを混乱させることにより、民主主義を標的とすることにおいて、より頻繁で、洗練され、効果的になっています.
ケーススタディとして、Twitter と Meta が 2019 年に中国政府に起因する Spamouflageネットワークにリンクされた、これまで報告されていなかった CCP のサイバー対応の影響力操作を明らかにします。米国が無責任に中国やその他の国に対してサイバースパイ活動を行っているという未確認の主張を広めるために、米国ベースのソーシャルメディアプラットフォーム。 Spamouflage にリンクされたアカウントによって誤ってツイートされた画像で識別可能な開いているブラウザー タブのような手違いを利用して、この影響力のある操作を実行している中国政府機関はそれを「OperationHoney Badger」と名付けたと考えられます。
Last week, the US Department ofJustice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers fromChina’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fakeonlinepersonason social media sites, includingTwitter, to targetChinese dissidents throughonline harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whosesole purposeis to sow divisions withinthe UnitedStates’.
This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specificChinesegovernment agency of covert malignactivitieson social media. However, the MPSisone of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence userson social media.
Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the TiananmenSquare Massacre, theChineseCommunist Party (CCP) justifiesits manipulation of information tomaintain social stability and political controloverChina.More recently,China’s authoritarianleader,Xi Jinping,has revived the CulturalRevolution-era term ‘public opinionstruggle’ and declared social media ‘themainbattlefield’ because ofits ability to spread values and ideas—likehuman rights and democracy—that are perceivedas threats to the party’s political legitimacy.
The CCP’s efforts to shape public opiniononlinenowgobeyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They aremore globaland aggressive, often directly interfering instate sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’sbroader strategic and economicgoals.
ASPI’sInternational Cyber Policy Centrehas published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reportingby TheWashington Post which explores the he alongside reportingby TheWashington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.
The report canvassesthe existing publicly availableevidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating fromChina to provide anassessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCPhas developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinatednetworks ofpersonas and that multipleChinesegovernment agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operationson social media. Those operations have becomemore frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democraciesby disruptingdomestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.
As acase study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflagenetwork, whichTwitter and Meta attributed to theChineseGovernment in 2019. This newiteration ofthe networkis using inauthentic accountson US-based andChina-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the USis irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations againstChina and other countries. Drawingon slip-upslike anopenbrowsertab identifiable in animage accidentally tweetedby a Spamouflage-linked account, webelieve theChineseGovernment agencies conducting this influence operation namedit ‘OperationHoney Badger.’
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ccps-increasingly-sophisticated-cyber-enabled-influence-operation/
CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation
中共日益复杂的网络影响力运作
！！！！！！！上周，美国司法部公布了一项重大刑事诉讼。中国公安部 (MPS) 的警官被指控在包括Twitter在内的社交媒体网站上创建“数千个虚假的在线角色，通过在线骚扰和威胁来针对中国持不同政见者”，并传播“其唯一目的是散布谣言的宣传”美国内部的分歧”。！！！！！！！！
！！！！！！！先週、米国司法省は重要な刑事訴状を公開しました。中国の公安省 (MPS) の警察官は、「Twitter を含むソーシャルメディアサイトで何千もの偽のオンラインペルソナを作成し、オンラインでの嫌がらせや脅迫を通じて中国の反体制派を標的に」し、「種をまくことのみを目的とするプロパガンダを広めた」として起訴されました。米国内の部門」。！！！！！！！！！
今、日本のネットを攻撃してるのは中国の公安である！！私も攻撃もしてくる！！日本人の書き込みを割り当てて特定の個人へ嫌がらせもする！！！！！！
気を付けてください！！！！！気を付けてください！！！！！！！！！
この発表は、特定の中国政府機関がソーシャルメディア上で秘密裏に悪意のある活動を行っていることを公に明らかにした初めての事例です。しかし、MPS は、ソーシャルメディアのユーザーに影響を与えるために秘密裏に強制的な操作を行っているとアナリストが長い間疑っていた多くの政党支配組織の 1 つです。
中国共産党 (CCP) は、天安門事件の直後に遡る政策概念である「世論の誘導」を装い、社会の安定と中国に対する政治的支配を維持するための情報操作を正当化しています。最近では、中国の権威主義的指導者である習近平は、文化大革命時代の「世論闘争」という用語を復活させ、人権や民主主義などの価値観やアイデアを広める能力があるため、ソーシャルメディアを「主要な戦場」と宣言しました。 党の政治的正当性に対する脅威とみなされた。
オンラインで世論を形成しようとする中国共産党の取り組みは、現在、単に反体制派を検閲し、政府寄りのプロパガンダを広めるだけではありません。 彼らはよりグローバルで攻撃的であり、多くの場合、国家主権と民主主義の言説に直接干渉し、党のより広範な戦略的および経済的目標をサポートしています。
ASPI の国際サイバーポリシーセンターは、「ゲームの世論:中国共産党のますます洗練されたサイバー対応の影響力作戦」というタイトルの新しいレポートを発行しました。ソーシャルメディアを通じて民主主義国家内で行われる CCP のサイバー対応の影響力作戦。
このレポートは、中国から発信された秘密のサイバー対応の影響力作戦の既存の公的に入手可能な証拠を調査して、CCPの進化する能力の評価を提供します。中国共産党はペルソナの調整されたネットワークを維持するための永続的な能力を開発しており、複数の中国政府機関が、おそらく集団ではないにしても並行して、ソーシャルメディアで秘密の影響力作戦を行っていることがわかりました. これらの作戦は、国内および外交の政策と意思決定プロセスを混乱させることにより、民主主義を標的とすることにおいて、より頻繁で、洗練され、効果的になっています.
ケーススタディとして、Twitter と Meta が 2019 年に中国政府に起因する Spamouflageネットワークにリンクされた、これまで報告されていなかった CCP のサイバー対応の影響力操作を明らかにします。米国が無責任に中国やその他の国に対してサイバースパイ活動を行っているという未確認の主張を広めるために、米国ベースのソーシャルメディアプラットフォーム。 Spamouflage にリンクされたアカウントによって誤ってツイートされた画像で識別可能な開いているブラウザー タブのような手違いを利用して、この影響力のある操作を実行している中国政府機関はそれを「OperationHoney Badger」と名付けたと考えられます。
Last week, the US Department ofJustice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers fromChina’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fakeonlinepersonason social media sites, includingTwitter, to targetChinese dissidents throughonline harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whosesole purposeis to sow divisions withinthe UnitedStates’.
This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specificChinesegovernment agency of covert malignactivitieson social media. However, the MPSisone of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence userson social media.
Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the TiananmenSquare Massacre, theChineseCommunist Party (CCP) justifiesits manipulation of information tomaintain social stability and political controloverChina.More recently,China’s authoritarianleader,Xi Jinping,has revived the CulturalRevolution-era term ‘public opinionstruggle’ and declared social media ‘themainbattlefield’ because ofits ability to spread values and ideas—likehuman rights and democracy—that are perceivedas threats to the party’s political legitimacy.
The CCP’s efforts to shape public opiniononlinenowgobeyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They aremore globaland aggressive, often directly interfering instate sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’sbroader strategic and economicgoals.
ASPI’sInternational Cyber Policy Centrehas published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reportingby TheWashington Post which explores the he alongside reportingby TheWashington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.
The report canvassesthe existing publicly availableevidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating fromChina to provide anassessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCPhas developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinatednetworks ofpersonas and that multipleChinesegovernment agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operationson social media. Those operations have becomemore frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democraciesby disruptingdomestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.
As acase study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflagenetwork, whichTwitter and Meta attributed to theChineseGovernment in 2019. This newiteration ofthe networkis using inauthentic accountson US-based andChina-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the USis irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations againstChina and other countries. Drawingon slip-upslike anopenbrowsertab identifiable in animage accidentally tweetedby a Spamouflage-linked account, webelieve theChineseGovernment agencies conducting this influence operation namedit ‘OperationHoney Badger.’
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ccps-increasingly-sophisticated-cyber-enabled-influence-operation/
CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation
中共日益复杂的网络影响力运作
！！！！！！！上周，美国司法部公布了一项重大刑事诉讼。中国公安部 (MPS) 的警官被指控在包括Twitter在内的社交媒体网站上创建“数千个虚假的在线角色，通过在线骚扰和威胁来针对中国持不同政见者”，并传播“其唯一目的是散布谣言的宣传”美国内部的分歧”。！！！！！！！！
！！！！！！！先週、米国司法省は重要な刑事訴状を公開しました。中国の公安省 (MPS) の警察官は、「Twitter を含むソーシャルメディアサイトで何千もの偽のオンラインペルソナを作成し、オンラインでの嫌がらせや脅迫を通じて中国の反体制派を標的に」し、「種をまくことのみを目的とするプロパガンダを広めた」として起訴されました。米国内の部門」。！！！！！！！！！
この発表は、特定の中国政府機関がソーシャルメディア上で秘密裏に悪意のある活動を行っていることを公に明らかにした初めての事例です。しかし、MPS は、ソーシャルメディアのユーザーに影響を与えるために秘密裏に強制的な操作を行っているとアナリストが長い間疑っていた多くの政党支配組織の 1 つです。
中国共産党 (CCP) は、天安門事件の直後に遡る政策概念である「世論の誘導」を装い、社会の安定と中国に対する政治的支配を維持するための情報操作を正当化しています。最近では、中国の権威主義的指導者である習近平は、文化大革命時代の「世論闘争」という用語を復活させ、人権や民主主義などの価値観やアイデアを広める能力があるため、ソーシャルメディアを「主要な戦場」と宣言しました。 党の政治的正当性に対する脅威とみなされた。
オンラインで世論を形成しようとする中国共産党の取り組みは、現在、単に反体制派を検閲し、政府寄りのプロパガンダを広めるだけではありません。 彼らはよりグローバルで攻撃的であり、多くの場合、国家主権と民主主義の言説に直接干渉し、党のより広範な戦略的および経済的目標をサポートしています。
ASPI の国際サイバーポリシーセンターは、「ゲームの世論:中国共産党のますます洗練されたサイバー対応の影響力作戦」というタイトルの新しいレポートを発行しました。ソーシャルメディアを通じて民主主義国家内で行われる CCP のサイバー対応の影響力作戦。
このレポートは、中国から発信された秘密のサイバー対応の影響力作戦の既存の公的に入手可能な証拠を調査して、CCPの進化する能力の評価を提供します。中国共産党はペルソナの調整されたネットワークを維持するための永続的な能力を開発しており、複数の中国政府機関が、おそらく集団ではないにしても並行して、ソーシャルメディアで秘密の影響力作戦を行っていることがわかりました. これらの作戦は、国内および外交の政策と意思決定プロセスを混乱させることにより、民主主義を標的とすることにおいて、より頻繁で、洗練され、効果的になっています.
ケーススタディとして、Twitter と Meta が 2019 年に中国政府に起因する Spamouflageネットワークにリンクされた、これまで報告されていなかった CCP のサイバー対応の影響力操作を明らかにします。米国が無責任に中国やその他の国に対してサイバースパイ活動を行っているという未確認の主張を広めるために、米国ベースのソーシャルメディアプラットフォーム。 Spamouflage にリンクされたアカウントによって誤ってツイートされた画像で識別可能な開いているブラウザー タブのような手違いを利用して、この影響力のある操作を実行している中国政府機関はそれを「OperationHoney Badger」と名付けたと考えられます。
Last week, the US Department ofJustice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers fromChina’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fakeonlinepersonason social media sites, includingTwitter, to targetChinese dissidents throughonline harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whosesole purposeis to sow divisions withinthe UnitedStates’.
This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specificChinesegovernment agency of covert malignactivitieson social media. However, the MPSisone of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence userson social media.
Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the TiananmenSquare Massacre, theChineseCommunist Party (CCP) justifiesits manipulation of information tomaintain social stability and political controloverChina.More recently,China’s authoritarianleader,Xi Jinping,has revived the CulturalRevolution-era term ‘public opinionstruggle’ and declared social media ‘themainbattlefield’ because ofits ability to spread values and ideas—likehuman rights and democracy—that are perceivedas threats to the party’s political legitimacy.
The CCP’s efforts to shape public opiniononlinenowgobeyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They aremore globaland aggressive, often directly interfering instate sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’s broader strategic and economicgoals.
ASPI’sInternational Cyber Policy Centrehas published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reportingby TheWashington Post which explores the he alongside reportingby TheWashington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.
The report canvassesthe existing publicly availableevidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating fromChina to provide anassessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCPhas developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinatednetworks ofpersonas and that multipleChinesegovernment agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operationson social media. Those operations have becomemore frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democraciesby disruptingdomestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.
As acase study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflagenetwork, whichTwitter and Meta attributed to theChineseGovernment in 2019. This newiteration ofthe networkis using inauthentic accountson US-based andChina-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the USis irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations againstChina and other countries. Drawingon slip-upslike anopenbrowsertab identifiable in animage accidentally tweetedby a Spamouflage-linked account, webelieve theChineseGovernment agencies conducting this influence operation namedit ‘OperationHoney Badger.’
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ccps-increasingly-sophisticated-cyber-enabled-influence-operation/
CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation
中共日益复杂的网络影响力运作
！！！！！！！上周，美国司法部公布了一项重大刑事诉讼。中国公安部 (MPS) 的警官被指控在包括Twitter在内的社交媒体网站上创建“数千个虚假的在线角色，通过在线骚扰和威胁来针对中国持不同政见者”，并传播“其唯一目的是散布谣言的宣传”美国内部的分歧”。！！！！！！！！
！！！！！！！先週、米国司法省は重要な刑事訴状を公開しました。中国の公安省 (MPS) の警察官は、「Twitter を含むソーシャルメディアサイトで何千もの偽のオンラインペルソナを作成し、オンラインでの嫌がらせや脅迫を通じて中国の反体制派を標的に」し、「種をまくことのみを目的とするプロパガンダを広めた」として起訴されました。米国内の部門」。！！！！！！！！！
この発表は、特定の中国政府機関がソーシャルメディア上で秘密裏に悪意のある活動を行っていることを公に明らかにした初めての事例です。しかし、MPS は、ソーシャルメディアのユーザーに影響を与えるために秘密裏に強制的な操作を行っているとアナリストが長い間疑っていた多くの政党支配組織の 1 つです。
中国共産党 (CCP) は、天安門事件の直後に遡る政策概念である「世論の誘導」を装い、社会の安定と中国に対する政治的支配を維持するための情報操作を正当化しています。最近では、中国の権威主義的指導者である習近平は、文化大革命時代の「世論闘争」という用語を復活させ、人権や民主主義などの価値観やアイデアを広める能力があるため、ソーシャルメディアを「主要な戦場」と宣言しました。 党の政治的正当性に対する脅威とみなされた。
オンラインで世論を形成しようとする中国共産党の取り組みは、現在、単に反体制派を検閲し、政府寄りのプロパガンダを広めるだけではありません。 彼らはよりグローバルで攻撃的であり、多くの場合、国家主権と民主主義の言説に直接干渉し、党のより広範な戦略的および経済的目標をサポートしています。
ASPI の国際サイバーポリシーセンターは、「ゲームの世論:中国共産党のますます洗練されたサイバー対応の影響力作戦」というタイトルの新しいレポートを発行しました。ソーシャルメディアを通じて民主主義国家内で行われる CCP のサイバー対応の影響力作戦。
このレポートは、中国から発信された秘密のサイバー対応の影響力作戦の既存の公的に入手可能な証拠を調査して、CCPの進化する能力の評価を提供します。中国共産党はペルソナの調整されたネットワークを維持するための永続的な能力を開発しており、複数の中国政府機関が、おそらく集団ではないにしても並行して、ソーシャルメディアで秘密の影響力作戦を行っていることがわかりました. これらの作戦は、国内および外交の政策と意思決定プロセスを混乱させることにより、民主主義を標的とすることにおいて、より頻繁で、洗練され、効果的になっています.
ケーススタディとして、Twitter と Meta が 2019 年に中国政府に起因する Spamouflageネットワークにリンクされた、これまで報告されていなかった CCP のサイバー対応の影響力操作を明らかにします。米国が無責任に中国やその他の国に対してサイバースパイ活動を行っているという未確認の主張を広めるために、米国ベースのソーシャルメディアプラットフォーム。 Spamouflage にリンクされたアカウントによって誤ってツイートされた画像で識別可能な開いているブラウザー タブのような手違いを利用して、この影響力のある操作を実行している中国政府機関はそれを「OperationHoney Badger」と名付けたと考えられます。
Last week, the US Department ofJustice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers fromChina’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fakeonlinepersonason social media sites, includingTwitter, to targetChinese dissidents throughonline harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whosesole purposeis to sow divisions withinthe UnitedStates’.
This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specificChinesegovernment agency of covert malignactivitieson social media. However, the MPSisone of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence userson social media.
Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the TiananmenSquare Massacre, theChineseCommunist Party (CCP) justifiesits manipulation of information tomaintain social stability and political controloverChina.More recently,China’s authoritarianleader,Xi Jinping,has revived the CulturalRevolution-era term ‘public opinionstruggle’ and declared social media ‘themainbattlefield’ because ofits ability to spread values and ideas—likehuman rights and democracy—that are perceivedas threats to the party’s political legitimacy.
The CCP’s efforts to shape public opiniononlinenowgobeyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They aremore globaland aggressive, often directly interfering instate sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’s broader strategic and economicgoals.
ASPI’sInternational Cyber Policy Centrehas published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reportingby TheWashington Post which explores the he alongside reportingby TheWashington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.
The report canvassesthe existing publicly availableevidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating fromChina to provide anassessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCPhas developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinatednetworks ofpersonas and that multipleChinesegovernment agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operationson social media. Those operations have becomemore frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democraciesby disruptingdomestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.
As acase study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflagenetwork, whichTwitter and Meta attributed to theChineseGovernment in 2019. This newiteration ofthe networkis using inauthentic accountson US-based andChina-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the USis irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations againstChina and other countries. Drawingon slip-upslike anopenbrowsertab identifiable in animage accidentally tweetedby a Spamouflage-linked account, webelieve theChineseGovernment agencies conducting this influence operation namedit ‘OperationHoney Badger.’
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ccps-increasingly-sophisticated-cyber-enabled-influence-operation/
CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation
中共日益复杂的网络影响力运作
！！！！！！！上周，美国司法部公布了一项重大刑事诉讼。中国公安部 (MPS) 的警官被指控在包括Twitter在内的社交媒体网站上创建“数千个虚假的在线角色，通过在线骚扰和威胁来针对中国持不同政见者”，并传播“其唯一目的是散布谣言的宣传”美国内部的分歧”。！！！！！！！！
！！！！！！！先週、米国司法省は重要な刑事訴状を公開しました。中国の公安省 (MPS) の警察官は、「Twitter を含むソーシャルメディアサイトで何千もの偽のオンラインペルソナを作成し、オンラインでの嫌がらせや脅迫を通じて中国の反体制派を標的に」し、「種をまくことのみを目的とするプロパガンダを広めた」として起訴されました。米国内の部門」。！！！！！！！！！
この発表は、特定の中国政府機関がソーシャルメディア上で秘密裏に悪意のある活動を行っていることを公に明らかにした初めての事例です。しかし、MPS は、ソーシャルメディアのユーザーに影響を与えるために秘密裏に強制的な操作を行っているとアナリストが長い間疑っていた多くの政党支配組織の 1 つです。
中国共産党 (CCP) は、天安門事件の直後に遡る政策概念である「世論の誘導」を装い、社会の安定と中国に対する政治的支配を維持するための情報操作を正当化しています。最近では、中国の権威主義的指導者である習近平は、文化大革命時代の「世論闘争」という用語を復活させ、人権や民主主義などの価値観やアイデアを広める能力があるため、ソーシャルメディアを「主要な戦場」と宣言しました。 党の政治的正当性に対する脅威とみなされた。
オンラインで世論を形成しようとする中国共産党の取り組みは、現在、単に反体制派を検閲し、政府寄りのプロパガンダを広めるだけではありません。 彼らはよりグローバルで攻撃的であり、多くの場合、国家主権と民主主義の言説に直接干渉し、党のより広範な戦略的および経済的目標をサポートしています。
ASPI の国際サイバーポリシーセンターは、「ゲームの世論:中国共産党のますます洗練されたサイバー対応の影響力作戦」というタイトルの新しいレポートを発行しました。ソーシャルメディアを通じて民主主義国家内で行われる CCP のサイバー対応の影響力作戦。
このレポートは、中国から発信された秘密のサイバー対応の影響力作戦の既存の公的に入手可能な証拠を調査して、CCPの進化する能力の評価を提供します。中国共産党はペルソナの調整されたネットワークを維持するための永続的な能力を開発しており、複数の中国政府機関が、おそらく集団ではないにしても並行して、ソーシャルメディアで秘密の影響力作戦を行っていることがわかりました. これらの作戦は、国内および外交の政策と意思決定プロセスを混乱させることにより、民主主義を標的とすることにおいて、より頻繁で、洗練され、効果的になっています.
ケーススタディとして、Twitter と Meta が 2019 年に中国政府に起因する Spamouflageネットワークにリンクされた、これまで報告されていなかった CCP のサイバー対応の影響力操作を明らかにします。米国が無責任に中国やその他の国に対してサイバースパイ活動を行っているという未確認の主張を広めるために、米国ベースのソーシャルメディアプラットフォーム。 Spamouflage にリンクされたアカウントによって誤ってツイートされた画像で識別可能な開いているブラウザー タブのような手違いを利用して、この影響力のある操作を実行している中国政府機関はそれを「OperationHoney Badger」と名付けたと考えられます。
Last week, the US Department ofJustice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers fromChina’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fakeonlinepersonason social media sites, includingTwitter, to targetChinese dissidents throughonline harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whosesole purposeis to sow divisions withinthe UnitedStates’.
This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specificChinesegovernment agency of covert malignactivitieson social media. However, the MPSisone of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence userson social media.
Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the TiananmenSquare Massacre, theChineseCommunist Party (CCP) justifiesits manipulation of information tomaintain social stability and political controloverChina.More recently,China’s authoritarianleader,Xi Jinping,has revived the CulturalRevolution-era term ‘public opinionstruggle’ and declared social media ‘themainbattlefield’ because ofits ability to spread values and ideas—likehuman rights and democracy—that are perceivedas threats to the party’s political legitimacy.
The CCP’s efforts to shape public opiniononlinenowgobeyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They aremore globaland aggressive, often directly interfering instate sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’s broader strategic and economicgoals.
ASPI’sInternational Cyber Policy Centrehas published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reportingby TheWashington Post which explores the he alongside reportingby TheWashington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.
The report canvassesthe existing publicly availableevidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating fromChina to provide anassessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCPhas developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinatednetworks ofpersonas and that multipleChinesegovernment agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operationson social media. Those operations have becomemore frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democraciesby disruptingdomestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.
As acase study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflagenetwork, whichTwitter and Meta attributed to theChineseGovernment in 2019. This newiteration ofthe networkis using inauthentic accountson US-based andChina-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the USis irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations againstChina and other countries. Drawingon slip-upslike anopenbrowsertab identifiable in animage accidentally tweetedby a Spamouflage-linked account, webelieve theChineseGovernment agencies conducting this influence operation namedit ‘OperationHoney Badger.’
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ccps-increasingly-sophisticated-cyber-enabled-influence-operation/
CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation
中共日益复杂的网络影响力运作
！！！！！！！上周，美国司法部公布了一项重大刑事诉讼。中国公安部 (MPS) 的警官被指控在包括Twitter在内的社交媒体网站上创建“数千个虚假的在线角色，通过在线骚扰和威胁来针对中国持不同政见者”，并传播“其唯一目的是散布谣言的宣传”美国内部的分歧”。！！！！！！！！
！！！！！！！先週、米国司法省は重要な刑事訴状を公開しました。中国の公安省 (MPS) の警察官は、「Twitter を含むソーシャルメディアサイトで何千もの偽のオンラインペルソナを作成し、オンラインでの嫌がらせや脅迫を通じて中国の反体制派を標的に」し、「種をまくことのみを目的とするプロパガンダを広めた」として起訴されました。米国内の部門」。！！！！！！！！！
この発表は、特定の中国政府機関がソーシャルメディア上で秘密裏に悪意のある活動を行っていることを公に明らかにした初めての事例です。しかし、MPS は、ソーシャルメディアのユーザーに影響を与えるために秘密裏に強制的な操作を行っているとアナリストが長い間疑っていた多くの政党支配組織の 1 つです。
中国共産党 (CCP) は、天安門事件の直後に遡る政策概念である「世論の誘導」を装い、社会の安定と中国に対する政治的支配を維持するための情報操作を正当化しています。最近では、中国の権威主義的指導者である習近平は、文化大革命時代の「世論闘争」という用語を復活させ、人権や民主主義などの価値観やアイデアを広める能力があるため、ソーシャルメディアを「主要な戦場」と宣言しました。 党の政治的正当性に対する脅威とみなされた。
オンラインで世論を形成しようとする中国共産党の取り組みは、現在、単に反体制派を検閲し、政府寄りのプロパガンダを広めるだけではありません。 彼らはよりグローバルで攻撃的であり、多くの場合、国家主権と民主主義の言説に直接干渉し、党のより広範な戦略的および経済的目標をサポートしています。
ASPI の国際サイバーポリシーセンターは、「ゲームの世論:中国共産党のますます洗練されたサイバー対応の影響力作戦」というタイトルの新しいレポートを発行しました。ソーシャルメディアを通じて民主主義国家内で行われる CCP のサイバー対応の影響力作戦。
このレポートは、中国から発信された秘密のサイバー対応の影響力作戦の既存の公的に入手可能な証拠を調査して、CCPの進化する能力の評価を提供します。中国共産党はペルソナの調整されたネットワークを維持するための永続的な能力を開発しており、複数の中国政府機関が、おそらく集団ではないにしても並行して、ソーシャルメディアで秘密の影響力作戦を行っていることがわかりました. これらの作戦は、国内および外交の政策と意思決定プロセスを混乱させることにより、民主主義を標的とすることにおいて、より頻繁で、洗練され、効果的になっています.
ケーススタディとして、Twitter と Meta が 2019 年に中国政府に起因する Spamouflageネットワークにリンクされた、これまで報告されていなかった CCP のサイバー対応の影響力操作を明らかにします。米国が無責任に中国やその他の国に対してサイバースパイ活動を行っているという未確認の主張を広めるために、米国ベースのソーシャルメディアプラットフォーム。 Spamouflage にリンクされたアカウントによって誤ってツイートされた画像で識別可能な開いているブラウザー タブのような手違いを利用して、この影響力のある操作を実行している中国政府機関はそれを「OperationHoney Badger」と名付けたと考えられます。
Last week, the US Department ofJustice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers fromChina’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fakeonlinepersonason social media sites, includingTwitter, to targetChinese dissidents throughonline harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whosesole purposeis to sow divisions withinthe UnitedStates’.
This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specificChinesegovernment agency of covert malignactivitieson social media. However, the MPSisone of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence userson social media.
Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the TiananmenSquare Massacre, theChineseCommunist Party (CCP) justifiesits manipulation of information tomaintain social stability and political controloverChina.More recently,China’s authoritarianleader,Xi Jinping,has revived the CulturalRevolution-era term ‘public opinionstruggle’ and declared social media ‘themainbattlefield’ because ofits ability to spread values and ideas—likehuman rights and democracy—that are perceivedas threats to the party’s political legitimacy.
The CCP’s efforts to shape public opiniononlinenowgobeyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They aremore globaland aggressive, often directly interfering instate sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’sbroader strategic and economicgoals.
ASPI’sInternational Cyber Policy Centrehas published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reportingby TheWashington Post which explores the he alongside reportingby TheWashington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.
The report canvassesthe existing publicly availableevidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating fromChina to provide anassessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCPhas developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinatednetworks ofpersonas and that multipleChinesegovernment agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operationson social media. Those operations have becomemore frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democraciesby disruptingdomestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.
As acase study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflagenetwork, whichTwitter and Meta attributed to theChineseGovernment in 2019. This newiteration ofthe networkis using inauthentic accountson US-based andChina-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the USis irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations againstChina and other countries. Drawingon slip-upslike anopenbrowsertab identifiable in animage accidentally tweetedby a Spamouflage-linked account, webelieve theChineseGovernment agencies conducting this influence operation namedit ‘OperationHoney Badger.’
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ccps-increasingly-sophisticated-cyber-enabled-influence-operation/
CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation
中共日益复杂的网络影响力运作
！！！！！！！上周，美国司法部公布了一项重大刑事诉讼。中国公安部 (MPS) 的警官被指控在包括Twitter在内的社交媒体网站上创建“数千个虚假的在线角色，通过在线骚扰和威胁来针对中国持不同政见者”，并传播“其唯一目的是散布谣言的宣传”美国内部的分歧”。！！！！！！！！
先週、米国司法省は重要な刑事訴状を公開しました。中国の公安省 (MPS) の警察官は、「Twitter を含むソーシャルメディアサイトで何千もの偽のオンラインペルソナを作成し、オンラインでの嫌がらせや脅迫を通じて中国の反体制派を標的に」し、「種をまくことのみを目的とするプロパガンダを広めた」として起訴されました。米国内の部門」。
この発表は、特定の中国政府機関がソーシャルメディア上で秘密裏に悪意のある活動を行っていることを公に明らかにした初めての事例です。しかし、MPS は、ソーシャルメディアのユーザーに影響を与えるために秘密裏に強制的な操作を行っているとアナリストが長い間疑っていた多くの政党支配組織の 1 つです。
中国共産党 (CCP) は、天安門事件の直後に遡る政策概念である「世論の誘導」を装い、社会の安定と中国に対する政治的支配を維持するための情報操作を正当化しています。最近では、中国の権威主義的指導者である習近平は、文化大革命時代の「世論闘争」という用語を復活させ、人権や民主主義などの価値観やアイデアを広める能力があるため、ソーシャルメディアを「主要な戦場」と宣言しました。 党の政治的正当性に対する脅威とみなされた。
オンラインで世論を形成しようとする中国共産党の取り組みは、現在、単に反体制派を検閲し、政府寄りのプロパガンダを広めるだけではありません。 彼らはよりグローバルで攻撃的であり、多くの場合、国家主権と民主主義の言説に直接干渉し、党のより広範な戦略的および経済的目標をサポートしています。
ASPI の国際サイバーポリシーセンターは、「ゲームの世論:中国共産党のますます洗練されたサイバー対応の影響力作戦」というタイトルの新しいレポートを発行しました。ソーシャルメディアを通じて民主主義国家内で行われる CCP のサイバー対応の影響力作戦。
このレポートは、中国から発信された秘密のサイバー対応の影響力作戦の既存の公的に入手可能な証拠を調査して、CCPの進化する能力の評価を提供します。中国共産党はペルソナの調整されたネットワークを維持するための永続的な能力を開発しており、複数の中国政府機関が、おそらく集団ではないにしても並行して、ソーシャルメディアで秘密の影響力作戦を行っていることがわかりました. これらの作戦は、国内および外交の政策と意思決定プロセスを混乱させることにより、民主主義を標的とすることにおいて、より頻繁で、洗練され、効果的になっています.
ケーススタディとして、Twitter と Meta が 2019 年に中国政府に起因する Spamouflageネットワークにリンクされた、これまで報告されていなかった CCP のサイバー対応の影響力操作を明らかにします。米国が無責任に中国やその他の国に対してサイバースパイ活動を行っているという未確認の主張を広めるために、米国ベースのソーシャルメディアプラットフォーム。 Spamouflage にリンクされたアカウントによって誤ってツイートされた画像で識別可能な開いているブラウザー タブのような手違いを利用して、この影響力のある操作を実行している中国政府機関はそれを「OperationHoney Badger」と名付けたと考えられます。
Last week, the US Department ofJustice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers fromChina’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fakeonlinepersonason social media sites, includingTwitter, to targetChinese dissidents throughonline harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whosesole purposeis to sow divisions withinthe UnitedStates’.
This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specificChinesegovernment agency of covert malignactivitieson social media. However, the MPSisone of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence userson social media.
Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the TiananmenSquare Massacre, theChineseCommunist Party (CCP) justifiesits manipulation of information tomaintain social stability and political controloverChina.More recently,China’s authoritarianleader,Xi Jinping,has revived the CulturalRevolution-era term ‘public opinionstruggle’ and declared social media ‘themainbattlefield’ because ofits ability to spread values and ideas—likehuman rights and democracy—that are perceivedas threats to the party’s political legitimacy.
The CCP’s efforts to shape public opiniononlinenowgobeyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They aremore globaland aggressive, often directly interfering instate sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’sbroader strategic and economicgoals.
ASPI’sInternational Cyber Policy Centrehas published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reportingby TheWashington Post which explores the he alongside reportingby TheWashington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.
The report canvassesthe existing publicly availableevidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating fromChina to provide anassessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCPhas developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinatednetworks ofpersonas and that multipleChinesegovernment agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operationson social media. Those operations have becomemore frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democraciesby disruptingdomestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.
As acase study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflagenetwork, whichTwitter and Meta attributed to theChineseGovernment in 2019. This newiteration ofthe networkis using inauthentic accountson US-based andChina-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the USis irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations againstChina and other countries. Drawingon slip-upslike anopenbrowsertab identifiable in animage accidentally tweetedby a Spamouflage-linked account, webelieve theChineseGovernment agencies conducting this influence operation namedit ‘OperationHoney Badger.’
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ccps-increasingly-sophisticated-cyber-enabled-influence-operation/
CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation
中共日益复杂的网络影响力运作
先週、米国司法省は重要な刑事訴状を公開しました。中国の公安省 (MPS) の警察官は、「Twitter を含むソーシャルメディアサイトで何千もの偽のオンラインペルソナを作成し、オンラインでの嫌がらせや脅迫を通じて中国の反体制派を標的に」し、「種をまくことのみを目的とするプロパガンダを広めた」として起訴されました。米国内の部門」。
この発表は、特定の中国政府機関がソーシャルメディア上で秘密裏に悪意のある活動を行っていることを公に明らかにした初めての事例です。しかし、MPS は、ソーシャルメディアのユーザーに影響を与えるために秘密裏に強制的な操作を行っているとアナリストが長い間疑っていた多くの政党支配組織の 1 つです。
中国共産党 (CCP) は、天安門事件の直後に遡る政策概念である「世論の誘導」を装い、社会の安定と中国に対する政治的支配を維持するための情報操作を正当化しています。最近では、中国の権威主義的指導者である習近平は、文化大革命時代の「世論闘争」という用語を復活させ、人権や民主主義などの価値観やアイデアを広める能力があるため、ソーシャルメディアを「主要な戦場」と宣言しました。 党の政治的正当性に対する脅威とみなされた。
オンラインで世論を形成しようとする中国共産党の取り組みは、現在、単に反体制派を検閲し、政府寄りのプロパガンダを広めるだけではありません。 彼らはよりグローバルで攻撃的であり、多くの場合、国家主権と民主主義の言説に直接干渉し、党のより広範な戦略的および経済的目標をサポートしています。
ASPI の国際サイバーポリシーセンターは、「ゲームの世論:中国共産党のますます洗練されたサイバー対応の影響力作戦」というタイトルの新しいレポートを発行しました。ソーシャルメディアを通じて民主主義国家内で行われる CCP のサイバー対応の影響力作戦。
このレポートは、中国から発信された秘密のサイバー対応の影響力作戦の既存の公的に入手可能な証拠を調査して、CCPの進化する能力の評価を提供します。中国共産党はペルソナの調整されたネットワークを維持するための永続的な能力を開発しており、複数の中国政府機関が、おそらく集団ではないにしても並行して、ソーシャルメディアで秘密の影響力作戦を行っていることがわかりました. これらの作戦は、国内および外交の政策と意思決定プロセスを混乱させることにより、民主主義を標的とすることにおいて、より頻繁で、洗練され、効果的になっています.
ケーススタディとして、Twitter と Meta が 2019 年に中国政府に起因する Spamouflageネットワークにリンクされた、これまで報告されていなかった CCP のサイバー対応の影響力操作を明らかにします。米国が無責任に中国やその他の国に対してサイバースパイ活動を行っているという未確認の主張を広めるために、米国ベースのソーシャルメディアプラットフォーム。 Spamouflage にリンクされたアカウントによって誤ってツイートされた画像で識別可能な開いているブラウザー タブのような手違いを利用して、この影響力のある操作を実行している中国政府機関はそれを「OperationHoney Badger」と名付けたと考えられます。
Last week, the US Department ofJustice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers fromChina’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fakeonlinepersonason social media sites, includingTwitter, to targetChinese dissidents throughonline harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whosesole purposeis to sow divisions withinthe UnitedStates’.
This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specificChinesegovernment agency of covert malignactivitieson social media. However, the MPSisone of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence userson social media.
Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the TiananmenSquare Massacre, theChineseCommunist Party (CCP) justifiesits manipulation of information tomaintain social stability and political controloverChina.More recently,China’s authoritarianleader,Xi Jinping,has revived the CulturalRevolution-era term ‘public opinionstruggle’ and declared social media ‘themainbattlefield’ because ofits ability to spread values and ideas—likehuman rights and democracy—that are perceivedas threats to the party’s political legitimacy.
The CCP’s efforts to shape public opiniononlinenowgobeyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They aremore globaland aggressive, often directly interfering instate sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’sbroader strategic and economicgoals.
ASPI’sInternational Cyber Policy Centrehas published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reportingby TheWashington Post which explores the he alongside reportingby TheWashington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.
The report canvassesthe existing publicly availableevidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating fromChina to provide anassessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCPhas developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinatednetworks ofpersonas and that multipleChinesegovernment agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operationson social media. Those operations have becomemore frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democraciesby disruptingdomestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.
As acase study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflagenetwork, whichTwitter and Meta attributed to theChineseGovernment in 2019. This newiteration ofthe networkis using inauthentic accountson US-based andChina-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the USis irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations againstChina and other countries. Drawingon slip-upslike anopenbrowsertab identifiable in animage accidentally tweetedby a Spamouflage-linked account, webelieve theChineseGovernment agencies conducting this influence operation namedit ‘OperationHoney Badger.’
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ccps-increasingly-sophisticated-cyber-enabled-influence-operation/
CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operation
中共日益复杂的网络影响力运作
先週、米国司法省は重要な刑事訴状を公開しました。中国の公安省 (MPS) の警察官は、「Twitter を含むソーシャルメディアサイトで何千もの偽のオンラインペルソナを作成し、オンラインでの嫌がらせや脅迫を通じて中国の反体制派を標的に」し、「種をまくことのみを目的とするプロパガンダを広めた」として起訴されました。米国内の部門」。
Last week, the US Department ofJustice unsealed a significant criminal complaint. Police officers fromChina’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) were charged with creating ‘thousands of fakeonlinepersonason social media sites, includingTwitter, to targetChinese dissidents throughonline harassment and threats’ and for spreading ‘propaganda whosesole purposeis to sow divisions withinthe UnitedStates’.
この発表は、特定の中国政府機関がソーシャルメディア上で秘密裏に悪意のある活動を行っていることを公に明らかにした初めての事例です。しかし、MPS は、ソーシャルメディアのユーザーに影響を与えるために秘密裏に強制的な操作を行っているとアナリストが長い間疑っていた多くの政党支配組織の 1 つです。
This announcement marked the first definitive public attribution to a specificChinesegovernment agency of covert malignactivitieson social media. However, the MPSisone of many party-controlled organisations that analysts have long suspected of conducting covert and coercive operations to influence userson social media.
中国共産党 (CCP) は、天安門事件の直後に遡る政策概念である「世論の誘導」を装い、社会の安定と中国に対する政治的支配を維持するための情報操作を正当化しています。最近では、中国の権威主義的指導者である習近平は、文化大革命時代の「世論闘争」という用語を復活させ、人権や民主主義などの価値観やアイデアを広める能力があるため、ソーシャルメディアを「主要な戦場」と宣言しました。 党の政治的正当性に対する脅威とみなされた。
Under the guise of ‘guiding public opinion’, a policy concept that dates back to the aftermath of the TiananmenSquare Massacre, theChineseCommunist Party (CCP) justifiesits manipulation of information tomaintain social stability and political controloverChina.More recently,China’s authoritarianleader,Xi Jinping,has revived the CulturalRevolution-era term ‘public opinionstruggle’ and declared social media ‘themainbattlefield’ because ofits ability to spread values and ideas—likehuman rights and democracy—that are perceivedas threats to the party’s political legitimacy.
オンラインで世論を形成しようとする中国共産党の取り組みは、現在、単に反体制派を検閲し、政府寄りのプロパガンダを広めるだけではありません。 彼らはよりグローバルで攻撃的であり、多くの場合、国家主権と民主主義の言説に直接干渉し、党のより広範な戦略的および経済的目標をサポートしています。
The CCP’s efforts to shape public opiniononlinenowgobeyond simply censoring dissidents and spreading pro-government propaganda. They aremore globaland aggressive, often directly interfering instate sovereignty and democratic discourse and supporting the party’s broader strategic and economicgoals.
ASPI の国際サイバーポリシーセンターは、「ゲームの世論:中国共産党のますます洗練されたサイバー対応の影響力作戦」というタイトルの新しいレポートを発行しました。ソーシャルメディアを通じて民主主義国家内で行われる CCP のサイバー対応の影響力作戦。
ASPI’sInternational Cyber Policy Centrehas published a new report entitled ‘Gaming public opinion: The CCP’s increasingly sophisticated cyber-enabled influence operations’, alongside reportingby TheWashington Post which explores the he alongside reportingby TheWashington Post, which explores the growing challenge of CCP cyber-enabled influence operations conducted within democracies through social media.
このレポートは、中国から発信された秘密のサイバー対応の影響力作戦の既存の公的に入手可能な証拠を調査して、CCPの進化する能力の評価を提供します。中国共産党はペルソナの調整されたネットワークを維持するための永続的な能力を開発しており、複数の中国政府機関が、おそらく集団ではないにしても並行して、ソーシャルメディアで秘密の影響力作戦を行っていることがわかりました. これらの作戦は、国内および外交の政策と意思決定プロセスを混乱させることにより、民主主義を標的とすることにおいて、より頻繁で、洗練され、効果的になっています.
The report canvassesthe existing publicly availableevidence of covert cyber-enabled influence operations originating fromChina to provide anassessment of the CCP’s evolving capabilities. We find that the CCPhas developed a persistent capability to sustain coordinatednetworks ofpersonas and that multipleChinesegovernment agencies probably conduct, in parallel if not collectively, covert influence operationson social media. Those operations have becomemore frequent, sophisticated, and effective in targeting democraciesby disruptingdomestic and foreign policies and decision-making processes.
ケーススタディとして、Twitter と Meta が 2019 年に中国政府に起因する Spamouflageネットワークにリンクされた、これまで報告されていなかった CCP のサイバー対応の影響力操作を明らかにします。米国が無責任に中国やその他の国に対してサイバースパイ活動を行っているという未確認の主張を広めるために、米国ベースのソーシャルメディアプラットフォーム。 Spamouflage にリンクされたアカウントによって誤ってツイートされた画像で識別可能な開いているブラウザー タブのような手違いを利用して、この影響力のある操作を実行している中国政府機関はそれを「OperationHoney Badger」と名付けたと考えられます。
As acase study, we reveal a previously unreported CCP cyber-enabled influence operation linked to the Spamouflagenetwork, whichTwitter and Meta attributed to theChineseGovernment in 2019. This newiteration ofthe networkis using inauthentic accountson US-based andChina-based social media platforms to spread unverified claims that the USis irresponsibly conducting cyber-espionage operations againstChina and other countries. Drawingon slip-upslike anopenbrowsertab identifiable in animage accidentally tweetedby a Spamouflage-linked account, webelieve theChineseGovernment agencies conducting this influence operation namedit ‘OperationHoney Badger.’
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ccps-increasingly-sophisticated-cyber-enabled-influence-operation/
・検索するタグは繋げたり、省いたりできる。これ結構便利、いつも使う。
・一定以上の安定したクオリティが見たい場合、チャンネルをフォローした方が良い。brazzersとか。日本のチャンネルは無い？のかな。Japaneseってジャンル自体は凄い需要あるのに。
・pornstar専用のチャンネルもある。プロとアマチュアに別れてて、一定の基準を満たすとverifiedmodelになれるらしい。
・特定の趣向で探すのが面倒だったりする場合、他者が作ったplaylistを見るのがおすすめ。同じ趣向のplaylistはビデオのすぐ下からアクセスできるようになってる。
・Pornhubでアカウントを作ると自分専用のplaylistを作れるようになる。これはpremiumにならなくてもできる。ビデオの順序変えたり、感覚的に管理できるのでおすすめ。
・premiumになるとプレミアムコンテンツにアクセスできる。一応フリーのお試し期間があるので、試してから登録したい。
・私みたいに女の子にこだわりがある場合、straightpornだけじゃなくて、lesbianやsolefemaleタグもおすすめ。straightよりお洒落に気合の入った可愛い女の子がいっぱい見れる。
I. INTRODUCTION
These Terms of Use and EndUser LicenseAgreement (collectively, the “Agreement”)together withall the documents referred to init constitute a legally bindingagreementmadebetweenyouas anatural person (“you”, “your” or “user”) and We (“we,” “us” or “our”), concerningyouraccess to and use of thesoftwareapplication formobile devices (the “App”).
All the documents that relate to the App are herebyexpressly incorporated hereinby reference.
Please read thisAgreement carefully beforeyoudownload, install or use the App.
Itis important thatyou read and understand thisAgreementasbydownloading, installing or using the Appyou indicate thatyou have read, understood, agreedand accepted theAgreement whichtakes effecton thedateon whichyoudownload, install or use the App.By using the Appyou agree to abideby thisAgreement.
Ifyou do not agree with (do notaccept) thisAgreement, or ifyou do not agreeat least withone of the provisions of thisAgreement,you are notauthorized to, andyoumay notaccess,download, install or use the App andyou must ly discontinuedownloading, installing the App and remove (delete) the App fromanymobile device inyour possession or underyour control.
We reserve the right,at oursole discretion, tomakechanges or modifications to thisAgreementatanytime and foranyreason. Wewill keepyou informed aboutanychangesby updating thisAgreement andyouwaiveany right to receive specific notice of each suchchange.Itisyour responsibility to periodicallyreview thisAgreement tostay informed of updates.Youwill be subject to, andwill be deemed to be aware of and to haveaccepted,the changes inany revisedAgreementbyyour continued use of the App after thedate such revisedAgreementis posted.
III. RESTRICTIONSONWHO CAN USE THE APP
In order todownload, install,access or use the App,you must (a) be eighteen (18) years ofage or older.
Alluserswho are minors in thejurisdiction in which they reside (generally under theage of 18) must have the permission of, and be directly supervisedby, their parent or guardian to use the App, so ifyou arebetween theages of thirteen (13) andseventeen (17) years andyouwish to usedownload, install,access or use the App, before doing soyou must: (a)assure and confirm (ifneeded) thatyour parent or guardian have readand agree (getyour parent or guardian’s consent) to thisAgreement prior toyou using the App; (b) havethe power to enter a binding contract with us and not be barred from doing so underany applicablelaws.
Parents and guardians must directly superviseany use of the Appby minors.
Any person under theage of thirteen (13) yearsis not permitted todownload, install,access or use the App.
You affirm thatyou are eithermore than eighteen 18 years ofage, or an emancipated minor, or possess legal parental or guardian consent,and are fully able and competent to enter into the terms, conditions, obligations, affirmations, representations, and warrantiessetforth in thisAgreement, and to abideby and complywith thisAgreement.
IV. GENERAL TERMS
The Appis a utility program designed to enhanceyour device experience. The Appallows toscanany types of document to high qualityPDF orJPEG; to save and storeanyscan copies of documentsonyourmobile devices; toshareyourscansvia email; uploadscanned documents to cloud serviceslikebox,Evernote orGoogle Drive (see the full performance liston the App’s pageonitunes.apple.com).All documents shall be stored locallyonyour device and shall never be sent toany third-party unlessyou export them to other apps or devicesby means of the App.
The Appis intendedonly foryour personal non-commercial use.You shall use the Apponly for the purposes, mentioned above.
V. PRIVACY POLICY
Your privacyis very important to us. Accordingly, we have developed the Privacy Policy in order foryou to understand how we process, use and store information including personal data.Access to the App and use of the Servicesis subject to the Privacy Policy.Byaccessing the App andby continuing to use the Services,you are deemed to haveaccepted the Privacy Policy, and in particular,you are deemed to have acknowledged the ways we processyour informationas wellas appropriate legal grounds forprocessing described in the Privacy Policy. We reserve the right to amend the Privacy Policy fromtime totime. Ifyou disagree withany part of the Privacy Policy,you must immediately stop using the App and Services. Please read our Privacy Policy carefully.
By using the App,you undertake torespect our intellectual rights (intellectual rights related to the App’s source code,UI/UX design, content material,copyright andtrademarks, hereinafter referred toas the “Intellectual Property Rights”)as wellas those ownedby third parties.
As longasyou keep using the App, weyou a limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable non-sublicensable, non-assignable and revocable license toaccess and use the App pursuant to thisAgreementonanyApple-branded products thatyou own or control except that the Appmay beaccessed and usedby other accountsassociatedwith youvia Family Sharing or volume purchasing (the “License”).
The source code, design and content, including information, photographs, illustrations, artwork and other graphic materials, sounds,music orvideo (hereinafter – the “works”)as wellas names,logos andtrademarks (hereinafter – “means of individualization”) within the App are protectedbycopyrightlaws and other relevantlaws and/orinternational treaties, and belong to us and/or our partners and/or contracted third parties,as thecasemaybe.
In the event ofany third party claim thatyour possession and use of the App infringes that third party’sintellectual property rights,Applewill not be responsible for the investigation, defense,settlement anddischarge ofany suchintellectual property infringement claim.
These works and means of individualizationmay not be copied, reproduced, retransmitted, distributed, disseminated, sold, published,broadcasted or circulated whether inwhole or in part, unlessexpressly permittedby us and/or our partners and/or contracted third parties,as thecasemaybe.
All rights,title and interest in and to the App andits content, works and means of individualizationas wellasits functionalities (1) arethe exclusive property of We and/or our partners and/or contracted third parties, (2) are protectedby the applicableinternational andnational legal provisions, and (3) are under no circumstances transferred (assigned) toyou in full or in part within the context of the license herewithin.
Wewill not hesitate totake legalaction againstany unauthorized use of ourtrademarks, names or symbols to protect and restore our rights.All rights notexpresslyed herein are reserved. Other product and company names mentioned hereinmay also be thetrademarks of theirrespective owners.
You agree not to use the App inany way that:
is unlawful, illegal or unauthorized;
is defamatory ofany other person;
infringesanycopyright, right ortrademark ofany other person;
advocates, promotes orassistsany unlawfulact suchas (by way of exampleonly)copyright infringement orcomputer misuse.
You shall notmake the App available toany third parties. Inaddition,you shall not modify, translate into other languages, reverse engineer, decompile, disassemble orotherwise derivative works from the App orany documentation concerning the App.
You shall not transfer, lend,rent, lease, distribute the App, or useit for providing services to a third party, orany rights to the App orany documentation concerning the App to a third party.
Misuse ofanytrademarks orany other content displayedon the Appis prohibited.
You shall not copy and/or duplicate and/or distribute and/or publish and/or useany content in the App, directly or indirectly,by way of aviolation of ourIntellectual Property Rights.
Moreover,you shall notmakeanyattempts to use the App or part thereof for malicious intentions.
Also we are not responsible for the wayyou use the App.
Itis clarified that wemay adopt, against auserwhoviolated the presentAgreement,any legal measuresat our disposal pursuant to the applicablelaws.
All disputes arising from the usage of the App, shall be governedby and construed in accordancewith thelaws ofthe United States of America, and shall be submitted to thesolejurisdiction of the competent courts ofNew York,New York,the United States of America.
VIII. AVAILABILITY OF THE APP, SECURITYAND ACCURACY
In order to use the App,you are required to have a compatiblemobile phone ortablet, andinternetaccess. However, pleasenote that we offeryou widgets that save translationsand allowyou toaccess them later in offline mode.
The Appis available fordownloading and installingon handheld compatiblemobile devices runningApple iOSOperating System11.0 with minimum system requirements.
We do not warrant that the Appwill be compatible withallhardware andsoftware whichyoumay use.
Wemake no warranty thatyouraccess to the Appwill be uninterrupted,timely orerror-free. NeitherdoesApple have an obligation whatsoever to furnishany maintenance and support services withrespect to the App.
You acknowledge the Appis providedvia theinternet andmobile networks and so the qualityand availability of the Appmay be affectedby factors outside ourreasonable control.
Theversion of the Appmay be upgraded fromtime totime toadd support for new functions and services.
Wemaychange or update the Appand anything described init without noticingyou. If theneed arises, wemay suspendaccess to the App, or closeit indefinitely.
You also warrant thatany information thatyou submit to usistrue, accurate and complete, andyou agree to keepitactualatalltimes.
You can discontinue using our Servicesatanytimeby choosing the relevant option inyouriTunes AccountSettings. Ifyou decide not to use the App foranyreasonyou should uninstall the App.
The Appis providedon a paid basis.Youwillneed to pay aone-time fee of $14.99 in order todownload the App.Onceyoudownload the App,youwillgetaccess toallits features.
Prices are in U.S. dollars,may vary in countries other than the U.S.and are subject tochange without notice.
Youmay be chargedbyyour communications service provider fordownloading and/oraccessing the Apponyourmobile phone ortablet device, soyou should check the terms ofagreementwith your operator. Thismay include data roaming charges ifyou do this outsideyourhome territory.All these charges aresolelyyour responsibility. Ifyou do not pay thebills related toyourmobile phone ortablet device, then weassume thatyou have the permission from the person thatdoesit before incurringany of these charges.
X. THIRD PARTYWEBSITES AND RESOURCES
The Appmaylinkyou to other siteson theInternet and contracted third parties to provideyou certain services. We have no controloverand accept no responsibility for the content ofanywebsite ormobileapplication to which alink from the App exists (unless we are the provider of thoselinkedwebsites ormobileapplications). Suchlinkedwebsites andmobileapplications are provided “asis” foryourconvenienceonly with no warranty,express or implied, for the information provided within them.
You acknowledge thatyou must comply with applicable third party terms ofagreement when using the App.You aresolely responsible for and bearall risks arising fromyour use ofany third-partywebsites or resources.
Ifyou haveany queries, concerns or complaints about such third partywebsites ormobileapplications (including, but not limited to, queries, concerns or complaints relating to products, orders for products, faulty products and refunds)you must direct them to the operator of that third partywebsite ormobileapplication.
YOU AGREE THATYOUR USE OF THE APP ANDITS SERVICES SHALL BEATYOURSOLE RISK. THE SERVICESAND ALL THE MATERIALS, INFORMATION,SOFTWARE, CONTENT INTEGRATED IN THE APP ARE PROVIDED “ASIS” AND “AS AVAILABLE”. WE DO NOTMAKEANY WARRANTIES OFANY KIND, EITHEREXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH REGARD TO THE MERCHANTABILITY, TECHNICAL COMPATIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OFANY SERVICE, PRODUCTS OR MATERIAL PROVIDED PURSUANT TO THISAGREEMENT. WE DO NOT WARRANT THAT THE FUNCTIONS CONTAINEDON OR THROUGH THE SERVICESWILL BE AVAILABLE, UNINTERRUPTED ORERROR-FREE, THAT DEFECTSWILL BE CORRECTED, OR THAT THE SER
Accepting the Terms Privacy Policy
These Terms of Service ("Terms") are a legalagreementbetween we andyou ("you").By installing or usinganyapplication ("Service")you agree to be boundby these Terms.Byaccessing or using the Service,you agree thatyou have read, understood,and accept to be boundby the Terms. We reserve the right, initssole discretion, to modify or revise these Termsatanytime, andyou agree to be boundby such modifications or revisions. Ifyou do not agree to the Terms, do not use the Service.
Users are responsible for periodicallyviewing the Terms.Your continued use of the Service after achange or updatehas beenmadewill constituteyour acceptance to the revised Terms. Ifyou do not agree to the Termsyouronly remedyis to discontinueyour use of the Service and cancelany accountsyou havemade using the Service.
We reserve the right to refuseanyuseraccess to the Services without notice foranyreason, including, but not limited to, aviolation of the Terms.
You represent thatyou are 13 years old or older. Ifyou arebetween theages of 13 and 18,you represent thatyour legal guardianhasreviewedand agrees to the Terms.
Intellectual Property/Ownership
All materials that are part of the Service (including, but not limited to,designs,text, graphics, pictures,video, information,applications,software,music, sound and other files, and their selectionand arrangement) are protectedby law from unauthorized use.
We grantyou a personal, non-exclusive, non-transferable, revocable, limitedscope license to use the Servicesolely for the purpose ofviewing and using the applicable Services and for no other purpose whatsoever.Your license to use the Servicesis limitedby these Terms.
You agree thatyou arewillingly publishing the contenton the Service using technology and tools providedby us.You understand and agree thatyoumay not distribute, sell, transfer or license this content and/orapplication inany manner, inany country, oronany socialnetwork oranothermedium withoutthe explicit written permission of us. We reserve the right to remove and permanentlydeleteanyUser Content from the Service with or without notice.
You agree thatallyourcommunicationswith theCommunication Channels are public, and thusyou have no expectation of privacy regardingyour use of theCommunication Channels. Weis not responsible for information thatyou choose toshareon theCommunication Channels, or for the actions of otherusers.
Privacy and Protection of Personal Information
By using the Service,you agree to the collection and use ofyour personal informationasoutlined in this Privacy Policy. Wemay amend the Privacy Policy fromtime totime, and we encourageyou to consult the Privacy Policy regularly forchanges.
Acookieis a small data file that we transfer toyourcomputer’s hard disk, generally to quickly identify auser'scomputer and to "remember" things about theuser'svisit, suchasyour preferences or ausername andpassword. The Service sendscookies toyourcomputer whenyouaccess orview the content of us. The information contained in acookiemay be linked toyour personal information for purposes suchas improving the quality of our service, tailoring recommendations toyour interests, and making the Service easier to use.You can disablecookiesatanytime, althoughyoumay not be able toaccess or use features of the Service.
Third-Party Advertising Companies
Wemay use third-party advertising companies to serve adson the Service. We do not provideany personal information to third-party advertising companieson a non-aggregate basis. Our system and the third-party advertising technologymay use aggregate information, non-personal information, Ourcookiesonyour harddrive andyour use of the Service to target advertisements. In addition, advertisersmay use other third-party advertising technology to target advertisingon other sites. If advertisements are served toyou, a unique third-partycookie orcookiesmay be placedonyourcomputer. Similarly, third-party advertising companiesmay provide us withpixel tags (also called “clear gifs” or “beacons”) to help manage and optimizeonline advertising. Beaconsenable us to recognize abrowser’scookie when abrowservisits the siteon whichis a beaconis located, and to learn which banner ads bringusers to a given site.
Changing or DeletingYour Information
Youmayreview, update, correct ordeleteany personal informationby changing the applicable information inyourprofile pageonFacebook and/oranother socialnetwork (s). Ifyou completelydeleteall this information,your accountmay become deactivated. Ifyou wouldlike us todeleteyour record in our system, please contact us and wewillattempt to accommodateyour request if we are not legally obligated to retain the record.
Security
We have put in placereasonable technical and organizational measures designed to secureyour personal information from accidental loss and from unauthorizedaccess, use, alteration or disclosure. However, we cannot guarantee that unauthorized third partieswill never be able to overcome those measures or useyour personal information for improper purposes. Also pleasenote that email and messaging systems are not considered secure, so we discourageyou from sending us personal information through thesemediums.
Policy Regarding Children
The Serviceis not geared toward children under theage of 13 and we do not knowingly collect personal information from children under theage of 13. If we learn that a child under 13has provided us with personal information wewilldelete such information from our filesas quicklyas possible.
Disclaimer of Warranty; Limitation of Liability
You agree thatyour use of the Service shall beatyoursole risk. To the fullest extent permittedby law, We,its officers, directors, employees,and agents disclaimall warranties,express or implies, in connectionwith thewebsite andyour use thereof including implied warranties oftitle, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or non-infringement, accuracy,authority, completeness, usefulness, andtimeliness. Wemake no warranties or representations about the accuracy or completeness of the content of the Service and of the content ofany sites linked to the Service; Weassume no liability or responsibility forany (i) errors, mistakes, or inaccuracies of content, (ii) personal injury or propertydamage, ofanynature whatsoever, resulting fromyouraccess to and use of the Service, (iii)any unauthorizedaccess to or use of our secure servers and/oranyand all personal information and/or financial information stored therein, (iv)any interruption or cessation oftransmission to or from the Service, (v)any bugs,viruses, trojan horses, orthe like whichmay be transmitted to or through the Servicebyany third party, and/or (vi)any errors or omissions inany content or forany loss ordamage ofany kind incurredas a result of the use ofany content posted, emailed, transmitted, orotherwisemade availablevia the Service.
In no eventwill We,its directors, officers,agents, contractors, partners and employees, be liable toyou orany third person forany special, direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive, or consequentialdamages whatsoever includinganylost profits orlost data arising fromyour use of the Service or other materialson,accessed through or downloaded from the Service, whether basedon warranty, contract, tort, orany other legaltheory, and whether or not We have been advised of thepossibility of thesedamages. The foregoing limitation of liability shall apply to the fullest extent permittedby law in the applicablejurisdiction.You specifically acknowledge that We shall not be liable foruser submissions or the defamatory, offensive, or illegal conduct ofany third party and that the risk of harm ordamage from the foregoing rests entirelywith you.
You agree to indemnify and hold We, and each ofits directors, officers,agents, contractors, partners, and employees, harmless fromand againstany loss, liability, claim, demand,damages, costs and expenses, includingreasonableattorney's fees, arisingout of or in connection with (i)your use ofand access to the Service; (ii)yourviolation ofany term of these Terms of Service; (iii)yourviolation ofany third party right, including without limitationanycopyright, property, or privacy right; (iv)any claim thatone ofyourUser Submissions causeddamage to a third party; or (v)any Contentyou post orshareon or through the Service.
General
Byvisiting or using the Service,you agree that thelaws ofUK, without regard to principles ofconflict oflaws and regardless ofyour location,will govern these Terms of Serviceand any dispute ofany sort that might arisebetweenyou and us.
Contacting Us
Ifyou haveany questions about these Terms of Service, please contact usat damonskimetsu.contact@gmail.com
## Accepting the Terms and Privacy Policy
These Terms of Service ("Terms") are a legalagreementbetween we andyou ("you").By installing or usinganyapplication ("Service")you agree to be boundby these Terms.Byaccessing or using the Service,you agree thatyou have read, understood,and accept to be boundby the Terms. We reserve the right, initssole discretion, to modify or revise these Termsatanytime, andyou agree to be boundby such modifications or revisions. Ifyou do not agree to the Terms, do not use the Service.
Users are responsible for periodicallyviewing the Terms.Your continued use of the Service after achange or updatehas beenmadewill constituteyour acceptance to the revised Terms. Ifyou do not agree to the Termsyouronly remedyis to discontinueyour use of the Service and cancelany accountsyou havemade using the Service.
We reserve the right to refuseanyuseraccess to the Services without notice foranyreason, including, but not limited to, aviolation of the Terms.
You represent thatyou are 13 years old or older. Ifyou arebetween theages of 13 and 18,you represent thatyour legal guardianhasreviewedand agrees to the Terms.
##Intellectual Property/Ownership
All materials that are part of the Service (including, but not limited to,designs,text, graphics, pictures,video, information,applications,software,music, sound and other files, and their selectionand arrangement) are protectedby law from unauthorized use.
We grantyou a personal, non-exclusive, non-transferable, revocable, limitedscope license to use the Servicesolely for the purpose ofviewing and using the applicable Services and for no other purpose whatsoever.Your license to use the Servicesis limitedby these Terms.
You agree thatyou arewillingly publishing the contenton the Service using technology and tools providedby us.You understand and agree thatyoumay not distribute, sell, transfer or license this content and/orapplication inany manner, inany country, oronany socialnetwork oranothermedium withoutthe explicit written permission of us. We reserve the right to remove and permanentlydeleteanyUser Content from the Service with or without notice.
You agree thatallyourcommunicationswith theCommunication Channels are public, and thusyou have no expectation of privacy regardingyour use of theCommunication Channels. Weis not responsible for information thatyou choose toshareon theCommunication Channels, or for the actions of otherusers.
Privacy and Protection of Personal Information
By using the Service,you agree to the collection and use ofyour personal informationasoutlined in this Privacy Policy. Wemay amend the Privacy Policy fromtime totime, and we encourageyou to consult the Privacy Policy regularly forchanges.
Acookieis a small data file that we transfer toyourcomputer’s hard disk, generally to quickly identify auser'scomputer and to "remember" things about theuser'svisit, suchasyour preferences or ausername andpassword. The Service sendscookies toyourcomputer whenyouaccess orview the content of us. The information contained in acookiemay be linked toyour personal information for purposes suchas improving the quality of our service, tailoring recommendations toyour interests, and making the Service easier to use.You can disablecookiesatanytime, althoughyoumay not be able toaccess or use features of the Service.
Third-Party Advertising Companies
Wemay use third-party advertising companies to serve adson the Service. We do not provideany personal information to third-party advertising companieson a non-aggregate basis. Our system and the third-party advertising technologymay use aggregate information, non-personal information, Ourcookiesonyour harddrive andyour use of the Service to target advertisements. In addition, advertisersmay use other third-party advertising technology to target advertisingon other sites. If advertisements are served toyou, a unique third-partycookie orcookiesmay be placedonyourcomputer. Similarly, third-party advertising companiesmay provide us withpixel tags (also called “clear gifs” or “beacons”) to help manage and optimizeonline advertising. Beaconsenable us to recognize abrowser’scookie when abrowservisits the siteon whichis a beaconis located, and to learn which banner ads bringusers to a given site.
Changing or DeletingYour Information
Youmayreview, update, correct ordeleteany personal informationby changing the applicable information inyourprofile pageonFacebook and/oranother socialnetwork (s). Ifyou completelydeleteall this information,your accountmay become deactivated. Ifyou wouldlike us todeleteyour record in our system, please contact us and wewillattempt to accommodateyour request if we are not legally obligated to retain the record.
Security
We have put in placereasonable technical and organizational measures designed to secureyour personal information from accidental loss and from unauthorizedaccess, use, alteration or disclosure. However, we cannot guarantee that unauthorized third partieswill never be able to overcome those measures or useyour personal information for improper purposes. Also pleasenote that email and messaging systems are not considered secure, so we discourageyou from sending us personal information through thesemediums.
Policy Regarding Children
The Serviceis not geared toward children under theage of 13 and we do not knowingly collect personal information from children under theage of 13. If we learn that a child under 13has provided us with personal information wewilldelete such information from our filesas quicklyas possible.
Disclaimer of Warranty; Limitation of Liability
You agree thatyour use of the Service shall beatyoursole risk. To the fullest extent permittedby law, We,its officers, directors, employees,and agents disclaimall warranties,express or implies, in connectionwith thewebsite andyour use thereof including implied warranties oftitle, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or non-infringement, accuracy,authority, completeness, usefulness, andtimeliness. Wemake no warranties or representations about the accuracy or completeness of the content of the Service and of the content ofany sites linked to the Service; Weassume no liability or responsibility forany (i) errors, mistakes, or inaccuracies of content, (ii) personal injury or propertydamage, ofanynature whatsoever, resulting fromyouraccess to and use of the Service, (iii)any unauthorizedaccess to or use of our secure servers and/oranyand all personal information and/or financial information stored therein, (iv)any interruption or cessation oftransmission to or from the Service, (v)any bugs,viruses, trojan horses, orthe like whichmay be transmitted to or through the Servicebyany third party, and/or (vi)any errors or omissions inany content or forany loss ordamage ofany kind incurredas a result of the use ofany content posted, emailed, transmitted, orotherwisemade availablevia the Service.
In no eventwill We,its directors, officers,agents, contractors, partners and employees, be liable toyou orany third person forany special, direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive, or consequentialdamages whatsoever includinganylost profits orlost data arising fromyour use of the Service or other materialson,accessed through or downloaded from the Service, whether basedon warranty, contract, tort, orany other legaltheory, and whether or not We have been advised of thepossibility of thesedamages. The foregoing limitation of liability shall apply to the fullest extent permittedby law in the applicablejurisdiction.You specifically acknowledge that We shall not be liable foruser submissions or the defamatory, offensive, or illegal conduct ofany third party and that the risk of harm ordamage from the foregoing rests entirelywith you.
You agree to indemnify and hold We, and each ofits directors, officers,agents, contractors, partners, and employees, harmless fromand againstany loss, liability, claim, demand,damages, costs and expenses, includingreasonableattorney's fees, arisingout of or in connection with (i)your use ofand access to the Service; (ii)yourviolation ofany term of these Terms of Service; (iii)yourviolation ofany third party right, including without limitationanycopyright, property, or privacy right; (iv)any claim thatone ofyourUser Submissions causeddamage to a third party; or (v)any Contentyou post orshareon or through the Service.
General
Byvisiting or using the Service,you agree that thelaws ofUK, without regard to principles ofconflict oflaws and regardless ofyour location,will govern these Terms of Serviceand any dispute ofany sort that might arisebetweenyou and us.
Contacting Us
Ifyou haveany questions about these Terms of Service, please contact usat reposting23334.contact@gmail.com
## Accepting the Terms and Privacy Policy
These Terms of Service ("Terms") are a legalagreementbetween we andyou ("you").By installing or usinganyapplication ("Service")you agree to be boundby these Terms.Byaccessing or using the Service,you agree thatyou have read, understood,and accept to be boundby the Terms. We reserve the right, initssole discretion, to modify or revise these Termsatanytime, andyou agree to be boundby such modifications or revisions. Ifyou do not agree to the Terms, do not use the Service.
Users are responsible for periodicallyviewing the Terms.Your continued use of the Service after achange or updatehas beenmadewill constituteyour acceptance to the revised Terms. Ifyou do not agree to the Termsyouronly remedyis to discontinueyour use of the Service and cancelany accountsyou havemade using the Service.
We reserve the right to refuseanyuseraccess to the Services without notice foranyreason, including, but not limited to, aviolation of the Terms.
You represent thatyou are 13 years old or older. Ifyou arebetween theages of 13 and 18,you represent thatyour legal guardianhasreviewedand agrees to the Terms.
##Intellectual Property/Ownership
All materials that are part of the Service (including, but not limited to,designs,text, graphics, pictures,video, information,applications,software,music, sound and other files, and their selectionand arrangement) are protectedby law from unauthorized use.
We grantyou a personal, non-exclusive, non-transferable, revocable, limitedscope license to use the Servicesolely for the purpose ofviewing and using the applicable Services and for no other purpose whatsoever.Your license to use the Servicesis limitedby these Terms.
You agree thatyou arewillingly publishing the contenton the Service using technology and tools providedby us.You understand and agree thatyoumay not distribute, sell, transfer or license this content and/orapplication inany manner, inany country, oronany socialnetwork oranothermedium withoutthe explicit written permission of us. We reserve the right to remove and permanentlydeleteanyUser Content from the Service with or without notice.
You agree thatallyourcommunicationswith theCommunication Channels are public, and thusyou have no expectation of privacy regardingyour use of theCommunication Channels. Weis not responsible for information thatyou choose toshareon theCommunication Channels, or for the actions of otherusers.
Privacy and Protection of Personal Information
By using the Service,you agree to the collection and use ofyour personal informationasoutlined in this Privacy Policy. Wemay amend the Privacy Policy fromtime totime, and we encourageyou to consult the Privacy Policy regularly forchanges.
Acookieis a small data file that we transfer toyourcomputer’s hard disk, generally to quickly identify auser'scomputer and to "remember" things about theuser'svisit, suchasyour preferences or ausername andpassword. The Service sendscookies toyourcomputer whenyouaccess orview the content of us. The information contained in acookiemay be linked toyour personal information for purposes suchas improving the quality of our service, tailoring recommendations toyour interests, and making the Service easier to use.You can disablecookiesatanytime, althoughyoumay not be able toaccess or use features of the Service.
Third-Party Advertising Companies
Wemay use third-party advertising companies to serve adson the Service. We do not provideany personal information to third-party advertising companieson a non-aggregate basis. Our system and the third-party advertising technologymay use aggregate information, non-personal information, Ourcookiesonyour harddrive andyour use of the Service to target advertisements. In addition, advertisersmay use other third-party advertising technology to target advertisingon other sites. If advertisements are served toyou, a unique third-partycookie orcookiesmay be placedonyourcomputer. Similarly, third-party advertising companiesmay provide us withpixel tags (also called “clear gifs” or “beacons”) to help manage and optimizeonline advertising. Beaconsenable us to recognize abrowser’scookie when abrowservisits the siteon whichis a beaconis located, and to learn which banner ads bringusers to a given site.
Changing or DeletingYour Information
Youmayreview, update, correct ordeleteany personal informationby changing the applicable information inyourprofile pageonFacebook and/oranother socialnetwork (s). Ifyou completelydeleteall this information,your accountmay become deactivated. Ifyou wouldlike us todeleteyour record in our system, please contact us and wewillattempt to accommodateyour request if we are not legally obligated to retain the record.
Security
We have put in placereasonable technical and organizational measures designed to secureyour personal information from accidental loss and from unauthorizedaccess, use, alteration or disclosure. However, we cannot guarantee that unauthorized third partieswill never be able to overcome those measures or useyour personal information for improper purposes. Also pleasenote that email and messaging systems are not considered secure, so we discourageyou from sending us personal information through thesemediums.
Policy Regarding Children
The Serviceis not geared toward children under theage of 13 and we do not knowingly collect personal information from children under theage of 13. If we learn that a child under 13has provided us with personal information wewilldelete such information from our filesas quicklyas possible.
Disclaimer of Warranty; Limitation of Liability
You agree thatyour use of the Service shall beatyoursole risk. To the fullest extent permittedby law, We,its officers, directors, employees,and agents disclaimall warranties,express or implies, in connectionwith thewebsite andyour use thereof including implied warranties oftitle, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or non-infringement, accuracy,authority, completeness, usefulness, andtimeliness. Wemake no warranties or representations about the accuracy or completeness of the content of the Service and of the content ofany sites linked to the Service; Weassume no liability or responsibility forany (i) errors, mistakes, or inaccuracies of content, (ii) personal injury or propertydamage, ofanynature whatsoever, resulting fromyouraccess to and use of the Service, (iii)any unauthorizedaccess to or use of our secure servers and/oranyand all personal information and/or financial information stored therein, (iv)any interruption or cessation oftransmission to or from the Service, (v)any bugs,viruses, trojan horses, orthe like whichmay be transmitted to or through the Servicebyany third party, and/or (vi)any errors or omissions inany content or forany loss ordamage ofany kind incurredas a result of the use ofany content posted, emailed, transmitted, orotherwisemade availablevia the Service.
In no eventwill We,its directors, officers,agents, contractors, partners and employees, be liable toyou orany third person forany special, direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive, or consequentialdamages whatsoever includinganylost profits orlost data arising fromyour use of the Service or other materialson,accessed through or downloaded from the Service, whether basedon warranty, contract, tort, orany other legaltheory, and whether or not We have been advised of thepossibility of thesedamages. The foregoing limitation of liability shall apply to the fullest extent permittedby law in the applicablejurisdiction.You specifically acknowledge that We shall not be liable foruser submissions or the defamatory, offensive, or illegal conduct ofany third party and that the risk of harm ordamage from the foregoing rests entirelywith you.
You agree to indemnify and hold We, and each ofits directors, officers,agents, contractors, partners, and employees, harmless fromand againstany loss, liability, claim, demand,damages, costs and expenses, includingreasonableattorney's fees, arisingout of or in connection with (i)your use ofand access to the Service; (ii)yourviolation ofany term of these Terms of Service; (iii)yourviolation ofany third party right, including without limitationanycopyright, property, or privacy right; (iv)any claim thatone ofyourUser Submissions causeddamage to a third party; or (v)any Contentyou post orshareon or through the Service.
General
Byvisiting or using the Service,you agree that thelaws ofUK, without regard to principles ofconflict oflaws and regardless ofyour location,will govern these Terms of Serviceand any dispute ofany sort that might arisebetweenyou and us.
Contacting Us
Ifyou haveany questions about these Terms of Service, please contact usat reposting23334.contact@gmail.com
## Accepting the Terms & Privacy Policy
These Terms of Service ("Terms") are a legalagreementbetween we andyou ("you").By installing or usinganyapplication ("Service")you agree to be boundby these Terms.Byaccessing or using the Service,you agree thatyou have read, understood,and accept to be boundby the Terms. We reserve the right, initssole discretion, to modify or revise these Termsatanytime, andyou agree to be boundby such modifications or revisions. Ifyou do not agree to the Terms, do not use the Service.
Users are responsible for periodicallyviewing the Terms.Your continued use of the Service after achange or updatehas beenmadewill constituteyour acceptance to the revised Terms. Ifyou do not agree to the Termsyouronly remedyis to discontinueyour use of the Service and cancelany accountsyou havemade using the Service.
We reserve the right to refuseanyuseraccess to the Services without notice foranyreason, including, but not limited to, aviolation of the Terms.
You represent thatyou are 13 years old or older. Ifyou arebetween theages of 13 and 18,you represent thatyour legal guardianhasreviewedand agrees to the Terms.
##Intellectual Property/Ownership
All materials that are part of the Service (including, but not limited to,designs,text, graphics, pictures,video, information,applications,software,music, sound and other files, and their selectionand arrangement) are protectedby law from unauthorized use.
We grantyou a personal, non-exclusive, non-transferable, revocable, limitedscope license to use the Servicesolely for the purpose ofviewing and using the applicable Services and for no other purpose whatsoever.Your license to use the Servicesis limitedby these Terms.
You agree thatyou arewillingly publishing the contenton the Service using technology and tools providedby us.You understand and agree thatyoumay not distribute, sell, transfer or license this content and/orapplication inany manner, inany country, oronany socialnetwork oranothermedium withoutthe explicit written permission of us. We reserve the right to remove and permanentlydeleteanyUser Content from the Service with or without notice.
You agree thatallyourcommunicationswith theCommunication Channels are public, and thusyou have no expectation of privacy regardingyour use of theCommunication Channels. Weis not responsible for information thatyou choose toshareon theCommunication Channels, or for the actions of otherusers.
Privacy and Protection of Personal Information
By using the Service,you agree to the collection and use ofyour personal informationasoutlined in this Privacy Policy. Wemay amend the Privacy Policy fromtime totime, and we encourageyou to consult the Privacy Policy regularly forchanges.
Acookieis a small data file that we transfer toyourcomputer’s hard disk, generally to quickly identify auser'scomputer and to "remember" things about theuser'svisit, suchasyour preferences or ausername andpassword. The Service sendscookies toyourcomputer whenyouaccess orview the content of us. The information contained in acookiemay be linked toyour personal information for purposes suchas improving the quality of our service, tailoring recommendations toyour interests, and making the Service easier to use.You can disablecookiesatanytime, althoughyoumay not be able toaccess or use features of the Service.
Third-Party Advertising Companies
Wemay use third-party advertising companies to serve adson the Service. We do not provideany personal information to third-party advertising companieson a non-aggregate basis. Our system and the third-party advertising technologymay use aggregate information, non-personal information, Ourcookiesonyour harddrive andyour use of the Service to target advertisements. In addition, advertisersmay use other third-party advertising technology to target advertisingon other sites. If advertisements are served toyou, a unique third-partycookie orcookiesmay be placedonyourcomputer. Similarly, third-party advertising companiesmay provide us withpixel tags (also called “clear gifs” or “beacons”) to help manage and optimizeonline advertising. Beaconsenable us to recognize abrowser’scookie when abrowservisits the siteon whichis a beaconis located, and to learn which banner ads bringusers to a given site.
Changing or DeletingYour Information
Youmayreview, update, correct ordeleteany personal informationby changing the applicable information inyourprofile pageonFacebook and/oranother socialnetwork (s). Ifyou completelydeleteall this information,your accountmay become deactivated. Ifyou wouldlike us todeleteyour record in our system, please contact us and wewillattempt to accommodateyour request if we are not legally obligated to retain the record.
Security
We have put in placereasonable technical and organizational measures designed to secureyour personal information from accidental loss and from unauthorizedaccess, use, alteration or disclosure. However, we cannot guarantee that unauthorized third partieswill never be able to overcome those measures or useyour personal information for improper purposes. Also pleasenote that email and messaging systems are not considered secure, so we discourageyou from sending us personal information through thesemediums.
Policy Regarding Children
The Serviceis not geared toward children under theage of 13 and we do not knowingly collect personal information from children under theage of 13. If we learn that a child under 13has provided us with personal information wewilldelete such information from our filesas quicklyas possible.
Disclaimer of Warranty; Limitation of Liability
You agree thatyour use of the Service shall beatyoursole risk. To the fullest extent permittedby law, We,its officers, directors, employees,and agents disclaimall warranties,express or implies, in connectionwith thewebsite andyour use thereof including implied warranties oftitle, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or non-infringement, accuracy,authority, completeness, usefulness, andtimeliness. Wemake no warranties or representations about the accuracy or completeness of the content of the Service and of the content ofany sites linked to the Service; Weassume no liability or responsibility forany (i) errors, mistakes, or inaccuracies of content, (ii) personal injury or propertydamage, ofanynature whatsoever, resulting fromyouraccess to and use of the Service, (iii)any unauthorizedaccess to or use of our secure servers and/oranyand all personal information and/or financial information stored therein, (iv)any interruption or cessation oftransmission to or from the Service, (v)any bugs,viruses, trojan horses, orthe like whichmay be transmitted to or through the Servicebyany third party, and/or (vi)any errors or omissions inany content or forany loss ordamage ofany kind incurredas a result of the use ofany content posted, emailed, transmitted, orotherwisemade availablevia the Service.
In no eventwill We,its directors, officers,agents, contractors, partners and employees, be liable toyou orany third person forany special, direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive, or consequentialdamages whatsoever includinganylost profits orlost data arising fromyour use of the Service or other materialson,accessed through or downloaded from the Service, whether basedon warranty, contract, tort, orany other legaltheory, and whether or not We have been advised of thepossibility of thesedamages. The foregoing limitation of liability shall apply to the fullest extent permittedby law in the applicablejurisdiction.You specifically acknowledge that We shall not be liable foruser submissions or the defamatory, offensive, or illegal conduct ofany third party and that the risk of harm ordamage from the foregoing rests entirelywith you.
You agree to indemnify and hold We, and each ofits directors, officers,agents, contractors, partners, and employees, harmless fromand againstany loss, liability, claim, demand,damages, costs and expenses, includingreasonableattorney's fees, arisingout of or in connection with (i)your use ofand access to the Service; (ii)yourviolation ofany term of these Terms of Service; (iii)yourviolation ofany third party right, including without limitationanycopyright, property, or privacy right; (iv)any claim thatone ofyourUser Submissions causeddamage to a third party; or (v)any Contentyou post orshareon or through the Service.
General
Byvisiting or using the Service,you agree that thelaws ofUK, without regard to principles ofconflict oflaws and regardless ofyour location,will govern these Terms of Serviceand any dispute ofany sort that might arisebetweenyou and us.
Contacting Us
Ifyou haveany questions about these Terms of Service, please contact usat reposting23334.contact@gmail.com
I. INTRODUCTION
These Terms of Use and EndUser LicenseAgreement (collectively, the “Agreement”)together withall the documents referred to init constitute a legally bindingagreementmadebetweenyouas anatural person (“you”, “your” or “user”) and We (“we,” “us” or “our”), concerningyouraccess to and use of thesoftwareapplication formobile devices (the “App”).
All the documents that relate to the App are herebyexpressly incorporated hereinby reference.
Please read thisAgreement carefully beforeyoudownload, install or use the App.
Itis important thatyou read and understand thisAgreementasbydownloading, installing or using the Appyou indicate thatyou have read, understood, agreedand accepted theAgreement whichtakes effecton thedateon whichyoudownload, install or use the App.By using the Appyou agree to abideby thisAgreement.
Ifyou do not agree with (do notaccept) thisAgreement, or ifyou do not agreeat least withone of the provisions of thisAgreement,you are notauthorized to, andyoumay notaccess,download, install or use the App andyou must ly discontinuedownloading, installing the App and remove (delete) the App fromanymobile device inyour possession or underyour control.
We reserve the right,at oursole discretion, tomakechanges or modifications to thisAgreementatanytime and foranyreason. Wewill keepyou informed aboutanychangesby updating thisAgreement andyouwaiveany right to receive specific notice of each suchchange.Itisyour responsibility to periodicallyreview thisAgreement tostay informed of updates.Youwill be subject to, andwill be deemed to be aware of and to haveaccepted,the changes inany revisedAgreementbyyourcontinued use of the App after thedate such revisedAgreementis posted.
III. RESTRICTIONSONWHO CAN USE THE APP
In order todownload, install,access or use the App,you must (a) be eighteen (18) years ofage or older.
Alluserswho are minors in thejurisdiction in which they reside (generally under theage of 18) must have the permission of, and be directly supervisedby, their parent or guardian to use the App, so ifyou arebetween theages of thirteen (13) andseventeen (17) years andyouwish to usedownload, install,access or use the App, before doing soyou must: (a)assure and confirm (ifneeded) thatyour parent or guardian have readand agree (getyour parent or guardian’s consent) to thisAgreement prior toyou using the App; (b) havethe power to enter a binding contract with us and not be barred from doing so underany applicablelaws.
Parents and guardians must directly superviseany use of the Appby minors.
Any person under theage of thirteen (13) yearsis not permitted todownload, install,access or use the App.
You affirm thatyou are eithermore than eighteen 18 years ofage, or an emancipated minor, or possess legal parental or guardian consent,and are fully able and competent to enter into the terms, conditions, obligations, affirmations, representations, and warrantiessetforth in thisAgreement, and to abideby and complywith thisAgreement.
IV. GENERAL TERMS
The Appis a utility program designed to enhanceyour device experience. The Appallows toscanany types of document to high qualityPDF orJPEG; to save and storeanyscan copies of documentsonyourmobile devices; toshareyourscansvia email; uploadscanned documents to cloud serviceslikebox,Evernote orGoogle Drive (see the full performance liston the App’s pageonitunes.apple.com).All documents shall be stored locallyonyour device and shall never be sent toany third-party unlessyou export them to other apps or devicesby means of the App.
The Appis intendedonly foryour personal non-commercial use.You shall use the Apponly for the purposes, mentioned above.
V. PRIVACY POLICY
Your privacyis very important to us. Accordingly, we have developed the Privacy Policy in order foryou to understand how we process, use and store information including personal data.Access to the App and use of the Servicesis subject to the Privacy Policy.Byaccessing the App andby continuing to use the Services,you are deemed to haveaccepted the Privacy Policy, and in particular,you are deemed to have acknowledged the ways we processyour informationas wellas appropriate legal grounds forprocessing described in the Privacy Policy. We reserve the right to amend the Privacy Policy fromtime totime. Ifyou disagree withany part of the Privacy Policy,you must immediately stop using the App and Services. Please read our Privacy Policy carefully.
By using the App,you undertake torespect our intellectual rights (intellectual rights related to the App’s source code,UI/UX design, content material,copyright andtrademarks, hereinafter referred toas the “Intellectual Property Rights”)as wellas those ownedby third parties.
As longasyou keep using the App, weyou a limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable non-sublicensable, non-assignable and revocable license toaccess and use the App pursuant to thisAgreementonanyApple-branded products thatyou own or control except that the Appmay beaccessed and usedby other accountsassociatedwith youvia Family Sharing or volume purchasing (the “License”).
The source code, design and content, including information, photographs, illustrations, artwork and other graphic materials, sounds,music orvideo (hereinafter – the “works”)as wellas names,logos andtrademarks (hereinafter – “means of individualization”) within the App are protectedbycopyrightlaws and other relevantlaws and/orinternational treaties, and belong to us and/or our partners and/or contracted third parties,as thecasemaybe.
In the event ofany third party claim thatyour possession and use of the App infringes that third party’sintellectual property rights,Applewill not be responsible for the investigation, defense,settlement anddischarge ofany suchintellectual property infringement claim.
These works and means of individualizationmay not be copied, reproduced, retransmitted, distributed, disseminated, sold, published,broadcasted or circulated whether inwhole or in part, unlessexpressly permittedby us and/or our partners and/or contracted third parties,as thecasemaybe.
All rights,title and interest in and to the App andits content, works and means of individualizationas wellasits functionalities (1) arethe exclusive property of We and/or our partners and/or contracted third parties, (2) are protectedby the applicableinternational andnational legal provisions, and (3) are under no circumstances transferred (assigned) toyou in full or in part within the context of the license herewithin.
Wewill not hesitate totake legalaction againstany unauthorized use of ourtrademarks, names or symbols to protect and restore our rights.All rights notexpresslyed herein are reserved. Other product and company names mentioned hereinmay also be thetrademarks of theirrespective owners.
You agree not to use the App inany way that:
is unlawful, illegal or unauthorized;
is defamatory ofany other person;
infringesanycopyright, right ortrademark ofany other person;
advocates, promotes orassistsany unlawfulact suchas (by way of exampleonly)copyright infringement orcomputer misuse.
You shall notmake the App available toany third parties. Inaddition,you shall not modify, translate into other languages, reverse engineer, decompile, disassemble orotherwise derivative works from the App orany documentation concerning the App.
You shall not transfer, lend,rent, lease, distribute the App, or useit for providing services to a third party, orany rights to the App orany documentation concerning the App to a third party.
Misuse ofanytrademarks orany other content displayedon the Appis prohibited.
You shall not copy and/or duplicate and/or distribute and/or publish and/or useany content in the App, directly or indirectly,by way of aviolation of ourIntellectual Property Rights.
Moreover,you shall notmakeanyattempts to use the App or part thereof for malicious intentions.
Also we are not responsible for the wayyou use the App.
Itis clarified that wemay adopt, against auserwhoviolated the presentAgreement,any legal measuresat our disposal pursuant to the applicablelaws.
All disputes arising from theusage of the App, shall be governedby and construed in accordancewith thelaws ofthe UnitedStates of America, and shall be submitted to thesolejurisdiction of the competent courts ofNew York,New York,the UnitedStates of America.
VIII. AVAILABILITY OF THE APP, SECURITYAND ACCURACY
In order to use the App,you arerequired to have a compatiblemobile phone ortablet, andinternetaccess. However, pleasenote that we offeryou widgets that save translationsand allowyou toaccess them later in offline mode.
The Appis available fordownloading and installingon handheld compatiblemobile devices runningApple iOSOperating System11.0 with minimum systemrequirements.
We do not warrant that the Appwill be compatible withallhardware andsoftware whichyoumay use.
Wemake no warranty thatyouraccess to the Appwill be uninterrupted,timely orerror-free. NeitherdoesApple have an obligation whatsoever to furnishany maintenance and support services withrespect to the App.
You acknowledge the Appis providedvia theinternet andmobile networks and so the qualityand availability of the Appmay be affectedby factorsoutside ourreasonable control.
Theversion of the Appmay be upgraded fromtime totime toadd support for new functions and services.
Wemaychange or update the Appand anything described init without noticingyou. If theneed arises, wemay suspendaccess to the App, or closeit indefinitely.
You also warrant thatany information thatyou submit to usistrue, accurate and complete, andyou agree to keepitactualatalltimes.
You can discontinue using our Servicesatanytimeby choosing the relevant option inyouriTunes AccountSettings. Ifyou decide not to use the App foranyreasonyou should uninstall the App.
The Appis providedon a paid basis.Youwillneed to pay aone-time fee of $14.99 in order todownload the App.Onceyoudownload the App,youwillgetaccess toallits features.
Prices are in U.S. dollars,may vary in countries other than the U.S.and are subject tochange without notice.
Youmay be chargedbyyour communications service provider fordownloading and/oraccessing the Apponyourmobile phone ortablet device, soyou should check the terms ofagreementwith your operator. Thismay include data roaming charges ifyou do thisoutsideyourhome territory.All these charges aresolelyyour responsibility. Ifyou do not pay thebills related toyourmobile phone ortablet device, then weassume thatyou have the permission from the person thatdoesit before incurringany of these charges.
X. THIRD PARTYWEBSITES AND RESOURCES
The Appmaylinkyou to other siteson theInternet and contracted third parties to provideyou certain services. We have no controloverand accept no responsibility for the content ofanywebsite ormobileapplication to which alink from the App exists (unless we are the provider of thoselinkedwebsites ormobileapplications). Suchlinkedwebsites andmobileapplications are provided “asis” foryourconvenienceonly with no warranty,express or implied, for the information provided within them.
You acknowledge thatyou must comply with applicable third party terms ofagreement when using the App.You aresolely responsible for and bearall risks arising fromyour use ofany third-partywebsites or resources.
Ifyou haveany queries, concerns or complaints about such third partywebsites ormobileapplications (including, but not limited to, queries, concerns or complaints relating to products, orders for products, faulty products and refunds)you must direct them to the operator of that third partywebsite ormobileapplication.
YOU AGREE THATYOUR USE OF THE APP ANDITS SERVICES SHALL BEATYOURSOLE RISK. THE SERVICESAND ALL THE MATERIALS, INFORMATION,SOFTWARE, CONTENT INTEGRATED IN THE APP ARE PROVIDED “ASIS” AND “AS AVAILABLE”. WE DO NOTMAKEANY WARRANTIES OFANY KIND, EITHEREXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH REGARD TO THE MERCHANTABILITY, TECHNICAL COMPATIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OFANY SERVICE, PRODUCTS OR MATERIAL PROVIDED PURSUANT TO THISAGREEMENT. WE DO NOT WARRANT THAT THE FUNCTIONS CONTAINEDON OR THROUGH THE SERVICESWILL BE AVAILABLE, UNINTERRUPTED ORERROR-FREE, THAT DEFECTSWILL BE CORRECTED, OR THAT THE SERPermalink |記事への反応(0) | 23:18
Terms of Use
1.By using MathX,you are agreeing to these Terms of Use
2. MathX canhide photos and videos in the encrypted storagearea protectedby aPIN code or fingerprint.It also offers a secure private cloud storage
3. Scanner service can be providedon free or paid basis
4. Paymentwill be charged toiTunes Accountat confirmation of purchase
5. Accountwill be charged for renewal within24-hours prior to the end of the current period, and identify the cost of the renewal
6.Auto-renew option can be turned off inyouriTunes AccountSettings
7. Subscriptions are managedby theuser
8.You can discontinue Scanner serviceatanytime inyouriTunes AccountSettings
9. We reserves the right to terminate thisAgreementatanytimeatitssole discretion foranyreason
10.YOU AGREE THATYOUR USE OF THE SERVICES SHALL BEATYOURSOLE RISK. WEDOES NOTMAKEANY WARRANTIES OFANY KIND, EITHEREXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH REGARD TO THE MERCHANTABILITY, TECHNICAL COMPATIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OFANY SERVICE, PRODUCTS OR MATERIAL PROVIDED PURSUANT TO THISAGREEMENT.YOU SPECIFICALLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WEDOES NOTMAKEANY WARRANTIES OFANY KIND, EITHEREXPRESS OR IMPLIED,AS TO THE LEGALITY OF THE USE OFANY OF THE MathX SERVICES INANY PARTICULARSTATE OR INANY COUNTRY OTHER THANTHE UNITEDSTATES OF AMERICA
11. IN NO EVENT SHALL WE BE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES OFANY TYPE, WHETHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT, ARISINGOUT OF OR INANY WAY RELATED TO THE SERVICES PROVIDEDBY THE MathX. WE SHALL NOT BE LIABLE UNDERANY CIRCUMSTANCES FORANY SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL, EXEMPLARY OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, OR LOSS OF PROFIT OR REVENUES, EVEN IF WEHAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THEPOSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. WE SHALL NOT BE LIABLE UNDERANY CIRCUMSTANCES FOR DAMAGES ARISINGOUT OF OR INANY WAY RELATED TO PRODUCTS, SERVICES AND/OR INFORMATION OFFERED OR PROVIDEDBY THIRD-PARTY VENDORSAND ACCESSED THROUGH THEWEBSITE, THEAPPLICATION ORBYANY OTHER MEANS.YOU ALSO SPECIFICALLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WEIS NOT LIABLE FOR COSTS OR DAMAGES ARISINGOUT OF PRIVATE OR GOVERNMENTAL LEGAL ACTIONS RELATED TOYOUR USE OFANY OF THE MathX SERVICES INANY COUNTRY.
12. These Terms of Use shall be governedby and construed in accordancewith thelaws ofthe UnitedStates of America. Wemakes no representations that the Serviceis appropriate or available for use in other locations. Thosewhoaccess or use the Service from other jurisdictions do soat their own volitionand are responsible forcompliance with local law.
13.You affirm thatyou are eithermore than 18 years ofage, or an emancipated minor, or possess legal parental or guardian consent,and are fully able and competent to enter into the terms, conditions, obligations, affirmations, representations, and warrantiessetforth in these Terms of Use, and to abideby and complywith these Terms of Use.
These Terms of Service ("Terms") are a legalagreementbetween we andyou ("you").By installing or usinganyapplication ("Service")you agree to be boundby these Terms.Byaccessing or using the Service,you agree thatyou have read, understood,and accept to be boundby the Terms. We reserve the right, initssole discretion, to modify or revise these Termsatanytime, andyou agree to be boundby such modifications or revisions. Ifyou do not agree to the Terms, do not use the Service.
Users are responsible for periodicallyviewing the Terms.Your continued use of the Service after achange or updatehas beenmadewill constituteyour acceptance to the revised Terms. Ifyou do not agree to the Termsyouronly remedyis to discontinueyour use of the Service and cancelany accountsyou havemade using the Service.
We reserve the right to refuseanyuseraccess to the Services without notice foranyreason, including, but not limited to, aviolation of the Terms.
You represent thatyou are 13 years old or older. Ifyou arebetween theages of 13 and 18,you represent thatyour legal guardianhasreviewedand agrees to the Terms.
All materials that are part of the Service (including, but not limited to,designs,text, graphics, pictures,video, information,applications,software,music, sound and other files, and their selectionand arrangement) are protectedby law from unauthorized use.
We grantyou a personal, non-exclusive, non-transferable, revocable, limitedscope license to use the Servicesolely for the purpose ofviewing and using the applicable Services and for no other purpose whatsoever.Your license to use the Servicesis limitedby these Terms.
You agree thatyou arewillingly publishing the contenton the Service using technology and tools providedby us.You understand and agree thatyoumay not distribute, sell, transfer or license this content and/orapplication inany manner, inany country, oronany socialnetwork oranothermedium withoutthe explicit written permission of us. We reserve the right to remove and permanentlydeleteanyUser Content from the Service with or without notice.
You agree thatallyourcommunicationswith theCommunication Channels are public, and thusyou have no expectation of privacy regardingyour use of theCommunication Channels. Weis not responsible for information thatyou choose toshareon theCommunication Channels, or for the actions of otherusers.
By using the Service,you agree to the collection and use ofyour personal informationasoutlined in this Privacy Policy. Wemay amend the Privacy Policy fromtime totime, and we encourageyou to consult the Privacy Policy regularly forchanges.
Acookieis a small data file that we transfer toyourcomputer’s hard disk, generally to quickly identify auser'scomputer and to "remember" things about theuser'svisit, suchasyour preferences or ausername andpassword. The Service sendscookies toyourcomputer whenyouaccess orview the content of us. The information contained in acookiemay be linked toyour personal information for purposes suchas improving the quality of our service, tailoring recommendations toyour interests, and making the Service easier to use.You can disablecookiesatanytime, althoughyoumay not be able toaccess or use features of the Service.
Third-Party Advertising Companies
Wemay use third-party advertising companies to serve adson the Service. We do not provideany personal information to third-party advertising companieson a non-aggregate basis. Our system and the third-party advertising technologymay use aggregate information, non-personal information, Ourcookiesonyour harddrive andyour use of the Service to target advertisements. In addition, advertisersmay use other third-party advertising technology to target advertisingon other sites. If advertisements are served toyou, a unique third-partycookie orcookiesmay be placedonyourcomputer. Similarly, third-party advertising companiesmay provide us withpixel tags (also called “clear gifs” or “beacons”) to help manage and optimizeonline advertising. Beaconsenable us to recognize abrowser’scookie when abrowservisits the siteon whichis a beaconis located, and to learn which banner ads bringusers to a given site.
Youmayreview, update, correct ordeleteany personal informationby changing the applicable information inyourprofile pageonFacebook and/oranother socialnetwork (s). Ifyou completelydeleteall this information,your accountmay become deactivated. Ifyou wouldlike us todeleteyour record in our system, please contact us and wewillattempt to accommodateyour request if we are not legally obligated to retain the record.
We have put in placereasonable technical and organizational measures designed to secureyour personal information from accidental loss and from unauthorizedaccess, use, alteration or disclosure. However, we cannot guarantee that unauthorized third partieswill never be able to overcome those measures or useyour personal information for improper purposes. Also pleasenote that email and messaging systems are not considered secure, so we discourageyou from sending us personal information through thesemediums.
The Serviceis not geared toward children under theage of 13 and we do not knowingly collect personal information from children under theage of 13. If we learn that a child under 13has provided us with personal information wewilldelete such information from our filesas quicklyas possible.
Disclaimer of Warranty; Limitation of Liability
You agree thatyour use of the Service shall beatyoursole risk. To the fullest extent permittedby law, We,its officers, directors, employees,and agents disclaimall warranties,express or implies, in connectionwith thewebsite andyour use thereof including implied warranties oftitle, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or non-infringement, accuracy,authority, completeness, usefulness, andtimeliness. Wemake no warranties or representations about the accuracy or completeness of the content of the Service and of the content ofany sites linked to the Service; Weassume no liability or responsibility forany (i) errors, mistakes, or inaccuracies of content, (ii) personal injury or propertydamage, ofanynature whatsoever, resulting fromyouraccess to and use of the Service, (iii)any unauthorizedaccess to or use of our secure servers and/oranyand all personal information and/or financial information stored therein, (iv)any interruption or cessation oftransmission to or from the Service, (v)any bugs,viruses, trojan horses, orthe like whichmay be transmitted to or through the Servicebyany third party, and/or (vi)any errors or omissions inany content or forany loss ordamage ofany kind incurredas a result of the use ofany content posted, emailed, transmitted, orotherwisemade availablevia the Service.
In no eventwill We,its directors, officers,agents, contractors, partners and employees, be liable toyou orany third person forany special, direct, indirect, incidental, special, punitive, or consequentialdamages whatsoever includinganylost profits orlost data arising fromyour use of the Service or other materialson,accessed through or downloaded from the Service, whether basedon warranty, contract, tort, orany other legaltheory, and whether or not We have been advised of thepossibility of thesedamages. The foregoing limitation of liability shall apply to the fullest extent permittedby law in the applicablejurisdiction.You specifically acknowledge that We shall not be liable foruser submissions or the defamatory, offensive, or illegal conduct ofany third party and that the risk of harm ordamage from the foregoing rests entirelywith you.
You agree to indemnify and hold We, and each ofits directors, officers,agents, contractors, partners, and employees, harmless fromand againstany loss, liability, claim, demand,damages, costs and expenses, includingreasonableattorney's fees, arisingout of or in connection with (i)your use ofand access to the Service; (ii)yourviolation ofany term of these Terms of Service; (iii)yourviolation ofany third party right, including without limitationanycopyright, property, or privacy right; (iv)any claim thatone ofyourUser Submissions causeddamage to a third party; or (v)any Contentyou post orshareon or through the Service.
Byvisiting or using the Service,you agree that thelaws ofUK, without regard to principles ofconflict oflaws and regardless ofyour location,will govern these Terms of Serviceand any dispute ofany sort that might arisebetweenyou and us.
Ifyou haveany questions about these Terms of Service, please contact usat otoco.contact@gmail.com
17世期Sancte Ioannesの頭文字の Si が加わり、
DominusのDoに変更されたそうです。
「ドレミの歌」
DO se do qualcosa a te
e cosi` ritorno al DO
（Tutti insieme appassionatamente)
(訳）
あげる 君になにかをあげるなら
私 私にと言うためのmi
FA ミの次の音
あっち こっちでないなら
はい いいえと言わないなら
さあこれでドに戻ります。
Do-Re-Mi
Doe, a deer, afemale deer
Tea, a drink withjam and bread
Thatwill bring us back to Doe
（訳）
ドゥは 鹿、雌鹿
ファーは 遠い、走っていく長い道のり
ソーは 針で糸をひくこと
ラは ソに続く音符
Si, c'estsiffler commeun merle
Et commecaon r'vient a Do-o-o-o
(訳）
Do Doは
Re 黄金の太陽の光
Mi 全体の半分
Fa 歌うのは易しい
さあ Doに戻りましょう
Re masmavi bir dere
Sol papatyali(*) bir yol
(*)トルコ語で文字化けするといけないので、u 、i 、g で代用
（訳）
ドは 1カップの アイスクリーム
レは 真っ青な 1つの渓流
ミは 海に 一隻の船
ファは 海に 一人の船員
ソは 真白菊の咲く 一本の道
dowa mesu no shika
soshite mou ichido
https://web.archive.org/web/20071005084349/http://danceart-web.hp.infoseek.co.jp/doremi.htm
