Nuclear sharing is a concept inNATO and Russia's policies of nucleardeterrence, which allows member countries withoutnuclear weapons of their own to participate in the planning, training, and, in extremis, the use of nuclear weapons. In particular, it provides for involvement of thearmed forces of those countries in the nuclear sharing arrangements for delivering nuclear weapons in the event of the authorization for their use by the head of state of the nuclear possessor country.
As part of nuclear sharing, the participating countries carry out consultations and make common decisions on nuclear weapons policy, training, and deployment, and maintain technical equipment (notably nuclear-capable airplanes) required for the delivery of nuclear weapons. Some of these states also allow the nuclear weapon state to store nuclear weapons on their territory. In case of war, the United States publicly stated (and the negotiating parties agreed) that theNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would no longer be controlling.[1]
Country | Base | Estimated |
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![]() | Kleine Brogel | 20 |
![]() | Büchel | 20 |
![]() | Aviano | 20-30 |
Ghedi | 10-15 | |
![]() | Volkel | 20 |
![]() | Incirlik | 20 |
Of the three nuclear powers in NATO (France, theUnited Kingdom and theUnited States), only the United States is known to have provided weapons for nuclear sharing. However, the UK also deployed, stationed, or tested nuclear weapons on the territory of other states, and France tested nuclear weapons on the territory of Algeria, then a colony. The United States began moving weapons to Europe in 1954, first to the UK, and then to West Germany. The US negotiated agreements with the Allied countries where US nuclear weapons would be stored, including Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act, and a national stockpile agreement. It also negotiated additional agreements with France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, and the UK for the use of nuclear weapons stored and controlled by US forces in West Germany. These arrangements included delivery of short-range nuclear weapons - including landmines, rockets, and artillery, as well as nuclear armed depth charges and anti-aircraft missiles. The US also negotiated a separate agreement with Canada to provide nuclear-armed anti-air and anti-ship weapons to defend North America. The US deployed nuclear forces in Greenland (Danish territory) and Iceland - as well as extensively in the Pacific theater, but these were solely for delivery by US troops.[3]
As of November 2009[update],Belgium,Germany,Italy, theNetherlands andTurkey have been hostingU.S. nuclear weapons as part of NATO's nuclear sharing policy.[4][5]Canada hosted weapons under the control of theNorth American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), rather than NATO, until 1984, andGreece until 2001.[4][6][7] TheUnited Kingdom also received U.S.tactical nuclear weapons such asnuclear artillery andLance missiles until 1992, even though the UK is a nuclear-weapon state in its own right; these were mainly deployed inGermany.[8]
Inpeacetime, the nuclear weapons stored in non-nuclear countries are guarded byUnited States Air Force (USAF) personnel and previously, some nuclear artillery and missile systems were guarded byUnited States Army (USA) personnel; thePermissive Action Link codes required for arming them remain under American control. In case of war, the weapons are to be mounted on the participating countries' warplanes. The weapons are under custody and control ofUSAF Munitions Support Squadrons co-located on NATO main operating bases who work together with the host nation forces.[4]
As of 2021[update], 100 tacticalB61 nuclear bombs are believed to be deployed inEurope under the nuclear sharing arrangement.[2] The weapons are stored within a vault inhardened aircraft shelters, using the USAFWS3 Weapon Storage and Security System. The delivery warplanes used areGeneral Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons (F-16s) andPanavia Tornados.[9]
Historically, the shared nuclear weapon delivery systems were not restricted to bombs. Greece usedNike-Hercules Missiles as well asA-7 Corsair II attack aircraft. Canada hadBomarc nuclear-armed anti-aircraft missiles,Honest John surface-to-surface missiles and theAIR-2 Genie nuclear-armed air-to-air rocket, as well as tactical nuclear bombs for theCF-104 fighter.[10]PGM-19 Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles were shared with Italian air force units and Turkish units with U.S. dual key systems to enable the warheads.[11]PGM-17 Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles were forward deployed to the UK with RAF crews.[12] An extended version of nuclear sharing, the NATOMultilateral Force was a plan to equip NATO surface ships of the member states withUGM-27 Polaris missiles, but the UK ended up purchasing the Polaris missiles and using its own warheads, and the plan to equip NATO surface ships was abandoned.[13]After theSoviet Union collapsed, the nuclear weapon types shared within NATO were reduced to tactical nuclear bombs deployed by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA).[4] According to the press, Eastern European Member States of NATO have resisted the withdrawal of the shared nuclear bombs from Europe, fearing it would show a weakening of U.S. commitment to defend Europe againstRussia.[14]
In Italy, B61 bombs are stored at theGhedi Air Base and at theAviano Air Base. According to the former Italian PresidentFrancesco Cossiga, Italy's role in a planned retaliation consisted in striking with those nuclear weaponsCzechoslovakia andHungary had theWarsaw Pact waged nuclear war against NATO.[15][16] He acknowledged the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Italy, and speculated about the possible presence of British and French nuclear weapons.[17]
The only German nuclear base is located inBüchel Air Base, near the border with Luxembourg. The base has 11Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS) equipped with WS3 Vaults for storage of nuclear weapons, each with a maximum capacity of 44B61 nuclear bombs. There are 20 B61 bombs stored on the base for delivery by German PA-200Tornado IDS bombers of the JaBoG 33 squadron. Germany's Tornado IDS aircraft are due to be retired by the end of 2024; while 2010 and 2018 assessments questioned what nuclear sharing role, if any, Germany would then retain,[4][18] in 2020 Germany announced that it would buy 30Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to replace the Tornado in its nuclear sharing role.[19] The Super Hornet was not yet certified for the B61 bomb, but Dan Gillian, head of Boeing's Super Hornet program, had previously stated his optimism about achieving this certification in a timely manner.[20] In 2022, against the backdrop of theRussian invasion of Ukraine, the Super Hornet order was cancelled and Germany instead chose to order 35Lockheed Martin F-35 jets for nuclear sharing use.[21][22]
On 10 June 2013, former Dutch prime ministerRuud Lubbers confirmed the existence of 22 shared nuclear bombs atVolkel Air Base.[23] This was inadvertently confirmed again in June 2019 when a public draft report to theNATO Parliamentary Assembly was discovered to reference the existence of US nuclear weapons at Volkel, as well as locations in Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Turkey. A new version of the report was released on 11 July 2019 without reference to the locations of the weapons.[24]
In 2017 due to an increasingly unstable relationship between the United States and Turkey it was suggested that the United States consider removing 50 tactical nuclear weapons stored under American control at the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey.[25][26][27][28][29][30][31] The presence of US nuclear weapons in Turkey gained increased public attention in October 2019 with the deterioration of relations between the two nations after the Turkish military incursion into Syria.[32][33][34][35][36]
The Soviet Union practiced nuclear sharing with East Germany, as early as 1959,[37] and nuclear sharing arrangements similar to the NATO arrangements were also made with Hungary,[38] and Poland.[39] It is possible that similar arrangements were made with Bulgaria, but no sources have been found to date.
On 27 February 2022, shortly after the2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belarusians voted ina referendum to repeal the post-Soviet Constitutional prohibition on basing of nuclear weapons in Belarus.[40] At a meeting on 25 June 2022, Russian PresidentPutin and President of BelarusLukashenko agreed the deployment of Russian short-range nuclear-capable missiles.[41]
Russia supplied Belarus with nuclear-capableIskander-M missile systems in 2023,[42] with President Putin announcing the first delivery of warheads occurring as of 16 June 2023 in a speech at the St. Petersburg International Forum.[43] Additionally, Russia has completed modifications necessary for BelarusianSu-25 bombers to carry nuclear air-dropped bombs and the pilots have received training.[44] Belarus has reported full operation of the nuclear-capable Iskanders and Su-25s, and exercised their use with training nuclear warheads in May 2024.[45]
In 2022, after theRussian invasion of Ukraine, reports appeared about the possible inclusion ofPoland in the nuclear sharing policy, with presidentAndrzej Duda calling the country's lack of nuclear weapons a "problem" and saying that it was in talks with the United States about the possibility of nuclear sharing.[46] In June 2023, then-prime ministerMateusz Morawiecki declared Poland's interest in hosting nuclear weapons under the policy, citing the reported deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to its Kaliningrad region and Belarus, whileNational Security Bureau headJacek Siewiera said the country was interested in certifying its upcomingF-35A fleet as being capable of delivering B61 bombs.[47] In April 2024, president Duda said that Poland was "ready" to host nuclear weapons and had been discussing the matter with the United States government for "some time".[48] The current Polish prime minister,Donald Tusk, said that he wanted to speak with Duda to understand the intention behind the statement and that he wanted Poland to "be safe and well-armed, but [he] would also like any initiatives to be very well prepared by the people responsible for them and for all [Poles] to be convinced that this is what [they] want."[49] In May 2024, foreign ministerRadosław Sikorski accused president Duda of failing to consult with him on this and other major foreign policy announcements and said that he had "asked the president privately and publicly not to discuss such delicate and secret matters in public, because it [did] not help Poland"; he also said that theprevious Polish government had been told that the idea of Poland being involved with nuclear sharing was "not on the table".[50]
In March 2025, amid European concerns over whether the United States could continue to be relied on as an ally, the French presidentEmmanuel Macron said that his country would consider the possibility of extending the protection offered by itsnuclear arsenal to other European states. Both Macron and defence ministerSébastien Lecornu stressed that ultimate control over the weapons would be retained by France, and claims that the potential decision amounted to a plan for nuclear sharing were explicitly denied.[51][52]Friedrich Merz said that discussions on nuclear sharing should be held with France and Britain (which also has nuclear weapons) but warned that European weapons could only ever be a supplement to the existing American arrangement.[53] Andrzej Duda welcomed the potential extension of French nuclear deterrence to other European countries[54] while simultaneously renewing his call for American weapons to be based in Poland.[55][56]
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It is common belief among foreign officials thatSaudi Arabia andPakistan have an understanding in which Pakistan would supply Saudi Arabia with warheads if security in thePersian Gulf was threatened. A Western official toldThe Times that Saudi Arabia could have the nuclear warheads in a matter of days of approaching Pakistan. Pakistan's ambassador to Saudi Arabia,Muhammed Naeem Khan, was quoted as saying, "Pakistan considers the security of Saudi Arabia not just as a diplomatic or an internal matter but as a personal matter." Naeem also said that the Saudi leadership considered Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to be one country and that any threat to Saudi Arabia is also a threat to Pakistan.[57] Other vendors were also likely to enter into a bidding war if Riyadh indicated that it was seeking nuclear warheads. Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have denied the existence of any such agreement.[58] Western intelligence sources have toldThe Guardian that "the Saudi monarchy paid for up to 60% of the Pakistani nuclear programme, and in return has the option to buy a small nuclear arsenal ('five to six warheads') off the shelf".[59] Saudi Arabia has potential dual-purpose delivery infrastructure, includingTornado IDS andF-15S fighter bombers and improved ChineseCSS-2intermediate range ballistic missiles with accuracy sufficient for nuclear warheads but delivered with high explosive warheads.[60][61]
In November 2013, a variety of sources toldBBC Newsnight that Saudi Arabia was able to obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan at will. The new-report further stated, according to western experts, it was alleged that Pakistan's defense sector, including its missile and defense labs, had received plentiful financial assistance from Saudi Arabia.[62]Gary Samore, an adviser toBarack Obama, said, "I do think that the Saudis believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan."[63] Amos Yadlin, formerly head of Israeli military intelligence, said "They already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring."[63]
According to the US based think-tank, theCenter for Strategic and International Studies, the BBC report on possible nuclear sharing between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is partially incorrect. There is no indication of the validity or credibility of the BBC's sources, and the article fails to expand on what essentially constitutes an unverified lead. Furthermore, if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear warheads onto Saudi soil, it is highly unlikely that either nation would face any international repercussions if both nations were to follow strict nuclear sharing guidelines like those ofNATO.[64] A research paper produced by theBritish House of CommonsDefence Select Committee states that as long as current NATO nuclear sharing arrangements remain in place, the NATO states would have few valid grounds for complaint if such a transfer were to occur.[65]
Nuclear weapons |
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Background |
Nuclear-armed states |
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Some members of theNon-Aligned Movement have raised concerns about NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements and their compatability with the NPT, going so far as to accuse NATO allies of violating Article I of the NPTNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[66] In 2015, Russia accused the US of violating the NPT,[67] but since Russia resumed its own nuclear sharing arrangements, now with Belarus, it no longer makes this assertion. However, China accused the US of violating the NPT at a side event to the NPT review process in Geneva in July 2024.[68]
At the time the NPT was being negotiated, the NATO nuclear sharing agreements were well known and discussed publicly in the United Nations at the NPT negotiations in Geneva,[69] national parliaments,[70][71] NATO[72] and government press releases,[73] and in the news media.[74] The US and USSR discussed the wording of Articles I and II at length bilaterally and negotiated the wording to ensure that they were compatible with the NPT during an especially intense negotiation from 22-30 October 1966 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.[75] While some have erroneously claimed that such arrangements were secret or unknown, and that some signatories not have known about these agreements and interpretations at that time,[76] these claims have been thoroughly debunked.[77][78]
About 100 of these (versions −3 and −4) are thought to be deployed at six bases in five European countries: Aviano and Ghedi in Italy; Büchel in Germany; Incirlik in Turkey; Kleine Brogel in Belgium; and Volkel in the Netherlands. This number has declined since 2009 partly due to reduction of operational storage capacity at Aviano and Incirlik (Kristensen 2015, 2019c). ... Concerns were raised about the security of the nuclear weapons at the Incirlik base during the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016, and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee for Europe stated in September 2020 that "our presence, quite honestly, in Turkey is certainly threatened," and further noted that "we don't know what's going to happen to Incirlik" (Gehrke 2020). Despite rumors in late 2017 that the weapons had been "quietly removed" (Hammond 2017), reports in 2019 that US officials had reviewed emergency nuclear weapons evacuation plans (Sanger 2019) indicated that that there were still weapons present at the base. The numbers appear to have been reduced, however, from up to 50 to approximately 20.
Neither Super Hornet nor Typhoon is presently nuclear certified, which could lead to a pause in Germany's participation in the nuclear sharing deal. "We certainly think that we, working with the U.S. government, can meet the German requirements there on the [German's] timeline," [Dan] Gillian said regarding this issue.