Teleology (fromτέλος,telos, 'end', 'aim', or 'goal', andλόγος,logos, 'explanation' or 'reason')[1] orfinality[2][3] is a branch ofcausality giving the reason or an explanation for something as a function of its end, its purpose, or its goal, as opposed to as a function of its cause.[4]James Wood, in hisNuttall Encyclopaedia, explained the meaning ofteleology as "the doctrine of final causes, particularly the argument for the being and character of God from the being and character of His works; that the end reveals His purpose from the beginning, the end being regarded as the thought of God at the beginning, or the universe viewed as the realisation of Him and His eternal purpose."
A purpose that is imposed by human use, such as the purpose of a fork to hold food, is calledextrinsic.[3]Natural teleology, common inclassical philosophy, though controversial today,[5] contends that natural entities also haveintrinsic purposes, regardless of human use or opinion. For instance,Aristotle claimed that an acorn's intrinsictelos is to become a fully grown oak tree.[6] Though ancientatomists rejected the notion of natural teleology, teleological accounts of non-personal or non-human nature were explored and often endorsed in ancient and medieval philosophies, but fell into disfavor during the modern era (1600–1900).
InWestern philosophy, the term and concept ofteleology originated in the writings ofPlato andAristotle. Aristotle's 'four causes' give special place to the telos or "final cause" of eachthing. In this, he followed Plato in seeing purpose in both human and nonhuman nature.
The wordteleology combinesGreektelos (τέλος, fromτελε-, 'end' or 'purpose')[1] andlogia (-λογία, 'speak of', 'study of', or 'a branch of learning').German philosopherChristian Wolff would coin the term, asteleologia (Latin), in his workPhilosophia rationalis, sive logica (1728).[7]
InPlato's dialoguePhaedo,Socrates argues that true explanations for any given physical phenomenon must be teleological. He bemoans those who fail to distinguish between a thing's necessary and sufficient causes, which he identifies respectively asmaterial andfinal causes:[8]
Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause, from that without which the cause would not be able to act, as a cause. It is what the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it a cause, thus giving it a name that does not belong to it. That is why one man surrounds the earth with a vortex to make the heavens keep it in place, another makes the air support it like a wide lid. As for their capacity of being in the best place they could be at this very time, this they do not look for, nor do they believe it to have any divine force, but they believe that they will sometime discover a stronger and more immortal Atlas to hold everything together more, and they do not believe that the truly good and 'binding' binds and holds them together.
Socrates here argues that while the materials that compose a body are necessary conditions for its moving or acting in a certain way, they nevertheless cannot be thesufficient condition for its moving or acting as it does. For example,[8] if Socrates is sitting in an Athenian prison, the elasticity of his tendons is what allows him to be sitting, and so a physical description of his tendons can be listed asnecessary conditions orauxiliary causes of his act of sitting.[9][10] However, these are only necessary conditions of Socrates' sitting. To give a physical description of Socrates' body is to saythat Socrates is sitting, but it does not give any idea whyit came to be that he was sitting in the first place. To say why he was sitting and notnot sitting, it is necessary to explain what it is about his sitting that isgood, for all things brought about (i.e., all products of actions) are brought about because the actor saw some good in them. Thus, to give an explanation of something is to determine what about it is good. Its goodness is itsactual cause—its purpose,telos or 'reason for which'.[11]
Aristotle argued thatDemocritus was wrong to attempt to reduce all things to mere necessity, because doing so neglects the aim, order, and "final cause", which brings about these necessary conditions:
Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all the operations of nature. Now, they are necessary, it is true, but yet they are for a final cause and for the sake of what is best in each case. Thus nothing prevents the teeth from being formed and being shed in this way; but it is not on account of these causes but on account of the end. ...
InPhysics, using thehylomorphic theory, (using eternalforms as his model[dubious –discuss]), Aristotle rejects Plato's assumption that the universe was created by an intelligent designer. For Aristotle, natural ends are produced by "natures" (principles of change internal to living things), and natures, Aristotle argued, do not deliberate:[12]
It is absurd to suppose that ends are not present [in nature] because we do not see an agent deliberating.
These Platonic and Aristotelian arguments ran counter to those presented earlier byDemocritus and later byLucretius, both of whom were supporters of what is now often calledaccidentalism:
Nothing in the body is made in order that we may use it. What happens to exist is the cause of its use.
In the 17th century, philosophers such asRené Descartes andThomas Hobbes wrote in opposition to Aristotelian teleology. The suggestion that there’s more to objects than their materialism was rejected in favor of a mechanistic view of even complex creatures and organisms.[13] According to Hobbes, writing inLeviathan:
Life is but a motion of limbs. For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body.[14]
But while science was doing a great job at explaining natural phenomena, it stopped short from explaining how life develops.[13] In the late 18th century,Immanuel Kant acknowledged this shortcoming in hisCritique of Judgement:
There will never be a Newton of the blade of grass, because human science will never be able to explain how a living being can originate from inanimate matter.[15]
The chief instance, and the largest polemic morass, of teleological viewpoint in modern cosmology and ontology is theteleological argument that posits anintelligent designer as agod.
Teleological-based "grand narratives" are renounced by thepostmodern tradition,[16] where teleology may be viewed as reductive, exclusionary, and harmful to those whose stories are diminished or overlooked.[17]
Against this postmodern position,Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that a narrative understanding of oneself, of one's capacity as an independent reasoner, one's dependence on others and on the social practices and traditions in which one participates, all tend towards an ultimate good of liberation. Social practices may themselves be understood as teleologically oriented to internal goods, for example, practices of philosophical and scientific inquiry are teleologically ordered to the elaboration of a true understanding of their objects. MacIntyre'sAfter Virtue (1981) famously dismissed the naturalistic teleology of Aristotle's "metaphysical biology", but he has cautiously moved from that book's account of a sociological teleology toward an exploration of what remains valid in a more traditional teleological naturalism.[18]
Teleology significantly informs the study ofethics, such as in:
Business ethics: People in business commonly think in terms of purposeful action, as in, for example,management by objectives. Teleological analysis ofbusiness ethics leads to consideration of the full range ofstakeholders in any business decision, including the management, the staff, the customers, the shareholders, the country, humanity and the environment.[19]
Medical ethics: Teleology provides a moral basis for the professional ethics of medicine, as physicians are generally concerned with outcomes and must therefore know thetelos of a given treatment paradigm.[20]
The broad spectrum ofconsequentialist ethics—of whichutilitarianism is a well-known example—focuses on the result or consequences, with such principles asJohn Stuart Mill's 'principle of utility': "the greatest good for the greatest number". This principle is thus teleological, though in a broader sense than is elsewhere understood in philosophy.
In the classical notion, teleology is grounded in the inherent nature of things themselves, whereas inconsequentialism, teleology is imposed on nature from outside by the human will. Consequentialist theories justify inherently what most people would call evil acts by their desirable outcomes, if the good of the outcome outweighs the bad of the act. So, for example, a consequentialist theory would say it was acceptable to kill one person in order to save two or more other people. These theories may be summarized by the maxim "the end justifies the means."
In deontological ethics, the goodness or badness of individual acts is primary and a larger, more desirable goal is insufficient to justify bad acts committed on the way to that goal, even if the bad acts are relatively minor and the goal is major (like telling a small lie to prevent a war and save millions of lives). In requiring all constituent acts to be good,deontological ethics is much more rigid than consequentialism, which varies by circumstance.
Practical ethics are usually a mix of the two. For example, Mill also relies on deontic maxims to guide practical behavior, but they must be justifiable by the principle of utility.[21]
A teleology of human aims played a crucial role in the work ofeconomistLudwig von Mises, especially in the development of his science ofpraxeology. Mises believed that an individual's action is teleological because it is governed by the existence of their chosen ends.[22] In other words, individuals select what they believe to be the most appropriate means to achieve a sought after goal or end. Mises also stressed that, with respect to human action, teleology is not independent of causality: "No action can be devised and ventured upon without definite ideas about the relation of cause and effect, teleology presupposes causality."[22]
Assuming reason and action to be predominantly influenced by ideological credence, Mises derived his portrayal of human motivation fromEpicurean teachings, insofar as he assumes "atomistic individualism, teleology, and libertarianism, and defines man as an egoist who seeks a maximum of happiness" (i.e. the ultimate pursuit of pleasure over pain).[23] "Man strives for," Mises remarks, "but never attains the perfect state of happiness described byEpicurus."[23] Furthermore, expanding upon the Epicurean groundwork, Mises formalized his conception of pleasure and pain by assigning each specific meaning, allowing him to extrapolate his conception of attainable happiness to a critique of liberal versus socialist ideological societies. It is there, in his application of Epicurean belief to political theory, that Mises flouts Marxist theory, considering labor to be one of many of man's 'pains', a consideration which positioned labor as a violation of his original Epicurean assumption of man's manifest hedonistic pursuit. From here he further postulates a critical distinction between introversive labor and extroversive labor, further divaricating from basic Marxist theory, in which Marx hails labor as man's "species-essence", or his "species-activity".[24]
In modern science, explanations that rely on teleology are often, but not always, avoided, either because they are unnecessary or because whether they are true or false is thought to be beyond the ability of human perception and understanding to judge.[iii] But using teleology as an explanatory style, in particular within evolutionary biology, is still controversial.[25]
Since theNovum Organum ofFrancis Bacon, teleological explanations inphysical science tend to be deliberately avoided in favor of focus on material and efficient explanations, although some recent accounts of quantum phenomena make use of teleology.[26] Final and formal causation came to be viewed as false or too subjective.[iii] Nonetheless, some disciplines, in particular withinevolutionary biology, continue to use language that appears teleological in describing natural tendencies towards certain end conditions. Some[who?] suggest, however, that these arguments ought to be, and practicably can be, rephrased in non-teleological forms; others hold that teleological language cannot always beeasily expunged from descriptions in the life sciences, at least within the bounds of practicalpedagogy.
Contemporary philosophers and scientists still debate whether teleologicalaxioms are useful or accurate in proposing modern philosophies and scientific theories. An example of the reintroduction of teleology into modern language is the notion of anattractor.[27] Another instance is whenThomas Nagel (2012), though not a biologist, proposed a non-Darwinian account ofevolution that incorporates impersonal and natural teleological laws to explain the existence of life,consciousness,rationality, and objective value.[28] Regardless, the accuracy can also be considered independently from the usefulness: it is a common experience inpedagogy that a minimum of apparent teleology can be useful in thinking about and explaining Darwinian evolution even if there is no true teleology driving evolution. Thus it is easier to say that evolution "gave" wolves sharpcanine teeth because those teeth "serve the purpose of"predation regardless of whether there is an underlying non-teleologic reality in which evolution is not an actor with intentions. In other words, because humancognition andlearning often rely on the narrative structure of stories – with actors, goals, and immediate (proximate) rather than ultimate (distal) causation (see alsoproximate and ultimate causation) – some minimal level of teleology might be recognized as useful or at least tolerable for practical purposes even by people who reject itscosmologic accuracy. Its accuracy is upheld by Barrow and Tipler (1986), whose citations of such teleologists asMax Planck andNorbert Wiener are significant for scientific endeavor.[29]
Apparent teleology is a recurring issue inevolutionary biology,[30] much to the consternation of some writers.[25]
Statements implying that nature has goals, for example where a species is said to do something "in order to" achieve survival appear teleological, and therefore invalid. Usually, it is possible to rewrite such sentences to avoid the apparent teleology. Some biology courses have incorporated exercises requiring students to rephrase such sentences so that they do not read teleologically. Nevertheless, biologists still frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even if that is not the intention. John Reiss argues that evolutionary biology can be purged of such teleology by rejecting the analogy of natural selection as awatchmaker.[31] Other arguments against this analogy have also been promoted by writers such asRichard Dawkins.[32]
Some authors, likeJames Lennox, have argued thatDarwin was a teleologist,[33] while others, such asMichael Ghiselin, describe this claim as a myth promoted by misinterpretations of his discussions and emphasized the distinction between using teleological metaphors and being teleological.[34]
Biologist philosopherFrancisco Ayala has argued that all statements about processes can be trivially translated into teleological statements, and vice versa, but that teleological statements are more explanatory and cannot be disposed of.[35]Karen Neander has argued that the modern concept of biological 'function' is dependent upon selection. So, for example, it is not possible to say that anything that simply winks into existence without going through a process of selection has functions. We decide whether an appendage has a function by analysing the process of selection that led to it. Therefore, any talk of functions must be posterior to natural selection and function cannot be defined in the manner advocated by Reiss and Dawkins.[36]
Ernst Mayr states that "adaptedness ... is ana posteriori result rather than ana priori goal-seeking".[37] Various commentators view the teleological phrases used in modern evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example,Simon Hugh Piper Maddrell writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation [may be] substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but that this "should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from mutations arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained by natural selection".[38] Likewise,J. B. S. Haldane says, "Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he's unwilling to be seen with her in public."[39][40]
The classification system underlying cybernetics has been criticized byFrank Honywill George and Les Johnson, who cite the need for an external observability to the purposeful behavior in order to establish and validate the goal-seeking behavior.[44] In this view, the purpose of observing and observed systems is respectively distinguished by the system's subjectiveautonomy and objective control.[44]
^ab"The received intellectual tradition has it that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, revolutionary philosophers began to curtail and reject the teleology of the medieval and scholastic Aristotelians, abandoning final causes in favor of a purely mechanistic model of the Universe."Johnson, Monte Ransom (2008),Aristotle on Teleology, Oxford University Press. pp. 23–24.
^abDubray, Charles. 2020 [1912]. "Teleology". InThe Catholic Encyclopedia 14. New York:Robert Appleton Company. Retrieved 3 May 2020. – viaNew Advent, transcribed by D. J. Potter
^Ayala, Francisco (1998). "Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology".Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology. Cambridge:MIT Press.
^Neander, Karen. 1998. "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense". pp. 313–333 inNature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology, edited by C. Allen, M. Bekoff, and G. Lauder. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press.
Gotthelf, Allan. 1987. "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality". InPhilosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, edited by A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.ISBN0-52-131091-1,978-0-52-131091-8
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 2006. "First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical Issues".The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays 1, edited by A. MacIntyre. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.ISBN0-19-875108-7,978-0-19-875108-3
Makin, Stephen. 2006.Metaphysics Book Theta, by Aristotle, with an introduction and commentary by S. Makin. New York: Oxford University Press.ISBN978-0-521-67061-6,0-521-67061-6
![[icon]](/mt/?noimg=&dark=on&url=http%3a%2f%2fwww.wikipedia.org%2fwiki%2fFile%3aWiki_letter_w_cropped.svg)
