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Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,January 30, 1998.
General Sani Abacha, who seized power in a palace coup in November1993, remained Head of State throughout 1997. Under Abacha, themain decisionmaking organ is the exclusively military ProvisionalRuling Council (PRC), which rules by decree. The PRC overseesthe 33-member Federal Executive Council composed of military officersand civilians. Pending the promulgation of the Constitution writtenby the Constitutional Conference in 1995 and subsequently approvedby the Head of State, the Government observes some provisionsof the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions. The decree suspending the1979 Constitution was not repealed and the 1989 Constitution wasnot implemented. The transition timetable announced by Abachain 1995, which purports to return the country to democraticallyelected civilian government by October 1, 1998, underwent significantrevisions in July.The judiciary's authority and independenceare significantly impaired by the military regime's arrogationof judicial power and prohibition of court review of its action.
The Government continued to enforce its arbitrary authoritythrough the Federal Security System (the military, the State SecurityService (SSS), the national police, and other regulatory and lawenforcement agencies), a variety of official and quasi-governmentalsecurity forces, and through decrees blocking action by the oppositionin the courts. All branches of the security forces committedserious human rights abuses.
Most of the approximately 105 million population is rural,engaging in small-scale agriculture. Oil exports account forover 90 percent of national foreign exchange earnings. The economystagnated during the year, and gross domestic product per capitadropped to $260 after marginal growth in 1996. The general levelof economic activity continued to be depressed, with factory capacityutilization remaining in the 30 percent range, and many majorcompanies reporting lower profits and expanding inventories. Endemic corruption and recurring fuel shortages further hinderedthe functioning of the economy. There was a continued lack oftransparency in government transactions. Government control overthe economy remained extensive, including government mandatedbelow-market fuel prices. Although the Government continued toespouse a program of "guided deregulation," actual stepstaken to liberalize investment and foreign exchange rules weredisappointing.
The Government's human rights record remained dismal. Throughoutthe year, Abacha's Government relied regularly on arbitrary detentionand harassment to silence its most outspoken critics. The winnerof the annulled 1993 presidential election, Chief Moshood K.O.Abiola, remained in detention on charges of treason, as did prominentpolitician Olu Falae, prodemocracy activist Fredrick Fasehun,and several others. Although Abacha announced on November 17that he would release political detainees, the Government failedto do so by year's end. Security forces continued to commit extrajudicialkillings and use excessive force to quell antigovernment protestsas well as to combat crime, resulting in the death or injury ofmany individuals, including innocent civilians. Security forcestortured and beat suspects and detainees. There were many reportsof sexual abuse of female suspects and prisoners by security forces. Prison conditions remained life threatening; many prisoners diedin custody. The Government repeatedly engaged in arbitrary arrestand detention, and lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. Securityservices routinely harassed human rights and prodemocracy groups,including labor leaders, journalists, and student activists. The Government also infringed on citizens' right to privacy.
Citizens do not have the right to change their governmentby peaceful means. Despite the announced timetable for transitionfrom military to multiparty rule, there was little meaningfulprogress toward democracy. Local government elections held onMarch 15 were largely peaceful, but a flawed voter registrationprocess, preelection screenings of candidates, and unresolveddebates over the delineation of constituencies cast doubts uponthe exercise.In April the Government issued Decree Number7, which allowed for the arbitrary removal of any elected officialby the Head of State. Several disputes over election resultsremained unresolved at year's end. On July 3, the TransitionImplementation Committee announced significant changes to thetransition to civil rule program outlined in 1995. State assemblyelections, moved from the third to the fourth quarter of the year,took place on December 6. Although they showed some improvementover the March local government elections, they were flawed, andthe authorities annulled the results in some constituencies andcalled for by-elections. Under the new timetable, gubernatorialelections originally scheduled for the end of the year were postponeduntil 1998, and the inauguration of governors and state assemblieswas rescheduled for September 1998. The presidential electionremains scheduled for August 1, 1998, with the inauguration ofa civilian government to follow on October 1.
The Government's reliance on tribunals, which operate outsidethe constitutional court system, and harsh decrees prohibitingjudicial review seriously undermined the integrity of the judicialprocess and often resulted in legal proceedings that denied defendantsdue process. Former head of state Olusegun Obasanjo and morethan 30 othersconvicted by secret military tribunals remainedin prison for their alleged roles in a purported March 1995 coupplot. Obasanjo's
erstwhile deputy and outspoken National Constitutional Conferencedelegate Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, one of those imprisoned for thealleged March 1995 coup plot, died in government custody on December8, provoking large public protests in the north. Yar'Adua's deathappears to have been from natural causes exacerbated by lack ofproper medical attention. Several days later a newspaper reportedthat another of the coup plotters, staff sergeant Patrick Usikekpo,had died in prison of typhoid fever at an undetermined date latein the year.Leading attorney and former presidentialaspirant Otunba Olabiyi Durojaiye was held incommunicado withoutcharge throughout the year; the Government ignored court ordersto bring his case to court. The Government's frequent refusalto respect court rulings also undercut the independence and integrityof the judicial process.
On December 21, the Government announced the arrest of thecountry's second highest-ranking military officer, Chief of GeneralStaff Lieutenant General Oladipo Diya, 10 other officers, and1 civilian on charges of coup plotting. Subsequently, the Governmentannounced that it had arrested an unstated number of additionalpersons for roles in the purported coup plot, and that it wouldtry the accused before a military tribunal. By year's end, theGovernment had not released details of the alleged plot, althoughits public pronouncements were prejudicial to the presumptionof innocence for the accused.
Other human rights problems included infringements on freedomof speech, press, assembly, association, and travel; violenceand discrimination against women; and female genital mutilation. Worker rights deteriorated as the Government continued to interferewith organized labor. The Government further weakened the independenceand viability of the labor movement by enacting decrees and takingother measures that restricted fundamental rights of association.
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), establishedby the Government in 1995 but not inaugurated until June 1996,was slow to get started but met several times with independenthuman rights groups and began a nationwide review of prison conditions. Public opinion of the NHRC was mixed, as some hoped that theCommission might prove useful while others dismissed it as irrelevant.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person,Including Freedom From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
As in previous years, security forces committed extrajudicialkillings and used excessive force to quell antigovernment andprodemocracy protests and civil unrest. Credible reports by domestichuman rights groups indicate numerous deaths of suspects in thecustody of security forces. These reports are consistent withother credible accounts of abuse, including the use of tortureto extract criminal confessions. The Government seldom held securityforces accountable for their use of excessive, deadlyforceor for the death of individuals in custody. The Government'sinaction fostered a climate of impunity in which these abusesflourished. Widespread violent crime prompted a proliferationof supplemental security forces, including state organized paramilitaryforces, personal security teams, special squads, civil-militarytask forces, and quasi-governmental vigilante groups.Securityforces employed roadblocks and checkpoints where extortion, violence,and lethal force were common. Accounts of security officers shootingat individuals who refused to pay bribes, comply with securityorders, or who simply appeared "suspicious" resultedin numerous deaths and injuries.
In January security forces called to quell disturbances atLagos State University shot and killed two students (see Section2.a.). In February police killed five Muslim demonstrators inKano (see Section 2.c.). In April Florence Okoye, a passengerin a private commuter bus, was fatally wounded when members ofthe Lagos State Task Force on Environmental Sanitation and SpecialOffenses shot at the bus when the driver allegedly failed to stopon demand. The bus driver may have been involved in an earlieraltercation with task force members over illegal parking; Okoye,who was shot in the thigh as she disembarked and subsequentlybled to death, was an unintended casualty. On June 26, 37-year-oldbus driver Bassey Paul was killed after security forces, includingmembers of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), police,military, customs, and immigration, stopped his bus at a checkpoint. During an argument between competing security forces, the unarmedPaul was shot through the chest and died instantly. Similar accountsof excessive use of force and extrajudicial killings at checkpointswere recorded throughout the year. There has been no officialreaction to the violence at checkpoints.In late November,a mobile policeman in Delta State allegedly killed Solomon Areigbore,a local prince, after he drove through a roadblock without payinga bribe. The policemen reportedly pursued Areigbore, stoppedhim at his house, and then one policeman shot him in the head. Areigbore's death led to an attack on the divisional police stationby local youths. The police commander for the Delta area hadno comment, and no action had been taken against the policemenby year's end.
On July 1, newspaper vendor Godfrey Chukwu was fatally woundedwhen uniformed soldiers in an Operation Sweep vehicle fired shotsfrom their car window. According to eyewitnesses, Chukwu wasselling newspapers by the roadside and was shot in the head bya stray bullet. It was not clear whether the security team waschasing a suspect or merely firing at random. An employee ofthe national fertilizer company was shot and killed on July 12by Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF) memberswho opened fire on a private transport bus for allegedly violatingtravel restrictions in effect on federally designated environmentalcleanup days. Two other passengers on the bus were injured. Secondary school student Saheed Arasi also died in July afterbecoming involved in an altercation with a policeman on the trailof suspected drug dealers. Arasi was shopping in an outdoor marketwhen the policeman stopped him, accused him of criminal activity,and, despite his protests of innocence and the corroboration ofnearby witnesses, shot him in the head at point blank range. As a result of the incident, a mob later approached the localpolice station brandishing cans of gasoline and threatening toburn down the office.The Government has taken no legalaction against the policeman.
Repeated fuel shortages often stimulated incidents, and armedsecurity forces killed several people when special treatment wasrefused. In March the body of gas station manager Kehinde Ehinderowas delivered to the Ondo state specialist hospital after armedmen claiming to be NDLEA officials had arrested him earlier inthe day. The station owner reported that the security men hadbecome enraged after their request for fuel was denied becausethe station had only kerosene in stock. Hospital staff confirmedthat the body was brought to the hospital by an NDLEA officer,who they then turned over to the police. According to policeon duty, the officer was released upon orders from "above." On June 21, an altercation at a gas station in Ogun state turnedviolent when an attendant refused to provide fuel on demand toa deputy superintendent of customs and three uniformed customsofficers. According to eyewitness reports, the deputy superintendenthit the attendant several times on the head with the butt of hisrifle before station manager James Olugbenga Dosumu intervened. The superintendent then shot the unarmed Dosumu in the chestat close range. He died instantly. The Government has takenno action against the deputy superintendent.
Credible reports of security forces shooting people suspectedof armed robbery or other crimes continued throughout the year,and excessive use of force in response to demonstrations resultedin the deaths of many unarmed civilians. On February 6, Lagospolice shot and killed seven people accused of robbery. The victimsincluded an elementary school teacher. Police claimed that thesuspects resisted arrest. On March 17, Oghenebrume Eburu wasshot and killed in Warri, Delta state, by security escorts ofnavy Captain Ekpeyong Ita during a protest march following theMarch 15 elections. Soldiers sent to quell disturbances in Warriin March were given shoot-to-kill orders, but no shots were firedand no demonstrators killed.In August police officialsin Kaduna state opened fire on demonstrators protesting the continueddetention of religious leader Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Zakzaky and killedfour people. In February Operation Sweep forces shot and killedtwo student demonstrators (see Section 2.a.). Security forcessometimes turned against each other, and as many as 80 peoplewere injured and 1 policeman was killed in the northern city ofKano in April after fighting broke out between soldiers and policemen. Reportedly, the clash was caused by policemen arresting off dutysoldiers suspected of marijuana possession. In May a confrontationbetween Federal Aviation Authority security agents and membersof the Air Force Presidential Task Force turned violent as membersof the two security forces fired on each other. Although no onewas killed, a third security force (the police) had to interveneto end the shooting.On September 29, four boatloads ofsoldiers reportedly attacked the ethnic Ijaw village of EkermorZion, Delta State, killed 1 man, detained 58 others, and destroyed10 homes. The attack was an apparent reprisal against the townfor the earlier disappearance and presumed killing of four soldierswho reportedly were involved in extorting money from the community.
The harsh interrogation methods reportedly practiced by somesecurity officers resulted in the deaths while in custody of severalpeople. The Civil Liberties Organization, a domestic nongovernmentalhuman rights group, called for a formal investigation into thedeath of Victor Udoma while in the custody of the Special FraudUnit of the Lagos state police. Udoma was arrested on May 12in connection with crimes committed by his employer and died after2 weeks in detention. The official report released by authoritiesattributed his death to "infectious diseases." After6 months in detention by the Lagos Special Antirobbery Squad,the bodies of two security guards employed by a Lagos companywere deposited at the state general hospital mortuary in January. The men were originally arrested for suspected complicity ina robbery at the company premises. The two were never chargedwith a crime and no explanation for their deaths has been forthcoming.
There were no developments in the June 1996 slaying of KudiratAbiola, outspoken senior wife of M.K.O. Abiola or the October1995 killing of political leader Alfred Rewane. The perpetratorswere never found and the Government ceased investigations shortlyafterwards, asserting without evidence that the attack was staged.No progress was made in the investigation of the January1996 attempted murder of prominent independent publisher AlexIbru.
Nigerian forces in the West African Peacekeeping Force inSierra Leone at times used excessive force. In June Nigerianwarships shelled Freetown, apparently trying to hit army headquarters. More than 30 civilians were killed in September at a docksidemarketplace in Freetown when Nigerian troops fired at ships unloadingrice in defiance of a West African embargo. In October Nigerianplanes bombed a television and radio station near the capital.
A series of bombings in Lagos, which later spread to otherparts of the country, resulted in several deaths and many injuries. On January 7, an explosion near Abati military barracks in Lagosleft 2 soldiers dead and 29 injured. On February 12, a bomb inthe Maryland district of Lagos injured nine persons. On May 7,a bomb detonated as a military truck passed a busy thoroughfarein Lagos, leaving four soldiers injured. An explosion in thesouthwestern city of Ibadan on May 12 damaged a military vehiclebut killed none of the soldiers and police on board. In May fourpeople were killed and several others wounded when two bombs explodedin Onitsha, Anambra state, in eastern Nigeria, one outside a mosqueand the other in an open market. An August 6 bomb blast outsidea cathedral in Port Harcourt left one person dead. On September2, a bomb exploded outside the offices of the Ekiti state militaryadministrator. The administrator escaped unhurt but four childrenwere injured. Late in 1996 and early in 1997, the Governmentarrested several leading opposition figures including Fred Fasehunand Olu Falae, and brought charges against government criticsWole Soyinka, Anthony Enahoro, and General Alex Akinrinade, allliving in self-imposed exile, in connection with the bombs, butby year's end had not made public the substance of the case againstthe men (see Section 1.d.).
b. Disappearance
Government detention practices cause many persons to be "missing"for extended periods. The only known case of a politically motivateddisappearance was that of former Razor newspaper editor MoshoodFayemiwo, who spent 7 months in detention before escaping to neighboringBenin in September 1996. On February 14, Fayemiwo disappearedfrom the United Nations refugee camp where he had been livingwith his family. Mrs. Fayemiwo reported that her husband hadbeen kidnaped by "unknown security agents," but reliablesources claim that he is being held incommunicado by Nigeriansecurity services. The Government was asked repeatedly aboutthe case by the media, but did not acknowledge any involvement.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The 1979 Constitution (suspended) and the 1989 Constitution(never implemented) prohibit torture and mistreatment of prisonersand provide criminal sanctions for such excesses. The EvidenceAct of 1960 prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained throughtorture. Nevertheless, detainees frequently died while in custody(see Section 1.a.), and there were credible reports that securityofficers seeking to extract confessions regularly beat suspects,detainees, and convicted prisoners. Security officers torturedprisoners with whippings, suspension by the limbs from the ceiling,burning with candles, and extraction of teeth.Detaineesare often kept incommunicado for long periods of time (see Section1.d.).
There were continued reports of torture or abuse by the RiversState Internal Security Task Force in Ogoniland. Reported abusesincluded extrajudicial killings, beating a victim's head witha gun butt, and arbitrary detention.
In pursuit of their objectives, security forces, task force,and other law enforcement personnel routinely assaulted or arrestedanyone perceived as uncooperative or "undisciplined,"usually market women, traders, street hawkers, children, jaywalkers,or errant drivers.
Several instances of violence against prominent individualsor strategic targets occurred throughout the year, but governmentinvestigations into the causes of the attacks were halfheartedand inconclusive. In January gunmen fired into the car of NationalDemocratic Coalition (NADECO) leader Abraham Adesanya on a busyLagos street, but he escaped unhurt. The perpetrators were neverfound and the Government ceased investigation quickly, assertingthat the attack was staged.
There were numerous reliable reports that flogging, stripping,andacts of public humiliation, such as duck-walking orcrawling, were used as punishment for minor infractions or publicdisturbances. Caning continued as a form of punishment for somecrimes, and four men were publicly canedwith 100 strokesafter a court convicted them of adultery under the Penal Code. Reliable sources reported witnessing amobile policeofficerin Lagos jump on the back of a truck driver whohad been forced onto his hands and knees at the side of the road. In another incident, an eyewitness reported watching mobile policeofficers stop a young man on a motorcycle and, after an argument,beat him on the head with their rifle butts. Credible reportscontinued throughout the year of security forces intervening inpersonal disputes and by publicly stripping or whipping the allegedperpetrator.
Security forces often use force or threats to extort moneyfrom civilians. In Oyo state, journalist Rinde Oladele was stoppedat a checkpoint by soldiers and police from Operation Gbale, theOyo state paramilitary anticrime squad. The security officersreportedly searched his car and interrogated him at gunpoint. Upon finding over $1,400 in local currency in the trunk, thesecurity officers accused him of being a thief, demanded money,and beat him. In June a staff member of the Committee for theDefense of Human Rights (CDHR), a local nongovernmental organization(NGO), was stopped on the street by Operation Sweep security forcepersonnel who searched him at gun point and took about $25. TheCDHR also reported that in March, two journalists, Mallam MohammedAbubakar of The Guardian and Alhaji Meto Adamu of the BritishBroadcasting Corporation Hausa service, were beaten unconsciousby military officers, acting on the orders of an aide of the Yobestate military administrator.
In April policemen at a Lagos state checkpoint opened fireon a minibus full of passengers after the driver reportedly ignoredan order to stop. No one was injured but, upon learning thatone of the passengers was the wife of Chief of General Staff,Lt. Gen. Oladipo Diya, top police officials described the incidentas "embarrassing to the force."
Chief Onii Egbunine, publisher of the Owerri-based newspaper,The Horn, was interrogated by an assistant to the Imo state militaryadministrator before being severely beaten by security forces,reportedly for publishing a story alleging corruption at the highestlevels of state government. Aides of former Chief of DefenseStaff Brigadier General Babatunde Idiagbon severely beat a stateofficial who arranged a meeting between the general and journalistComfort Obi. The aides contended that the meeting, which laterappeared as the cover story of Obi's magazine, had not been agreedto by Idiagbon. Security agents of Ogun state military administratorWing Commander Sam Ewang flogged Nigerian Youth Service Corpsmembers who protested eviction from a state-run housing complexin July. Subsequently, the youths, both men and women, were forcedby security officials to crawl across the concrete on their kneesas punishment after they failed to disperse when ordered by theadministrator.The administrator later "reprimanded"the security men involved.
For the most part, the Government neither acknowledged nordenied that security force abuses occurred and left perpetratorsunpunished. Those security force officials who were punishedfaced, at the worst, dismissal from service and, more often, demotionor a "stern reprimand." However, some officials, mostnotably Lagos state administrator Colonel M. B. Marwa, acknowledgedthat there had been abuses and said that he would try to curbthem,but by year's end, he had taken no action on theseproblems.
Prison and detention conditions remained life threatening. Lack of potable water, inadequate sewage facilities, and severeovercrowding resulted in unhealthy and dangerous sanitary conditions. Disease was pervasive in the cramped, poorly ventilated facilities,and chronic shortages of medical supplies were reported. Prisoninmates were only irregularly allowed outside their cells forrecreation, and many inmates must provide their own food. Onlythose with money or whose relatives brought food regularly hadsufficient food. Poor inmates often relied on handouts from othersto survive. Prison officials, police, and security forces oftendenied inmates food and medical treatment as a form of punishmentor to extort money from them. Reports of sexual abuse of femaleprisoners were common. The Government derived considerable savingsfrom the practice of leaving children born in prison with theirjailed mothers rather than placing them in foster homes.Womenare generally housed separately from men, but juvenile prisoners,usually boys, are detained together with adults. There are nooverall statistics on prison deaths due to harsh conditions orlack of medical treatment. However, one human rights group counted56 prisoners who died in 4 Lagos prisons in 1996. Forty-threeof the dead were males awaiting trial. The human rights groupattributed the deaths to malnutrition, torture, and tuberculosis.
Political detainees are commonly dispersed around the country,often in remote locations. For example union leader Frank Kokoriis held in Borno state, near the Chadian border. Another laborleader, Milton Dabibi, is reportedly in a prison in the far southeast. Such action poses financial and logistical burdens on the detainees'families, in cases when visitation is allowed.
The Government acknowledged the problem of overcrowding inthe prisons and promised to seek a solution to the problem, butfew substantive changes were made. A committee established inlate 1996 to review the problem of overcrowding submitted a reportin April that prompted the Government to direct state administratorsto take steps to reduce prison congestion. However, no methodto reduce the problem was announced,and by year's endthere was no indication that overcrowding had been reduced. Accordingto 1996 prison statistics, approximately 55,000 prisoners inhabitthe nation's 43 prisons, which were built to hold 33,345 inmates. Human rights groups contend that even these figures are conservative,and Interior Minister Babagana Kingibe said that there were over70,000 inmates in the prisons. A report by the Nigerian Instituteof Advanced Legal Studies stated that the number of inmates inIkoyi prison in Lagos exceed by 250 percent the designed capacityof the prison.
Prison officials generally do not allow human rights monitorsaccess to prisons. However, some NGO's fare better than othersand have occasional access.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Government repeatedly engaged in arbitrary arrest anddetention. Police and security forces are empowered to make arrestswithout warrants if they believe thatthere is reason tosuspect that a person has committed an offense; they often abusedthis power. The law requires that the arresting officer informthe accused of charges at the time of arrest and take the accusedto a station for processing within a reasonable time. By lawpolice must provide suspects with the opportunity to engage counseland post bail. However, police generally did not adhere to thesesafeguards and often held suspects incommunicado under harsh conditionsfor extended periods without charge. Over 50 percent of the nation'sprison inmates are awaiting trial. In some prisons such as Ikoyiprison, 90 percent of the population were Awaiting Trial Persons(ATP's). Many of these ATP's have been detained for 5 years ormore, with some waiting as long as 12 years for their case tobe heard in court. More than 100 supporters of Shi'ite religiousleader Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Zakzaky arrested in 1996 remain in jailand have not been charged with any offense.
The State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree of 1984(Decree Two) allows the Government to detain without charge personssuspected of acts prejudicial to state security or harmful tothe economic well-being of the country. When invoked, DecreeTwo suspends the detainee's civil liberties and precludes judicialreview. Many citizens consider Decree Two to be the main threatto their basic freedoms, because the judicial ouster clause encouragesarbitrary detention and fails to define what constitutes actsunder the Decree's purview. Decree 11 of 1994 authorizes thePRC Vice Chairman or the Commissioner of Police to detain personsfor up to 3 months without charge.
In June 1996, the Government announced the repeal of Decree14 of 1994, which had effectively suspended the right of habeascorpus by forbidding courts from hearing cases demanding thatthe Government produce in court those detained under Decree Two. However, despite this repeal, the Government still retains fulllegal authority under Decree Two and Decree 12 of 1994 to detaincitizens arbitrarily and dispense with habeas corpus challenges,and the Government regularly defied court orders to produce detainees. In the case of prominent attorney and politician Otunba OlabiyiDurojaiye, who was arrested on December 3, 1996, the Governmentignored a court order requiring it to present Durojaiye in courton February 2, 3 months after his detention. The Government subsequentlyignored two more calls for Durojaiye's appearance in court.
Police and security forces often disregarded court ordersto arraign or release detainees. Calabar businessman EffiongHenshaw was arrested by the NDLEA on March 12 and remained indetention at year's end as the NDLEA ignored a court order toarraign him. An April 7 order from the Lagos federal high courtto release Omochiere Aisagbonhi was ignored by police and Aisagbonhi,who was arrested on March 26 in relation to a dispute over money,remained in detention without charge.
Persons unfortunate enough to be nearby when a crime is committedare normally held for interrogation for periods ranging from afew hours to several months. Even after their release, thosedetained are asked to return repeatedly for further questioning. Each of the bombing incidents (see Section 1.a.) was followedby the arbitrary arrest of dozens of bystanders. In one bombingcase, a local employee of a foreign embassy was detained for severalhours for questioning and required to report to authorities routinelyfor weeks.
Relatives and friends of wanted suspects were regularly placedin detention without criminal charge to induce suspects to surrenderto arrest. The wife and pregnant daughter of retired army officerLieutenant Colonel Raphael Iluyomade, reportedly a close friendof NADECO leader Alex Akinrinade, were arrested on February 20by security forces searching for the lieutenant colonel. Thewomen were held for over 3 months at a military installation inApapa, Lagos. Folasade, Iluyomade's daughter, was 4 months pregnantat the time of her arrest and miscarried while in detention. Neither of the women was charged with any offense. NDLEA officialssearching for architect Chijioke Okoye, wanted in connection withthe collapse of a building in Enugu, broke into the Okoye houseon the night of July 24 and, when they did not find Okoye, arrestedhis wife. Mrs. Okoye and her 4-month-old baby were detained for3 days until her husband surrendered to authorities. The wifeof Tell magazine editor in chief Nosa Igiebor was taken into custodyon the night of September 10, after armed security officers brokeinto her home, intimidated her children, and detained her forseveral hours of interrogation. According to a Tell press release,the security agents held a gun to the head of the Igiebor's 4-year-olddaughter and asked the child repeatedly, "Where is your father?" The harassment came just a few days after Tell published an articleon Abacha's ill health. Nosa Igiebor, who spent 6 months in detentionin 1996, has grown accustomed to spending much of his life inhiding as a result of the confrontational stand taken by his magazine.
The Government routinely arrested, harassed, and detainedwithout charge leading human rights and prodemocracy activists,including the Iluyomades, who were presumably detained for theirrelative's political associations, and Otunba Durojaiye. Ogonihuman rights activist Bari-Aara Kpalap, originally arrested inOctober 1996 by the RSISTF, remained in detention without charge. Chief Osaro Oseghale spent a week in detention in January forhis alleged association with NADECO. In an apparent effort toblock human rights activist Anyakwee Nsirimovu, executive directorof the Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (IHRHL),from meeting with visiting Organization of African Unity representatives,security officers raided IHRHL offices in Port Harcourt on March13. The security officers reportedly broke open doors and lockersand took documents and project materials.
Several leading labor and prodemocracy activists who werearrested in 1994 remained in detention, including M.K.O. Abiolaand Frank Kokori, General Secretary of the National Union of Petroleumand Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) (see Section 6.a.). GeneralSecretary of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association(PENGASSAN) Milton Dabibi, who was arrested in January 1996, remainedin detention without charge. Dabibi was not permitted visitors. Former Petroleum Minister Don Etiebet was detained for severaldays in March (see Section 3).
The Government routinely detained human rights monitors,journalists, and political opponents for making or publishingcritical statements. Government security forces frequently harassed,arrested, detained, and threatened journalists for a variety ofreasons, including the alleged spreading of false informationand printing of stories that exposed the actions of governmentofficials (see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 4).
Ladi Olorunyomi, the journalist wife of a prominent criticof the Government currently living in exile, spent 2 months indetention. The Abuja bureau chief of African Concord magazine,Mohammed Adamu, was arrested on July 27 after his magazine publishedan article critical of presidential security officer Hamza Al-Mustapha,and he remained in detention at year's end. A reporter for theindependent daily Vanguard, George Onah, spent a year in detentionafter publishing an article about military personnel issues andremained in prison at year's end. Onah spent 7 months in solitaryconfinement and often had his arms and legs chained. The editorof The Week magazine, Godwin Agbroko, was arrested on December18, 1996, and not released until May. Chris Ikwunze, a Vanguardcorrespondent, and Akandem James, a reporter with The Punch, werearrested on September 4 and detained for several days after reportingthat RSISTF members had impounded copies of a book written bythe late Ken Saro-Wiwa.
There are no reliable figures for the number of politicaldetainees, but local human rights groups estimates range between100 and 200.
There were no known instances of forced exile as ameans of political control, although several NADECO members, includingformer Senator Bola Tinabu, retired Air Commodore Dan Suleiman,Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, and elder statesman and senior NADECOfigure Anthony Enahoro live in self-imposed exile. Other activistssuch as Owens Wiwa, brother of executed Ogoni rights activistKen Saro-Wiwa, Ledum Mittee, President of the Movement for theSurvival of the Ogoni Peoples (MOSOP), and outspoken journalistDapo Olorunyomi, joined them. An unknown number of Ogoni reportedlyfled to neighboring countries, North America, or Europe in searchof asylum.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Government has taken several steps to undercut the independenceand integrity of the judiciary. To suppress opposition to itsrule, the regime first bypassed the regular courts in favor of"tribunals" and then declared itself above the law byprohibiting court review of any government action. Tribunal sentencesare generally severe. The Government's reliance on tribunals,which operate outside the constitutional court system, seriouslyundermines the judicial process and often results in legal proceedingsthat deny defendants due process, as in the 1995 case of Ken Saro-Wiwaand his eight codefendants. The Government's frequent refusalto respect court rulings also undermines the integrity of thejudicial process.
The regular court system is composed of both federal andstate trial courts, state appeals courts, the federal Court ofAppeal, and the federal Supreme Court. Under the 1979 Constitution,courts of the first instance include magistrate or district courts,customary or area courts, Shari'a (Islamic) courts, and for somespecified cases, the state high courts. The nature of the caseusually determines which court has jurisdiction. In principlecustomary and Shari'a courts have jurisdiction only if both plaintiffand defendant agree. In practice, however, fear of legal costs,delay, and distance to alternative courts encouraged many litigantsto choose these courts.
Myriad administrative, logistical, and financial hurdlesrepeatedly hinder the work of the judicial system. One Lagosstate judge conducted hearings in prison when prison officialsinformed him that there were no vehicles to transport the accusedto court. Decree One of 1984, the first decree promulgated bythe military officers who overthrew the civilian regime of PresidentShehu Usman Aliyu Shagari in 1983, left the institutional frameworkof the judiciary largely intact. However, it established a parallelsystem of military tribunals with sole jurisdiction over certainoffenses, such as coup plotting, corruption, armed robbery, andillegal sales of petroleum. A 1991 decree amended Decree Oneby providing that only sitting or retired civilian judges couldpreside over tribunals hearing nonmilitary cases. Decree 12 statesthat "no act of the federal military Government may henceforthbe questioned in a court of law" and "divests all courtsof jurisdiction in all matters concerning the authority of thefederal Government."
Criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3 monthsof arraignment for most categories of crimes. Inefficient administrativeprocedures, petty extortion, bureaucratic inertia, poor communicationbetween police and prison officials, and inadequate transportationcontinue to result in considerable delays, often stretching toseveral years, in bringing suspects to trial.
Trials in the regular court system are public and generallyrespect constitutionally protected individual rights, includinga presumption of innocence, the right to be present, to confrontwitnesses, to present evidence, and to be represented by legalcounsel. However, there is a widespread perception that judgesare easily bribed or "settled," and that litigants cannotrely on the courts to render impartial judgments.
There are no legal provisions barring women or other groupsfrom testifying in civil court or giving their testimony lessweight. The testimony of women is, however, accorded less weightin Shari'a courts.
In most cases before the tribunals, the accused have theright to legal counsel, bail, and appeal, although some tribunalssubstitute a presumption of guilt for the presumption of innocence,and conviction rates in the tribunals reportedly exceed convictionrates in the regular courts.
In June 1996, in response to the report of a U.N. fact-findingteam sent to investigate human rights and the transition process,the Government announced two decrees, one repealing Decree 14of 1994, which had effectively suspended the right of habeus corpus(see Section 1.d.), and the other amending the Civil Disturbances(Special Tribunal) Decree of 1987 to remove members of the armedforces from the membership of the tribunal and allow for a rightof appeal to the Special Appeals Tribunal. Military personnelconvicted of coup plotting do not, however, enjoy the right ofappeal to the Special Appeals Tribunal, and the decree remainedsilent regarding appeals for civilians convicted of coup plotting,but all indications are that the decree does not apply to them. These changes came in the wake of the international outcry afterthe November 1995 execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogonileaders who were convicted of murder by the Ogoni Civil DisturbancesSpecial Tribunal (which included a military officer) and deniedthe right of appeal.
The Ogoni 19, originally arrested in 1994 and accused ofmurder along with Ken Saro-Wiwa and the 8 Ogonis executed in 1995,remained in detention awaiting trial. Although arraigned in July1996 in connection with the murder of 4 Ogoni leaders, the caseof the Ogoni 19 (20 men were originally arrested but 1, ClementTusiima, died while in custody) has been stymied by the Government'sindifference to constituting a new tribunal composed of only civilianmembers to hear their case. Strict adherence to the amendmentof the Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree of 1987 precludesthe hearing of the case by the tribunal that condemned the Ogoni9, as a military officer was a member of the board.
Despite assurances that military-style tribunals are no longerused in nonmilitary cases, the practice continued. In the highlypublicized trial of seven Nigerian men known as the "Otokoto7," a three-member tribunal, which included a military majorand a police superintendent, convicted and sentenced the allegedarmed robbers to death. The seven were permitted to appeal thetribunal's ruling; however, the appeal was heard not by a SpecialAppeals Tribunal but by the state military administrator. Theadministrator upheld the death sentences for six of those convictedand commuted the sentence of one juvenile to life in prison. The six were executed by firing squad on July 31.
In March the Government formally charged 16 people with treason,including elder statesman Chief Anthony Enahoro, Nobel laureateWole Soyinka, prodemocracy advocate Dr. Fred Fasehun, and prominentpolitician Chief Olu Falae. While 12 of the accused had beenin official custody for several months without charge, 4 of thoseaccused reside in self-imposed exile. Arrest warrants were issuedfor those living abroad. By year's end, little progress had beenmade in the case and the substance of the Government's investigationshad not been revealed. The 12 accused remained in detention whilea team of lawyers, including prominent attorney Chief Gani Fawehinmiand senior advocates former Senator Abraham Adesanya and ChiefBola Ige, filed motions to enforce court orders granting the detaineesleave to seek bail, access to medical treatment, and improveddetention conditions.At year's end, there had been noaction on these motions.
The number of political prisoners (as distinct from politicaldetainees) held by the Government is also unknown (see Section1.d.). Thirty-three individuals convicted in 1995 of coup plottingand related charges by a secret military tribunal remained inprison. These included former Head of State Olusegun Obasanjo;editor in chief of The Sunday Magazine Chris Anyanwu; Tell magazineassistant editor George Mbah; The News magazine editor Kunle Ajibade;Weekend Classique editor Ben Charles Obi; and chairman of theprominent human rights organization Campaign for Democracy (CD)Beko Ransome-Kuti. Twoothers convicted by the 1995 coupplot tribunal died while in prison: former Obasanjo deputy andnational constitutional conference delegate Shehu Musa Yar'Adua,and Sergeant Patrick Usikekpo.
Eleven military men allegedly involved in a 1990 coup plotagainst the regime of former President Ibrahim Babangida and convictedfor their actions remained in detention despite an October 31,1991, state pardon granted on their behalf. The ConstitutionalRights Project (CRP), took their case to court and obtained inJuly a release order for seven of the men. The Government ignoredthe court order, and at year's end the men were still in detention.
Queenette Allogoa, detained in 1996 after finishing her sentence,was released. The case of the Ogoni 19, arrested in 1994 in connectionwith the murder of 4 Ogoni politicians and arraigned in July 1996,is unresolved and those arrested remain in jail.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family,Home, or Correspondence
Provisions of the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions provide forthe right to privacy in the home, in correspondence, and in oralelectronic communications. However, the military Government regularlyinterfered in the lives of citizens, and if the authorities desiredto use a warrant in a particular search case, they often securedit from a military tribunal rather than a regular court. Humanrights and prodemocracy leaders reported that security agentsregularly followed them and cut off or monitored their organizations'telephones. Police routinely detain relatives and friends ofsuspects without charge to induce suspects to surrender (see Section1.d.).
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Constitutional provisions providing for freedom of speechand of the press were not enforceable because of the continuedsuspension of constitutional rights. The regime often publiclydeclared support for these freedoms, but it nevertheless soughtto limit or confine public political dialog. The Government continuedits arbitrary intimidation and harassment of the press throughlegal and extralegal means.
Although there is a large and vibrant independent domesticpress that is frequently critical of the Government, the Governmentalso owns or controls many publications. All newspapers and magazinesare required to register with the Government under the NewspaperRegistration Board Decree 43 of 1993, and Minister of Cultureand Information Walter Ofonagoro threatened to close newspapersnot registered with the board. The registration fee is about$3,000, and the registration process requires editors to providetheir home as well as office address. Although no newspaper hadregistered by year's end, the Culture and Information Ministerregularly threatened to close unregistered newspapers.Theregime has, at various times, shut independent newspapers foroffenses, but there were no known cases of papers being prosecutedfor failing to register. Ofonagoro also called repeatedly fora "press court" to check the "excesses" ofthe media. A decree establishing such courts was reportedly draftedbut had not been promulgated by year's end. Throughoutthe year, security agents frequently harassed, arrested, and detainedjournalists (see Section 1.d.). Virtually all senior editorsof publications critical of the Government were subject to surveillanceand harassment by securityagents. Some were driven undergroundby fear of arrest and operated clandestinely from numerous locationsscattered throughout Lagos; others fled the country. Governmentsecurity forces continued to intimidate the media with a seriesof arrests of editors and reporters from journals critical ofthe Abacha regime. One human rights group estimates more than30 journalists are in prison, including 9 journalists who werearrested during the year and remain in detention atyear'send. This figure also includes four journalists convicted ofinvolvement in an alleged 1995 coup plot (see Section 1.e.). Security forces detained for varying lengths of time but releasedat least 17 other journalists during the year.
On July 27, the Abuja bureau chief of the African Concordwas arrested. Beginning in October, security forces stepped uppressure with a series of arrests of editors and reporters fromjournals critical of the Abacha regime. The weekly magazinesThe News and Tell were particularly hard hit. On October 2, IyoboisaUwugiaren, correspondent for The News was detained by police inLagos and released later the same evening. On October 10, HenryOgbolue, Kadunacorrespondent of The News was detained,reportedly beaten, and released later that day. On October 17,Gbenga Alaketu and Ademola Abimboye, both assistant editors ofThe News, were arrested in Lagos. Alaketu and Abimboye were releasedby year's end. On October 24, Soji Omotunde, editor of The AfricanConcord, was abducted by security operatives on a busy Lagos street. On November 4, Aoetokunbo Fakeye, defense correspondent for TheNews, was arrested. On November 8, Jenkins Alumona, editor ofThe News, was arrested by SSS agents ataLagostelevision station. On November 9, Onome Osifo-Whiskey, managingeditor of Tell magazine, was arrested by SSS agents in Lagos whiledriving to church with his children. On October 29, Osifo-Whiskeyhad warned that the magazine had received a written death threat,which listed the names of 27 staff members. On November 16, SSSagents arrested Babafemi Ojudu, editor of the News/Tempo. RafiuSalau, an administration editor for the News/Tempo, was also arrestedin mid-November.On December 28, armed soldiers reportedlyfrom the Directorate of Military Intelligence arrested for unknownreasons four journalists in Lagos from the Diet newspaper, includingeditor Niran Malaolu. Three were released after 1 day and instructedto report to DMI office weekly, while editor Malaolu remainedin detention at year's end.
Subsequent to the December 21 arrest of second-in-commandLieutenant General Oladipo Diya and 11 others for alleged coupplotting, the Government repeatedly warned journalists that theycould face treason charges if they repeated unsubstantiated reportscarried in international media. In issuing these strong warnings,the government spokesman referred to the four journalists convictedof coup-related offenses after the fact by a secret military tribunalin 1995 (see Section 1.e.).
The Government used other means to harass and intimidatethe press. These methods included intimidation of advertisers,surveillance of printers, seizure of print runs, and withholdinginformation. For some publications, the relationship with theGovernment is so adversarial that they are forced to operate essentiallyas underground publications. The Government did not proscribeany newspapers during the year, although it has done so in thepast.
The Government granted broadcasting rights to private radiostations in 1994, but maintains careful watch over broadcasts. Television, both Nigerian and otherwise, is widely available. Access is limited more by substandard cable installation, electricalpower surges and outages, and technical broadcasting difficultiesthan by government intervention. However, government-controlledbroadcast media still dominate the country, and even private broadcastersdo not transmit stories that criticize the Government. The Governmentcontinued to enforce laws permitting only government broadcastersto air programs nationwide, limiting the scope of private stations. The Government has used the foreign content provision of thePress Law of 1993 to revoke licenses granted to some broadcasters. The regulation requires local television stations to limit programmingfrom other countries to 40 percent; satellite broadcasters arelimited to 20 percent. Despite the limitations, however, privatetelevision and radio broadcasters gained wider audiences and morerobust advertising support. While government broadcasters complainedthat government funding and advertising were inadequate for theirneeds, private stations thrived on advertising support alone.
Foreign journalists are routinely required to inform theNigerian embassy of the subject matter of their proposed coveragebefore they are granted visas. Proposing political coverage isdiscouraged and may result in the visa request being refused. There are fewer than 10 resident foreign correspondents.
The Government increased its efforts to limit academic freedom. Security forces routinely monitored and on occasion interferedwith conferences they perceived as forums for prodemocracy orhuman rights groups (see Section 2.b.). The Government tape recordsfaculty conversations. The May 1996 government ban on activitiesby the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) continued. The Government also continued a ban on university staff unions(see Section 6.a.). Nigerian embassies often refused to issuevisas to visiting lecturers and artists. This policy limiteddiscussions between foreign and Nigerian academicians on topicsof mutual interest.
In 1996 the American Studies Association of Nigeria (ASAN)annual conference was banned on opening day by the SSS. In Aprilthe annual conference was postponed until August when the NigerianUniversities Commission (NUC) sent a letter to all universityvice chancellors recommending that they discourage their stafffrom attending the conference, and later canceled entirely whenit became clear that the authorities would not allow the conferenceto proceed. In June the University of Jos announced with greatfanfare the establishment of an American studies diploma program. Only days later, the program was officially put on indefinitehold by the NUC, reportedly acting on instructions from the Government.
Security forces were called in to quell campus disturbancesseveral times during the year. Some student activities, suchas elections, were disrupted by security agents. Student groupsbelieve that university authorities followed government directivesto suspend or expel activist students. In a January 29 crackdownat the Federal Polytechnic in Offa, Kwara state, 10 students werearrested, reportedly as a result of their involvement in studentelections. The students were held without charge for 2 weeks,released, and then expelled from school. The parents of two otherstudents, who were sought but not found on campus, were arrestedin place of their children. The parents were releasedby September. On February 10, the Vice Chancellor of LagosState University (LASU) called on Operation Sweep forces to quelldisturbances on campus that he attributed to "cult violence." Two students were shot and killed by the sweep team and severalothers were injured. On December 10 and 11, security forces wereagain used to stop student demonstrations at LASU that eruptedafter the university's dismissal of student union leaders.
Eighteen professors were arrested at the University of Nigeria,Nsukka, after student unrest on the campus in February. Eightof the professors, one of whom was the former chairman of theNsukka wing of the banned Academic Staff Union of Universities(ASUU), were later charged with sedition and arson. The professorsmaintained their innocence and argued that the student demonstrationwas merely a reaction to proposed increases in school fees. Theprofessors were reportedly released, although their cases haveyet to be resolved. In August thousands of secondary school studentsdemonstrated in Kaduna, calling for the resignation of state militaryadministrator Colonel Hameed Ali. When tear gas proved ineffectivein dispersing the demonstrators, police spokesman Tanimu Bindawawarned that, in the future, police would have "no other optionthan to shoot;" no further student protests took place byyear's end.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The two Constitutions provide citizens with the right toassemble freely and associate with other persons in politicalparties, trade unions, or special interest associations. However,the Government proscribed all political activity 1 day after comingto power in 1993. In August 1994, Abacha announced that "individualsor groups may henceforth canvass political ideas, but they cannotform political parties for now." In June 1995, the Governmentannounced a partial lifting of the ban on political activity,but it was not until June 1996 that a reconstituted National ElectoralCommission of Nigeria (NECON) announced cumbersome and complexrequirements for registering political parties. Parties wereallowed an unrealistic 6-week period in which to satisfy requirementsthat included registering 40,000 members in each of the then 30states and 15,000 in the federal capital territory of Abuja andissuing photo identity cards to each of them. Despite the logisticaldifficulty of satisfying NECON's requirements, 23 parties purchasedregistration forms from NECON for approximately $6,000; 18 ofthem submitted the forms and supporting documentation by the deadline.
In response to widespread protests over the registrationprocess, NECON announced in 1995 a new exercise allowing the 18groups to apply for mergers. The merger requests required anotherburdensome set of documents, including addresses of the national,state and local government council chapters of the party; thenew name, constitution, acronym, symbol, and manifesto of theparty; and the names of proposed staff members at all levels ofthe organization. In September 1996, NECON announced the registrationof five parties and ordered all other parties to be dissolved,effectively preventing the participation of the majority of establishedpoliticians and potential opposition leaders.
Although Abacha announced the lifting of remaining restrictionson political activities in his October 1, 1995, Independence Dayaddress, he did not issue the enabling decree until February 1996. When the text of the decree was released in March 1996, it becameclear that the Government had negated its decree lifting restrictionson political activity by establishing vague new categories ofcrimes for impeding the transition to democracy, which carrieda penalty of
5 years in prison for those found guilty. This action effectivelyallowed the regime to remove its opponents from the politicalscene until after completion of the transition program
(see Section 3).
The Government continued to repress the political activitiesof opposition groups. A number of public meetings were arbitrarilycanceled or prevented during the year, including cultural events,academic conferences, and human rights meetings (see Section 2.a.). While permits are not normally required for public meetings indoorsand permit requirements for outdoor public functions are oftenignored by both government authorities and those assembling, theGovernment retained legal provisions banning gatherings whosepolitical, ethnic, or religious content might lead to unrest. Security forces used permit requirements as one of the justificationsfor disrupting prodemocracy conferences, meetings, or seminars. Open-air religious services away from places of worship remainedprohibited in most states due to religious tensions in variousparts of the country (see Section 2.c.). Although most religious,professional, and other organizations do not have to registerwith the Government and are generally permitted to associate freelywith other national and foreign bodies, the regime significantlytightened regulations on organized labor (see Section 6.a.).
The Government continued to ban political organizations thatit contended were founded primarily along ethnic, tribal, religious,or other parochial lines for the purpose of sponsoring variouspolitical candidates. Only the five government-sanctioned politicalparties may sponsor political candidates.
In February a seminar organized by the Katsina state branchof the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) was cordoned off byantiriot police, who turned away union members and dignitaries. Police officers in the northern city of Kaduna prevented theholding of three meetings scheduled by NGO's for March 1. Thevarious venues of the meetings, which were to address the issuesof human rights, labor unions, and the progress of the transitionprogram, were closed by police, who in two cases used tear gasto disperse participants. A May 1 workshop on conflict managementin Port Harcourt was canceled when the SSS warned local coordinatorsthat such a meeting could not be held on Workers Day, a localholiday. Similar workshops elsewhere proceeded unimpeded despitethe holiday. In August a seminar organized by the Bureau of AfricanLabor, Human, and Democratic Rights was canceled after policeoccupied the seminar site and ordered participants to disperse.
On August 27, police canceled a reception and award ceremonyorganized by the domestic NGO, Human Rights Africa (HRA), in honorof Justice Elizabeth Kayissan Pognon, President of Benin's ConstitutionalCourt, arrested HARA director Tunji Abayomi, and detained himfor 3 days. On September 25, police and SSS agents broke up anHRA seminar for students in Jos, arrested Abayomi and 4 others,and briefly detained some 70 students. Abayomi and the otherswere held for 10 days and then released on bail.On August28, security forces prevented the public launching of a book entitled"Abiola, Democracy and Rule of Law," which was publishedsubsequently. In September a farewell reception hosted by Nigeriandemocracy and human rights NGO'sin honor of a departingforeign ambassador was dispersed by uniformed military and policeofficers, who forced their way into the private residence wherethe party was being held and ordered guests at gunpoint to disperse.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government generally respects freedom of belief, practice,and religious education provided for by the suspended 1979 and1989 Constitutions. Both Constitutions also prohibit state andlocal governments from adopting an official religion. The Governmentinstituted a ban in 1987 (which is still in effect) on religiousorganizations on campuses of primary schools, although individualstudents retain the right to practice their religion in recognizedplaces of worship.
Distribution of religious publications remained generallyunrestricted. There is a lightly enforced ban on published religiousadvertisements, and religious programming on television and radioremains closely controlled by the Government. While it did notoutlaw the practice, the Government discouraged proselytizingin the belief that it stirs up religious tensions. The Governmentcontinued to enforce a ban on open-air religious services awayfrom places of worship (see Section 2.b.).
Both Christian and Muslim organizations allege that the Ministryof Foreign Affairs and the Immigration Department restrict theentry into the country of certain religious practitioners, particularlypersons suspected of proselytizing.
Isolated incidents of religious tension, either motivatedby or resulting in government intervention, occurred throughoutthe year. Both Muslim and Christian groups were affected by theseincidents. The continued detention of Shi'ite religious leaderSheikh Ibrahim al-Zakzaky sparked demonstrations in northern Nigeriathat were handled harshly by government security forces. In Januaryover 100 people were arrested in Sokoto when police raided a meetingin a mosque where plans to "breach the peace" were allegedlybeing discussed. On February 7, the Muslim holy day marking theend of Ramadan, police opened fire on unarmed demonstrators inKano and killed at least five persons. The Government took noaction against the police who had fired on the demonstrators. In July similar protests in Kaduna also resulted in some deaths.
Over 100 people were arrested in late 1996 after the Septemberarrest of Zakzaky led to a series of demonstrations by his followers. Zakzaky was arraigned in late July on charges of inciting disaffectionagainst the federal and Kaduna state governments and publishingand distributing magazines critical of the regime. Zakzaky hasrepeatedly called for the establishment of Islamic governmentand urged supporters to reject the authority of the present regime. Many of his followers who were arrested during demonstrationsin 1996 remained in detention without charge.
In June Lagos state police and Operation Sweep members raidedthe Agege area of Lagos and arrested at least 36 people believedto be members of the Maitatsine religious sect. A subsequentraid in August reportedly resulted in over 200 arrests, and thosedetained remain in prison at year's end.The Maitatsinefollow the teachings of Maitatsine Marwa, an Islamic leader fromCameroon whose activities in Nigeria led to his expulsion fromKano in 1960 and a series of bloody uprisings in the 1980's inwhich more than 4,000 persons are believed to have died. Accordingto many sources, hundreds of supporters of the two main Islamicgroups in northern Nigeria, the Islamic Brotherhood and the TajdidJihad Islamiya, were detained for varying periods during the year,while others "disappeared."
A Palm Sunday procession in Ilorin, Kwara state was dispersedby soldiers after a member of the procession asked a car owner,a military officer, to remove his vehicle from the processionroute. In response the officer reportedly ordered his colleaguesto disperse the crowd, and the soldiers proceeded to whip membersof the religious gathering. The Government took no action againstthe officer or the soldiers. Several Christian leaders who wereoutspoken on political issues reported being harassed, being threatenedby unknown persons, and receiving threatening letters.
A debate over taxation of religious organizations was sparkedin June when the Ifelodun/Ajeromi local government council ofLagos state sent notices to local churches that they would soonbe required to pay a fee of about $110 (10,000 naira) under anew religious premises permit edict. Christian and Muslim leadersunited against the proposed legislation, and the federal InternalRevenue Service soon denied that there was any plan to tax religiousbodies.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, ForeignTravel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The two Constitutions entitle citizens to move freely throughoutthe country and reside where they wish. However, increasing violentcrime in many parts of the country prompted police to set up roadblocksand checkpoints where security and law enforcement officials routinelyengaged in extortion, violence, and excessive use of force (seeSection 1. a.).
The Constitutions also prohibit expulsion or denial of exitor entry to any citizen. In practice, however, women must oftenobtain permission from a male family member before being granteda passport, and the Government commonly prevented travel for politicalreasons. Throughout the year, the Government seized the passportsof critics.
Journalists reported harassment at the nation's airportsby security officials, including being required to fill out specialentry and exit forms detailing their movements abroad, reasonsfor traveling, and names of friends and associates overseas. Security officials continued to interrogate and temporarily confiscatethe passports of journalists seeking to travel. The Governmentassigned security personnel to Murtala Mohammed InternationalAirport to screen departing passengers and apprehend prodemocracysupporters. Government security agents questioned extensivelycitizens who had been issued U.S. visas. Agents reportedly hadorders to seize passports and detain citizens whose responseswere not satisfactory. Some travelers were transferred to militaryintelligence officers or SSS personnel for further questioning.
The passport of Eke Ubiji, Executive Secretary of AmnestyInternational Nigeria, was seized in December 1996 when he attemptedto travel to London for an official workshop. The passport remainedwith security officials throughout the year. On July 26, theExecutive Director of the independent human rights monitoringgroup Media Rights Agenda, Edetaen Ojo, was prevented from travelingwhen security agents seized his passport at the airport. Afterhis flight had departed, his passport was returned and he wasallowed to go home. NADECO leader Abraham Adesanya sought inJuly to regain his passport, which had been held since his detentionin the wake of the 1995 murder of Kudirat Abiola, to enable himto travel for a special meeting of the Commonwealth MinisterialAction Group. The passport was returned the day before his proposedtravel but had expired and was not renewed. Former chairman ofthe editorial board of the daily The Guardian and a visiting professorof journalism at a U.S. university, Olatunji Dare, was detainedovernight and his passport seized upon his arrival from the UnitedStates on June 2. He was told to report to the SSS to retrievehis passport. After being interrogated on June 17 by SSS officialsabout his activities abroad, his passport was returned. Manyhuman rights and prodemocracy activists preferred to use alternativetravel routes for fear of being stopped by security agents, andsome reported that they circumvented potential problems with traveldocuments by having them renewed at embassies and consulates abroad.
The Government cooperates with the Lagos office of the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarianagencies in assisting refugees through the National Commissionfor Refugees and its Federal Commissioner. Regulations governingthe granting of refugee status, asylum, and resettlement are outlinedin Decree 52 of 1989, which incorporates many aspects of the 1951U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967Protocol. Refugee and resettlement applications are reviewedby the Eligibility Committee established under Decree 52. A representativefrom the UNHCR participates in this committee. The issue of theprovision of first asylum has not arisen since the establishmentof the National Commission for Refugees under Decree 52.
There are an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 Liberian, 1,400 Chadian,1,500 Cameroonian, 140 Ghanaian, 100 Sierra Leonean, and an undeterminednumber of Togolese, Somalian, Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees. The UNHCR, in cooperation with the Government, began a programof voluntary repatriation of Liberian refugees in July. Therewere no reports that refugees were expelled. There were no reportsof the forced return of persons to a country where they fearedpersecution.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Rightof Citizens to Change Their Government
Citizens did not have the right to change their governmentin 1997. There was little indication that Abacha's military regimeintended to allow citizens to exercise this right other than througha process tightly controlled by the regime. Laws continued tobe made by decree approved by the Head of State. Throughout theyear, the regime committed numerous, repeated, and serious humanrights abuses in its effort to prevent citizens from mountingpeaceful opposition.
After coming to power, the PRC headed by General Sani Abachapromised to return the country to civilian, democratic rule butdid not provide a timetable until Abacha's 1995 Independence Dayaddress. In this speech, Abacha announced a transition timetableleading to inauguration of a civilian president on October 1,1998. The transition process provided for a series of local,state, and federal elections over the 3-year period. After significantdelays and repeated organizational problems marred the originaltransition program, the head of the Transition ImplementationCommittee, a government body set up to oversee and advise on theprogram, announced in July significant changes to the transitiontimetable delaying the dates for gubernatorial and state assemblyelections. The National Assembly elections, however, are stillscheduled to take place in the second quarter of 1998 and thedate for inauguration of a new government remained October 1,1998.
By year's end, there was little meaningful progress towardsdemocracy despite Abacha's 3-year transition program. Local government elections originally scheduled for late 1996were held March 15, but significant problems with voter registration,the delineation of constituencies, guidelines for the conductof elections, and the screening of candidates remained even afterthe elections were held, casting doubts on the process. At year'send, disputes over the results of several elections were stillpending before the government- appointed election tribunals, andquestions remained as to whether the boundaries of local governmentareas and wards would again be shifted, leading to the removalof some elected officials. In April the Government promulgateda decree granting the Head of State the authority to replace atwill any elected, local government official with a sole administratorand forbidding court review of election contests. At year'send, the Government had not used this authority.
Most leading politicians remained outside the political arena,after key political parties were denied registration by the NationalElectoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) in 1996 (see Section 2.b.). NECON retained the right to revoke the registration of politicalparties at any time, leaving a loophole to disqualify partiesfor arbitrary reasons. Individual members of unregistered partiesare permitted to join the officially registered parties. FormerPetroleum Minister and prominent political figure, Don Etiebet,founded the National Center Party of Nigeria (NCPN), which wasregistered by NECON. Early in the year, Etiebet made public hisintention to run for the presidency under the NCPN banner. OnMarch 15, the day of local government elections, security operativesarrested Etiebet. He was detained for several days; upon hisrelease, he gave a press conference in which he renounced hispresidential ambitions and announced his decision to transferto the dominantUnited Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP).
At the end of the year, the electoral process had failedto generate popular support for the authorized political partiesor their leadership. The possibility of the transition programproducing a serious presidential candidate other than Abacha appearedremote.State assembly elections took place on December6, but voter turnout was very low.
The Government took no further action against 10 former stateadministrators removed from their positions in 1996, reportedlyfor their activities while holding office. None of the administratorswere formally charged with any offense.
Politics remained dominated by men. However, there are nolegal impediments to political participation or voting by womenor members of any minority group.There are three womenin the Cabinet announced on December 15 and female judges andmagistrates at all levels of the judiciary.Governmentregulations restrict the participation of dual nationals in politics(NECON guidelines for local government elections stipulated thatdual nationals may not run for office), but the regulations wereonly loosely enforced. There were several reports that minorityvoters living outside their traditional regions were preventedfrom voting by overly zealous government officials.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding Internationaland Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of HumanRights
The Government permitted local human rights groupsto operate but often interfered with their activities, detainingand intimidating their members, and preventing them from criticizingthe Government's human rights record (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.). High-level government officials regularly denounced the activitiesof the human rights community, often accusing its members andthe independent press of participating in foreign-inspired plotsto destabilize the country.
Notwithstanding the Government's hostile attitude, domesticand international human rights groups engaged in a vocal and publiccampaign to promote human rights. Among the most active organizationsare: the Civil Liberties Organization; the Committee for theDefense of Human Rights; the Constitutional Rights Project; theNational Association of Democratic Lawyers; Human Rights Africa;and the Legal Research and Resource Development Center. A numberof prominent authors, artists, educators, and jurists, in additionto professional and labor organization leaders, spoke out frequentlyon human rights issues as well. Amnesty International is activeand the International Committee of the Red Cross has a regionaloffice in Lagos.
The regime established a National Human Rights Commission(NHRC) in 1996, but the scope of its activities was hindered bylack of adequate funding and organizational support. Althoughsome NGO's agreed to coordinate with the NHRC, the Commissionlacked credibility as an independent monitoring body. The Commissionwas further hampered by the lack of a clear mandate to do anythingother than convene meetings. The Commission did begin reviewingsome cases submitted for adjudication and was instrumental inprocuring the release of some people who had been detained withouttrial for periods exceeding 10 years. The Commission embarkedon a factfinding tour of the nation's prisons. However, repeatedrequests for the NHRC to review the cases of alleged coup plottersand political detainees went unanswered.
The Government impeded visits by foreign human rights monitoringgroups and individuals by delaying or refusing visas and attemptingto manipulate their schedules. The most notable example was theaborted trip in February of United Nations special rapporteurswho intended to review problems of judicial independence and extrajudicialkillings. The rapporteurs, who initially had received governmentassurances of access to detainees, were later denied assurancesof access to alleged coup plotters convicted by secret militarytribunals and detained political figures such as M.K.O. Abiolaand postponed the trip "indefinitely." After the Governmentprevented a delegation from the Commonwealth Ministerial ActionGroup from meeting with human rights and prodemocracy leaders,several groups were invited to London by the Commonwealth MinisterialAction Group to present their points of view.
In August a prominent jurist from Benin, who was to receivean award from Human Rights Africa, canceled her trip to Lagosfollowing a warning by government officials to diplomats at theBenin embassy in Lagos that she should not enter Nigeria.
Since November 1995, the International Labor Organization(ILO) has repeatedly called on the Government to receive an ILOdirect contacts mission to examine violations of workers rightsand to visit prominent detained labor leaders. In a June 18 letterto the ILO, the Government agreed that such a mission could takeplace in September. Several days before the planned departureof the mission, however, the Government notified the ILO thatSeptember was no longer suitable. The ILO has expressed "graveconcern" over the Government's continual postponement ofthe mission.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,Disability, Language, or Social Status
Both the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions provide citizenswith the right to freedom from discrimination based on "community,place of origin, ethnic group, sex, religion, or political opinion." However, customary and religious discrimination against womenpersisted, and tension between the Government and disaffectedminority groups also continued.
Women
Reports of spousal abuse were common, especially those ofwife beating in polygynous families. Police did not normallyintervene in domestic disputes, which were seldom discussed publicly. The Penal Code permits husbands to use physical means to chastisetheir wives as long as it does not result in "grievous harm,"which is defined as loss of sight, hearing, power of speech, facialdisfigurement, or other life-endangering injuries. In more traditionalareas, courts and police were reluctant to intervene to protectwomen who formally accused their husbands, if the level of allegedabuse did not exceed customary norms in the area. Purdah, theIslamic practice of keeping girls and women in seclusion frommen outside the family, continued in parts of the far north.
Women also bore the brunt of attacks for social and religiousreasons, particularly for "immodest" or "inappropriate"behavior. There were credible reports that suspected prostitutesin Lagos (prostitution is not illegal; pandering is) were detainedroutinely by security forces and subjected to involuntary HIVtesting. The extent to which this action was part of a nationalgovernment policy was not clear, and what sanctions would be placedon those who tested positive for the virus remained undetermined. In January women wearing trousers were prevented from enteringthe federal secretariat in Abuja, sparking a national debate overstandards of immodest or inappropriate dress for women. In Februarythe Government announced that women in trousers were to be permittedfree access to government buildings.
Women experienced considerable discrimination as well asphysical abuse. There are no laws barring women from particularfields of employment, but women often experienced discriminationbecause the Government tolerates customary and religious practicesthat adversely affect them. Women remained underrepresented inthe formal sector, but played an active and vital role in thecountry's increasingly important informal economy.Whilethe number of women employed in the business sector increasesevery year, women do not receive equal pay for equal work andoften find it extremely difficult to acquire commercial creditor obtain tax deductions or rebates as heads of households.
While some women have made considerable individual progress,both in the academic and business world, most remained underprivileged. Although women are not legally barred from owning land, undersome customary land tenure systems only men can own land, andwomen gain access to land through marriage or family. In additionmany customary practices do not recognize a woman's right to inherither husband's property, and many widows are rendered destitutewhen their in-laws take virtually all of the deceased husband'sproperty. In other areas, a widow is considered part of her husband'sproperty and she too may be "inherited" by his family. Polygyny continued to be widely practiced among all ethnic groupsin both Christian and Islamic communities. Women were sometimesrequired to obtain permission from a male family member to geta passport (see Section 2.d.). The testimony of women is notequal to that of men in Shari'a courts (see Section 1.e.).
Children
The Government remained only sporadically committed to children'srights and welfare. Public schools continued to deteriorate,and limited facilities precluded access to education for manychildren. The requirement for compulsory primary education israrely enforced.While the Government has increased spendingon children's health in recent years, it seldom enforced eventhe inadequate laws designed to protect the rights of children.
Although the law stipulates that "no child shall beordered to be imprisoned," juvenile offenders are routinelyincarcerated along with hardened criminals. The Government onlyoccasionally condemned child abuse and neglect and made littleeffort to stop customary practices harmful to children, such asthe sale of young girls into marriage. There were credible reportsthat poor families sold their daughters into marriage as a meansof supplementing their income. Young girls were often forcedinto marriage as soon as they reached puberty, regardless of age,to prevent the "indecency" associated with premaritalsex.
The Government publicly opposed female genital mutilation(FGM) which is widely condemned by international health expertsas damaging to both physical and psychological health. However,the Government took only limited steps to abolish the procedure.Government officials have supported the campaign againstFGM, which is spearheaded by private groups. In February theMinister of Health, Ihechukwu Madubuike, announced that the Governmenthad established a 25-person committee to study the issue, butno results from the study were available at year's end. FGM ispracticed extensively in all parts of the country and among allreligious groups,and many ethnic groups continued to subjectyoung females to FGM. Current estimates place the prevalenceof FGM between 60 and 90 percent. According to a 1997 World HealthOrganization (WHO) study, an estimated 30.6 million women andgirls, or about 60 percent of the nation's total population, haveexperienced FGM. A 1996 United Nations Development Systems (UNDS)study reported a similar number of 32.7 million women affectedby FGM. However, according to recognized experts in FGM studyin Nigeria, the actual prevalence of FGM may be much higher thaneither of the figures reported by WHO or UNDS, for there is speculationthatmany communities may be less than straightforwardwith information regarding their FGM practices. For example somedata indicate that the prevalence of FGM could be as high as 90percent.Other local experts estimated that as many as50 percent of women have undergone FGM, and most agreed that thenumber of young girls now facing FGM is declining.Indigenousforms of FGM vary from the simple removal of the clitoral hoodor labia minora to excision of the clitoris and the most dangerousform, infibulation. The age at which females are subjected toFGM varies from the first week of life until after a woman deliversher first child. The Ministry of Health and many NGO's sponsoredpublic awareness projects to educate communities about the healthhazards of FGM. The press openly condemned the practice.
People With Disabilities
While the Government called for private businesses to institutepolicies ensuring fair treatment for the disabled, it did notenact any laws requiring greater accessibility to buildings orpublic transportation nor did it formulate any policy specificallyensuring the right of the disabled to work. The Government announcedits intention to establish a National Rehabilitation Instituteand resource center in Abuja and encouraged the work of privateorganizations involved with the disabled.
Religious Minorities
The law prohibits religious discrimination. Nonetheless,reports were common that government officials discriminated againstpersons practicing a religion different from their own. Privatebusinesses are frequently guilty of informal religious discriminationin their hiring practices.
Religious tensions led to several instances of violence duringthe year. There were regular clashes in northern Nigeria betweenShi'ite Muslim groups and Sunni Muslims, which resulted in deathsand injuries. Sporadic incidents of attacks on individual religiousleaders were reported, but the nature and perpetrators of theattacks were various, and there was not a pattern of one religiousgroup attacking another.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Government has promulgated no official policy concerningdiscrimination against any of the more than 250 ethnic groups,and laws do not favor one group over another. However, thereis a long history of tension among the diverse ethnic groups. Clashes continued between rival ethnic groups in Delta, Rivers,Benue, Cross River, Bayelsa, Osun, Kaduna, Plateau, and Tarabastates, often resulting in casualties. Tradition continued toimpose considerable pressure on individual government officialsto favor their own ethnic group, and ethnic favoritism persisted. Theongoing government review of boundaries for stateand local government areas sparked several communal clashes, mostnotably in Ife-Modakeke, Osun state (that by some estimates costover 100 lives), and the Ijaw-Itsekiri conflict in Delta state(that has led to over 110 deaths according to unofficial estimates).
The Ogoni, an ethnic group indigenous to Rivers state ineastern Nigeria (one of the oil-producing regions), maintainedthat the Government continued a systematic campaign to deprivethe group of its land and wealth. Members of the Ogoni groupclaimed that the Government seized their property without faircompensation, ignored the environmental impact of oil productionon Ogoni land, and failed to provide adequate public services,such as water and electricity. The confrontation between theGovernment and the Ogoni remained tense at times. The Movementfor the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), an NGO that campaignsfor Ogoni autonomy, described government policy toward the Ogonias genocide. Ogoni concerns about environmental degradation andthe quality of social services have merit. The Ogoni 19, accusedof murdering 4 Ogoni leaders in July 1994, remained in detentionat year's end (see Section 1.e.) as did other Ogonis suspectedof opposing the Government. On November 10, military authoritiesin the Ogoni area banned all public meetings to prevent publicdemonstrations on the second anniversary of the hanging of Ogonileader Ken Saro-Wiwa. The ban, backed by a heavy armed forcespresence, was effective. MOSOP leaders claimed on December 29that authorities had increased harassment of Ogoni residents andarrested 20 people in an alleged attempt to forestall the January4 commemoration of Ogoni Day.
Other ethnic minorities, particularly in Delta, Rivers, Bayelsaand Akwa Ibom states have echoed Ogoni claims of environmentaldegradation and government indifference to their development. Groups such as the Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo grew increasinglyvocal in expressing their unhappiness, while incidents of ethnicconflict and confrontation with government forces increased significantlyin these areas.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Worker rights further deteriorated as the Government continuedits far-reaching interference in the affairs of organized labor. Since 1994, the Government has systematically weakened the independenceand viability of the labor movement by enacting decrees to restrictselection of union leaders; directing union mergers; dissolvingsome unions entirely; and throwing intoquestion the legalstatus of other labor organizations. In 1997 the Government officiallyannounced two new decrees that seriously infringe upon workerrights: Decree 26 of 1996 grants the Labor Minister broad administrativeauthority to dissolve unions, while Decree 29 of 1996 prohibitsunion affiliation with international labor organizations, exceptwith express government approval. The Government continues toadminister directly the central labor body and two key petroleumunions, refusing to allow a return to freely elected leadership. Despite domestic and international pleas for their release, twoprominent union leaders remain detained without charge. Nigeria'sfrequent disregard for the right of association drew concern andcondemnation from the International Labor Organization (ILO).
Workers, except members of the armed forces and employeesdesignated as essential by the Government, may join trade unions. Essential employees include firefighters, police, employees ofthe central bank, the security printers (printers of currency,passports, and government forms), and customs and excise staff. Since issuing the Teaching Essential Services Decree in May 1993,the Government has considered education an essential service. The Decree did not, however, proscribe education sector unions.
By law any nonagricultural enterprise employing 50 or morepeople in commerce or industry must allow blue-collar and clericalemployees to unionize and must institute a compulsory dues checkoff. The Government has in the past withdrawn the obligatory duescheckoff provision when unions pursue strikes, as in the casesof the 1993 general strike and the 1994 petroleum strike.
Approximately 11.5 percent of the total work force belongto unions. With the exception of a small number of workers infood processing enterprises, the agricultural sector, which employssome 70 percent of the work force, is not unionized. Most ofthe informal sector and practically all small businesses remainnonunionized.
The right to strike is recognized by law, except for thoseperforming essential services. However, workers are requiredto give 21 days' notice prior to commencing a strike. Numerouspublic and private sector strikes occurred, often due to nonpaymentof salaries or noncompliance with previous agreements.
There are no laws prohibiting retribution against strikersand strike leaders, but strikers who believe that they experienceunfair retribution may submit their cases to the Industrial ArbitrationPanel (IAP) with prior approval of the Labor Ministry. Decisionsof the IAP are binding on all parties, but may be appealed tothe Nigerian Industrial Court (NIC). Union representatives havedescribed the arbitration process as cumbersome and time consuming.
Since 1978 the Government has mandated a single trade unionstructure with service and industrial unions grouped under theNigeria Labor Congress (NLC). The NLC claims to represent 3 millionworkers out of a total work force of 30 million. In 1994 theGovernment dissolved the elected National Executive Council ofthe NLC and placed it under the authority of a government-appointedsole administrator. Despite repeated promises over a period ofseveral years that a freely elected executive council would replacethe sole administrator, the Government took no credible stepsto hold such elections. Although state-level NLC executive councilscontinue to function, direct government control over the NLC atthe national level prevents it from representing workers in anycredible manner.
In 1994 the Government also dissolved the elected nationalexecutive councils of two key oil sector unions, the NationalUnion of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG), and the Petroleumand Natural Gas Senior Staff Associations (PENGASSAN). The unionsremain under the authority of government-appointed sole administrators,despite ILO calls for a return to freely elected leadership.
In 1996 the Government unveiled the Trade Unions (amendment)Decree, known as Decree 4. The measure reduced the number ofindustrial trade unions from 41 to 29 through directed mergers;barred full-time union managers and organizers from seeking electivepositions in the NLC or the unions that employ them; directedunions to collect dues on behalf of the NLC; and included a clauseto preclude judicial challenges to the decree. The Governmenthas yet to officially register four of the newly merged unionsprescribed by Decree 4.
In the past, mid-level employees, termed "senior staff,"have been allowed to form labor unions, called senior staff associations,but these were not permitted to affiliate with the NLC. Thesestaff associations formed a nationwide body, the Senior StaffConsultative Association of Nigeria (SESCAN), in 1985. Thoughcomprised of 22 affiliates with a potential membership of some600,000, SESCAN is not recognized by the Government. In the midstof a 1986 strike involving senior university staff, the Governmentruled that a dues checkoff for senior staff is not compulsory,although many private companies continue the practice. Decree4 did not mention senior staff associations, leaving their statusambiguous and resulting in legal challenges to their authorityin labor matters.
In August 1996, the Government dissolved three campus-basedunions in response to a nationwide strike launched in April 1996by the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU). In additionto proscribing the ASUU, the Government dissolved two non-strikingunions, the Nonacademic Staff Union (NASU) and the Senior StaffAssociation of Nigerian Universities (SSANU), and seized theirassets.
The Government further strengthened its control over organizedlabor with the January release of an additional amendment to theTrade Unions Act, Decree 26 of 1996, granting the Labor Ministerbroad administrative authority to revoke the registration of anyunion "due to overriding public interest." The Decreestipulates that the Minister's decision cannot be appealed ina court of law.
In an apparent violation of ILO Convention 87,theGovernment promulgated the Trade Unions International AffiliationDecree in April, which bars labor federations and trade unionsfrom affiliating with international labor organizations, exceptwith express government permission. The Decree requires all unionsto sever any existing links. Labor leaders who fail to followthe decree face criminal penalties and deregistration of theirunions.
Civil servants in Kaduna state began a strike on June 16to demand full implementation of an increase in allowances originallyapproved in 1994. Relying upon Decree 4, the state administrationrefused to negotiate with representatives chosen by the workers. The state administrator subsequently dismissed all civil servantswho failed to return to work by June 30, an order affecting some16,000 employees. Criminal charges were pending against some21 strike leaders in Kaduna at year's end.
The Government used threats of arrest and short-termand long-term detention without charge to intimidate labor activists. The Government continues to hold without charge NUPENG GeneralSecretary Frank Kokori, detained since August 1994, and formerPENGASSAN General Secretary and Secretary General of SESCAN, MiltonDabibi, imprisoned since January 1996 (see Section 1.d.).
In 1997 Nigeria was again the subject of a special paragraphat the International Labor Conference (ILC), due to the Government'sdisregard for worker rights and violations of Convention 87. The ILC expressed great concern that, although the Nigerian casehad been the subject of two previous special paragraphs (in 1995and 1996), "no concrete progress had been made to date inrelation to the very grave trade union situation in the country." The ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association, meeting in March,noted with concern a "persistent deterioration of trade unionrights." The committee's report called on the Governmentto release Kokori; repeal decrees dissolving the executive councilsof the NLC, NUPENG, and PENGASSAN; allow independently electedofficials to exercise their trade union functions; and urgentlyauthorize an ILO direct-contacts mission without further delay. The ILO called repeatedly and urgently for the Government toaccept a direct contacts mission to examine complaints of seriousviolations of worker rights. The Government did not give permissionfor an ILO mission and failed to respond officially to the ILOproposal for a September visit.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The labor laws provide for both the right to organize andthe right to bargain collectively between management and tradeunions. Collective bargaining continues in many sectors of theeconomy. Complaints of antiunion discrimination may be broughtto the Ministry of Labor for mediation and conciliation. Unresolveddisputes subsequently may be taken to the Industrial ArbitrationPanel (IAP) and the NIC (see Section 6.a.). Union officials havequestioned the independence of the NIC in light of its refusalto resolve various disputes stemming from the Government's failureto fulfill contract provisions for public employees.
In his January budget speech, Sani Abacha announced the abolitionof the uniform national salary structure and deregulation of collectivebargaining in the civil service. The Government directed eachstate administration to establish its own salary structure onthe basis of its ability to pay and with reference to the minimumwage (see Section 6.e.). The Government announced this decisionwithout consulting the civil service unions. The Government abolishedthe uniform wage structure for state enterprises in 1991.
An export processing zone remains in development in Calabar,Cross River state, and a second is planned for Port Harcourt,Rivers state. Workers and employers in such zones are subjectto national labor laws.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The 1974 Labor Decree and the 1979 and 1989 Constitutionsprohibit forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occurwith any prevalence. Alhough employment of persons under 18 yearsof age, except for agricultural and domestic work, is generallyprohibited, the Government does not specifically prohibit forcedand bonded labor by children. Reports of such practices are infrequent. In 1996 one private organization reported an illegal child tradeexporting Nigerian children to other West African nations andalso importing children into the country. The children are reportedlysold into domestic servitude or forced to work as prostitutes.In August police in Benin reportedly arrested 3 men tryingto transport 90 children to Nigeria to be sold in Lagos. In Octoberthe Lagos press reported that child "traders" from otherparts of the country and from Gabon were operating in the southeaststate of Akwa-Ibom, allegedly shopping for children to serve ashouse boys and maids.The ILO has noted that, with noconstitution in force, the Government may be unable to enforcethe ILO Convention against forced labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Agefor Employment
The 1974 Labor Decree prohibits employment of children under18 years of age in commerce and industry, and restricts otherchild labor to home-based agricultural or domestic work. Thelaw further stipulates that children may not be employed in agriculturalor domestic work for more than 8 hours per day. The decree allowsthe apprenticeship of youths at age 13 under specific conditions.
Primary education is compulsory, although this requirementis rarely enforced. Studies indicate declining school enrollmentdue to the continuing deterioration of public schools and to increasedeconomic pressures on families. The lack of sufficient primaryschool infrastructure has ended some families' access to education,forcing them to place children in the labor market. Growing economicdifficulties have led to a substantial increase in the use ofchildren for commercial activities aimed at enhancing meager familyincome. The use of children as beggars, hawkers, and bus conductorsis widespread in urban areas. Private and government initiativesto stem the growing incidence of child employment have not beeneffective.
The Government does not specifically prohibit forced andbonded labor by children, and reports of such practices are rare. However, there were reports of trafficking in children (see Section6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The 1974 Labor Decree sets a minimum wage, which is reviewedon an ad hoc basis. The last review, undertaken in 1991 by atripartite group consisting of representatives of the NLC, theNigeria Employers' Consultative Association, and the Ministryof Labor, raised the monthly minimum wage to about $5.30 (450naira)--a level now rendered meaningless by inflation and depreciationof the naira--which does not provide a decent living for a workerand family.
The 1974 Labor Decree called for a 40-hour workweek, prescribed2 to 4 weeks of annual leave, and stipulated that workers mustbe paid extra for hours worked over the legal limit. The Decreealso stated that employees who work on Sundays and statutory publicholidays must be paid a full day's pay in addition to their normalwages. There is no law prohibiting excessive compulsory overtime.
The 1974 Labor Decree contains general health and safetyprovisions, some aimed specifically at young or female workers. While it requires that the factory inspectorate of the Ministryof Labor and Employment inspect factories for compliance withhealth and safety standards, this agency often neglects safetyoversight of construction sites and other nonfactory work. TheDecree also requires employers to compensate injured workers anddependent survivors of those killed in industrial accidents. The Labor Decree does not provide workers with the right to removethemselves from dangerous work situations without loss of employment. The Labor Ministry, which is charged with enforcement of theselaws, has experienced large staff turnover and has been largelyineffective in identifying violations. The Government has failedto act on various ILO recommendations since 1991 to update itsmoribund inspection and accident reporting program.
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