Most recently he expanded his work on sentimentalism into aphilosophy of mind (book 2014). In his latest work he also stresses the importance of receptivity as a virtue, a value and as a psychological characteristic (article 2014 and book 2013). The significance of receptivity feature was first considered byNel Noddings in 1984, but did not receive further attention in the ethics of care neither was it used to criticize typical Western philosophical values. InThe Impossibility of Perfection, he argues against moral perfection as it was endorsed byAristotle and theEnlightenment and defends a more realistic view of moral issues.[citation needed]
"The Morality of Wealth" (1977) inWorld Hunger and Moral Obligation Prentice Hall
"Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgment: Outline of a Project" (2003) inMetaphilosophy 34(1/2), pp. 131–143; reprinted inMoral and Epistemic Virtues, Michael Brady & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), (Wiley-Blackwell, 2004).
"Moral Sentimentalism" (2004),Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 3–14.
"Moral Sentimentalism and Moral Psychology" (2005a) inThe Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, David Copp (ed.), Oxford University Press.
"The Dualism of the Ethical" (2005b),Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues, vol. 15, pp. 209–217.
'"The Virtue of Receptivity" (2014),Revue internationale de philosophie, vol. 68, pp. 7–19.
"Sentimentalist Virtue Epistemology: Beyond Responsibilism and Reliabilism" (2019). In Heather Battaly (ed.)Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, New York: Routledge: 105-114.
