UNITED
NATIONS
Economic and Social Council
| UNITED Economic and Social Council | Distr. |
| GENERAL | ||
| E/CN.4/1996/13 | ||
| 26 March 1996 | ||
| ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN ONLY | ||
| Original: ENGLISH |
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-second session
Item 3 of the provisional agenda
1. At the fifty-first session of the Commission on Human Rights,the Chairman read out a statement indicating the Commission'sconsensus agreement in connection with the situation of humanrights in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation (seeE/1995/23-E/CN.4/1995/176, para.594). In the statement, entitled"Situation of human rights in Chechnya", the Commissionexpressing its deep concern over the disproportionate use of forceby the Russian armed forces, deplored the grave violations ofhuman rights, before and after the beginning of the crisis, aswell as of international humanitarian law and the continuationof those violations.
2. The Commission strongly deplored the high number of victimsand the suffering inflicted on the civilian population and ondisplaced persons, and the serious destruction of installationsand infrastructure used by civilians. It called for all thosewho had committed violations of human rights against individualsto be brought to justice.
3. The Commission called urgently for an immediate cessationof the fighting and of violations of human rights and for theholding of a dialogue without delay with the aim of achievinga peaceful solution to the crisis, with respect for the territorialintegrity and the constitution of the Russian Federation, as wellas a guarantee of human rights. It called for the unhindered deliveryof humanitarian aid to all groups of the civilian population inneed.
4. Noting that it would continue to follow the developmentof the situation in Chechnya, the Commission requested the Secretary-Generalto report on the situation of human rights in the Republicof Chechnya during its fifty­second session under theappropriate item of its agenda. The present report of the Secretary-Generalhas been prepared in compliance with that request on the basisof information: (a) submitted by the Government of the RussianFederation; (b) available under United Nations human rights mechanismsand procedures; and (c) received from United Nations bodies andprogrammes, and from intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.
5. During 1995 and 1996, the High Commissioner for Human Rightscarried out a number of consultations with Russian authoritieson the human rights situation in Chechnya. During his meetingon 17 January 1995 with the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. AndreyKozyrev, the High Commissioner appealed for an immediate end toviolence and violations of human rights in Chechnya and offeredto the Russian authorities the cooperation of his Office. He alsooffered to send as soon as possible a mission to Moscow and Chechnyato meet with all parties concerned.
6. On 1 February 1995, the High Commissioner met with the Commissionerfor Human Rights of the Russian Federation, Mr. Sergei Kovalev,who was also the head of the Russian delegation to the fifty-firstsession of the Commission on Human Rights. Mr. Kovalev expressedhis support for a mission to the Russian Federation by the HighCommissioner and stated his willingness to make relevant documentationavailable to such a mission.
7. At the invitation of the Government of the Russian Federation,the High Commissioner sent an envoy, Professor Fausto Pocar, tovisit the Russian Federation, including the Republics of Chechnyaand Ingushetia from 20 to 30 May 1995. TheHigh Commissioner's envoy was expected to make an overall evaluationof the human rights situation in Chechnya, as well as an assessmentof needs, and to recommend action aimed at the promotion of humanrights in the region, including cooperation with intergovernmentalorganizations and non-governmental organizations.
8. The High Commissioner's envoy met with representatives ofthe Government, the Parliament, the Presidential Administration,the civil society, and the United Nations Resident Coordinator.In view of the military conflict in the region, it was not possiblefor the envoy to establish direct contact with the Chechen leadershipunder General Dudayev. The High Commissioner notified the Governmentof the Russian Federation of the substance of his envoy's conclusionsand recommendations.
9. In July 1995, the High Commissioner proposed to send a humanrights officer to join the Assistance Group of the Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Grozny. In thelight of the difficult circumstances, including the serious securitysituation in Chechnya, the proposal has not yet been implemented.
10. The High Commissioner has maintained contacts with theRussian authorities, United Nations agencies, intergovernmentalorganizations, in particular the OSCE, and non-governmental organizationswith a view to contributing to the promotion and protection ofhuman rights in Chechnya. In the second half of March 1996, theHigh Commissioner's envoy is expected to visit Moscow again todiscuss the modalities of a United Nations human rights fieldpresence in the context of the situation in Chechnya.
11. On 5 January 1996, the High Commissioner, alarmed by eventsin Kizlyar, where Chechen fighters had taken hostage a large numberof civilians, including women and children, called once againon the parties in Chechnya to take immediately all necessary stepsto ensure respect for human rights and humanitarian law.
12. Thematic special rapporteurs and working groups establishedby the Commission on Human Rights have continued to receive informationon human rights violations in Chechnya which they reviewed andacted upon according to their respective mandate.
13. The report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary execution to the Commission contains informationon his activities with regard to Chechnya (see E/CN.4/1996/4,paras. 408-413).
14. In January 1995 the Special Rapporteur sent two appealsto the Government of the Russian Federation expressing his concernfor the lives and physical integrity of the civilian populationof Chechnya, as well as that of members of the armed forceswho had laid down their arms or had been placedhors de combat.The concerns of the Special Rapporteur were reiterated in an appeal,dated 5 May 1995, issued jointly with the Special Rapporteur onthe question of torture following the raid on the village of Samashkiby Federal forces in April 1995. On 3 October 1995, the SpecialRapporteur sent his fourth appeal expressing concern about thethreat posed by the military activities of Federal troops to thelives of the civilian population of the town of Sernovodsk onthe Chechen-Ingush border.
15. The reports of the Special Rapporteur on the question oftorture to the Commission contain information on his activitieswith regard to Chechnya (see E/CN.4/1996/35, paras. 140,141, 150 and E/CN.4/1996/35/Add.1, paras. 568-572, 575-577).
16. On 3 February 1995, the Special Rapporteur sent an appealto the Russian Government regarding allegations that Federal forceshad severely beaten and otherwise ill-treated people during theconflict in the Republic of Chechnya. He expressed his concernfor the right of detainees to physical and mental integrity. On5 May 1995, the Special Rapporteur reiterated his concern in anappeal, transmitted jointly with the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions, regarding the raid on the villageof Samashki by Federal forces in April 1995 after which civilianswere reportedly detained in the camps in Mozdok and Assinovskaya,in the latter of which they had allegedly been tortured or ill-treated.
17. The Representative of the Secretary-General on internallydisplaced persons has expressed concern with regard to the situationin Chechnya in his report to the United Nations General Assembly(see A/50/558, para. 8).
18. On 7 November 1995, the Representative issued an appealto the Government of the Russian Federation expressing his concernabout the situation of internally displaced persons in the townof Sernovodsk. According to the information he had received, over3,000 internally displaced persons from Grozny, Samashki and Assinovskaya,living in the town's sanatorium complex, faced serious food shortagesas Federal forces blocked roads preventing the transportationof food from neighbouring villages. The Representative calledon the Russian Government to guarantee the fundamental rightsof the displaced and civilian population of the town, includingthe rights to life, to be free from hunger and of freedom of movement.
19. On 11 August 1995, a draft resolution entitled "Situationin Chechnya"
was submitted to the forty-seventh session of the Sub-Commission(see E/CN.4/1996/2-E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/51, para. 247).
20. At its 27th meeting, on 18 August 1995, the Sub-Commissionconsidered a draft resolution entitled "Situation in theChechen Republic of the Russian Federation". At the samemeeting, the draft resolution was withdrawn (see E/CN.4/1996/2-E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/51,paras. 248 and 249).
21. The Russian Federation has been a party to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights since 23 March 1976. Ithas also ratified the Optional Protocol to the Covenant.
22. The Human Rights Committee considered the fourth periodicreport of the Russian Federation (CCPR/C/84/Add.2) on the implementationof the Covenant and the Optional Protocol thereto at its1426th to 1429th meetings (CCPR/C/SR.1426­1429), held on 17and 18 July 1995.
23. In its concluding observations (CCPR/C/79/Add.54), adoptedat its 1440th meeting held on 26 July 1995, the Committeeexpressed concern that article 4 of the Covenant, which specifiesthe provisions that are non-derogable even in times of publicemergency, had not been complied with. It maintained that thearticle was applicable to the situation in Chechnya, where theuse of weapons by combatants had led to the loss of life and deprivationof freedom of large numbers of persons, regardless of the factthat a state of emergency had not been formally declared.
24. The Committee deplored the excessive and disproportionateuse of force by Russian forces in Chechnya indicating grave violationof human rights. It further deplored the fact that no one hadbeen made responsible for the inhumane treatment of prisonersand other detained persons, that investigations of charges ofhuman rights violations by Russian forces, including killing ofcivilians, had so far been inadequate, that civilian installationssuch as schools and hospitals had been destroyed by governmentforces, and that a large number of civilians had been killed ordisplaced as a consequence of the destruction of their homes.
25. The Committee expressed deep concern about the large numberof reported cases of torture, ill-treatment and arbitrary detentionin "reception centres" or "filtration camps",which had originally been established to determine the identitiesof captured combatants but were reported to accommodate largenumbers of civilians as well. It deplored the maltreatment ofdetainees in those centres and was concerned that the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had not been given access toall such camps.
26. The Committee was concerned that, due to the violent excessesof recent developments in Chechnya, the level of confidence ofthe people in the reconstruction efforts by the local authoritiesand the attempts to bring relief to human rights violations wasextremely low.
27. The Committee firmly urged that the serious violationsof human rights which had occurred and continued to occur in Chechnyabe vigorously and immediately investigated, the perpetrators punishedand the victims compensated. It urged the Government to ensurethat all persons held in detention were held for legitimate cause,for a reasonable period of time, and under humane conditions,in conformity with the State party's obligations under the Covenant.
28. The Committee also urged that adequate measures be adoptedto alleviate the conditions of all displaced persons followingthe fighting in Chechnya, including measures aimed at facilitatingtheir return to their towns and villages.
29. Finally, the Committee recommended that, in order to addressthe lack of confidence in the local government authorities, theGovernment consider inviting a greater international presence,including the Centre for Human Rights, to assist the Special MultilateralCommission established to investigate recent events in Chechnyain improving the effectiveness of human rights investigationsand ensuring fairness of trials until such time as the judiciarywas functioning properly. Such a measure would make clear thatthe Government was committed to ending human rights violationsboth by submitting itself to international scrutiny and by drawingon international expertise towards that end.
30. In a decision taken at its forty-sixth session, at its1086th meeting held on 9 March 1995 (A/50/18, para. 5), theCommittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, concernedat the situation of human rights in Chechnya, expressed alarmover the disproportionate use of force by the Russian armed forcesand the massive loss of life which has resulted in Chechnya; deploredthe destruction of civilian property; condemned all violationsof human rights and of international humanitarian law, and calledfor all those who have committed such violations to be broughtto justice. The Committee also called urgently for an immediatecessation of the fighting and for a dialogue to achieve a peacefulsolution while respecting the territorial integrity and the Constitutionof the Russian Federation.
31. On 27 December 1994, the Russian Government, through itsFederal Migration Service, requested humanitarian assistance fromthe United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) forpersons displaced from Chechnya. Displaced persons are locatedprincipally in the three neighbouring Republics of Daghestan,Ingushetia and North Ossetia, as well as in Chechnya itself. TheGovernment also requested assistance from the International Organizationfor Migration (IOM) and from the International Committee of theRed Cross (ICRC), who were already present in the region and whowere focusing attention initially on displaced persons withinChechnya.
32. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), in closecollaboration with other humanitarian organizations, carriesout its task to facilitate inter­agency communication andcoordination through its involvement in information­gathering,liaison with all humanitarian partners as well as with the Governmentof the Russian Federation, the dissemination of appeals and situationreports and the establishment of various coordination mechanisms.The overall coordination in-country falls under the responsibilityof the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Moscow, whois also the UNHCR Representative and DHA Coordinator.
33. The initial Flash Appeal of five United Nations agencies(DHA, UNHCR, United Nations Children's Fund, World Food Programme,World Health Organization), launched on 1 February 1995, soughta total of US$ 23.6 million to cover their activities for Januarythrough April 1995. The main focus of the appeal was to assistover 160,000 internally displaced persons from Chechnya in Daghestan,Ingushetia and North Ossetia. It was estimated that 60 per centof the displaced persons were children under the age of 14, withmost of the remainder being women.
34. The Flash Appeal was revised and detailed through the UnitedNations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Persons Displacedas a Result of the Emergency Situation in Chechnya launched on23 March 1995. With a total value of US$ 25.1 million, the revisedappeal sought to assist 220,000 most needy displaced persons withinthe period from 1 January to 30 June 1995. On 6 April 1995,an Alert was issued to raise awareness, within the donor community,of the continuing need to mobilize resources.
35. The United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal wasupdated in July 1995 to cover the period between 1 Januaryand 31 December 1995. A mid­term review was prepared in September1995 to provide an update on the implementation of humanitarianprogrammes under the Appeal. The latest inter­agency review(as at 9 December 1995) accounted for a total of some 80,000 internallydisplaced persons.
36. Following the establishment of military checkpoints bythe Federal troops which prevented United Nations staff from providinghumanitarian relief to a sanatorium in the town of Sernovodskwhich accommodated 3,200 internally displaced persons, the DHACoordinator, on 12 October 1995, addressed a letter to the Russianauthorities expressing concern about the safety of this population.
37. Although UNHCR does not maintain a presence in the Republicof Chechnya of the Russian Federation, it is assisting displacedpersons who have fled the Republic for neighbouring regions, includingDaghestan, Ingushetia and North Ossetia. As reported by theUNHCR offices in the surrounding republics, the return of thedisplaced population has continued unabated since the announcementin August 1995 of the ceasefire agreement between the Federaland Chechen parties. United Nations agencies operating in thefield estimated that fewer than 120,000 displaced persons werelikely to remain in Daghestan and Ingushetia during the winterof 1995.
38. UNHCR indicates that displacement or further displacementmay take place, and that displaced persons could delay their returnbecause of uncertain security conditions, the destruction of homesand basic infrastructure in parts of Chechnya, and a widespreadshortage of basic commodities, particularly food, which bearsheavily on the living conditions. In the view of UNHCR, the highestlevel of vigilance remains necessary in the face of destitutionand insecurity which together could generate a new humanitariancrisis. UNHCR also indicated that, concerned for the protectionof the rights of those displaced outside Chechnya, it is takingactive measures in particular by encouraging and assisting federaland local authorities in the implementation of the existing legislationin a fair and non-discriminatory manner and in accordance withinternational standards. Furthermore, UNHCR is monitoring, throughregular visits, the situation of the affected population.
39. UNICEF worked in the republics neighbouring Chechnya fromJanuary to the end of August 1995. It has provided assistanceto internally displaced persons, mostly mothers and children,and trauma relief to the affected children and their mothers includingtraining social workers and women's groups. UNICEF indicated thatflagrant human rights violations against women and children werereported during the surveys conducted amongst the displaced population.
40. UNICEF reports that many children who spent days hidingin cellars are unable to sleep because of the nightly strobe-lightbombings and accompanying noise. In addition, children manifestdifferent symptoms of trauma: some wet their bed nightly, otherswake up screaming, others withdraw into a world of their own.Approximately 80 per cent of trauma victims have sufferedsome degree of trauma from bombing, in particular from the anti-personnelmines strewn around the Chechen countryside. UNICEF is particularlyconcerned about the numerous accounts of children going out forfirewood and having a leg or an arm blown off by a mine.
41. IOM has been involved since January 1995 in the provisionof temporary shelter to and emergency transportation for displacedpersons as a result of the conflict in Chechnya. It has alsoprovided medical assistance to internally displaced personshoused in its temporary shelters. Over 60,000 internallydisplaced persons were estimated to have received assistance andde facto protection from IOM.
42. IOM reports that it has been able to deliver, without administrativeor other obstacles, humanitarian aid to the persons falling underits mandate and was given free access to all areas of the region.Through a comprehensive "winterization" programme IOMprovided shelter and other basic facilities to some 18,000 persons.
43. IOM indicates that only a peaceful settlement will ensurerespect for human rights and, like other United Nations humanitarianagencies, it fully supports the efforts to seek a durable solutionwhich will include full respect for human rights.
44. In view of the OSCE's role and involvement in the peacefulsettlement of the conflict in Chechnya, the Secretary-General,by letter of 19 October 1995, requested the OSCE Chairman-in-Officeto submit, by 6 November 1995, any information and views in connectionwith the OSCE's activities in Chechnya. The reply of the OSCE,dated 17 November 1995, was received by fax on 12 December1995 transmitting the information which is reproducedin extensobelow.
" After the outbreak of hostilities in Chechnya that putin jeopardy basic OSCE commitments, the Russian Federation acceptedOSCE involvement in the efforts to find negotiated solutions.
"Following a report by the Personal Representative ofthe Chairman­in­Office and other OSCE officials, basedon their visits to the area, the Permanent Council decided,on 11 April 1995, to establish an Assistance Group (AG). Its mandatewas to promote respect for human rights, to help foster the developmentof democratic institutions and processes, and to promote a peacefulresolution of the crisis in accordance with OSCE principles andthe constitution of the Russian Federation. The AG, initiallyconsisting of a team of six diplomats, began its work in Groznyon 25 April 1995.
"A month later, direct talks chaired by the AG began amongthe parties involved in the crisis, in the premises of the OSCEAG. Representatives of the Executive Authorities of the RussianFederation, of the Committee of National Accord of Chechnya, andof representatives of the separatist Chechen leader D. Dudayevtook part in these talks. On 31 July 1995, an agreement to endhostilities was signed by Russian officials and representativesof Mr. Dudayev. The agreement provided for an immediate cessationof military hostilities, the liberation of all forcefully detainedpersons, the disarming of illegal armed formations, the gradualwithdrawal of Federal troops, and the cessation of terrorist acts.A Special Observation Commission (SOC) comprising mutually agreed-uponrepresentatives of all sides and of the OSCE was established toensure the implementation of this agreement. In spite of someprogress, the implementation of the agreement met with seriousdifficulties. Attempts on the lives of high-level Russian officialswere made, and sporadic fighting increased. Due to this, the RussianFederation suspended the activities of the SOC, although regularunofficial consultations have continued. In spite of a numberof unfriendly acts from some local Grozny authorities and a directarmed attack against its premises, the AG has remained in Grozny,ensuring its availability at a particularly critical time. Inparticular, the AG has continued to make plain its willingnessto assist all sides in the starting up again of the work of theSOC and in establishing contacts with each other towards a durablepolitical solution to this crisis.
"On the question of the state of human rights in Chechnya,the AG has found it necessary to deal with it within the frameworkof the peace process itself. Indeed, the conduct of hostilities,by creating a state of exception, and thus by disrupting the processof improving the well­being of the local population, has beena permanent impediment to the respect of human rights. Consequently,what improvement of the human rights situation has taken placehere has been strongly influenced by the efforts of all partiesconcerned to come to a peaceful solution to the crisis, as theonly means towards the creation of sustainable political, economicand social stability conducive to the setting up again of mechanismsand institutions for the protection and the enhancement there.
"Towards this goal, the signing of the Military Agreement,on 31 July 1995, can be construed as an intermediarystage, inasmuch as it established a Special Observation Commissionfor its implementation that provided some means for dealing withthe consequences of military hostilities on the well-being ofthe local population.
"One of the first tasks undertaken by the OSCE AG wasto make known its availability to all those who wished to makestatements concerning missing persons and alleged human rightsviolations. All these statements were forwarded to the variousFederal and local official bodies, which have been nominated todeal with such cases. From 27 April to 10 November 1995,937 persons, be they Russian or Chechen, have made statementsconcerning 1,325 cases. Until now, the AG has little informationon how the different authorities have dealt with them. It is tobe noted that during the period before the start of the talks'process none of the civil or criminal courts in Chechnya seemedto have taken up again their work.
"Such a situation was indeed precarious and the FederalAuthorities with various local representative bodies set up aJoint Inspection Commission to examine the most blatant claimsconcerning the violation of human rights. The OSCE AG was ableto take part in some of the work of this Commission, the resultsof which were deemed insufficient by the claimants.
"As from the start of the talks' process, especially after19 June 1995, claims made to the OSCE were directly passed tothe official delegations to the negotiations. On several occasionsmembers of each of the delegations and of the AG made on-the-spotvisits to help determine facts concerning human rights violations,often made against individual but unidentified Federal troops.The Federal Military Prosecutor's Office was then seized, but,to OSCE knowledge, information concerning the result of its investigationshas not been made known.
"Since the signing of the Military Agreement, the OSCEAG has insisted that the parties to the Agreement use the mechanismestablished by the Special Observation Commission to deal withhuman rights issues through its subordinated bodies, in particular,the exchange of forcibly detained persons by either side. Untilnow, only 25 prisoners have been exchanged and this has been donemore on a case-by-case basis than in application of the 'all forall' principle stipulated in the agreement. The absence of a sufficientamount of trust between the parties to the agreement has lessenedthe capacity of the SOC to implement the agreement, with its consequenceson the human rights situation.
"However, to a large extent the difficulties that haveappeared for the implementation of the Military Agreement havebeen due to the absence of a global political agreement withoutwhich political stability will be more difficult to establish.
"As it would appear that the signing of such an agreementwill take time, the AG has again discussed at length with theFederal military and civilian authorities the measures taken bythem to deal with the consequences of the hostilities for thelocal population.
"The Federal military authorities have indicated thatthey were aware of the negative effects on the local populationof measures taken by the Federal forces to keep the situationunder control in spite of the continuous 'provocation' bythe Dudayev side. Instructions had been given to avoid militaryoperations that would endanger the civilian population and measurestaken to re-deploy troops away from populated areas. In responseto criticism from the local population concerning discipline,a series of new orders has also been issued for the movement ofarmed vehicles and general conduct of troops in their relationswith the civilian population. Finally, the activity of the FederalMilitary Prosecutor's Office was being enhanced in the Republicand a Military Tribunal was to be set up soon.
"Mr. Lobov, Plenipotentiary Representative of PresidentYeltsin to Chechnya, has presented to the AG the more global approachthat the Federal Authorities have adopted for dealing with thegeneral well-being of the local population: a Presidential decreetaken in the beginning of September 1995 opened the door to aseries of measures to be implemented through him with Federalfinancial support. These measures have concerned the restoringof the water, sewage and electricity systems, the distributionof compensation for damage and the setting up of information centresto deal with claims concerning missing persons and human rightsviolations. Both the civilian and Federal authorities have agreedthat to improve relations with the local population greater publicityfor the measures that they had taken was still necessary.
"In all, the general situation of the local populationhas changed, somewhat to the better over the last six months,in particular since the signing of the Military Agreement. However,without more durable political stability the necessary institutionsfor coping with and enhancing the human rights situation can onlyfunction with difficulty."
45. The ICRC, alone and in cooperation with the local committeesof the Russian Red Cross Society, operates both inside and outsideof Chechnya. Its activities of protection of and assistance tothe civilian population include: visiting detainees; search missionsto reunite families split up by the fighting; medical assistance;supply of drinking water to prevent outbreaks of epidemics; promotionof respect for humanitarian rules and cooperation as well as supportof local Red Cross agencies.
46. Since the beginning of the conflict ICRC has visited some530 detainees in 17 points of detention located both insideand outside of Chechnya. Between the months of March and June1995, the Committee assisted 400,000 persons displaced oraffected by the conflict. Sixty-five establishments, including25 hospitals in the region, have benefited from ICRC assistance.Humanitarian norms and basic rules of war have been disseminatedthrough local radio and television and through a brochure includedin 80,000 first-aid kits, which were distributed among the membersof the armed forces in northern Caucasus.
47. By note verbale of 19 October 1995, the Secretary-Generalrequested the Government of the Russian Federation to submit,by 15 November 1995, any information and views in connection withthe statement of the Chairman of the fifty-first session of theCommission on Human Rights on the "Situation of human rightsin Chechnya". Also, by note verbale of 18 September 1995the Government of the Russian Federation transmitted to the Secretary-General93 pages of background information in Russian. This informationis available for consultation at the Secretariat together witha summary, in English, of the information contained in those texts.
48. On 24 March 1995 and on 13 March 1996, the Government ofthe Russian Federation replied to the appeals of 5 January1995 and 3 October 1995 sent by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions concerning the situation in Chechnya.On 15 August 1995, the Government provided a reply to the appealof 5 May 1995 sent jointly by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions and the Special Rapporteur ontorture concerning events in the village of Samashki. On 29 February1996, the Government transmitted a reply to the appeal of 7 November1995 sent by the Representative of the Secretary-General on internallydisplaced persons regarding the situation in the town of Sernovodsk.
49. The Secretary-General thanks the Government for its communicationsand the constructive cooperation it has provided to the variousUnited Nations mechanisms on Human Rights. The reply of the Governmentto the note verbale of the Secretary-General, received on 11 January1996, is reproducedin extenso below:
"The Government of the Russian Federation wishes to pointout that the initial cause of the tragedy in Chechnya was theseizure of power over a part of the Russian Federation by theillegal regime of Djokhar Dudaev, as a result of which an abnormalsituation developed between 1991 and 1994 in the ChechenRepublic, a constituent entity of the Russian Federation:the Constitution and laws of the Federation were repudiated, thesystem of legitimate organs of power was overturned, regular,illegal armed units supplied with brand-new military equipmentwere set up, and massive violations of citizens' human rightsand freedoms took place.
"The extremely complex situation forced the adoption ofa very grave decision: to use armed force in Chechnya. Havinginquired into the constitutionality of the various edicts on thesubject by the President of the Russian Federation, the ConstitutionalCourt of the Russian Federation decided on 31 July 1995: 1. tohalt proceedings on the case and in the matter of the constitutionalityof Edict No. 2137, dated 30 November 1994, by the President ofthe Russian Federation, 'Measures to restore the rule of constitutionallaw and order in the Chechen Republic'; 2. to accept that EdictNo. 2166, dated 9 December 1994, by the President of theRussian Federation, 'Measures to halt the activities of illegalarmed units in the Chechen Republic and the area of the Osset­Ingushconflict', was issued within the constitutional authority of thePresident of the Russian Federation and was in accordance withthe Constitution of the Federation.
"The Government of the Russian Federation wishes to bringto the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nationsthe fact that, in order to monitor respect for constitutionalrights and freedoms during the restoration of the constitutionalorder in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, a ProvisionalObserver Commission on respect for citizens' constitutional rightsand freedoms is in operation in the Chechen Republic pursuantto Edict No. 2224, dated 28 December 1994, by the President ofthe Russian Federation. The Commission incorporates three subcommissions,dealing with military, legal and socio-economic affairs.
"In the course of its activities the Commission has establishedthe facts in human rights violations and submitted reports tothe appropriate authorities. The Commission has been dealing withthe violations of constitutional rights and freedoms it discoversas it goes, forwarding information and reports to the appropriateadministrative bodies. In all, it sent 57 reports to various entitiesbetween December 1994 and the end of October 1995, including 16to judicial bodies and 8 to the Ministry of Defence.
"Criminal proceedings have been instituted on the strengthof 7 reports by the Commission; 9 reports are in the process ofimplementation, and ministries and government departments havegone over the facts and material in the remaining 41 and submittedreports to the effect that the violations have been halted.
"A military prosecutor's office was established in Groznyin January 1995 to oversee the Russian military's compliance withthe law, to prevent law-breaking and to deal day by day with crimeas it is reported. Over the reporting period it instituted proceedingsin 286 criminal cases. Altogether 122 criminal cases are now inprogress, 38 of them concerning offences committed by membersof the military against the local population; sentence has alreadybeen handed down in 20 cases brought against Russian soldiers.
"The Government of the Russian Federation draws to theSecretary­General's attention the Constitutional Court ofthe Russian Federation's ruling that 'It is the responsibilityof the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to bringorder to the legislation governing the use of the Russian ArmedForces and the resolution of other matters arising during abnormalsituations and conflicts, including matters arising out of theProtocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts (Protocol II).'
"At the same time, the Constitutional Court ruled thatunder articles 52 and 53 of the Constitution of the Russian Federationand article 2, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights, 'the victims of any violations, crimes orabuses of power must be afforded effective means of legal protection,and compensation for the injury they have suffered'.
"On 20 May 1995, the Government of the Russian Federationapproved Provisional Regulations on Compensatory Payments andother Social Safeguards for citizens of the Federation who havesuffered as a result of the conflict in the Chechen Republic.
"The Government wishes to draw the Secretary-General'sattention to the flagrant violations of the principles of humanityand the savage acts of terrorism committed by the illegal armedunits. For instance, on 14 July 1995, a group of armedChechen terrorists led by Shamil Basaev mounted an attack on thetown of Budennovsk. Over 120 people died at the terrorists' hands.
"Peaceful members of the public, primarily women and childrenfrom the Russian-speaking population, have been used as hostagesand 'human shields' in Grozny, Gvardeiskoe, Bratskoe, Kalinovskaya,Nikolaevskaya, Komsomolskaya and Alpatovo.
"The Government of the Russian Federation wishes to informthe Secretary­General of the United Nations that the Russianleadership has tried from the outset to settle the Chechen crisisby peaceful means. The sequence of events listed below bears thisout.
"Early in December 1991 the leaders of the RSFSR SupremeSoviet dispatched a team of independent experts to Grozny; theirmission was thwarted by Dudaev.
"In 1992 there were a dozen different meetings and consultationsbetween representatives of the RSFSR Supreme Council and the Dudaevregime. The Chechen delegation broke off these consultations.
"Between November 1992 and the end of January 1993 delegationsheld a series of meetings in Moscow and Grozny under the chairmanshipof R. Abdulatipov, the Chairman of the Council of Nationalitiesunder the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, S. Shakhrai,a Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government, Y. Soslambekov andY. Mamadaev. During the consultations in Moscow in November andDecember 1992 an agreement was drafted which would delimit areasof responsibility and authority between the State organs of theRussian Federation and the organs of power in the Chechen Republic.It was accepted (by the Chechen delegation too) as a basis forfurther work.
"The agreement, however, was fiercely resisted by Dudaevand his supporters. Dudaev in effect disowned Soslambekov andMamadaev's delegation, calling their meeting with the Russianleadership a 'private initiative', and on 6 January 1993 the UnitedCongress of the Chechen People declared the draft agreement notin keeping with the spirit or letter of the Chechen Republic'sDeclaration of State Independence.
"Despite Dudaev's fierce resistance to the processes ofpolitical settlement, work continued. At talks in Grozny on 14January 1993 between a delegation from the Russian Federation(R. Abdulatipov, S. Shakhrai, V. Shuykov) and Chechen representatives(K. Akhmadov, B. Mezhidov, Y. Soslambekov and S. Yusupov),it was decided to form working groups to draft an agreement onthe delimitation and reciprocal delegation of authority.
"The protocol on the delimitation of authority signedfollowing the talks, which was supposed to form the basis forthe agreement, was almost immediately disavowed by Dudaev.
"Between January and May 1993, negotiations by the delegationsover the preparation of an agreed text continued in Moscow. AgainDudaev broke off the negotiations.
"A number of documents defining a political formula forresolving the Chechen crisis were accepted in 1994. In February1994, the message by the President of the Russian Federation tothe Federal Assembly mentioned that 'the holding in Chechnya offree, democratic elections and talks on the delimitation of powerswith the Federal authorities' might form the basis for the regularizationof relations between the Federal authorities and the Chechen Republic.
"In May 1994, consultations were held with various politicalforces in the Chechen Republic. These took place against the backgroundof an abrupt exacerbation of the social and political situationin Chechnya.
"Even in these complicated circumstances, the Presidentand Government of the Russian Federation continued to believethat political means could be used to resolve the crisis.
"Later on, even after military actions had commenced,the Russian President and Government persevered in their questfor a political settlement.
"On 10 January 1995, the Russian Government adopted aproposal to the members of the illegal armed units in the ChechenRepublic of the Russian Federation, stating that in orderto prevent further bloodshed and enable efforts to reach a settlementin the Chechen Republic to be shifted into peaceful channels,the Government, on instructions from the Russian President, proposedto the members of the illegal armed units in the Chechen Republicof the Russian Federation that between 8 a.m. on 10 Januaryand 8 a.m. on 12 January they should cease fire, abandon theirpositions and military equipment and lay down their weapons, andreturn the people they had captured during armed clashes.
"The members of the illegal armed units who voluntarilylaid down their arms would be guaranteed safe passage back totheir homes, a return to peaceful work and strict enforcementof the State Duma's resolution of 13 December 1994 declaringan amnesty on those who had taken part in unlawful activitiesassociated with the armed conflicts in the northern Caucasus.
"Beginning in mid-March, the Federal authorities triedto resume a dialogue with representatives of the illegal armedunits; the units, however, took advantage of the talks to strengthentheir positions and regroup their forces and equipment.
"On 26 April 1995, the Russian President signed an Edicton additional measures to normalize the situation in the ChechenRepublic. This announced a moratorium on the use of armed forcein Chechnya from midnight on 28 April to midnight on 12 May 1995.Investigating bodies were advised not to institute criminal proceedingsagainst people not involved in grave offences against citizens'lives and well-being who voluntarily laid down their arms.
"Despite the good will displayed by the Russian leadership,the illegal armed units took advantage of the moratorium to regrouptheir forces and equipment, procure additional weapons and munitions,and mount diversions and terrorist attacks on Federal troops.Figures for 10 May 1995 indicate that 20 Federal soldiers werekilled and around a hundred wounded while the moratorium was ineffect. Hence the moratorium was used by the fighters to preparefor a continuation of military activities.
"On 5 July 1995, the Government of the Russian Federationconferred its approval on a delegation to attend talks on a peacefulresolution of the crisis in the Chechen Republic.
"On 30 July 1995, an agreement on an assemblage of militaryquestions was signed, presenting a real chance to start afreshon settling the matters at issue while ruling out the use or threatof force.
"The first organizational meeting of the Special ObserverCommission which, under the agreement of 30 July, is responsiblefor monitoring compliance with negotiated agreements on a cease-fire,was held in Grozny on 1 August 1995.
"The co-chairmen of the meeting signed a declaration andan appeal to the Chechen people, and distributed them to journalists.
"Among other things, the Declaration called for a cease-firebeginning at midnight on 2 August, and described the stages inthe process of disarming the Chechen units and withdrawing Russiantroops.
"The Russian party handed over a list of the people ithad detained, which was publicized. Dudaev's representatives madeno matching gesture as regards prisoners.
"To guarantee human rights and freedoms, coordinate theactivities of Federal executive bodies working to restore therule of constitutional law and order, bring about conditions underwhich free, democratic elections could be held in the ChechenRepublic, establish Chechen governmental organs and safeguardthe implementation of agreements on the peaceful resolution ofthe situation in the Chechen Republic, the Russian President on29 August 1995 appointed as his Plenipotentiary Representativein the Chechen Republic, O.I. Lobov, the secretary of the RussianSecurity Council.
"The Government of the Russian Federation is reluctantlyforced to observe that, despite the efforts made to resolve thesituation in the Chechen Republic, Dudaev's implacable supporterscontinue to stage provocations with a view to undermining thepeace process.
"On 19 September 1995, an attempt was made on the livesof the Russian President's Plenipotentiary Representative in theChechen Republic, O.I. Lobov, and leaders of the Governmentand Committee for National Harmony of the Chechen Republic.
"An act of terrorism was carried out in Grozny on 6 October,as a result of which Lt.-Gen. Anatoly Romanov, a co-chairman ofthe Special Observer Commission and Commander of the combinedFederal troops in Chechnya, was seriously wounded.
"Between 30 July and 19 October 1995, Chechen fightersfired on Russian positions 1,336 times; 651 of the shootings werein Grozny. In September alone, 45 Federal soldiers were killedand 215 wounded by Chechen gunfire. Recently the shootings andattacks on positions held by the combined Federal forces haveintensified. As a result, between 20 and 26 Octoberalone, 23 soldiers were killed and 54 wounded.
"On 7 October, the building housing the OSCE Support Groupcame under fire from a grenade-launcher. Russia regards this actof terrorism as yet another attempt to undermine the negotiatingprocess and the return to peaceful existence in the Chechen Republicof the Russian Federation. The Russian President's PlenipotentiaryRepresentative in the Chechen Republic, O.I. Lobov, gave orderson 8 October to the services concerned to step up security measuresfor members of the OSCE Support Group.
"Besides armed provocations, Dudaev and his supportersare using terrorist activities to try and disrupt work by theFederal authorities to restore vital facilities and the economyof the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation. On the nightof 7 October, builders from Mineralnye Vody who had come to Chechnyafor the reconstruction work were shot. Diversionary activitieson the Chechen sector of the Northern Caucasus Railway have becomemore frequent.
"In spite of provocations by Dudaev and his supporters,the command of the combined Federal forces is determined to maintainrestraint in the use of appropriate force.
"As the Chairman of the Russian Government, V.S. Chernomyrdin,said: 'The provocations staged by the implacable supporters ofDudaev in Chechnya can not force Russia to break off the processof peaceful settlement in the Chechen Republic. Everything possiblewill be done to resolve the conflict in the Chechen Republic bypeaceful means. We will not be driven into war by acts of provocation.'
"In accordance with the statement by the Chairman of theUnited Nations Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-first session,the Russian authorities have established close cooperation andensured free access by representatives of international humanitarianorganizations to all areas affected by the Chechen crisis; theyhave also instituted unhindered deliveries of humanitarian aidto all groups of the civilian population in need. The Governmentof the Russian Federation wishes to take this opportunity to thankICRC, UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF and donor countries for their assistancein coping with the humanitarian consequences of the Chechen crisis.
"At the same time, the Government of the Russian Federationis making every effort to rebuild the economy and improve thesocio-economic situation in the Chechen Republic.
"The Russian Ministry of the Economy has drawn up a programmeunder which 15.8 trillion roubles will be allocated to reconstructionwork in Chechnya in 1996.
"The Government of the Russian Federation wishes to drawto the attention of the United Nations Secretary-General the factthat on 11 April 1995 the Permanent Council of OSCE decided todispatch a support group to the Chechen Republic.
"The Group arrived in the Chechen Republic of the RussianFederation on 25 April. The Government of the Russian Federationis cooperating constructively and maintaining constant contactwith the Group. The Group is carrying out its mandate efficiently,and regularly informs the Chairman-in-Office of OSCE of developmentsin the situation in Chechnya.
"The Government of the Russian Federation informs theSecretary-General that, by order of the Russian Government, dated7 April 1995, representatives of ICRC have been allowed unrestrictedaccess to individuals captured during the eradication of illegalarmed units in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation.Specific comments by ICRC on the conditions in which captivesare held are considered by the appropriate government departmentsin the Federation with a view to action to remedy any shortcomingsfound. Representatives of other international organizations havealso been allowed access to the captives. In particular, a groupof rapporteurs from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Councilof Europe visited a temporary detention point in Grozny on 22August.
"The Government of the Russian Federation wishes to drawto the Secretary-General's attention the fact that many Russianand foreign non­governmental organizations are operating unhinderedin the Chechen Republic.
"Between 22 and 29 May 1995, a representative of the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fausto Pocar, visitedMoscow, the Chechen Republic and the Ingush Republic. The Ministryof Foreign Affairs is continuing its dialogue with the High Commissionerin the context of the human rights situation in the Chechen Republicof the Russian Federation."
50. The Secretary-General has received, on a regular basisand from different channels, information on the activities ofthe Russian Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Sergei Kovalev, in relation to the situation in the Republic of Chechnya.Alarmed by reports of gross violations of human rights and humanitarianlaw by both sides in the conflict, the Russian Commissioner forHuman Rights has undertaken, since 15 December 1994, a seriesof missions to the conflict area, including Ingushetia. The purposeof his missions was,inter alia, to monitor human rightsviolations in the zone of conflict, and to report objectivelyto the Russian Government and press on events in and around Grozny.Mr. Kovalev has regularly met with the Chechen leadership, includingPresident Dudayev.
51. Mr. Kovalev reports that gross and widespread violationsof human rights and the norms of humanitarian law have been committedin Chechnya. Although both sides in the conflict are involvedin human rights violations, in the view of Mr. Kovalev, Federaltroops are responsible for conducting military operations, usingmodern heavy weapons and aircraft for indiscriminate attacks whichare causing widespread death and injury among the civilian populationand destroying housing and civilian infrastructure indispensablefor survival. Neither side in the conflict is taking the necessarymeasures for the protection and evacuation of the civilian populationlocated in the war zone. Mr. Kovalev further indicates that theFederal side is obstructing shipment to the war zone of humanitarianassistance, including life­saving medical supplies for thewounded. No attempt has been made to safeguard the security ofcitizens and to defend the constitutional order by introducinga state of emergency. Finally, Mr. Kovalev's report indicatesthat there were no Muslim mercenaries involved in the fighting,as alleged.
52. A number of non-governmental organizations transmittedreports on the situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the RussianFederation to the Secretary-General. These included Human RightsWatch/Helsinki, Amnesty International, Unrepresented Nations andPeoples Organization (UNPO), the Quaker Peace and Service, theCovcas Center for Law & Conflict Resolution, the InternationalCommission of Jurists, the International League for Human Rightsand the International Group of Parliamentarians on the Problemof Chechenia. Information was also received from Russian non-governmentalorganizations, including the Memorial Human Rights Centre, thepublic foundation "Glasnost", the Union of North CaucasianWomen and the Soldiers' Mothers Organization of St. Petersburg.This information is summarized below.
53. Reports by non-governmental organizations suggest largenumbers of fatalities resulting from the conflict in the Republicof Chechnya of the Russian Federation. An investigation carriedout by Russian non­governmental organizations found that,within a period of five months (25 November 1994­15 April1995), a total of 26,550 civilians had died, of whom 2,300 werechildren under 15 years of age, 5,050 women and some 2,500 personsover the age of 50. Other reports suggest that by August of 1995at least 40,000 civilians had died and 10,000 Russian soldiersand an unknown number of Chechen fighters had been killed in thefighting.
54. Reports indicate many cases of summary executions. Accordingto information received, a humanitarian organization discoveredsome 40 unmarked graves with approximately 300 remains, a numberof which appeared to be those of teenagers. Some, including thoseof children, were reported to have clear marks of summary execution- a bullet hole through the temple. Other reports indicatethat Federal troops repeatedly fired on and killed civilians atcheckpoints and summarily executed captured Chechen men,both civilians and fighters. Two cases were reported of the shootingto death by Federal troops of humanitarian aid workers when theyattempted to prevent the summary execution of a civilian on astreet in Grozny.
55. Russian Ministry of Interior Forces (senior officers) allegedlyfired into a group of soldiers who refused to obey orders to killthe civilian population. In this regard reports werecritical of the behaviour and conduct of the Federal militarypersonnel serving in the field and noted that they lacked trainingin humanitarian law.
56. Although the conduct of Chechen fighters has scarcely beendocumented in non-governmental reports, information indicatesthat they indiscriminately fired on, and killed, civilians. Forexample, on 14 June 1995, Chechen commandos took some2,000 people hostage in the town of Budennovsk in the Stavropolregion and barricaded themselves in the town's hospital. The hostage-takers allegedly shot to death in the hospital fourcivilian men. In this incident, over 100 hostages were reportedlykilled when Federal forces attempted to take over the hospital.
57. There have also been reports that Chechen forces executedmembers of the militia's special task forces of the Ministry ofInterior (OMON) whom they had captured. For example, on13 June 1995, Chechen forces threatened to shoot five Russianprisoners every day unless Federal troops stopped bombing thevillage of Shatoi. It is reported that they executed five Russiansoldiers on that day and four the next.
58. It is reported that a massacre of over 100 people, mainlycivilians, occurred between 7 and 8 April 1995 in the villageof Samashki, in the west of Chechnya.
59. According to the accounts of 128 eye-witnesses, Federalsoldiers deliberately and arbitrarily attacked civilians and civiliandwellings in Samashki by shooting residents and burning houseswith flame­throwers. The majority of the witnesses reportedthat many OMON troops were drunk or under the influence of drugs.They wantonly opened fire or threw grenades into basements whereresidents, mostly women, elderly persons and children, had beenhiding.
60. Russian human rights NGOs carried out an investigationinto the incident and concluded,inter alia, that: (a)Federal troops had conducted a "clean­up" operation,including extensive house-to-house searches, during which theykilled civilians, mistreated detainees and committed arson; (b) atleast 103 civilians, most of whom did not participate in the armedclashes were killed; (c) owing to the blockade of the villageby Federal troops, the wounded did not have access until 10 April1995 to qualified medical assistance, as a result of which manyof them died; (d) indiscriminate arbitrary detention of the malepopulation of the village was carried out, during which torture,beatings, mistreatment and summary executions were reported.
61. Attacks by Federal forces on Chechen towns and villageshave been characterized as completely indiscriminate, disproportionateand deliberate. Reports also describe, in the victims' ownwords the indiscriminate attacks against displaced persons intransit, and the shelling of their camps by Federal soldiers.For example, on 7 March 1995, outside the village of Achkhoy-Martan,south-west of Grozny, Federal troops reportedly opened fire ontwo vehicles transporting people fleeing the conflict zone andshot dead seven people, including five women and a three­month-oldbaby girl.
62. According to the information received, explosive devicesand means of delivery prohibited by international humanitarianlaw were used in Chechnya. Anti-personnel mines, and to a lesserextent unexploded shells, reportedly began to claim an increasingnumber of civilian victims in Chechnya, most of whom were believedto be children. Problems relating to anti-personnel mines makethe deteriorating security situation in Chechnya even more seriousand impede the return of internally displaced persons.
63. In a statement made at the forty-seventh session of theSub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protectionof Minorities, Dr. Aslambek Kadiev, the representativeof the NGO Society for Threatened Peoples, alleged that chemicalweapons had been used in Chechnya.
64. The Russian member of the Sub-Commission, Mr. Chernichenko,dismissed allegations as "complete fabrication demonstratinga lack of sufficient scrutiny on the part of the Russian press".He pointed out that previous
allegations on the use of chemical weapons, made on Russiantelevision by one of the groups associated with General Dudayev,had proven unfounded.
65. In addition to the information already provided in thereport of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture (seeparas. 15­16 of the present report), much of the informationreceived refers to abuses committed by Federal forces. Accordingto those sources, in February and March 1995 concentration centres,situated at army bases beyond outside control and verification,became the sites of the most comprehensive violence and cruelor degrading acts committed against the detainees. Systematicbeatings, torture and other forms of ill-treatment, includingelectric shocks, were said to be routine during detention at "filtrationpoints" or transportation between them. In the latter casedetainees with their hands and legs tied were allegedly loadedonto trucks in several layers, one on top of another. As a resultsome prisoners suffocated to death.
66. It has been alleged that 1,438 civilians, including 150women and 74 children, disappeared in and around Grozny, mostlyduring the period January to March 1995. Most of them weresaid to be between the ages of 18 and 40. In addition tothe disappeared civilians, 1,407 Chechen combatants are said tobe unaccounted for.
67. Arbitrary detentions on a mass scale were reported to havetaken place from January to early February and in April 1995;many of the people detained were held without the necessary authorityfrom the prosecutor. Since the spring of 1995, reports indicate,the practice of detaining people elsewhere than in the officiallyestablished "filtration camps" has become widespread. Reportedly, 2,000 men were detained in concentration camps, includingmany teenagers and old men who had not participated in the militaryresistance. Other sources allege that Federal forces havefrequently detained any Chechen male, regardless of whether therewas any evidence of their involvement in the armed opposition,in order to exchange them for captured Russian soldiers.
68. Reports indicate that since 30 September 1995 Federal forcessurrounded and cut off the town of Sernovodsk. As a result, 3,600internally displaced persons at the town's sanatorium complex,the 20,000 residents of Sernovodsk and other internally displacedpersons living with relatives or friends reportedly suffered foodshortages. Reports also indicate that Russian officials were reportedto be directing aid to northern areas of Chechnya believed tobe more supportive of central government rule and away from twoother regions, southern Chechnya and the Republic of Daghestan,which had become a refugee centre. In addition, it is reportedthat the Russian authorities have repeatedly attempted to blockhumanitarian relief to the area by creating bureaucratic difficultiesfor relief organizations, interfering with the distribution ofaid and halting medical evacuations from Grozny.
69. Free movement or passage of both displaced and residentcivilians trying to flee to safer locations was reported to beoften restricted or stopped by Federal forces. Injured personswere said to have encountered difficulties in passing throughsome military checkpoints. Allegations state that peoplegoing in and out of the village of Achkoi Martan were being charged100,000 roubles (US$ 23) each by Russian soldiers at thecheckpoints. The charge for entering or leaving Sernovodsk (onfoot only, and not all were allowed through) was 50,000 roubles.
70. By the end of April 1995, the war in Chechnya had reportedlycaused the displacement of some 450,000 people, more than 45 percent of Chechnya's population, half of them scattered throughoutthe northern Caucasus, especially in Ingushetia and Daghestan.
71. The conditions in which the internally displaced personscurrently live are reported to be alarming, in particular withrespect to shelter, health care, nutrition and sanitation. Reportsnote that some internally displaced persons had to move one ormore times for various reasons, mainly unpredictable repeatedarmed clashes in the areas where they had found shelter. For example,of the 49,000 internally displaced persons from Chechnya in Ingushetiaat the end of September 1995, 2,107 were persons from Prigorodnydistrict who had fled to Grozny in 1992 and had been displacedagain to Ingushetia in 1995. Many NGOs are concerned about theprotection of internally displaced persons attempting to fleezones of military activity within Chechnya because there is noUNHCR presence in Chechnya itself.
72. The majority of those displaced as a result of the conflictin Chechnya are reported to be women, children and the elderly.Reports indicate that with a large percentage of men absent fora variety of reasons, the women heading most internally displacedfamilies were overwhelmed by the daily humiliation and frustrationsof life in displacement, and were often not able to provide fortheir children's needs. A case of sexual abuse has been reportedinvolving a young Chechen internally displaced woman from thetown of Sernovodskaya, who was abducted and raped by several Russianinebriated soldiers in early October 1995.
73. It is estimated that at least 2,000 children were killed,and 6,000 children lost at least one parent as a result of theconflict in Chechnya. Other sources report that in Chechnya duringthe period from September 1994 to February 1995, 4.6 per centof all civilians wounded were children, while from February throughMay 1995, children were an appalling 40 per cent of all civiliancasualties. Reports indicate that children in Chechnya have beenseverely traumatized. Many children reportedly manifested emotionaland functional psychosomatic disturbances and other forms of disorders.Reports also note that internally displaced parents showed highlevels of intense anxiety, fear and aggressivity, which in turnaggravated the psychological impact on children. Adult behaviourand the mass media also contribute to strong feelings of revengeamong the children. Concerns were expressed that the needs ofchild victims in terms of protection and assistance are far frombeing met with present resources.
74. Reports indicate that a large number of children, includingsome as young as 11, served in the armed forces fighting in Chechnya.In this regard, the Dudayev authorities reportedly admitted thatchildren between 15 and 18, including females, serve in theirforces and participate in combat. Child soldiers in Chechnya werereportedly assigned the same tasks as adult combatants, and servedon the front lines soon after joining the armed forces.
Notes