Monthly regional updates Update

Africa Overview: August 2025

In July, violence from Sudan’s war spilled into a bordering prefecture in CAR, and power struggles in the South Tigray zone of Ethiopia and the Hiiraan region of Somalia continued to affect security in the region.

8 August 2025

Authors: Ladd Serwat
Senior Analyst, Africa
Jalale Getachew Birru
Senior Analyst, East Africa
Ali Mahmoud Ali
Samuele Minelli Zuffa
Niger Researcher

Central African Republic: Violence spills into Vakaga from Sudan

After an increase in violence in Sudan’s South Darfur state in June, armed groups moved into Vakaga, the Central African Republic’s bordering prefecture, last month. This drove a surge in violence in July that exceeded levels recorded during the Coalition of Patriots for Change rebellion in 2020 and 2021 — the last time levels of violence escalated in this area. Locals identified some of these armed gunmen as Rapid Support Forces (RSF), but many reports lacked clarity on their identity.¹ While ACLED records several violent events involving the RSF in Vakaga prefecture in 2025, the RSF has also been collaborating with allied armed groups in the area.² Concerningly, nearly all of the violence in July targeted civilians, likely as reprisals for Central African Armed Forces offensives near Birao town against the RSF on 6 July.³

Although the Vakaga prefecture has long been a corridor for smuggling resources, arms trafficking, and recruitment of fighters for armed groups in Darfur, these trends have been more acute since the war broke out in Sudan.⁴ The corridor has been used especially by Sudanese and Chadian armed groups, which has caused violence to escalate in Vakaga each month since May 2025.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: Ugandan military forces overtake the ADF’s Madina camp

On 10 July, the Ugandan military claimed to have captured the largest Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) camp.⁵ The ADF camp, commonly referred to as Madina, hosted between 1,000 to 1,500 fighters along with their families and is one of three camps used by the ADF since it consolidated its structure from six camps in 2024.⁶ The takeover of the Madina camp did not lead to the capture of the militants. Instead, it pushed the ADF fighters further west as they continued the group’s broader westward shift that has been driven by joint Ugandan-Congolese operations since 2024. The development comes on the back of increased Ugandan troop deployments and expanded operations in the DRC under the joint Operation Shujaa with Congolese military forces in the early months of 2025.

Despite the setback, the ADF’s persistent targeting of civilians and clashes with opposing armed groups surged in July. Notably, the ADF reportedly killed around 43 civilians on 27 July at a church in Komanda in Ituri province. Militants looted several shops, houses, and vehicles and set property ablaze. The majority of civilian deaths and violence targeting civilians in 2025 have been carried out by the ADF camp under the leadership of Ahmad Mahmood Hassan, commonly known as Abwakasi. However, reports suggest the militants on 27 July attacked Komanda from Mount Hoyo,⁷ making Seka Umaru the likely leader of these ADF fighters given his camp has been located nearby in recent months. Umaru is a Ugandan national who joined the ADF between 2004 and 2014, rising to become the second in command behind Musa Baluku.⁸

For more on the ADF camp locations, see this ACLED report.

Ethiopia: A power struggle in South Tigray zone sparks protests and violence

On 21 July, theTigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)-led Tigray interim administration deployed anti-riot police to forcibly remove the Southern Tigray zone leadership. The anti-riot police seized public offices, including the mayor's office in Maichew. While the mayor and cabinet left the town to avoid any violence,⁹ clashes broke out between police and local militias in Raya Alamata town. The Southern Tigray zone had remained outside TPLF control during previous takeovers in central and eastern Tigray in March.

Tensions in southern Tigray first escalated in May when TPLF head Debretsion Gebremichael announced plans to replace the local leadership, accusing them of aligning with a rival TPLF faction.¹⁰ The announcement triggered at least seven protests in May and early June. Similarly, the July takeover sparked another round of protests, with ACLED recording at least seven protests. One of these protests in Adi Gudem turned violent after security forces reportedly opened fire, killing one person. The interim administration said it is unclear who fired the shots, and that it is investigating the incident.¹¹ The president of the interim administration held multiple meetings with local representatives and leaders in late July. Following these meetings, public offices reportedly reopened and anti-riot police withdrew across the Southern Tigray zone, and the mayor and his cabinet returned to their offices.¹²

Political tensions have remained high in Tigray over the past year due to the TPLF’s internal splits, which have been worsened by Eritrean interference. In July, two battle events between the Tigray Peace Forces and Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) — which support TPLF — were recorded for the first time. The Tigray Peace Forces is a newly formed group by former members of the TDF that has emerged with the stated plan to remove the TPLF from power in the Tigray region.¹³

For more on the March local administration takeovers, see the EPO’s Ethiopia situation update (5 March 2025) and Ethiopia situation update (19 March 2025).

Mali: JNIM intensifies its operations in the south

Last month, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) intensified its violent activities in Mali’s southern regions of Segou and Kayes. As a result, violence involving JNIM rose by over 44% in Segou and at least 175% in Kayes. JNIM orchestrated complex operations against the Malian armed forces (FAMa) and Africa Corps, clashing in border areas near Senegal and Mauritania and major city centers. Beyond causing significant losses and the seizure of military equipment, this operation is consistent with JNIM’s rising territorial ambitions and shows enhanced coordination capabilities. In two of JNIM’s most prominent operations that targeted Kayes city and Niono town in Segou, FAMa and Africa Corps were able to repel the assaults, but JNIM retaliated by establishing blockades against the two cities, capturing weapons, and declaring civilians legitimate targets.¹⁴

The decision to blockade the cities aligns with JNIM’s increasing engagement in economic warfare that has included the destruction of key sites for industries such as sugar and mining, along with the kidnapping of foreign laborers. The escalating violence led China to suspend gold mining operations in the country on 2 August.¹⁵ These incidents demonstrate the group’s ambition to threaten Mali’s revenue sources and industrial capability. The group is progressively consolidating its presence in the Segou and Kayes regions and exploiting the mountainous corridor between Sikasso and Bobo-Dioulasso to hide and coordinate the operations between Burkina Faso and Mali.¹⁶

Somalia: Security forces battle militants amid power struggle fights in the south

On 25 July, al-Shabaab captured Sabiid and Caanoole after fighting with Somali forces and the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (AUSSOM). Sabiid is about 40 kilometers away from the capital city, Mogadishu, and Caanoole 50 km away. This capture formed part of wider al-Shabaab gains in Lower Shabelle and Hiraan in July and came despite earlier gains by the joint forces in June during Operation Silent Storm, which had temporarily reclaimed those villages. In July, 54 of the 208 al-Shabaab-related battles took place in Lower Shabelle, which borders the capital — making it one of Somalia’s most contested areas. Sabiid, in particular, holds strategic value due to its river crossing, which analysts say could be vital for smuggling weapons into Mogadishu.¹⁷

In Hiiraan, al-Shabaab recaptured Gumare, Tardo, and Moqokori, threatening key roads and supply lines to government-controlled areas. Hiiraan’s former governor, Ali Jeyte Osman, who was leading and organizing the counter-insurgency operation in the region and was removed due to a row between authorities in Hirshabelle state and Hiiraan regional authorities in April 2023, issued a call for a swift military intervention following al-Shabaab’s capture of Moqokori town.¹⁸ He reached out to the Somali region of Ethiopia in mid-July for assistance to fight the militant group.¹⁹ The 2023 political dispute led to Ali Jeyte removing his fighters, who clashed with Hirshabelle state forces, giving al-Shabaab an opportunity to recapture some territories.

Al-Shabaab’s gains in July highlight the group’s growing resurgence in Somalia and expose how political disputes undermine ongoing counter-insurgency efforts. One of these political disputes is between Mogadishu and the Jubaland administration over the election system and constitutional amendments. Starting on 22 July, federal troops clashed with Jubaland forces in Belet Xaawo, Gedo, for days, finally capturing the town on 30 July. The conflict escalated on 27 July when Ethiopian troops backing Jubaland exchanged fire with Somalia’s federal forces in Doolow town in Gedo. This marked the first direct clash between Ethiopian and Somali forces since ties between the Somali federal and Jubaland governments broke down in November 2024. This dual pressure from insurgents and political infighting threatens Somalia’s fragile security.

Sudan: The SAF pivots to Kordofan amid new ethnic mobilization

Since launching a major offensive in September 2024 and retaking Khartoum, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have pivoted its focus to regain control over the Kordofan region, where the SAF broke several key sieges and re-established vital supply lines in February 2025. In parallel with its ground operations, the SAF relied heavily on airstrikes to target RSF forces beyond the frontlines. These strikes have disrupted RSF logistics and leadership. One strike killed the RSF Group 13 commander in Abu Zabad on 23 July.

In the past months, the RSF has focused on halting SAF advances by mobilizing along three major frontlines surrounding El Obeid: from the south via al-Quoz locality in South Kordofan, from the west through al-Khiwai locality in West Kordofan, and from the north via Bara locality in North Kordofan. In July, the western front witnessed intense clashes, particularly in the town of Umm Sumeima, where the RSF ultimately seized control on 30 July and advanced toward El Obeid. The SAF reportedly killed commanders of the RSF’s 19th group, while the RSF inflicted heavy casualties on SAF forces, including allied units.

As RSF troops redeployed into the northern front — particularly in Gebrat al-Sheikh and Bara localities — their attacks on civilians were particularly deadly and took on ethnic dimensions. Northern areas of North Kordofan are home to Dar Hamid, Kababish, and other tribal groups historically hostile to the RSF. The RSF had previously avoided antagonizing these groups to safeguard the strategic supply corridor from Darfur to the capital, but following their loss of Khartoum, the RSF resumed aggressive tactics and provoked local unrest. With the increasing hostilities, tribal groups mobilized against the RSF. Groups like the Kababish announced the formation of the Kordofan Shield Forces, which are allied with the SAF, and called on other communities to resist the RSF.²⁰