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The term "illiberal democracy" describes agoverning system that hides its "nondemocratic practices behind formally democratic institutions and procedures".[1] There is a lack of consensus among experts about the exact definition of illiberal democracy, however, it may be used broadly to refer to the notion that some governments attempt to look like democracies while suppressing opposing views.[2] It has been described as the 21st century's vision offascism; loyal to electoral democracy but taking control of the state for purposes that are largely nationalistic, anti-minority, anti-freedom, and led by strong leaders and their associates.[3]
The rulers of an illiberal democracy may ignore or bypassconstitutional limits on their power.[4] While liberal democracies protect individual rights and freedoms, illiberal democracies do not.[5] Elections in an illiberal democracy are often manipulated or rigged, being used to legitimize and consolidate the incumbent rather than to choose the country's leaders and policies.[6] Illiberalism rejects rational discourse, instead promoting intolerance, fear of difference, the cult of force, discipline, and moral authority.[7] Illiberal constitutions are generallyanti-pluralist andanti-institutionalist.[8]
Scholars have criticized the claim that illiberal democracies are democracies, arguing that liberal principles and democracy cannot be separated and that without freedom of the press and speech, elections cannot truly be free and fair.[9] Other theorists say that classifying illiberal democracy as democratic is overly sympathetic to the illiberal regimes,[10] and therefore prefer terms such aselectoral authoritarianism,[11]competitive authoritarianism,[12] orsoft authoritarianism.[13][14]
Elements of illiberalism date back toPlato's embrace of an illberal social order,[7] with democracy viewed as inferior to monarchy and aristocracy.[15] Since antiquity, the terms liberal and illiberal lacked any connection with democracy and political government until theFrench Revolution, and were instead used to describe the noble or ignoble personal qualities of individuals. In the eighteenth century, liberal came to be viewed as character traits of an enlightened gentleman, associated with reasonableness, politeness, open-mindedness, and tolerance; whereas illberal was described as being ungenerous, mean, narrow-minded, bigoted, and offensive.[15] By the 20th century, liberalism was primary viewed in a European context, eventually becomingAmericanized and associated withliberal democracy. While totalitarian regimes during the 1930's and 40's criticized liberalism, they did not embrace the label of "illiberal democracy" partly due to its prior negative connotations, although anti-totalitarian critics soon came to use the term.[16]
The fall of theBerlin Wall in 1989 led toFrancis Fukuyama's influential bookThe End of History and the Last Man, announcing that the last "beacon of illiberal forces" in the world had been extinguished and that Western-style liberalism was ascendant through Americanization,liberalization, andglobalization.[17] The modern term and concept ofilliberal democracy derives from the 1995 bookTowards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia.[18] ChallengingFrancis Fukuyama's end-of-history thesis that political history was culminating in the global rule of capitalist liberal democracy, the book countered that Pacific Asia was not converging on liberal democracy but had instead taken an illiberal turn. Political philosopherDaniel A. Bell contributed a chapter on Confucianism as offering an alternative, illiberal approach to democracy.[citation needed]
The term illiberal democracy was then used and popularized byFareed Zakaria in a regularly cited 1997 article in the journalForeign Affairs.[19] According to Zakaria, illiberal democracies were "democratically elected regimes often re-elected or reinforced by referendums that ignored the constitutional limits of their power and deprived their citizens of basic rights and liberties."[9] Zakaria stated that in theWest, electoral democracy and civil liberties (of speech, religion, etc.) go hand in hand but that around the world, the two concepts were coming apart. According to Zakaria, democracy withoutconstitutional liberalism was producingcentralized regimes, the erosion of liberty, ethnic competition, conflict, and war. Recent scholarship has addressed why elections, institutions commonly associated withliberalism and freedom, have led to such negative outcomes in illiberal democracies.Hybrid regimes are political systems in which the mechanism for determining access to state office combines both democratic and autocratic practices. In hybrid regimes, freedoms exist and the opposition is allowed to legallycompete in elections, but the system ofchecks and balances becomes inoperative.[citation needed]
By the decade after theCold War, a rise in right-wing nationalist and populist parties began openly declaring themselves against liberal democracy. Beginning in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe, political scientistsIvan Krastev andStephen Holmes described the emergence of an "illiberal counter-revolution". Prime Minister ofHungary,Viktor Orbán, gave an oft-cited speech in 2014 where he proclaimed Hungary an illiberal democracy, stating that "a democracy does not necessarily have to be liberal" and that "the new state we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state." Modern advocates of illiberal democracy insist they are more democratic than others, and generally define themselves as being against liberal democracy,the West, and theUnited States.Vladimir Putin ofRussia is an outspoken critic of liberalism, with him and Orban described as re-defining it in ways that suit their agendas by equating it withmulticulturalism,immigration andLGBTQ rights.[20] The election ofDonald Trump saw a large increase in scholarly research about illiberalism, what it means, and if America is onthe road to fascism.[21]
Scholars have generally criticized the claim that illiberal democracies are democracies, arguing that liberal principles and democracy cannot be separated and that without freedom of the press and speech, elections cannot truly be free and fair.[9] According to juristAndrás Sajó, illiberal democracy should be counted as a type of democracy because it is "democratic in aplebiscitarian sense".[22][23] Other theorists say that classifying illiberal democracy as democratic is overly sympathetic to the illiberal regimes,[10][9] and therefore prefer terms such as electoral authoritarianism,[11] competitive authoritarianism,[12] or soft authoritarianism.[13][14]
There is a spectrum of illiberal democracies: from those that are nearlyliberal democracies to those that are almost openlydictatorships. One proposed method of determining whether a regime is an illiberal democracy is to determine whether "it has regular, free, fair, and competitive elections to fill the principal positions of power in the country, but it does not qualify as Free inFreedom House's annual ratings of civil liberties and political rights."[24] A 2008 article by Rocha Menocal, Fritz and Rakner describes the emergence of illiberal democracies and discusses some of their shared characteristics.[25] Rocha Menocal, Fritz, and Rakner try to draw the similarity between illiberal democracies andhybrid regimes. The authors make the case that the "democratic optimism" in the 1990s—following the collapse of the Soviet Union—has led to the emergence of hybrid regimes holding illiberal values. Initially, the Western powers assumed thatdemocratic consolidation would occur automatically and disregarded the alternatives. In reality, the non-consolidation of democracy has led to the rise of hybrid regimes that possess "illiberal values".[26]
Regime type is important for illiberal democracies. This is because illiberal democracies can rise from both consolidated liberal democracies and authoritarian states. Zakaria initially wrote his paper using the term illiberal democracy interchangeably with pseudo-autocracies but today they are used to describe countries that are potentiallydemocratically backsliding as well.[27][28]
According toMarlène Laruelle, there are "significant differences between illiberalism and conservatism" as it has been "traditionally understood".
The key element that dissociates illiberalism from conservatism is its relationship to political liberalism. Classical conservatives – such as the Christian Democrats in Europe or the Republican Party in the U.S. before Donald Trump – are/were fervent supporters of political rights and constitutionalism, while illiberalism challenges them. For classical conservatives, the political order is a reflection of the natural and family order, and therefore commands some submission to it. For illiberals, today’s political order is the enemy of the natural order and should be fought against.[29]
Author Jennifer Gandhi says that many autocrats allow elections in their governance to stabilize and reinforce their regimes. She first says that elections help leaders resolve threats from elites and from the masses by appeasing those capable of usurping power with money and securing the cooperation of the general public with political concessions.[30] Gandhi also claims that illiberal elections serve other useful purposes, such as providingautocrats with information about their citizens and establishinglegitimacy both domestically and in the international community, and that these varied functions must be elucidated in future research.[31] One example of the regime durability provided by illiberal democracy is illustrated inMubarak's Egyptian regime. Lisa Blaydes shows that under Mubarak's lengthy rule, elections provided a mechanism through which elites bought votes to support the government (through distributing needed goods and resources to the public) to acquire regime-enforcedparliamentary immunity. This enabled them to accumulate illicit wealth and draw from state resources without legal consequence.[32] Such research suggests that, given the stability-providing function of illiberal elections, states governed under illiberal democracies may have low prospects for a transition to a democratic system protected by constitutional liberties.[citation needed]
In order to discourage this problem and promote the development ofliberal democracies withfree and fair elections, Zakaria proposes that the international community and theUnited States must promote gradualliberalization of societies. Zakaria advances institutions like theWorld Trade Organization, theFederal Reserve System, and a check on power in the form of thejudiciary to promote democracy and limit the power of people which can be destructive.[19] Illiberal democratic governments may believe they have a mandate to act in any way they see fit as long as they hold regularelections. Lack of liberties such asfreedom of speech andfreedom of assembly make opposition extremely difficult. The rulers may centralize powers between branches of the central government and local government (exhibiting noseparation of powers).Media are often controlled by the state and strongly support the regime.[33]Non-governmental organizations may face onerous regulations or simply be prohibited. The regime may usered tape, economic pressure, imprisonment or violence against its critics. Zakaria believes thatconstitutional liberalism can bring democracy, but not vice versa.[citation needed]
With the different types and different examples of illustrations discussed, a key component in the rise of illiberal democracies today ispopulism. Current populist leaders—especially within Western states—have the tendency to promote illiberal values, a notable example being the exclusion of immigrants and openly xenophobic statements. This wave has been labeled as "xenophobic populism".[citation needed]
Authors Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser discuss the role of populism in deteriorating liberal democracies. Within the article, Mudde and Kaltwasser say that populism—although surrounded by negative connotations—is democratic in nature, as it gives a voice to the people and heavily follows the idea of majoritarian rule. The problem arises within liberal democracies, as the authors say that liberal values and democracy internally contradict each other. Democracy promises majoritarian rule while liberal values promise the protection of minorities.[34] Furthermore, it is said that populism is a product of democracy, but in general populist leaders try to use the democratic aspect of liberal democracies to undermine liberalism. This is closely related to Zakaria's argument. The authors try to establish the idea that the rise of populism is undermining liberal values as populism at its core rejects plurality and minority protection—often the evident liberal values.
Moreover,Sheri Berman supports that idea that democracy being unchecked by liberalism can lead to populist—and in some regards dangerous—rule, but further says that liberal values unchecked by democracy can be just as dangerous, as she says, through the use of historical examples, this can lead to oligarchic rule. Berman takes a different perspective on the role of populism and says that it is rather the weakening of democratic institutions that has led to the rise of populism and the deterioration of liberal democracies.[35] When discussing this matter, Berman through the example of Western states—United States and Europe—has attributed the cause of populist backlash to national government disregarding the interests of average citizens for business elites. In sum, Berman is trying to demonstrate that populism has led to the rise of illiberal democracies, while the populism has gained traction as a result in democratic institutions being too elite-led.[36]
While populism is closely associated with leading to illiberal democracy, religious fundamentalism, radical nationalism, and communitarianism are also common paths.[7]
In a 2014 speech, after winning re-election for the first time,Viktor Orbán,Prime Minister of Hungary described his views about the future ofHungary as an "illiberal state". In his interpretation the "illiberal state" does not reject the values of theliberal democracy, rather modernsocial liberalism,[37] calling itcorrupt andunfair and states that the country should work as a community. Orbán listedSingapore,Russia,Turkey, andChina as examples of economically "successful" nations, "none of which is liberal and some of which aren’t even democracies."[38][39]
In 1995 Slovak journalists coined the term "Democracy of the Carpathian type" to describe the illiberal democracy ofVladimír Mečiar's government in the 1990s. Today, the term is often used in connection with the policies ofRobert Fico's government, which has been criticised for censorship of criticism of government politicians in media,[40] abolition of the special prosecutor's office, politically motivated abolition of theRadio and Television of Slovakia bySlovak Television and Radio,[41] unjustified exchanges in various expert positions,[42] the cover-up of the accident of government politicianAndrej Danko,[43] etc. The previous cabinet of Robert Fico was accused of organisedcorruption and some politicians were directly or indirectly linked to the kidnapping of Vietnamese businessmanTrịnh Xuân Thanh[44] and to the assassination of investigative journalistJán Kuciak and his fiancée.[45]
Indian-American journalistFareed Zakaria claimed that India was the largest illiberal democracy in the world, in his bookThe Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad.[46]
In a 2015CNN reportage, Zakaria said thatTurkey underRecep Tayyip Erdoğan had become a textbook case of illiberal democracy.[47] Erik Meyersson observed that usingFreedom House’smeasure of liberty, Turkey took the last place among electoral democracies in 2015, scoring worse on the liberty measure than some countries that are not even considered electoral democracies.[48]
Since 2016, thePhilippines under presidentsRodrigo Duterte[49] andBongbong Marcos[50] has been described as being in an illiberal democracy. It has been described as a worldwide capital and stronghold of illiberalism culturally and politically.
In America, some academics have criticized American liberalism for not being liberal enough and living up to its professed values, with critics deriding this as "cancel culture" and a form of illiberalism. Other right-wing thinkers such asPatrick Deneen have openly criticized liberalism, instead arguing for replacing it with a new form of illiberal government.[51] TheRepublican Party has in recent years faced criticism that it is becoming increasingly illiberal under the leadership ofDonald Trump, who was electedpresident in 2016 and 2024.[52][53][54] According to a 2020 study by theV-Dem Institute, the Republican Party has become more illiberal and populist in the last decade with a large increase under the leadership of Donald Trump.[55][56] Trump's populist style of governance has been considered by some to be a dangerous risk to the heart of liberal democracy, as well as indifference towards traditional democratic allies and praising other "strongman rulers" in the world likePutin.[57]
Writers such asSteven Levitsky and Lucan Way reject the concept of an illiberal democracy, saying it only "muddies the waters" on the basis that if a country does not have opposition parties and an independent media, it is not democratic.[58] They say that terms like "illiberal democracy" are inappropriate for some of these states because the term implies that these regimes are at their heart democracies that have gone wrong. Levitsky and Way say that states such as theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia underSlobodan Milošević,Zimbabwe and post-SovietRussia were never truly democratic and not developing toward democracy, but were rather tending toward authoritarian behavior despite having elections, which were sometimes sharply contested. Thus, Levitsky and Way coined a new term to remove the positive connotation ofdemocracy from these states and distinguish them from flawed or developing democracies:competitive authoritarianism.[59]
According toWojciech Sadurski, "illiberal democracy is largely an oxymoron" in Poland underPrawo i Sprawiedliwość, because "[b]y dismantling various checks and balances, and the many democratic institutions related to elections and judicial review, the ruling party greatly weakens the democratic character of the state". Sadurski prefers the term "plebiscitarian authoritarianism".[60]
In 1998, author Marc Plattner said that democracy and liberalism have a turbulent relationship, where throughout history they constantly repel and attract one another. Plattner believes that the rise of illiberal democracies is merely part of a democratization cycle, where states democratizing will often shift from liberal to illiberal tendencies. From this, Plattner believes that through the careful assistance of consolidated democracies these 'illiberal democracies' can slowly push themselves out of this cycle.[61][needs update]
According to a study byGeorge Washington University political scientist Michael K. Miller, multiparty autocratic elections predict significantly better outcomes on health, education, gender equality, and basic freedoms relative to non-electoral autocracy. Effects on health and education are as strong as those of democracy and are significantly better than in non-electoral autocracy.[62]
In political theory, an illiberal democracy is defined as one that only pays attention to elections, while it violates, in the years between elections, some core democratic principles, especially freedom of expression
And so in this sense the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom, and I could list a few more, but it does not make this ideology the central element of state organisation, but instead includes a different, special, national approach.
Laruelle, Marlene (2022)."Illiberalism: A conceptual introduction".East European Politics.38 (2):303–327.doi:10.1080/21599165.2022.2037079.S2CID 247210327.
Thus, there is a real danger of 'pseudo-democracy', especially because elections can be manipulated and often are. In these cases, elections and other democratic institutions are simply adapted patterns of authoritarianism, not democracy in some imperfect form, having the dual purpose of legitimising the incumbent's rule and guarding it from any danger of democratic change.