Russians constitute the country's largestethnic minority in Ukraine. This community forms the largest single Russian community outside of Russia in the world. In the2001 Ukrainian census, 8,334,100 identified themselves as ethnic Russians (17.3% of the population of Ukraine); this is the combined figure for persons originating from outside of Ukraine and the Ukrainian-born population declaring Russian ethnicity.[1]
This article needs to beupdated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(January 2023)
Russian is the most commonfirst language in theDonbas andCrimea regions ofUkraine and the city ofKharkiv, and the predominant language in large cities in theeastern andsouthern portions of the country.[2] The usage and status of the language is the subject of political disputes.Ukrainian is the country's sole state language since the adoption of the1996 Constitution, which prohibits an official bilingual system at state level but also guarantees the free development, use and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities.[3] In 2017 a newLaw on Education was passed which restricted the use of Russian as a language of instruction.[3] Nevertheless, Russian remains a widely used language in Ukraine in pop culture and in informal andbusiness communication.[2]
Largest ethnicities in Ukraine's cities and raions, according to the 2001 census. Russians are in blue
Ethnic Russians live throughout Ukraine. They form a notable fraction of the overall population in the east and south, a significant minority in the center, and a smaller minority in the west.[1]
The west and the center of the country feature a higher percentage of Russians in cities and industrial centers and much smaller percentage in the overwhelmingly Ukrainophone rural areas.[1] Due to the concentration of the Russians in the cities, as well as for historic reasons, most of the largest cities in the center and the south-east of the country (includingKyiv where Russians amount to 13.1% of thepopulation)[1] remained largelyRussophone as of 2003[update].[4] Russians constitute the majority inCrimea (71.7% inSevastopol and 58.5% in theAutonomous republic of Crimea).[1]
In 1599, TsarBoris Godunov ordered the construction of Tsareborisov on the banks ofOskol River, the first city and the first fortress in Eastern Ukraine. To defend the territory from Tatar raids the Russians built theBelgorod defensive line (1635–1658), and Ukrainians started fleeing to be under its defense.
Sloboda UkraineThe regional concentration of the ethnic Russian population of Ukraine in 1897
MoreRussian speakers appeared in northern, central and eastern Ukrainian territories during the late 17th century, following theCossack Rebellion led byBohdan Khmelnytsky. The uprising led to a massive movement of Ukrainian settlers to theSloboda Ukraine region, which converted it from a sparsely inhabited frontier area to one of the major populated regions of theTsardom of Russia. Following theTreaty of Pereyaslav, Ukrainian Cossacks lands, including the modern northern and eastern parts of Ukraine, became a protectorate of the Tsardom of Russia. This brought the first significant, but still small, wave of Russian settlers into central Ukraine (primarily several thousand soldiers stationed in garrisons,[7] out of a population of approximately 1.2 million non-Russians).[8]
At the end of the 18th century, the Russian Empirecaptured large uninhabited steppe territories from the formerCrimean Khanate. The systematic colonization of lands in what became known asNovorossiya (mainlyCrimea,Taurida and aroundOdesa) began. Migrants from many ethnic groups (predominantly Ukrainians and Russians from Russia proper) came to the area.[9] At the same time, the discovery of coal in theDonets Basin also marked the commencement of a large-scale industrialization and an influx of workers from other parts of the Russian Empire.
Nearly all of the major cities of southern and eastern Ukraine were established or developed in this period: Aleksandrovsk (nowZaporizhzhia; 1770), Yekaterinoslav (nowDnipro; 1776),Kherson andMariupol (1778),Sevastopol (1783),Simferopol and Novoaleksandrovka (Melitopol) (1784), Nikolayev (Mykolaiv; 1789), Odessa (Odesa; 1794), Lugansk (Luhansk; foundation of Luhansk plant in 1795).
Both Russians and Ukrainians made up the bulk of the migrants – 31.8% and 42.0% respectively.[citation needed] The population of Novorossiya eventually became intermixed, and withRussification being the state policy, the Russian identity dominated in mixed families and communities. TheRussian Empire officially regarded Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians asLittle,Great andWhite Russians, which, according to the theory officially accepted in theImperial Russia, belonged to a single Russian nation, the descendants of the people ofKievan Rus.[citation needed]
The firstRussian Empire Census, conducted in 1897, showed extensive usage (and in some cases dominance) of the Little Russian, a contemporary term for theUkrainian language,[10] in the nine south-western Governorates andKuban. Thus, when theCentral Rada officials were outlining the future borders of the new Ukrainian state they took the results of the census in regards to the language and religion as determining factors. The ethnographic borders of Ukraine thus turned out to be almost twice as large as the originalBohdan KhmelnytskyState incorporated into theRussian Empire during the 17-18th centuries.[11]
DuringWorld War I, a strong national movement managed to obtain some autonomous rights from the Russian government inSaint Petersburg. However, theOctober Revolution brought big changes for the newRussian Republic. Ukraine became a battleground between the two main Russian war factions during theRussian Civil War (1918–1922), the Communist Reds (Red Army) and the Anti-Bolshevik Whites (Volunteer Army).
The Russian SFSR government supported military intervention against theUkrainian People's Republic, which at different periods controlled most of the territory of present-day Ukraine with the exception of Crimea and Western Ukraine.[8] Although there were differences between Ukrainian Bolsheviks initially,[12] which resulted in the proclamation of several Soviet Republics in 1917, later, due in large part to pressure fromVladimir Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders, oneUkrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed.
The Ukrainian SSR wasde jure a separate state until the formation of the USSR in 1922 and survived until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Lenin insisted that ignoring the national question in Ukraine would endanger the support of the Revolution among the Ukrainian population and thus new borders of Soviet Ukraine were established to the extent that theUkrainian People's Republic was claiming in 1918.[8] The new borders completely includedNovorossiya (including the short-livedDonetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic) and other neighboring provinces, which contained a substantial number of ethnic Russians.
In his 1923 speech devoted to the national and ethnic issues in the party and state affairs,Joseph Stalin identified several obstacles in implementing the national program of the party. Those were the "dominant-nation chauvinism", "economic and cultural inequality" of the nationalities and the "survivals of nationalism among a number of nations which have borne the heavy yoke of national oppression".[13]
In Ukraine's case, both threats came, respectively, from the south and the east: Novorossiya with its historically strong Russian cultural influence, and the traditional Ukrainian center and west. These considerations brought about a policy ofUkrainization, to simultaneously break the remains of theGreat Russian attitude and to gain popularity among the Ukrainian population, thus recognizing their dominance of the republic.[14] The Ukrainian language was mandatory for most jobs, and its teaching became compulsory in all schools.
By the early 1930s attitudes towards the policy of Ukrainization had changed within the Soviet leadership. In 1933 Stalin declared that local nationalism was the main threat to Soviet unity.[8] Consequently, many changes introduced during the Ukrainization period were reversed: Russian language schools, libraries and newspapers were restored and even increased in number. Changes were brought territorially as well, forcing the Ukrainian SSR to cede some territories to the RSFSR. Thousands of ethnic Ukrainians were deported to the far east of the Soviet Union, numerous villages with Ukrainian majority were eliminated withHolodomor, while remaining Ukrainians were subjected to discrimination.[15][16] During this period parents in the Ukrainian SSR could choose to send their children whose native language was not Ukrainian to schools with Russian as the primary language of instruction.
The territory of Ukraine was one of the main battlefields duringWorld War II, and its population, including Russians, significantly decreased. The infrastructure was heavily damaged and it required human and capital resources to be rebuilt. This compounded with depopulation caused by two faminesof 1931–1932 and a third in 1947 to leave the territory with a greatly reduced population. A large portion of the wave of new migrants to industrialize, integrate and Sovietize the recently acquired western Ukrainian territories were ethnic Russians who mostly settled around industrial centers and military garrisons.[17] This increased the proportion of the Russian speaking population.
Near the end of the War, the entire population ofCrimean Tatars (numbering up to a quarter of a million) wasexpelled from their homeland in Crimea toCentral Asia, under accusations of collaborations with Germans.[18][19] The Crimea was repopulated by the new wave of Russian and Ukrainian settlers and the Russian proportion of the population of Crimea went up significantly (from 47.7% in 1937 to 61.6% in 1993) and the Ukrainian proportion doubled (12.8% in 1937 and 23.6% in 1993).[20]
The Ukrainian language remained a mandatory subject of study in all Russian schools, but in many government offices preference was given to the Russian language that gave an additional impetus to the advancement ofRussification. The 1979 census showed that only one third of ethnic Russians spoke the Ukrainian language fluently.[8]
In 1954, thePresidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued the decree on thetransfer of the Crimean Oblast from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. This action increased the ethnic Russian population of Ukraine by almost a million people. Many Russian politicians considered the transfer to be controversial.[21] Controversies and legality of the transfer remained a sore point in relations between Ukraine and Russia for a few years, and in particular in the internal politics in Crimea. However, in a 1997 treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Russia recognized Ukraine's borders and accepted Ukraine's sovereignty over Crimea.[8]
This article needs to beupdated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(August 2020)
TheRussian Cultural Center in Lviv has been attacked and vandalized on several occasions. On January 22, 1992, it was raided byUNA-UNSO led by a member of theLviv Oblast Council.[22]According to the2001 Ukrainian Census the percentage of Russian population tends to be higher in the east and south in the country.[1]
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine became an independent state. This independence was supported by thereferendum in all regions of Ukrainian SSR, including those with large Russian populations.[23] A study of theNational Academy of Sciences of Ukraine found that in 1991, 75% of ethnic Russians in Ukraine no longer identified themselves with theRussian nation.[24] In theDecember 1991 Ukrainian independence referendum 55% of the ethnic Russians in Ukraine voted for independence.[25]
The return ofCrimean Tatars has resulted in several high-profile clashes over land ownership and employment rights.[26]
In 1994 a referendum took place in theDonetsk Oblast and theLuhansk Oblast, with around 90% supporting theRussian language gaining status of an official language alongsideUkrainian, and for theRussian language to be an official language on a regional level; however, the referendum was annulled by theKyiv government.[27][28]
Much controversy has surrounded the reduction of schools with Russian as their main language of instruction. In 1989, there were 4,633 schools with Russian as the main instruction language, and by 2001 this number fell to 2,001 schools or 11.8% of the total in the country.[29] A significant number of these Russian schools were converted into schools in with both Russian and Ukrainian language classes. By 2007, 20% of pupils in public schools studied in Russian classes.[30]
Some regions such asRivne Oblast have no schools with Russian only instruction left, but only Russian classes provided in the mixed Russian-Ukrainian schools.[31] As of May 2007, only seven schools with Russian as the main language of instruction are left in Kyiv, with 17 more mixed language schools totaling 8,000 pupils,[32] with the rest of the pupils attending the schools with Ukrainian being the only language of instruction. Among the latter pupils, 45,700 (or 18% of the total) study the Russian language as a separate subject[32] in the largely Russophone Ukrainian capital,[4][33] although an estimated 70 percent of Ukraine's population nationwide consider that Russian should be taught at secondary schools along with Ukrainian.[34]
TheRussian Cultural Center in Lviv has been attacked and vandalized on several occasions. On January 22, 1992, it was raided byUNA-UNSO led by the member ofLviv Oblast Council.[22] UNA-UNSO members searched the building, partially destroyed archives and pushed people out from the building.[22] Their attackers declared that everything in Ukraine belonged to the Ukrainians, so the Russians and theJews were not allowed to reside or have property there.[22] The building was vandalized during the Papal Visit to Lviv in 2001,[35] then in 2003 (5 times),[36][37] 2004 (during theOrange Revolution[38]), 2005,[39][40] 2006.[41]
After theEuromaidan events,[42] regions with a large ethnic Russian populations became the scene ofAnti-Maidan protests and Russian-backed separatist activity. After beingseized byRussian unmarked troops, theSupreme Council of Crimea announced the2014 Crimean referendum, and sent a request toRussia to send military forces into theCrimea to "protect" the local population from Euromaidan protesters, which marked the beginning of theRussian annexation of Crimea. MajorAnti-Maidan protests took place in otherRussian speaking major cities likeDonetsk,Odesa, andKharkiv. After the elected regional parliament of theDonetsk Oblast refused to comply with the demands of the pro-Russian protesters, the secessionists decided to create their own council consisting of unelected separatist individuals, which in its first session voted to conduct a referendum on deciding the future of the region.[43]
On 3 March, a number of people, including Russian nationals with "clear Russian accents", who referred to themselves as "tourists", started storming theregional administration building inDonetsk, waving Russian flags and shouting ″Russia!″ and ″Berkut are heroes!″. The police was not able to offer much resistance, and was quickly overrun by the crowd.[44][45][46] The regional council inLuhansk, in which theparty of ousted pro-Russian presidentViktor Yanukovich held an absolute majority, voted to demand granting theRussian language the status as second official language, stopping ″the persecution ofBerkut fighters″, disarming Maidan self-defense units and banning a numberfar-right political organizations likeSvoboda andUNA-UNSO. If the authorities failed to comply with the demands, the Oblast council reserved itself the ″right to ask for help from the brotherly people of the Russian Federation.″[47]
The pro-Russian protests inDonetsk andLuhanskoblasts of the 2014 pro-Russian conflict inUkraine escalated into an armed separatist insurgency, which was backed by Russianspecial andregular forces.[48][49][50][51][52] This led the Ukrainian government to launch a military counter-offensive against the insurgents in April 2014. During this war, major cities likeLuhansk andDonetsk[53] have seen heavy shelling.[54][55] According to the United Nations, 730,000refugees from the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts have fled to Russia since the beginning of 2014.[56] Approximately 14,200 people, including 3,404 civilians,have died from 2014-2022 because of the war.
Ruslan Stefanchuk, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, said that there is no "Russian ethnic minority" in Ukraine and that "if these people show aggression rather than respect towards Ukraine, then their rights should be correspondingly suppressed."[57]
In total, according to a 2007 country-wide survey by the Institute of Sociology, only 0.5% of the respondents describe as belonging to a group that faces discrimination by language.[58]: 133–135 Furthermore, in a poll held October 2008, 42.8% of the Ukrainian respondents said they regard Russia as “very good” while 44.9% said their attitude was “good" (87% positive).[59]
According to the Institute of Sociology surveys conducted yearly between 1995 and 2005, the percentage of respondents who have encountered cases of ethnic-based discrimination against Russians during the preceding year has consistently been low (mostly in single digits), with no noticeable difference when compared with the number of incidents directed against any other nation, including the Ukrainians and the Jews.[60] According to the 2007 Comparative Survey of Ukraine and Europe only 0.1% of Ukrainian residents consider themselves belonging to a group which is discriminated by nationality.[58]: 156 However, by April 2017 in a public opinion survey conducted by Rating Group Ukraine, 57 percent of Ukrainians polled expressed a very cold or cold attitude toward Russia, as opposed to only 17 percent who expressed a very warm or warm attitude.[61]
Some surveys indicate that Russians are not socially distanced in Ukraine. The indicator of the willingness of Ukraine's residents to participate in social contacts of varying degrees of closeness with different ethnic groups (theBogardus Social Distance Scale) calculated based on the yearly sociological surveys has been consistently showing that Russians are, on the average, least socially distanced within Ukraine except the Ukrainians themselves.[62] The same survey has shown that, in fact, that Ukrainian people are slightly more comfortable accepting Russians into their families than they are acceptingUkrainians living abroad.[62] Such social attitude correlates with the political one as the surveys taken yearly between 1997 and 2005 consistently indicated that the attitude to the idea of Ukraine joining the union of Russia and Belarus is more positive (slightly over 50%) than negative (slightly under 30%).[63]
Since Dignity Revolution the Russian government dramatically increased the anti-opposition campaign which resulted in politically motivated cases against Russian liberal opposition. As a result, many notable Russians moved to Ukraine to avoid political prosecution in Russia.[citation needed]
According to the statistics presented by the United Nation's Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in 2014 approximately 140 Russians applied for political asylum in Ukraine. In the first six months of 2015 this number grew by fifty people more.[64]
In the same time Ukrainian migration policies are complicated and limit the number of Russians who can successfully apply for a refugee status.[citation needed]
According to 2006 survey by Research & Branding Group (Donetsk) 39% of Ukrainian citizens think that the rights of the Russophones are violated because the Russian language is not official in the country, whereas 38% of the citizens have the opposite position.[73][74] According to annual surveys by the Institute of Sociology of theNational Academy of Sciences 43.9% to 52.0% of the total population of Ukraine supports the idea of granting the status of state language to Russian.[34] At the same time, this is not viewed as an important issue by most of Ukraine's citizens. On a cross-national survey involving ranking the 30 important political issues, the legal status of the Russian language was ranked 26th, with only 8% of respondents (concentrated primarily in Crimea and Donetsk) feeling that this was an important issue.[75]
Russian continues to dominate in several regions and in Ukrainian businesses, in leading Ukrainian magazines, and other printed media.[76]Russian language in Ukraine still dominates the everyday life in some areas of the country.
On February 23, 2014, theUkrainian parliament adopted a bill to repeal the 2012law on minority languages, which—if signed by the Ukrainian president—would have established Ukrainian as the soleofficial state language of all Ukraine, including Crimea which is populated by a Russian-speaking majority.[77] Repeal of the law was met with great disdain in Southern and Eastern Ukraine.[78]The Christian Science Monitor reported: "The [adoption of this bill] only served to infuriate Russian-speaking regions, [who] saw the move as more evidence that the antigovernment protests in Kiev that toppled Yanukovich's government were intent on pressing for anationalistic agenda."[79] A proposal to repeal the law was vetoed on 28 February 2014 by acting presidentOleksandr Turchynov.[80] On 28 February 2018 theConstitutional Court of Ukraine ruled the 2012 law on minority languages unconstitutional.[81]
On September 25, 2017, a new law on education was signed by PresidentPetro Poroshenko (draft approved by Rada on September 5, 2017) which says thatUkrainian language is the language of education at all levels except for one or more subjects that are allowed to be taught in two or more languages, namelyEnglish or one of the otherofficial languages of the European Union.[82] The law faced criticism from officials in Russia and Hungary.[83] According to theNew Europe:
The latest row between Kiev and Budapest comes on the heels of a bitter dispute over a decision by Ukraine’s parliament – the Verkhovna Rada – to pass a legislative package on education that bars primary education to all students in any language but Ukrainian. The move has been widely condemned by the international community as needlessly provocative as it forces the historically bilingual population of 45 million people who use Russian and Ukrainian interchangeably as mother tongues to become monolingual.[84]
TheUnian reported that "A ban on the use of cultural products, namely movies, books, songs, etc., in the Russian language in the public has been introduced" in theLviv Oblast in September 2018.[85]
Some authors born in Ukraine who write in the Russian language, notablyMarina and Sergey Dyachenko andVera Kamsha, were born in Ukraine, but moved to Russia at some point. Marina and Sergey Dyachenko later moved to California.
In March 2022, during theSiege of Mariupol, Mariupol's deputy mayor Serhiy Orlov said that "Half of those killed by Russian bombing are Russian-origin Ukrainians."[86]
In general the population of ethnic Russians in Ukraine increased due to assimilation and in-migration between 1897 and 1939 despite the famine, war and Revolution. Since 1991 it has decreased drastically in all regions, both quantitatively and proportionally. Ukraine in general lost 3 million Russians, or a little over one-quarter of all Russians living there in the 10-year period between 1991 and 2001, dropping from over 22% of the population of Ukraine to just over 17%. In the past 22 years since 2001, a further drop of Russian numbers has continued.[citation needed]
Several factors have affected this – most Russians lived in urban centres in Soviet times and thus were hit the hardest by the economic hardships of the 1990s. Some chose to emigrate from Ukraine to (mostly) Russia or to the West. Finally some of those who were counted as Russians in Soviet times declared themselves Ukrainian during the last census.[87]
The Russian population is also hit by the factors that affected all the population of Ukraine, such as low birth rate and high death rate.[88]
2001 census showed that 95.9% of Russians in Ukraine consider the Russian language to be native for them, 3.9% named Ukrainian to be their native language.[89] The majority, 59.6%[90] of Ukrainian Russians were born in Ukraine. They constitute 22.4% of all urban population and 6.9% of rural population in the country.[90]
Women make up 55.1% of Russians, men are 44.9%.[90] The average age of Russians in Ukraine is 41.9 years.[90] The imbalance in sexual and age structure intensifies in western and central regions.[90] In these regions the Russians are concentrated in the industrial centers, particularly the oblast centres.[90]
Political parties whose electoral platforms are crafted specifically to cater to the Russian voters' sentiments fared exceptionally well. Until the2014 Ukrainian parliamentary election several ofUkraine's elections,[94] political parties that call for closer ties with Russia received a higher percentage of votes in the areas where Russian-speaking population predominate.
In 2014, there were political parties and movements in Ukraine that advocated a pro-Russian policy, and pro-Russian political organizations.[112][113] Many of these were opposed to Ukrainian independence and openly advocated for the restoration of theRussian Empire.[114] Few in number, they generated media coverage and political commentary.[115][116]
The actions organized by these organizations are most visible in the Ukrainian part of historicNovorossiya (New Russia) in the south of Ukraine and in the Crimea, a region in which in some areas Russians are the largest ethnic group. As ethnic Russians constitute a significant part of the population in these largelyRussophone parts of southern Ukraine (and a majority in the Crimea),[1] these territories maintain particularly strong historic ties with Russia on the human level. Thus, a stronger than elsewhere in the country pro-Russian political sentiment makes the area a more fertile ground for the radical pro-Russian movements that are not as common elsewhere in the country.[citation needed]
As of December 2009 clashes betweenUkrainian nationalists and pro-Russian organisations do sometimes take place.[117]
Among such movements are the youth organizations, theProryv (literally theBreakthrough) and theEurasian Youth Movement (ESM).[118] Both movements' registration and legal status have been challenged in courts; and the leader of Proryv, a Russian citizen, was expelled from Ukraine, declaredpersona non grata and barred from entering the country again.[citation needed]Alexander Dugin, the Moscow-based leader of the ESM and his associatePavel Zariffulin have also been barred from travelling to Ukraine because of their involvement in the activities of these organizations, although bans have been later lifted and reinstated again.[119]
These movements openly state their mission as the disintegration of Ukraine and restoration of Russia within the borders of the former Russian Empire[114] and, reportedly, have received regular encouragement and monetary support from Russia's politically connected businessmen.[120] These organizations have been known not only for their pro-Russian activities, but have been also accused of organising massive acts of protest.[121]
The pro-Russian organizationProryv was involved in the2006 anti-NATO protests in Crimea.[122] This photo taken on June 11, 2006, inFeodosiya features typical for this organization protesters' banners with pro-Russian and anti-Western rhetoric. Banners claim the solidarity ofBakhchisaray,Kerch,Odesa,Kharkiv with Feodosian protesters. Others say: "The future of Ukraine is in the union with Russia", "Crimea and Russia: the strength lies in unity", "Russia – friend,NATO – enemy", "Shame to traitors."
Some observers point out the Russian government and theRussian Orthodox Church's support of these movements and parties in Ukraine, especially in Crimea.[123] The publications and protest actions of these organizations feature strongly pro-Russian and radically anti-NATO messages, invoking the rhetoric of "Ukrainian-Russian historic unity", "NATO criminality", and other similar claims.[citation needed]
Some observers link the resurgence of radical Russian organizations in Ukraine withKremlin's fear that theOrange Revolution in Ukraine could be exported to Russia, and addressing that possibility has been at the forefront of these movements' activities.[124]
As a branch of a similar Russian organization theEurasian Youth Union (ESM) has been organizing annualRussian Marches. The November 2006 "Russian march" in Kyiv, the capital, gathered 40 participants, but after the participants attacked the riot police, it was forced to interfere and several participants from were arrested.[125]InOdesa and Crimean cities the November 2006 "Russian marches" drew more participants, with 150–200 participants in Odesa,[125] and 500 inSimferopol[125] and went more peacefully. The marchers were calling for theUkrainian andRussian Orthodox Church unity as well as the national unity between Russia and Ukraine. In Odesa the march of about 200 people carried anti-Western, pro-Russian slogans and religious symbols.[126][127]
In March 2022, shortly after the start of theRussian invasion of Ukraine, a poll found that 82% of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine said they did not believe that any part of Ukraine was rightfully part of Russia. The poll did not involve respondents from Crimea or the separatist-controlled part of Donbas.[128] 65% of Ukrainians—including 88% of those of Russian ethnicity—agreed that "despite our differences there is more that unites ethnic Russians living in Ukraine and Ukrainians than divides us".[128]
Notable Ukrainians of full or partial Russian ancestry
Leonid Toptunov, Soviet electrical engineer who was the senior reactor control chief engineer at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Reactor Unit 4 on the night of the Chernobyl disaster, 26 April 1986
Aleksandr Akimov, Soviet engineer who was the supervisor of the shift that worked at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Reactor Unit 4 on the night of the Chernobyl disaster, 26 April 1986
Nikolai Fomin, chief engineer of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant from 1981 until the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986
Viktor Bryukhanov, manager of construction of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and the director of the plant from 1970 to 1986
Pavlo Klimkin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2014-2019)
Dmytro Lunin, businessman and statesman, who served as the acting governor of Poltava Oblast 24 December 2021 to 10 October 2023
Yevhen Kushnaryov, former mayor of Kharkov, Governor of the Kharkov Oblast, Chief of Staff to the President of Ukraine, and Deputy to the Verkhovna Rada.
Oleksandr Novikov, law enforcement officer, former Head of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) from 2020 to 2024, former prosecutor since 2004, including at the Office of the Prosecutor General from 2012 to 2020
Volodymyr Horbulin, Secretary of National Security and Defense Council (1994–1999, 2006)
Andrei Ivanov, member of the Presidium and the secretary of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and a delegate of the XII and XIII Party Congresses
Yuliya Lyovochkina, People's Deputy, served in the Verkhovna Rada from 2007 to 2022
Serhiy Teryokhin, Minister of Economy of Ukraine from 4 February to 27 September 2005, Batkivshchyna Party member
Vyacheslav Ovechkin, 1st Deputy Head of the Odesa Regional State Administration
Andriy Klyuyev, 2nd Head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine
Serhiy Sobolev, member of the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) and acting Batkivshchyna faction leader
Yevheniy Murayev, leader of the now-banned political party Nashi
Vladimir Maltsev, People's Deputy of Ukraine, member of the Party of Regions (since November 2007), a member of the Committee on Justice (December 2007)
Volodymyr Malyshev, colonel-general of militia of Ukraine, People's deputy of Ukraine of the V-th, VI-th, VII-th convocations (2006-2014), Doctor of Law (2013), Honored Lawyer of Ukraine (1997)
Ihor Yeremeyev, People's Deputy of Ukraine of the 4th, 7th and 8th convocation (non-partisan, Chairman of the Deputy Group "People's Will")
Serhiy Klyuyev, businessman and a former member of the Ukrainian Parliament
Oleksandr Ponomaryov, People's Deputy of Ukraine since 12 December 2012 from Ukraine's 78th electoral district, representing south-easternZaporizhzhia Oblast
Serhiy Kaplin, People's Deputy of Ukraine of the VIIth (candidate from UDAR) and VIIIth (candidate from Petro Poroshenko Bloc) convocations, and the leader of the Social Democratic Party
Oleksiy Azarov, First Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Finance and Banking, People's Deputy of Ukraine, and a member of the Party of Regions faction in the Verkhovna Rada of the VII convocation
Serhii Kivalov, politician and jurist who served as the head of Central Election Commission during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election which led to the Orange Revolution
Iryna Venediktova, Prosecutor General of Ukraine (17 March 2020 – 19 July 2022)
Iryna Suslova, People's Deputy of Ukraine (27 November 2014 – 29 August 2019)
Mykhailo Papiyev, former Minister of Labour and Social Policy, serving from 2002 to 2005 and from 2006 to 2007.
Ivan Lyakhov, Member of the Verkhovna Rada (1990–1994)
Mykola Popov, Member of the Verkhovna Rada from 1990 to 1994
Serhiy Yefremov, the deputy head of the Central Council of Ukraine (1917)
Iryna Akimova, politician and former First Deputy Head of Presidential Administration of Ukraine
Hanna Antonieva, People's Deputy of Ukraine of the 3rd and 4th convocationsconvocations
Volodymyr Ariev, Member of Parliament of Ukraine since 2007, chairman of Ukrainian delegation in Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2015–2019, PACE Vice-President (2015, 2018), President of PACE Committee for Culture, Education, Science and Media (2016–2017)
Stanislav Arzhevitin, Chairman of the Association of Ukrainian Banks, and People's Deputy of Verkhovna Rada
Aleksey Baburin, People's Deputy of Ukraine, and member of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Verkhovna Radas, member of the Communist Party of Ukraine
Nina Karpachova, Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights from 1998 until 2012
Borys Kolesnikov, leader of the political party Ukraine is Our Home
Vitaliy Kononov, environmental activist who served as a People's Deputy of Ukraine from the Party of Greens of Ukraine from 1998 to 2002, heading the party's electoral list
Vyacheslav Boguslayev, engineer, businessman, and politician, former member of the Party of Regions, People's Deputy of Ukraine from 2006 to 2019
Pavlo Burlakov, Member of the Liberal Party of Ukraine (1995–2005)
Ivan Gerasymov, former deputy in the Verkhovna Rada, was a member of the Communist Party of Ukraine
Yurii Karmazin, politician and judge, served four terms as a People's Deputy of Ukraine
Leonid Klimov, member of the Party of Regions in Verkhovna Rada (from November 2007) and a member of the Committee on National Security and Defense (from December 2007)
Serhiy Larin, member of the Ukrainian parliament since 1998 for the People's Democratic Party, For United Ukraine! (2002), Party of Regions (2006, 2007), Opposition Bloc (2014), and Opposition Platform — For Life (2019)
Mykhailo Pozhyvanov, politician who served as the Deputy Minister of Economy from 2008 to 2010
Andriy Portnov, Member of Parliament (25 May 2006 – 16 April 2010)
Viktor Topolov, 6th Minister of Coal Industry of Ukraine (18 August 2005 – 4 August 2006)
Yuriy Chertkov, people's deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine V (2006–2007), VI (2007–2012), and VII (2012–2014) convocations, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (since 12.2007)
Oleksandr Tretiakov, People's Deputy of Ukraine of the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th convocations
Maksym Polyakov, politician, economist and public figure, served on Uman City Council as Deputy Mayor for Economic Activities from 2011 to 2012
Artur Herasymov, the leader of the then-Petro Poroshenko Bloc parliamentary faction from 2017 to 2019
Olga Bielkova, former Member of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) from 2012 until June 2020
Olha Chervakova, People's Deputy of Ukraine in the eighth convocation
Yehor Soboliev, elected to the Verkhovna Rada in the October 2014 Ukrainian parliamentary election, appearing 13th on the party list of Self Reliance
Tetiana Ostrikova, member of parliament of Ukraine of the 8th convocation, Member of the parliamentary faction Samopomich Union
Anna Romanova, former Member of the Ukrainian Parliament, member of the parliamentary faction Samopomich Union, former deputy mayor ofChernihiv
Oleksiy Ryabchyn, People's Deputy of Ukraine (27 November 2014 – 24 July 2019), Deputy Minister for Energy and Environmental Protection of Ukraine (12 October 2019 – 27 May 2020)
Ihor Zhdanov, politician who served as the Minister of Youth and Sports in both the Yatsenyuk Government and in the Groysman Government
Tetiana Rychkova, People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 27th electoral district from 2016 to 2019
Oleh Kryshyn, People's Deputy of Ukraine of the 8th convocation
Maxim Efimov, former People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 48th electoral district from 2014 to December 2023
Volodymyr Areshonkov, People's Deputy of Ukraine and Honored Worker of Education of Ukraine (2017)
Anastasiya Radina, politician who is a who is currently a member of the Verkhovna Rada since 29 August 2019 from the Servant of the People party
Yehor Cherniev, People's Deputy of Ukraine from the Servant of the People party in the Verkhovna Rada, number 26 on the party's list
Maryna Bardina, People's Deputy of Ukraine of the 9th convocation
Yulia Ovchynnykova, People's Deputy of Ukraine from the "Servant of the People" party
Denys Maslov, judge, lawyer, politician and Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Legal Policy (since July 2022)
Oleh Voloshyn, political pundit on 112 Ukraine, politician, and former government official under Ukrainian prime ministers Mykola Azarov and Viktor Yanukovych
Tetiana Plachkova, People's Deputy elected to the Verkhovna Rada in 2019
Oleksandra Ustinova, public activist serving as a People's Deputy of Ukraine from the proportional list of the Holos party since 2019
Serhiy Rakhmanin, journalist and politician currently serving as a People's Deputy of Ukraine on the proportional list of the Holos party since 2019
Andriy Sharaskin, People's Deputy of Ukraine from the proportional list of the Holos party since 2020
Iryna Borzova, People's Deputy of Ukraine of the IX convocation
Viacheslav Rublyov, People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 20th electoral district since 29 August 2019 as a member of Servant of the People
Andriy Aksyonov, member of the Verkhovna Rada, the national parliament of Ukraine
Oleksandr Kovalov, People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 51st electoral district since 29 August 2019
Serhiy Kuzminykh, People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 67th electoral district since 29 August 2019
Maryna Nikitina, People's Deputy of Ukraine representing Ukraine's 82nd electoral district as a member of Servant of the People since 2019
Oleksiy Kuznyetsov, politician and businessman, who is currently a member of the Verkhovna Rada of the 9th convocation
Oleksandr Lukashev, People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 113th electoral district since 29 August 2019
Ihor Kopytin, People's Deputy of Ukraine representing Ukraine's 129th electoral district as a member of Servant of the People since 2019
Artem Chornomorov, People's Deputy of Ukraine representing Ukraine's 131st electoral district as a member of Servant of the People since 2019
Maksym Dyrdin, People's Deputy of Ukraine representing Ukraine's 132nd electoral district, as a member of Servant of the People since 2019
Oleh Koliev, People's Deputy of Ukraine representing Ukraine's 134th electoral district from Servant of the People since 2019
Oleksiy Leonov, People's Deputy of Ukraine representing Ukraine's 162nd electoral district from Servant of the People since 29 August 2019
Serhiy Koleboshyn, People's Deputy of Ukraine, representing Ukraine's 140th electoral district as a member of Servant of the People since 29 August 2019
Dmytro Nalotov, People's Deputy of Ukraine representing Ukraine's 144th electoral district from Servant of the People since 2019
Maksym Berezin, People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 151st electoral district in northern Poltava Oblast since 2019
Roman Ivanisov, politician and convicted child rapist currently serving as a People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 153rd electoral district since 29 August 2019, at first as a member of Servant of the People and currently as an independent since 2019
Ihor Serhiyovych Vasylyev, politician, in 2019 elected for the Servant of the People in the 9th Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada
Maria Mezentseva, politician, was elected to Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, in 2019
Oleksandr Bakumov, Ukrainian soldier, professor, and politician currently serving as a People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 173rd electoral district since 29 August 2019
Yevhen Pyvovarov, professor and politician currently serving as a People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 175th electoral district since 29 August 2019
Oleksiy Krasov, People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 180th electoral district since 29 August 2019
Volodymyr Ivanov, People's Deputy of Ukraine from Ukraine's 185th electoral district since 29 August 2019
Mykhailo Fedorov, politician and businessman, served as a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister Digital Transformation from 2019 to March 2023
Ihor Kolykhaiev, former People's Deputy of Ukraine, elected in the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary election
Valentyna Astakhova, historian, doctor of historical sciences (1981), professor (1983), academician of the Academy of Sciences of the Higher School of Ukraine (2004), advisor to the rector, former rector of Kharkiv Humanitarian University People's Ukrainian Academy
Denis Ivanov, producer, film distributor, cultural manager, TV presenter, head of the Arthouse Traffic film company, member of the European Film Academy and National Union of Cinematographers of Ukraine, founder of the Odesa International Film Festival and «Children Kinofest» – International Film Festival for children and teenagers (Ukraine)
Leonid Bykov, Soviet actor, film director, and script writer
Vitaly Zholobov, retired Soviet cosmonaut who flew onSoyuz 21 space flight as the flight engineer
^abIn the 2003 sociological survey in Kyiv the answers to the question 'What language do you use in everyday life?' were distributed as follows: 'mostly Russian': 52%, 'both Russian and Ukrainian in equal measure': 32%, 'mostly Ukrainian': 14%, 'exclusively Ukrainian': 4.3%. "What language is spoken in Ukraine?". Welcome to Ukraine. February 2003..
^V.M. Kabuzan: The settlement of Novorossiya (Yekaterinoslav and Taurida guberniyas) in 18th–19th centuries. Published byNauka, Moscow, 1976. Available on-line at Dnipropetervosk Oblast Universal Science Library,Retrieved 15 November 2007
^1897 Census on Demoscope.ruRetrieved on 20th May 2007.
^Kulchitsky, Stanislav."Імперія та ми" [Empire and we].day.kyiv.ua (in Ukrainian). Retrieved2023-07-29.
^"National Factors in Party and State Affairs – Theses for the Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Approved by the Central Committee of the Party".URL
^Терлюк І.Я. Росіяни західних областей України (1944–1996 р.р.) (Етносоціологічне дослідження). – Львів: Центр Європи, 1997.- С.25.
^J. Otto Pohl, "The Stalinist Penal System: A Statistical History of Soviet Repression and Terror, 1930–1953",McFarland, 1997,ISBN0-7864-0336-5,Selected pages
^Directory of resources on minority human rights and related problems of the transition period in Eastern and Central Europe. Demographic Balance and Migration Processes in Crimea.Retrieved June 3, 2007
^Our Security Predicament, Vladimir P. Lukin, Foreign Policy, No. 88 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 57–75
^abcdСокуров С. А. Очерки истории русского национально-культурного движения в Галиции (1988–1993 годы) – М.: "Клуб «Реалисты», 1999. – C. 8ISBN966-7617-65-3
^According to a 2006 survey, Ukrainian is used at home by 23% of Kyivans, as 52% use Russian and 24% switch between both. "Kyiv: the city, its residents, problems of today, wishes for tomorrow.",Zerkalo Nedeli, April 29 – May 12, 2006.in RussianArchived 2007-02-17 at theWayback Machine,in UkrainianArchived 2007-02-17 at theWayback Machine
^Buckley, Neil; Olearchyk, Roman; Jack, Andrew; Hille, Kathrin (2014-04-16)."Ukraine's 'little green men' carefully mask their identity".Financial Times. Archived fromthe original on March 21, 2022. Retrieved2022-04-25.Locals said that what exactly happened to make Novoazovsk headline news remains unclear, but military experts believe the Russian troops and military hardware may have moved north into rebel-held territory shortly after crossing the border. Some said they saw tanks and other military vehicles stationed about 10 miles outside the city, while others said they saw "green men" such as the ones who appeared in the Crimean Peninsula in late February.
^"Жодних російських нацменшин в Україні немає і не може бути – Стефанчук" (in Ukrainian). ТСН. 20 November 2023. Retrieved20 November 2023.... жодних російських нацменшин в Україні наразі не може бутию... Якщо цей народ не демонструє поваги, а навпаки - здійснює агресію проти України, то його права мають бути ущемлені в цій частині.
^Азаров виявився наполовину естонцем [Azarov, as it turns out, is half Estonian] (in Ukrainian).TSN. 6 October 2010.Archived from the original on 19 October 2013. Retrieved23 January 2012.
^Микола Азаров став прем’єр-міністром [Mykola Azarov became prime minister] (in Ukrainian). Gazeta.ua. 12 March 2010.Archived from the original on 9 August 2011. Retrieved31 August 2010.
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