| Operation Restore Hope | |||||||
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| Part of theSomali Civil War | |||||||
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| Participants | |||||||
| Somali National Alliance Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Mohamed Farrah Aidid Hassan Dahir Aweys | |||||||
TheUnified Task Force (UNITAF), also known asOperation Restore Hope, was aUnited States-led,United Nations-sanctioned multinational military force deployed toSomalia from 5 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. It was established to replaceUnited Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), which had been deployed in April 1992 in response to the1992 famine—a crisis that followed the 1991 collapse of theSomali Democratic Republic and the full outbreak of theSomali Civil War.
UNITAF was mandated to create a secure environment for humanitarian operations "by all necessary means". The task force, led by 28,000US troops,[1] included international contributions from dozens of armed forces, totaling around 37,000 troops. Military deployments focused on the south, as central and northern Somalia remained relatively stable.[2] UNITAF forces began landing in Somalia during early December 1992, just as the famine was concluding[3] and had the effect of speeding the conclusion of the crisis by about a month.[4]
Aspects of the operation, in particular the large foreign military deployment, faced opposition from significant segments of Somali society and major factions such as theSomali National Alliance andAl-Itihaad al-Islamiya.[5][6] Several instances human rights violations by UN contingents later emerged, including Canada’sSomalia Affair and Italy’s Gallo Commission, which exposed cases of abuse and murder of civilians.[7][8][9] Overall, UNITAF avoided an armed conflict due to American Lt. Gen.Robert B. Johnston's strictrules of engagement, aimed at winning the Somali publics confidence—an approach abandoned in the succeeding phase of the UN operation in Somalia.[10]
In May 1993, UNITAF handed over its responsibilities toUnited Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), transitioning to a broader UN-led mission—though the operation effectively remained under US control.[11][12] According to journalist Scott Peterson, approximately 10,000–25,000 lives were saved as a result of the UNITAF and UNOSOM II operation.[13]
During the 1980s, theSomali Rebellion intensified, eventually culminating in the outbreak offull-scale civil war in 1991, which led to the collapse of theSomali Democratic Republic. The following year,a famine emerged, driven by both a majordrought and the serious fighting that engulfed the nation’sbreadbasket in the southern regions.
Faced with a humanitarian disaster in Somalia, exacerbated by a complete breakdown in civil order, the United Nations created theUNOSOM I mission in April 1992. During July 1992 the first UN troops landed in Somalia, sevenPakistani military troops under the command ofBrigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen.[14] Some elements were actively opposing the UNOSOM intervention. Troops were shot at, aid ships attacked and prevented from docking, cargo aircraft were fired upon and aid agencies, public and private, were subject to threats, looting and extortion.[15]
In August 1992, UNOSOM I headMohammed Sahnoun secured an agreement withMohamed Farah Aidid and theSomali National Alliance (SNA) to allow 500 UN peacekeepers, with the condition that any further deployments required SNA approval. However, later that month, UN Secretary-GeneralBoutros Ghali announced plans to expand UNOSOM to 3,500 troops without consultation, to the surprise of both Sahnoun and the SNA. According to Professor Stephen Hill, Sahnoun recognized this move would undermine his local support, as it was made “without consulting Somali leaders and community elders.” He attempted to delay the deployment but was overruled by UN headquarters.[16] The large-scale foreign intervention in late 1992 fuelednationalist opposition to international troops, strengthening support for Aidid’s SNA, which condemned the UN’s perceivedcolonial practices.[5] Somali Islamist factions such asAl-Itihaad Al-Islamiya also demonstrated hostility to a foreign military presence.[6]John Drysdale, a prominent advisor hired by the UN for the operation warned that Somalis would widely see a military deployment asgumeysi (foreign oppression) if it was perceived to be made without their sanction.[17]
The head of UNOSOM I,Mohammed Sahnoun, was replaced by anIsmat T. Kittani during November 1992. Kittani immediately adopted a confrontational stance ordered the deployments of UNOSOM troops in politically sensitive areas, sparking a security crisis with local Somali factions.[18] Kittani pushed claims that 80% of all aid shipments were being looted, which was later repeated by the UN Secretariat and the US State Department to justify expanding the scope of the intervention in Somalia.Alex de Waal observes that though the statistic was treated as fact by the Americans and UN, "its origins are untraceable."Doctors Without Borders noted that nobody on the ground could seriously claim that such a proportion was not getting through, while staff at various aid agencies operating in Somalia such asWorld Food Program, theRed Cross andCARE contested that real figures were far lower.[19] The head of UNOSOM I troops,Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen of the Pakistani army, stated in an interview with British journalists that the amount of aid being looted was being exaggerated in order justify expanding the scope of the operation and that estimates of 80% were completely fabricated.[20]
The United Nations Secretariat believed Somalia represented an ideal candidate for a test case of a UN operation in expanded size and mandate.[21] In the view of some top UNOSOM I commanders, the scope of the famine in Somalia was being exaggerated in order to justify using Somalia as an experiment for 'conflict resolution'.[20]Rony Brauman, the president ofDoctors Without Borders during the intervention in Somalia, observed of UN Secretary GeneralBoutros Ghali, "I think he wanted to make Somalia the test case for using muscular intervention to restore order and rebuild states; underneath that design lay his ambition to create a permanent UN intervention force."[22]
TheUnited States had various motives for military involvement in Somalia. TheUS armed forces wanted to prove its capability to conduct major 'Operations Other Than War', while theUS State Department wanted to set a precedent for humanitarian military intervention in the post-Cold War era.[21] TheLos Angeles Times reported that, shortly before the collapse of theSomali Democratic Republic in 1991, nearly two-thirds of the country had been allocated to American oil giants such asConoco in deals with the government. Some observers in the petroleum industry and East African experts suggested that protecting these concessions played a factor in the decision to launch the operation.[23]
On 3 December 1992 the Security Council unanimously adoptedResolution 794, authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". The Security Council urged the Secretary-General and member states to make arrangements for "the unified command and control" of the military forces that would be involved.[24] UNITAF has been considered part of a larger state building initiative in Somalia, serving as the military arm to secure the distribution of humanitarian aid. However, UNITAF cannot be considered a state building initiative due to its specific, limited and palliative aims, which it nonetheless exercised forcefully. The primary objective of UNITAF was security rather than larger institution building initiatives.[25]
The vast bulk of UNITAF's total personnel strength was provided by the United States (some 25,000 out of a total of 37,000 personnel). Other countries that contributed to UNITAF were1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment fromAustralia (January–May 1993),Bangladesh,Belgium,Botswana,Canada,Egypt (one battalion), Ethiopia,France (brigade HQ and one battalion),Germany,Greece (medical company at Waajid), theIndian Army (brigade HQ at Baidoa and three battalions), Ireland (transport company), Italy, Indonesia, Kuwait, Morocco, elements ofNo. 40 Squadron RNZAF from New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.[26] The national contingents were co-ordinated and overseen byU.S. Central Command, however, the relationship between CentCom and the contributing nations varied. There were a few confrontations over the methods and mandates employed by some contingents. For example, the Italian contingent was accused of bribing local militias to maintain peace, whilst theFrench Foreign Legion troops were accused of over-vigorous use of force in disarming militiamen.[27] The Canadian contingent of the operation was known by the Canadian operation nameOperation Deliverance.
Prior to Resolution 794, the United States had approached the UN and offered a significant troop contribution to Somalia, with the caveat that these personnel would not be commanded by the UN. Resolution 794 did not specifically identify the U.S. as being responsible for the future task force, but mentioned "the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment".[28] Resolution 794 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 3 December 1992, and they welcomed the United States offer to help create a secure environment for humanitarian efforts in Somalia.[29] PresidentGeorge H. W. Bush responded to this by initiating Operation Restore Hope on 4 December 1992, under which the United States would assume command in accordance with Resolution 794.[30]
The operation began on 6 December 1992, whenNavy SEALs and other units began laying the groundwork for the landing over a period of three days. In the early hours of 8 December 1992, elements of the US4th Psychological Operations Group attached to the approachingMarine Expeditionary Unit conducted leaflet drops over the capital city ofMogadishu.[31][32]
On 9 December 1992, American troops began landing on theSomali coastline atMogadishu. A total 17,800US Marines and 10,000US Army infantry were deployed.[33] Thefamine in Somalia was already abating as the troops began landing.[3]
Mohamed Farah Aidid, leader of theSomali National Alliance (SNA), initially welcomed the operation, reportedly at the urging of his lieutenantOsman Atto, who had close ties to U.S. embassy officials inNairobi and the American oil companyConoco. Aidid favored a U.S.-led mission over a UN-led one, given his strained relationship with the UN Secretary-GeneralBoutros-Ghali. Regardless the SNA and other factions lacked the military capability to resist the landings had they wanted to. This non-confrontational stance was reciprocated by the Americans who initially avoided trying to disarm Aidid's faction. American diplomatRobert B. Oakley and US Marine GeneralRobert Johnson made clear in public statements that the intentions of US troops were 'strictly humanitarian' and that their forces would only use force to protect themselves or aid convoys.[33]
Concurrently, various Somali factions returned to the negotiating table in an attempt to end the civil war. This effort was known as theConference on National Reconciliation in Somalia and it resulted in theAddis Ababa Agreement signed on 27 March 1993.[34] The conference, however, had little result as the civil war continued afterwards.
Many Somalis who would have been otherwise supportive of the operation were antagonized by the behavior of foreign troops.[35] Peacekeepers often displayed a "casual brutality" in encounters with Somalis, particularly American, Italian and Belgian troops who engaged in torture, murder and sexual violence with relative impunity. Testimony from Italian troops later described the routine destruction of Somali property and abuse of detainees, with some Italian soldiers suggesting the death toll was higher than officially acknowledged. Many incidents involving abuses by Belgian troops regarded children[7] with some soldiers also stating that the official reports regarding killings of Somalis were understated.[7] Despite this, UNITAF avoided armed conflict with Somali factions due to the carefulrules of engagement created by the head of the operation,US Marine Lt. Gen.Robert B. Johnston. Johnston's approach, which focused above all on winning the Somali's public confidence, was lost during the transfer to the far more aggressiveUNOSOM II mandate.[10]
As UNITAF's mandate was to protect the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid, the operation was regarded as a success.[36]United Nations Secretary-GeneralBoutros Boutros-Ghali determined that the presence of UNITAF troops had a "positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance."[37] An epidemiological survey determined approximately 10,000 lives had been saved by the military intervention. While UNITAF saw a dramatic increase in the scope of the military intervention, no more lives were saved compared toUNOSOM I. The primary reason was due to the sharp decline in mortality rates during October 1992, before the large scale deployment of troops. Studies on the intervention noted that UNITAF had the effect of speeding up the famine's conclusion by about a month.[4]
According to an assessment by theWashington based independentNGO Refugee Policy Group, only 10,000 to 25,000 lives of the approximately 100,000 rescued by international assistance had been saved by the UNITAF and UNOSOM II interventions, and according to ProfessorAlex de Waal the true figure may have been even lower.[38][39] Figures like Secretary-GeneralBoutros-Ghali and American diplomatChester Crocker claimed that the intervention saved a quarter of a million Somali lives,[40] a claim which has been disputed by other observers who have noted that there is minimal evidence to suggest that UNITAF had had any significant impact on mortality.[4]
No disarmament of the rivalling factions within Somalia was undertaken.[41] This meant that the situation stayed stable only for the time UNITAF's overwhelming presence was deterring the fighting. Therefore, the mandate to create a "secure environment" was not achieved in a durable fashion. TheCanadian Airborne Regiment was disbanded due to its conduct at UNITAF that was revealed during an investigation into theSomalia Affair.[citation needed]
During March 1993, several weeks before UNOSOM II was created, the first UN sponsored Somali peace conference was being held inAddis Ababa,Ethiopia. TheConference on National Reconciliation consisted of the majority of Somalis factions and leaders. UN Special RepresentativeLansana Kouyate ofGuinea warned the delegates of the national reconciliation conference that the UN was going to invoke itsChapter VI powers across the entirety of Somalia unless they came to an agreement by 25 March 1993. The conference finalized an agreement 24 hours past the deadline.[42] On 26 March 1993 UNOSOM II, was established by the Security Council inResolution 814,[42] though did not formally take over operations in Somalia until UNITAF was dissolved just over a month later on 4 May 1993.[43]
On 3 May 1993, UNOSOM II officially assumed command, and on 4 May 1993 it assumed responsibility for the operations. Despite UNOSOM II being composed of a coalition of twenty-seven countries, most of the decision makers were still Americans, giving the United States significant control over much of the operation.[44][45] Marine Lt. Gen.Robert B. Johnston, head of UNITAF, would state that although in his view UNITAF had been success US efforts and losses would be in vain if UNOSOM II was also not successful.[45] UNOSOM II Force CommanderCevik Bir openly admitted that the critical posts in his headquarters were manned by Americans by May 1993,[45] and it was observed that very few nations involved had any representation in the UN military command structure.[44][46] In addition to this the representative of theUN Secretary-General in Somalia and head of UNOSOM II, retired US AdmiralJonathan Howe, staffed his headquarters with twenty-eight US officers in key positions. Months into the operation, following the5 June 1993 killings of the Pakistanis and the passing ofUNSCR 837, the US would effectively take lead of the mission.[44]
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