54°12′N23°24′E / 54.2°N 23.4°E /54.2; 23.4
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TheSuwałki Gap, also known as theSuwałki corridor[a][b] ([suˈvawkʲi] ⓘ), is a sparsely populated area aroundthe border betweenLithuania andPoland, and centres on the shortest path betweenBelarus and theRussianexclave ofKaliningrad Oblast on the Polish side of the border. Named after the Polish town ofSuwałki, thischoke point has become of great strategic and military importance since Poland and theBaltic states joined theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The border between Poland and Lithuania in the area of the Suwałki Gap was formed after theSuwałki Agreement of 1920, but it carried little importance in theinterwar period as at the time, thePolish lands stretched farther northeast. During theCold War,Lithuania was part of theSoviet Union andcommunist Poland was a member of the Soviet-ledWarsaw Pact alliance. Thedissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact hardened borders that cut through the shortest land route between Kaliningrad (Russian territoryisolated from the mainland) and Belarus, Russia's ally.
As the Baltic states and Poland eventually joined NATO, this narrow border stretch between Poland and Lithuania became a vulnerability for the military bloc because, if a hypothetical military conflict were to erupt between Russia and Belarus on one side and NATO on the other, capturing the 65 km (40 mi)-long strip of land between Russia'sKaliningrad Oblast andBelarus would likely jeopardise NATO's attempts to defend the Baltic states, because it would cut off the only land route there. NATO's fears about the Suwałki Gap intensified after 2014, whenRussia annexed Crimea and launched thewar in Donbas, and further increased afterRussia started a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These worries prompted the alliance to increase its military presence in the area, and anarms race was triggered by these events.
Both Russia and theEuropean Union countries also saw great interest in civilian uses of the gap. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia attempted to negotiate an extraterritorial corridor to connect its exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast withGrodno in Belarus. Poland, Lithuania and theEU did not consent. Movement of goods through the gap was disrupted in summer 2022, during theRussian invasion of Ukraine, as Lithuania and the European Union introducedtransit restrictions on Russian vehicles as partof their sanctions. TheVia Baltica road, a vital link connectingFinland and theBaltic states with the rest of the European Union, passes through the area and, as of April 2024, is under construction. The expressway connection from the Polish side, the newS61 expressway, is almost complete, while theA5 highway in Lithuania is being upgraded to adivided highway. TheRail Baltica route near the Suwałki Gap is still in pre-construction stages.
The Suwałki Gap is a sparsely populated region in the north-eastern corner of Poland, inPodlaskie Voivodeship. This hilly area, one of thecoldest in Poland,[1] is located on the western margins of theEast European Plain. It is crossed by numerous river valleys and deep lakes (such asHańcza andWigry), and its vast swathes are covered by thick forests (including theAugustów Primeval Forest) andmarshes, such as those in theBiebrza National Park.[2][3] To its west lies another lake district known asMasuria. The area is relatively poorly developed - there is little industry besidesforestry-related facilities, the road network is sparse and the nearest large airport is located several hundred kilometres away;[3][4] only two major roads (with at least one lane in each direction) and one rail line link Poland with Lithuania.[5][6] The area is home to some ethnic minorities, particularlyUkrainians,Lithuanians (close to the border withLithuania) andRussians, but the Russians are not very numerous on the Polish side.[2][7]
Poland and Lithuania bothgainedindependence in the aftermath ofWorld War I and started tofight in order to establish control over as much terrain as they could militarily hold. While Lithuania claimed majority-PolishSuwałki andVilnius, it ultimately failed to control both. Suwałki was agreed to be part of Poland as a result of theSuwałki Agreement, while Vilnius was captured by Poland in afalse flag operation known asŻeligowski's mutiny.[8] In theinterwar period, the Suwałki region was a protrusion of Poland into surroundingLithuania andEast Prussia (part ofGermany), rather than a gap, and played little strategic importance.[3]
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FollowingWorld War II, the vicinity ofKönigsberg, renamedKaliningrad shortly after the war, was incorporated as part of theRussian SFSR, part of theSoviet Union, and became aclosed area for most of theSoviet era.[9]Lithuania became aUnion republic within the USSR, whilePoland came under theSoviet sphere of influence and joined theWarsaw Pact. Until thedissolution of the Soviet Union, Poland's only eastern and northern neighbour was the USSR, thus, as in the interwar period, the region mattered little in military terms.[5][10] This changed after 1991, whenKaliningrad Oblast became asemi-exclave of Russia, sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania, both of which are neighbours withBelarus. Neither borders the "mainland" part of Russia.[6]
Kaliningrad Oblast's neighbours both entered theEuropean Union and theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the same time, only 65 km (40 mi) of Polish territory separates two areas of the rivalCollective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and theUnion State, both of which include Russia and Belarus.[6] The former Estonian PresidentToomas Hendrik Ilves claims to have come up with the name "Suwałki Gap" before his meeting withUrsula von der Leyen, then serving as thedefence minister of Germany, in April 2015 to highlight the vulnerability of the area for the Baltic states.[11]
The first time a special corridor between Kaliningrad and Belarus (planned to go via Poland) was discussed during a 1990 meeting between Yuri Shemonov, a senior official in Kaliningrad Oblast, andNikolai Ryzhkov andMikhail Gorbachev,Premier andPresident of the Soviet Union, respectively. While Ryzhkov was supportive of the idea, Gorbachev vetoed the proposal, urging the other two men to "stop spreading panic".[12]
After the Soviet Union fell apart, Kaliningrad was cut off from Russia, thus the Russians sought to secure a land transit route from the exclave to mainland Russia through Belarus. After some initial preparations, including signing a treaty which obliged Poland and Russia to open aborder crossing nearGołdap, the Russian government announced their intention to build a special "communication corridor" between the checkpoint andGrodno in Belarus, justifying the decision by the region's close economic ties with the country. Russia, which communicated the idea to the Polish side in 1994, additionally sought to bypass Lithuania, with which it had straineddiplomatic relations.[13] Initially, the idea sparked little interest,[13] but extensive discussions came in 1996, whenBoris Yeltsin,President of Russia, declared he would negotiate with the Polish side to seek permission to build amotorway, citing high transit costs via Lithuania.[14]
Top Polish government officials rejected the proposal.[15] Among the main reasons was the fact that among Poles, the proposal sounded too much like theGerman request for an extraterritorial link through thePolish Corridor just prior to its 1939invasion of Poland, and was thus seen as unacceptable.[16][17] This feeling was amplified by the persistent usage of the word "corridor" among Russian officials.[18][19]Aleksander Kwaśniewski, then-president of Poland, sounded concerns about the environmental impact of the investment,[14] while some politicians from the then-ruling coalition (SLD-PSL) argued that the corridor would cause a deterioration ofdiplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania.[13][20]
There have been reports thatSuwałki Voivodeship started talks about the corridor to alleviate its economic problems and even signed an agreement withGrodno Region authorities to promote its construction via a border crossing inLipszczany,[12][20] butCezary Cieślukowski, then-voivode of Suwałki who was seen by the media as supportive of the idea, denied having ever endorsed the proposal, and no proof for that (such as plans or cost estimates) was found in an internal party investigation.[13] WhenGDDKiA, the Polish agency responsible for the maintenance of main roads, updated its plans for the expressway network in 1996, the proposed link was nowhere to be found.[21]
The topic returned in 2001–2002 when Poland and Lithuania were negotiatingaccession to the European Union. Russian citizens in Kaliningrad were facing the prospect of having to usepassports and apply forvisas to cross the border of the new EU member states, which sparked outrage in theRussian press. Therefore, Russia suggested that theEuropean Commission grant a right to a 12-hour free transit for the citizens of the oblast through special corridors in Poland and Lithuania, but this proposal was rejected.[22] Another proposal, withsealed trains, also failed to gain traction; it was ultimately agreed to introduce special permits for Russian citizens travelling to/from Kaliningrad Oblast for transit through Lithuania (but not Poland),[19] known as Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) and a Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) for rail and road trips, respectively.[23]
Kaliningrad Oblast has since been generally supplied by freight trains transiting through Lithuania. However, on 17 June 2022, in retaliation for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Lithuania started blocking supplies ofsanctioned items to the enclave via road or rail, citing EU's sanction guidance.[24] That guidance was then clarified in a way that exempted rail traffic from the restrictions so long as the volume of deliveries remained within prior consumption volumes,[25] but thenŠiaulių bankas, the bank servicing the transit payments, announced it would refuse to accept ruble payments from 15 August and any payments from Russian entities from 1 September.[26]
Transit remains possible via payments to other banks but, in September 2022, was expected to become more burdensome as payments for each freight service will be processed separately to comply withLithuanian anti-fraud regulator's guidance.[27] Another possibility remains for ships to go fromSt. Petersburg to Kaliningrad, but this route may be unavailable in winter because the more northerly port may freeze.[28]
The Suwałki Gap hosts several critical corridors because it is the only land route between the Baltic states and the rest of the European Union and NATO.
A strategic communication artery, known in theinternational E-road network asE67 or asVia Baltica (expressway S61 on the Polish side andA5 highway on the Lithuanian part), passes through the Suwałki Gap.[29] It is part of theNorth Sea-Baltic Corridor (previously theBaltic-Adriatic Corridor),[30] one of the core routes of theTrans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) that connects Finland and theBaltic states with the rest of Europe.[31] As of April 2024, the Polish expressway is almost completed; the only segment not yet open is the bypass ofŁomża, expected to be unveiled in May 2025.[32][33][34] On the Lithuanian side, the existingA5 highway is being upgraded to adual highway with grade-separated junctions. The section of the motorway close to the Suwałki Gap is slated to be completed by late 2025.[35]
TheRail Baltica project, currently under construction, will improve the existing connection between the Baltic states and the rest of the European Union by creating a new, unifiedstandard-gauge trunk line running across the Baltic states from Kaunas to Tallinn and eventuallyunderneath the Gulf of Finland to Helsinki. The existing rail connection is only a single-track, non-electrified line that can only go toKaunas without changingtrack gauges. This is because Baltic state railways still use the widerRussian gauge, while the vast majority of Polish rolling stock is adapted to thestandard gauge common in Western Europe.[36] The Polish sections are expected to be ready by 2028, but as of February 2024 construction work in Poland is already delayed by 3 years and there is no guaranteed funding for the section between Ełk and the Polish-Lithuanian border.[37]
TheGas Interconnection Poland–Lithuania, which opened on 1 May 2022, is the only terrestrial link between the Baltic and Finnishnatural gas pipeline system and the rest of the European Union. Its strategic importance was the reason it was recognized as aProject of Common Interest by the EU.[38] TheLitPol Link is the route for the only land-basedhigh voltage line between Poland and Lithuania, which was opened in late 2015.[39] Another high-voltage line to Lithuania is yet in the planning stages, as the sea-basedHarmony Link (throughKlaipėda) was found to be economically unfeasible.[40]
The Suwałki Gap is an important constraint on civilian airspace since the2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Because ofsanctions against Russia and Belarus (in the latter case imposed afterRoman Protasevich's airplanewas hijacked by the government while over its airspace), aviation from these countries may not fly through the European Union, including to Kaliningrad. However, Russia also banned EU carriers over its territory, and EU airlines were urged not to fly over Belarus.[41][42] Thus the only feasible way for civilian planes to fly from the Baltic states or Finland southwards is through the Suwałki Gap, or over the Baltic Sea.
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Long before the Suwałki Gap became of concern to NATO, several army battles or operations occurred on the terrain. For example, duringNapoleon'swar in Russia, part of his army, which crossed into the country from theDuchy of Warsaw, used the Suwałki Gap as a launching pad for the invasion and, by the beginning of 1813, when the remnants of his army retreated, it crossed the gap fromKaunas towardsWarsaw. Bothbattles of the Masurian Lakes duringWorld War I passed or were directly waged on the territory. During the invasion of Poland, which startedWorld War II, most of the action skirted the area, while in 1944, theRed Army simply advanced into East Prussia and no major battle occurred in the area.[6]
Poland and Lithuaniajoined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999 and 2004, respectively. On the one hand, this meant that the Kaliningrad exclave was surrounded by NATO states, but on the other, this created achoke point for the military alliance as all troops supplied by land must pass through the Suwałki Gap. In the event of its capture, the Baltic states would be surrounded by Russia, Russian-controlled territories, and Belarus, a Russian ally.[43]
Even if Belarus or Russia are not physically present in the corridor, it is narrow enough for the short-range rockets stationed in either country to target any military supplies coming through the corridor, while alternative routes of delivery, i.e. bysea or air, are also threatened by theanti-air andanti-ship missiles stationed in Kaliningrad Oblast.[44][45] Due to its strategic importance for NATO and the Baltic states, it has been described as one of NATO's hot spots,[2] its "Achilles' heel"[46] and dubbed the modern version of theFulda Gap.[47][48][49][50]
Initially, this vulnerability was of relatively little concern as, throughout most of the 1990s, Russia was stuck in a deepdepression, which necessitated large-scale cuts to the country's military budget.[17] Even though the army was of significant size, it was poorly equipped and had low military capabilities.[51]Russia–NATO relations were more cordial then, as Russia was not openly hostile to NATO, which was affirmed while signing the1997 Founding Act, and it was thought that Russia would eventually become apacifist democracy, decreasing its military and nuclear presence.[52][c] NATO's commitment not to build any permanent bases beyond theOder river therefore seemed reasonable.[47]
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The qualitative and quantitative improvement in armaments started with the rule ofVladimir Putin.[51] Short-range (500 km [310 mi])Iskander missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, were installed in 2018.[54][55] Additional installations were deployed in the late 2010s, including morearea denial weapons, such asK-300P Bastion-P andP-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles andS-400 anti-air missiles.[56][57][45]
In general, the importance of the corridor among the Western nations is said to have been initially underestimated due to the fact that Western countries sought to normalise relations with Russia.[6] Most of NATO's activities therefore concentrated on drills and exercises rather than deterrence.[58] The shift in policy occurred gradually afterRussia's aggression in Ukraine, which started in 2014.[44][59][60] After the2014 Wales summit and then the2016 Warsaw summit, NATO members agreed on more military presence in the eastern member states of the Alliance, which came to fruition as theNATO Enhanced Forward Presence.[61][62] In 2018, the Polish side proposed to station a permanentarmoured division in theBydgoszcz-Toruń area (dubbed "Fort Trump") with up to US$2 billion in financial support,[60] but NATO did not agree to it as it was afraid it would potentially run afoul of the 1997 Founding Act, which, among other things, constrains NATO's ability to build permanent bases next to the Suwałki Gap.[63][64]
While the permanent military base ultimately did not appear, the military situation around the region has been steadily escalating, and deterrence tactics seem only to have increased the concentration of firepower on both sides.[7] Several military drills, includingZapad 2017,Zapad 2021 and theUnion Resolve 2022 exercises in Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast and others that were unexpected,[7] and NATO's 2017 Iron Wolf exercises in Lithuania as well as some of the annualOperation Saber Strike operations,[65] occurred in areas close to the Suwałki Gap. Around 20,000 soldiers riding 3,500 military vehicles participated in the Dragon 24 NATO drill in Northern Poland.[66]
The Russian forces did not leave Belarus after the 2022 exercises andinvaded Ukraine from the north in February and March that year. As the war on NATO's eastern border unraveled, NATO dispatched more troops to its eastern flank,[67][68] though its representatives said it would not establish permanent presence on its eastern borders.[69] The situation around the area further intensified following Lithuania's declaration on banning the transit of sanctioned goods through its territory.[70] As the security situation rapidly worsened on the east, the Lithuanian andIcelandic ministers of foreign affairs said that Russia had effectively repudiated the 1997 agreement,[71] which was also indirectly suggested byMircea Geoană, NATO's Deputy Secretary General.[72]
However, by the end of 2023, several assessments found that the threat has become much smaller after the invasion began. They suggested that Russian troops getting bogged down in eastern and southern Ukraine, accession ofSweden andFinland to NATO and a change in the alliance's tactics that saw more troops deployed on NATO's borders meant that Russia was much less likely to start another war.[28][73]
As of spring 2022, units closest to the Suwałki Gap that belong to NATO or to its member states included:
In June 2022,Jens Stoltenberg,Secretary General of NATO, pledged more weapons and troops to the Baltic States, seeking to augment NATO's presence to abrigade in each of the Baltic states and Poland (3,000-5,000 troops in each country), while the NATO Response Force will be increased to 300,000 troops.[86]
Kaliningrad Oblast is a very heavily militarized area subordinate to the command of theWestern Military District.[87] Until the2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Western MD hosted the best equipment and army forces at Russian disposal.[88] In 1997–2010, the whole oblast was organised as aspecial region under a unified command of all forces dispatched there. Kaliningrad is the headquarters of theBaltic Fleet and the headquarters of the11th Army Corps (Russian Navy), which has ample air defence capabilities and whose divisions have undergone extensive modernisation in the late 2010s.[89]
According to Konrad Muzyka, who authored a detailed study on the district's forces, the units stationed in Kaliningrad permit medium-intensity combat in the area without support from the Russian mainland. The town ofGusev, in the eastern part of theoblast, just 50 km (31 mi) from the Vištytis tripoint, hosts the 79th Motor Rifle Brigade (BMP-2s and2S19 Msta self-propelled howitzers) and the 11th Tank Regiment (90 tanks, of which most areT-72B1s at least 23 are the more recent T-72B3s).[90][91]
Missile units are stationed on theChernyakhovsk air base (Iskander missile launchers), while the majority of air defence units (Smerch andBM-27 Uragan multiple rocket launchers) are located in the vicinity of Kaliningrad.[88] Kaliningrad also hosts capabilities to conductelectronic warfare,[88] in which the Russian forces have both inherited much experience from the Soviet times and earned it duringhybrid warfare operations such as inDonbas.[92]
Russia has not officially confirmed whether it hasnuclear warheads in the exclave, but Iskander missiles are known to be capable of carrying such weapons.[93] In 2018, theFederation of American Scientists published photos showing a weapons storage facility northwest of Kaliningrad being upgraded in a way that enables nuclear weapons storage.[94] In addition to that,Arvydas Anušauskas, the Lithuanian minister of defence, claimed that Russia already has these in the exclave.[95][96]
Belarus's military command, while formally independent as a military command of a sovereign state, has organisationally aligned itself with the Russian command and is in many respects wholly or substantially dependent on Russian defence institutions and contractors, while persistent underinvestment in its own military and deepening ties with its eastern neighbour left the military with low offensive capabilities, with the only feasible role being that of support of the main Russian forces.[97][98] For instance, the countries share the air defence system, including its command.[99]
There are relatively few units on the Belarusian side - the headquarters of the Western Operational Command (one of the two in Belarus) as well as the 6th Mechanised Brigade is in Grodno (S-300 anti-air missiles),[100] while air operations may be conducted from the military air base inLida.[98] They have received some Russian reinforcements ahead of Zapad-2021 exercises, including more S-300 missiles in Grodno,[101] and in early 2022, when S-400 missiles were installed inGomel Region. In May 2022,Alexander Lukashenko announced that he had bought Iskanders and S-400 missiles from the Russians.[102]
There is broad consensus among Western militarythink tanks that any hypothetical attack on NATO would involve an attempt to capture the Suwałki Gap and therefore to surround the Baltic states.[60] The reasons for the hypothetical attack are seen not to be primarily the occupation of the three former Soviet republics by Russia but to sow distrust in NATO's capabilities, to discredit the military alliance and to assert Russia's position as one of the major military powers.[7][60] A possible scenario for such a move was voiced byIgor Korotchenko [ru], a retired Russian colonel andstate TVpundit, who suggested that the Russians could take over the Suwałki Gap as well as theSwedish island ofGotland whilejamming NATO's radio signals, in order to establish effective military control over all possible supply routes to the Baltic states.[103] Another summary was presented by Franz-Stefan Gady of theInternational Institute for Strategic Studies, where he suggested that Russia would capture the Suwałki Gap and then force NATO to back downusing the threat of deploying nuclear weapons.[77]
Despite being shorter, the Polish side of the Suwałki Gap is unlikely to be used as the area of main concentration of these forces, according to these experts. A 2019 Russian paper indicated that the potential attack cutting off the Baltic states from NATO could be held north of the Suwałki Gap, in south-western Lithuania, due to better efficiencies for the Russian forces;[104][105] the same route was assumed in Zapad 2017[3][88] and Zapad 2021[106] military exercises. This is also an area of attack deemed more favourable by the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)[6] and theSwedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)[107] papers, as the terrain is flatter and less forested and thus easier for heavier troops. Faustyna Klocek was one of the few proposing that the attack would lie over Polish territory.[108]
Some analysts suggest another theory, namely that the importance of the Suwałki Gap is overblown.CNA's Michael Kofman compared the Suwałki Gap's to a "MacGuffin" (by itself unimportant but what he argues could be part of a frontline stretching for hundreds of kilometres) and arguing that previous analyses, which were necessarily limited, relied on a simplified view of the Russian military and did not sufficiently analyse itsdoctrine as a whole.[109] Franz-Stefan Gady, on the other hand, opined that if Russia's goal were to present afait accompli situation, it would be easier for Russia to capture any Baltic state rather than specifically the Suwałki Gap because the Russians would have to defend it against Poles and possibly Germans instead of the small armies of the Baltic states.[77] Alexander Lanoszka ofChatham House says that Russia has no interest in closing the gap, as the transit agreements are already good enough and invading NATO would create as many problems for Russia as NATO would have.[110] Fredrik Westerlund (FOI) had a similar point of view.[89]
During themigrant crisis on the eastern border of NATO and EU, there were concerns voiced by NATO and Ukrainian intelligence officials that Belarus would send migrants to the Suwałki Gap in order to destabilise the area, which in turn would give a pretext for Russia to introduce "peacekeeping" troops.[111] The Polish government's fear that Russia could potentially open up a migrant route via Kaliningrad Oblast culminated in a decision to build a fence on the border with the exclave, similar to the one Poland erected on the Belarusian border the previous year.[112] To some extent, these fears were justified after theWagner Group aborted therebellion in Russia and was thus exiled to Belarus. The mercenaries started training Belarusian soldiers in close proximity to the Polish border near the vulnerable area, which prompted thePolish Armed Forces to close some of the border crossings and send 10,000 reinforcement troops.[28]
Some of the initial assessments were grim about the prospect of the Baltic states. In 2016, theRAND Corporation ran simulations that suggested that with the NATO forces available at the time and despite less military presence in the area than in the Soviet times, an unexpected attack would have Russian troops enter or approachRiga andTallinn in 36–60 hours from the moment of the invasion. The think tank attributed the swift advance to the tactical advantage in the region, easier logistics for Russian troops, better maneuverability and an advantage in heavy equipment on Russia's side.[113][114] In general, the Russian Armed Forces, according to NATO's expectations, will try to overwhelm the Baltic states, cut off its only land route to the rest of NATO and force afait accompli situation before the Alliance's reinforcements are able to come by land (air reinforcements are much more expensive and are vulnerable to surface-to-air strikes), only to face a dilemma between surrendering the area to the invader and directly confronting Russian troops, potentially escalating the war to anuclear conflict.[107]
Ben Hodges, a retired US Army general who served as a high-ranking NATO commander and who co-authored a paper published by the CEPA[6] on the defence of the Suwałki Gap, said in 2018 that the Suwałki Gap was an area where "many (of) NATO's [...] weaknesses converge[d]". Following major setbacks in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Hodges revised his opinion towards a more positive tone, saying that NATO was much better prepared and could hold control over the area in case of an attack, particularly since Sweden and Finland would, in his opinion, likely help NATO despite at the time not being members of the alliance.[5] An EstonianMP estimated that Finland's membership in NATO, for whichthe accession protocol was signed in 2022, would make the security situation of the Baltic states more tenable thanks to an alternative corridor lying through the waters of theGulf of Finland, which could be enforced using the relatively robustFinnish Navy.[115] It was also suggested thatSwedish accession to NATO would finally grant NATO somestrategic depth in the area and otherwise facilitate the defence of the Baltic states.[116][117]
There appears to be strong support for Russia's invasion of the area among the Russians. A March 2022 survey by a Ukrainian pollster, which was concealing its identity while soliciting answers and which was asking questions using the Russian government-preferred rhetoric, reported that a large majority of Russians could support an invasion of another country should the "special military operation", as Russia officially calls the invasion of Ukraine, succeed, and that the most support for that invasion (three-quarters of those who did not abstain from an answer, and almost half of all respondents) would be against Poland, followed by the Baltic states.[118][119]
While the Suwałki Gap is a choke point, military analysts suggest that the fact that the region has abundant thick forests, streams and lakes means that the landscape facilitates defence against an invading force.[2][3][46] Additionally, the soil in the area makes it very hard to operate under rainy conditions as off-road areas or roads without a hard surface become impassablemud.[2] The Center for European Policy Analysis paper points out that the hilly and more forested terrain of the Polish part of the Suwałki Gap favours actions on the defensive side, such asambushes and holding entrenched positions;[6] at the same time, low density of roads that are largely not designed for carrying heavy cargo means that the few that remain available for the military may be easily blocked.[46]
The natural defences largely eliminate the need for additional military fortifications, and some of them, such as the one inBakałarzewo, have been converted to private museums.[46] On the other hand, this also means that once Russia is in possession of the corridor, which could happen if NATO reinforcements arrive late, it will be very hard to eject the Russians from the area.[120] These reports say that the conditions are unfavourable for heavy equipment, particularly in bad weather, though John R. Deni of theStrategic Studies Institute argued the terrain was generally fine for a tank offensive.[121]
The current Polish military doctrine underMariusz Błaszczak, thePolish Minister of Defence (MoD), is to concentrate the units close to theRussian andBelarusian borders in order to wage a defensive campaign in a similar way to the one Poland was conducting in September 1939.[122] There were two war games made to verify the scenario. In the first one, made in 2019, the USMarine Corps War College modelled a hypothetical scenario ofWorld War III.[123] The other one, codenamedZima-20, was conducted by the PolishWar Studies Academy on MoD's request in 2020. Most of its assumptions remain confidential,[124] but it is known that they include units with yet-to-be-delivered upgraded equipment that try to endure 22 days of defence against an invading force and, similarly to the American model, the military activities start in the Suwałki Gap and Poland tries to defendEastern Poland at all cost.[125]
Both results were catastrophic: in the American simulation, Polish units would incur about 60,000 casualties in the first day of war, and NATO and Russia would fare a battle that would prove very bloody to both sides, losing about half of the participating forces within 72 hours.[123] Zima-20's results, which are interpreted with some dose of caution, showed that by day 4 of the invasion, the Russians already advanced to theVistula river and fighting inWarsaw was underway, while by day 5, the Polish ports were rendered unusable for reinforcements or occupied, theNavy and theAir Force were obliterated despite NATO's assistance,[124] while the Polish units dispatched close to the border could lose as much as 60-80% of personnel and materiel.[126][d]
Very few locals are expected to endorse an invasion, in contrast towhat happened in Crimea in 2014, as the influence of the Russians in the area is not significant;[7] that said, Daniel Michalski's survey found that the region's local population is inadequately prepared for a hypothetical military conflict and that the area has next to no civilians immediately ready to engage in combat.[128] Regional tensions are such that some tourists are afraid to go there, though Andrzej Sęk and retired Col. Kazimierz Kuczyński say that such fears are likely unfounded as Russia's resources are being expended in Ukraine.[129] Additionally, the Russians may want to use the historic tensions between Poland and Lithuania to set them against each other.[113]
NATO's military doctrine assumes that its member states would have to hold the invasion for as long as NATO needs to send reinforcements to the attacked states, and in the meantime, NATO would operate on the terrain usingtripwire forces dispatched in the area.[6] There is no consensus about the right kind of forces and their mode of deployment near the Suwałki Gap that would best fit the doctrine, though the predominant thought goes that at least some forces or money to improve infrastructure should be sent to Poland.[60]
Among the analysts that took into account the Suwałki Gap vulnerability in their reports or opinion pieces, the majority argued that some form of permanent U.S. military presence in Poland should exist, and most of the reports agreed that the NATO (or American) units should be as mobile as practically possible.[130] TheWarsaw Institute argued that while it would be costly to maintain, the military base proposed by Poland in 2018 would be an effective deterrent for Russia and would ensure quick dispatches of U.S. forces to the Suwałki Gap if needed.[131]
Hunzeker and Lanoszka say that fears over the bottleneck are exaggerated, as are fears over Russian war against NATO, and they conclude that nothing should constrain the Alliance from attacking Kaliningrad Oblast or Belarus if the latter engages in the conflict, too.[132] They advocate for a permanent presence of U.S. military but with units dispersed all over Poland instead of one big military base, and crafted in a way that avoids as much Russian rebuke as possible.[133] Lanoszka separately suggests troops dispatched to Russian-minority areas inEstonia andLatvia instead, as he believes Russia is more likely to make a limited incursion on these areas.[110] Another report, by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), also suggested a permanent presence of onebrigade of NATO troops in each of the Baltic states.[134]
Hodgeset al., writing for CEPA, in principle supported an increased permanent presence of U.S. forces (including a divisional headquarters) but also said that NATO forces must be more mobile so that Russian troops have no chance to avoid the tripwire units. The report also recommended that more effort should be put into improving transport capabilities and reducing red tape between NATO's member states, noting that defending the Suwałki Gap is a much different challenge from that of theCold War-era Fulda Gap.[6] John R. Deni of the SSI echoed CEPA paper's arguments and argued that since Russia deployed a large contingent of Russian troops together with modern arms in Belarus just prior to the beginning of the full-scaleRussian invasion of Ukraine, NATO should disregard the 1997 Founding Act and start a dramatic increase of armaments and troop numbers near the Suwałki Gap and in the Baltic states.[121]
Some experts argued the opposite, i.e. that increased NATO presence may be detrimental for NATO. Nikolai Sokov of theJames Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, writing for the conservative outletThe National Interest, criticised the recommendations for ramping up military presence, arguing that Russia and NATO should learn to live with their own vulnerabilities in order to prevent anarms race.[135] Some people, includingDmitri Trenin ofCarnegie Moscow Center, said this had already been happening due to NATO's increased presence in the area.[136]
James J. Coyle of theAtlantic Council similarly argued thatthe West should not escalate by sending more troops to the immediate vicinity of the Suwałki Gap, but instead rely on efficient logistics in case of war.[137] Viljar Veebel and Zdzisław Śliwa, on the other hand, proposed that NATO should either deploy as many troops as it can while not paying attention to Russia's complaints about that or attempt to convince them (by escalating elsewhere, for example) not to reinforce their troops near the Suwałki Gap using means other than deterrence.[7]
Other NATO vulnerabilities:
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